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THE JUDGES OF THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
CHIEF JUDGE
STEPHANIE K. SEYMOUR
Judge Seymour was born in Battle
Creek, Michigan in 1940. She was graduated
magna cum laude from Smith College in
1962, and from Harvard Law School in
1965. After graduating from law school,
Judge Seymour practiced law in Boston, Mas-
sachusetts from 1965 until 1966, in Tulsa,
Oklahoma in 1967 and in Houston, Texas
from 1968 until 1969. From 1971 to 1979
she practiced with the Tulsa law firm of
Doerner, Stuart, Saunders, Daniel & Ander-
son. In 1979, she was appointed to the
United States Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit.
She is a member of Phi Beta Kappa and
the American and Oklahoma County Bar As-
sociations. Additionally, Judge Seymour
served as a bar examiner from 1973 through
1979; she served on the United States Judi-
cial Conference Committee on Defender
Services, 1985-87, and as chair, 1987-90.
JUDGE JAMES K. LOGAN
Judge Logan was born in Quenemo,
Kansas, in 1929. He received his B.A. from
the University of Kansas in 1952 and was
graduated magna cum laude from Harvard
Law School in 1955. He became law clerk
for United States Circuit Judge Walter
Huxman and subsequently practiced with
the Los Angeles law firm of Gibson, Dunn &
Crutcher. Judge Logan became a professor
at the University of Kansas Law School in
1957 and was selected in 1961 as Dean of
that school. He served in that capacity until
1968. Since 1961, Judge Logan has been a
visiting professor at Harvard Law School, the
University of Texas Law School, Stanford
University School of Law, and the University
of Michigan Law School. He lectures at
Duke University Law School. He was a spe-
cial commissioner for the United States Dis-
trict Court for the District of Kansas from
1964 until 1967 and was a candidate for the
United States Senate in 1968.
Judge Logan is a Rhodes Scholar, a
member of Phi Beta Kappa, Order of the
Coif, Beta Gamma Sigma, Omicron Delta
Kappa, Pi Sigma Alpha, Alpha Kappa Psi,
and Phi Delta Phi, and has co-authored
books and numerous articles on estate plan-
ning, administration and corporate law. In
1977, he was appointed to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.
JUDGE JOHN P. MOORE
Judge Moore was born in Denver, Colo-
rado in 1934. He received his B.A. from the
University of Denver in 1956 and received
his LL.B. from the University of Denver Col-
lege of Law in 1959. Judge Moore then prac-
ticed law with the Denver firm of Carbone &
Walsmith until 1962. From 1962 until 1975,
he worked in the Colorado Attorney Gen-
eral's Office. Specifically, Judge Moore
served as Assistant Attorney General from
1962 until 1967, as Deputy Attorney General
from 1967 to 1972, and as Attorney General
for the State of Colorado from 1972 until
1975.
In January, 1975, Judge Moore was ap-
pointed to the Bankruptcy Court of the
United States District Court for the District
of Colorado where he served until 1982.
Judge Moore was then appointed to the
United States District Court for the District
of Colorado. In 1985, he was appointed to




Judge Anderson was born in 1932. He
attended Eastern Oregon College from 1949
to 1951, and Brigham Young University from
1955 to 1956 when he graduated. Judge An-
derson then attended the University of Utah
College of Law where he received his LL.B.
degree in 1960. He was Editor in Chief of
the Utah Law Review, Order of the Coif, and
Phi Kappa Phi. He then served as a trial at-
torney in the tax division of the United
States Department of Justice until 1964.
Judge Anderson subsequently joined
the law firm of Ray, Quinney & Nebeker in
Salt Lake City, Utah in 1964 where he prac-
ticed until he was appointed to the United
States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
in 1985.
Judge Anderson has appeared as lead
counsel in federal courts in seventeen states,
and in the United States Supreme Court.
He has served as President and Commis-
sioner of the Utah State Bar. Additionally,
Judge Anderson has been a member of the
Utah Judicial Counsel and the Utah Judicial
Conduct Commission, and he has served as
Chairman of the Utah Law and Justice
Center Committee. Judge Anderson's civic
activities include lectures at the University of
Utah College of Law, member of the Execu-
tive Committee of the Salt Lake Area Cham-
ber of Commerce, and director of numerous
corporations. He is a Master of the Bench,
American Inn of Court Number VII.
JUDGE DEANELL R. TACHA
Judge Tacha grew up in Scandia,
Kansas. She received her BA in American
Studies from the University of Kansas in
1968 and was a member of Mortar Board
and Phi Beta Kappa. Judge Tacha then
attended law school and received her J.D.
from the University of Michigan in 1971.
In 1971, she was selected to be a White
House Fellow. During her year as a White
House Fellow, Judge Tacha was sent on
official trips to southeast Asia, east and
central Africa, and the European Economic
Community. After her fellowship, Judge
Tacha was an associate with the law firm of
Hogan and Hartson in Washington, D.C. In
1973, she returned to Kansas and entered
private practice in Concordia, Kansas.
Judge Tacha was appointed to the
faculty of the University of Kansas Law
School in 1974. In 1979, she became
associate Vice Chancellor of Academic
Affairs, and in 1981, she became the Vice
Chancellor for Academic Affairs.
Judge Tacha was appointed to the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the 10th Circuit in
1985.
JUDGE BOBBY R. BALDOCK
Judge Baldock was born in Rocky,
Oklahoma, in 1936, however, he grew up in
Hagerman and Roswell, New Mexico. Judge
Baldock attended the New Mexico Military
Institute, where he graduated in 1956. He
received his J.D. from the University of Ari-
zona College of Law in 1960.
From 1960 until 1983, Judge Baldock
practiced as a trial lawyer for the firm of
Sanders, Bruin & Baldock, P.A. In 1983, he
became a federal district judge in Albuquer-
que, New Mexico and was appointed to the
United States Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit in 1985. In 1988, Judge
Baldock received an Outstanding Judge
Award from the State Bar of New Mexico.
JUDGE WADE BRORBY
Judge Brorby was born May 23, 1934 in
Omaha, Nebraska. He was raised in Upton
and Newcastle, Wyoming. Judge Brorby at-
tended the University of Wyoming and re-
ceived a B.S. in Business. He graduated with
ai.D. with Honor from the University of Wy-
oming in 1958.
Judge Brorby served in the United
States Air Force from 1958 to 1961. He en-
gaged in the private practice of law in Gil-
lette, Wyoming from 1961 to 1988. Judge
Brorby was appointed to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in
1988.
Judge Brorby served on the Uniform
Laws Commission and was Chairman of the
Wyoming Judicial Supervisory Commission.
He has served on numerous Bar committees.
JUDGE DAVID M. EBEL
Judge Ebel was born in Wichita, Kansas
in 1940 and grew up in Topeka, Kansas. He
received his B.A. in economics from North-
western University in 1962 and received his
J.D. from the University of Michigan Law
School in 1965, where he graduated first in
his class. While at the University of Michi-
gan Law School, he was elected to the Order
of Coif, the Barrister Society, and he was Edi-
tor-in-Chief of the Michigan Law Review.
Judge Ebel then clerked for Justice By-
ron R. White of the United States Supreme
Court during the 1965-1966 term. From
1966 until 1988, he practiced as a trial lawyer
with the Denver law firm of Davis, Graham &
Stubbs. In 1988, Judge Ebel was appointed
to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit.
Judge Ebel's civic activities include
teaching Corporations as an adjunct profes-
sor at the University of Denver College of
Law, teaching Professionalism and Ethics at
Duke University School of Law, teaching the
confirmation class at the St. James Presbyte-
rian Church and participating in numerous
Bar Association activities. He has served as
vice-president of the Colorado Bar Associa-
tion and is a fellow of the American College
of Trial Lawyers, a senior judge of the Doyle
Inns of Court, and a member of the Town &
Gown Society.
JUDGE PAUL J. KELLY,
Judge Paul J. Kelly, Jr. was born in Free-
port, New York, in 1940. He received a
B.B.A. in Economics and Finance from the
University of Notre Dame in 1963 and his
J.D. from Fordham University School of Law
in 1967.
From 1968 to 1992, Judge Kelly en-
gaged in a general litigation practice with
the New Mexico law firm of Hinkle, Cox, Ea-
ton, Coffield & Hensley. Judge Kelly served
in the New Mexico House of Representatives
from 1977 to 1981.
Currently, Judge Kelly is a member of
the Board of Visitors of the Fordham Univer-
sity School of Law and serves as President of
the Northern New Mexico American Inn of
Court. Judge Kelly has been active in various
Bar activities. He has served on a New Mex-
ico Board of Bar Examiners, the New Mex-
ico Appellate Judges' Nominating
Commission, as a reviewing officer and
Hearing Committee chair for the Discipli-
nary Board of New Mexico Supreme Court,
as a member of the New Mexico Public De-
fender Board, the New Mexico State Person-
nel Board and as President of the Chaves
County Bar Association. Judge Kelly was ap-
pointed to the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Tenth Circuit in 1992.
JUDGE ROBERT H. HENRY
Judge Henry was born in Shawnee,
Oklahoma on April 3, 1953. He received his
B.A. in Political Science in 1974 and hisJ.D.
in 1977, both from the University of
Oklahoma.
After graduating from law school,Judge
Henry opened a private law practice in
Shawnee and served in the Oklahoma House
of Representatives for five terms. In 1986, at
the age of thirty-three, he was elected
Oklahoma Attorney General, running unop-
posed for re-election in 1990. In 1991, he
became Dean of the Oklahoma City Univer-
sity School of Law, where he taught in the
areas of state and local government law and
legislation.
Judge Henry served on numerous com-
mittees of the National Association of Attor-
neys General, including the Supreme Court
Committee, which he chaired, and the State
Constitutional Law Advisory Board. He is an
American Bar Foundation Fellow, a Commis-
sioner for Oklahoma on the National Con-
ference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws, and a member of the American Law
Institute. Judge Henry has also served on
numerous civic and educational boards in-
cluding the Oklahoma Nature Conservancy,
the Board of Visitors of the University of
Oklahoma Press, and the Western History
Collection of the University of Oklahoma.
He has received the Conservationist of the
Year Award from the Oklahoma Wildlife
Federation, the Human Rights Award from
the Oklahoma Human Rights Commission,
and is a member of Phi Beta Kappa.
Judge Henry was appointed to the
United States Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit in 1994.
SENIOR JUDGE
MONROE G. MCKAY
Judge McKay was born in Huntsville,
Utah, in 1929. He graduated from Brigham
Young University in 1957 with high honors.
Judge McKay then received hisJ.D. from the
University of Chicago in 1960 and was the
law clerk for Justice Jesse A. Udall of the Ari-
zona Supreme Court for the 1960-61 term.
From 1961 to 1974, Judge McKay practiced
with the law firm of Lewis and Roca in Phoe-
nix, Arizona; however, he did take a two year
leave to serve as Director of the United
States Peace Corps in Malawi, Africa. Judge
McKay was a law professor at Brigham Young
University from 1974 until 1977. In 1977, he
was appointed to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit Judge McKay
currently resides in Provo, Utah.
SENIOR JUDGE OLIVER SETH
Judge Seth was born in 1915 and grew
up in Santa Fe, New Mexico. He received
his A.B. degree from Stanford University in
1937 and his LL.B. from Yale University in
1940. During World War II he served as a
Major in the U.S. Army and was decorated
with the Croix de Guerre. In 1962, he was
appointed to the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Tenth Circuit. He served as
Chief Judge from 1977 until 1984. In 1984,
Judge Seth assumed senior status.
Judge Seth has served as director of the
Santa Fe National Bank, chairman of the
Legal Committee of the New Mexico Cat-
tlegrowers' Association, Regent of the Mu-
seum of New Mexico and as a director of the
Santa Fe Boy's Club.
SENIOR JUDGE
WILLIAM J. HOLLOWAY, JR.
The son of a former Oklahoma gover-
nor, Judge Holloway was born in Hugo,
Oklahoma in 1923 and later moved to
Oklahoma City in 1927. During World War
II, he served as a First Lieutenant in the
Army. After the war, Judge Holloway re-
turned to complete his undergraduate stud-
ies at the University of Oklahoma, receiving
his B.A. in 1947. Judge Holloway then at-
tended Harvard Law School, where he grad-
uated in 1950.
In 1951 and 1952, Judge Holloway was
an attorney with the Department of Justice
in Washington, D.C. He subsequently re-
turned to Oklahoma City and entered pri-
vate practice. Judge Holloway was appointed
to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit in 1968 and became Chief
Judge in 1984. He is a member of Phi Beta
Kappa and Phi Gamma Delta.
SENIOR JUDGE
ROBERT H. MCWILLIAMS
Judge McWilliams was born in Salina,
Kansas, in 1916 and moved to Denver in
1927 where he has lived since. He received
his A.B. and LL.B. degrees from the Univer-
sity of Denver. In 1971, he was awarded an
Honorary Doctor of Law degree from the
University.
During World War II, Judge McWilliams
served in the United States Army and was
with the Office of Strategic Services. He has
served as a Deputy District Attorney and as a
Colorado District Court Judge. In 1961,
Judge McWilliams was elected to the Colo-
rado Supreme Court where he served until
he was appointed to the United States Court
of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in 1970. In
1984, he assumed senior status.
Judge McWilliams is a member of Phi
Beta Kappa, Omicron Delta Kappa, Phi
Delta Phi, and Kappa Sigma.
SENIOR JUDGE
JAMES E. BARRETT
Judge Barrett was born in Lusk, Wyo-
ming in 1922. He is the son of the late
Frank A. Barrett, who served as Wyoming's
Congressman, Governor and United States
Senator. Judge Barrett attended the Univer-
sity of Wyoming for two years prior to his ser-
vice in the Army during World War II.
Following the war, he attended Saint Cathe-
rine's College at Oxford University and
Catholic University of America and received
his LL.B. from the University of Wyoming
Law School in 1949. In 1973, he received
the Distinguished Alumni Award from the
University of Wyoming.
Judge Barrett was in private practice in
Lusk, Wyoming for eighteen years. He also
served as County and Prosecuting Attorney
for Niobrara County, Town Attorney for the
towns of Lusk and Manville and attorney for
the Niobrara County Consolidated School
District. From 1967 until 1971, Judge Bar-
rett served as Attorney General for the State
of Wyoming. In 1971, he was appointed to
the United States Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit. In 1987, he assumed senior
status.
Judge Barrett was a member of theJudi-
cial Conference Subcommittee on Federal
Jurisdiction, the United States Foreign Intel-
ligence Surveillance Court of Review, and
was a trustee of Saint Joseph's Children's
Home.
L.E v WEISAINAND THE MAJORITARIAN IMPLICATIONS OF
ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE
INTRODUCTION
The Establishment Clause of the First Amendment of the Constitu-
tion provides that "Congress shall make no law respecting an establish-
ment of religion."' In recent years, the Court has consistently applied the
three prong test from Lemon v. Kurtzman2 to determine whether a certain
government action violates the Clause. In 1992, however, the Court devi-
ated from these set principles in Lee v. Weisman.3 The Court, while admit-
ting that Establishment Clause analysis is fact-specific, 4 seemingly
abandoned the three-prong Lemon test and adopted a new coercion
standard.
5
The Court found that an invocation and benediction at a high school
graduation ceremony violated the Establishment Clause. By using a
stricter coercion test, however, the Court made violations of the Establish-
ment Clause more difficult to prove. Therefore, governmental actions
that would not pass muster under more reasonable tests are now valid sim-
ply because they lack a coercive element.
This Note examines the recent decision in Lee.6 Part I explores the
background of Establishment Clause jurisprudence and addresses the con-
flict between the First and Sixth Circuits on the proper application of the
Clause to prayer at high school graduation ceremonies. Part I1 discusses
the facts of Lee and the reasoning underlying the Court's decision. Part III
analyzes the case and addresses the future implications of the decision in
light of recent federal circuit and district court cases. The Note concludes
that the Court's adoption of a coercion standard fails to give the broad
protection the Establishment Clause meant to provide. By not aggressively
enforcing the Clause, the Court furthers majoritarian tyranny and aban-
dons its role as protector of minority interests.
I. BACKGROUND
A. The Framers' Intent
The Supreme Court has considered analysis of the history of the Con-
stitution to be essential to a proper understanding of the two religion
1. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
2. 403 U.S. 602 (1971). The test provides that "[flirst, the statute must have a secular
legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances
nor inhibits religion; finally, the statute must not foster an excessive government entangle-
ment with religion." Id. at 612-13 (citations omitted).
3. Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649 (1992).
4. Id. at 2661.
5. See id. at 2655.
6. 112 S. Ct. 2649 (1992).
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clauses-the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause. 7 Histori-
cal considerations have led the Court to assume the role of Constitutional
historian.8 While this type of inquiry is not determinative, 9 because the
Framers could not have foreseen many of today's problems,1 0 it does give
a general understanding of the intent behind the Establishment Clause.
This understanding helps formulate a proper application of the Clause to
today's issues.
Three general philosophies surrounded the enactment of the Estab-
lishment Clause of the First Amendment.1 1 The first view, associated with
Roger Williams, was the evangelical view. 12 This view believed that
"worldly corruptions . ..might consume the churches if sturdy fences
against the wilderness were not maintained."1 3 The second view, promul-
gated by Thomas Jefferson, argued that the church should be separated
from the state to protect secular interests "against ecclesiastical depreda-
tions and incursions.1 4 The third view, advanced by James Madison,
urged that both religion and the state would be furthered if religious
power were decentralized so as to avoid domination of one religion over
another.15
Roger Williams saw the religion clauses as a means to protect the
church. Jefferson, however, argued the clauses were to protect the state.
He demanded that there be a "wall of separation between church and
state.' 6 Madison believed that both religion and the state could better
flourish if each were free to pursue its own goals without the other's en-
croaching influence.1 7 To achieve this end Madison argued that religion
and government would best be protected from each other "by an entire
abstinence [sic] of the Government from interference [with religion] in any
way whatever."
18
While these views seem to overlap in some areas, the Supreme Court
has distilled these philosophies into three generally accepted conclu-
sions.' 9 First, historical inquiry is relevant in determining the meaning of
7. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 33 (1947) (Rutledge,J., dissenting) (recogniz-
ing that "[n]o provision of the Constitution is more closely tied to or given content by its
generating history than the religious clause of the First Amendment").
8. For a general discussion of the Court's use of history see CHARLES A. MILLER, THE
SUPREME COURT AND THE USES OF HISTORY (1969).
9. School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 237 (1963) (Brennan,J., concurring) (assert-
ing that "too literal a quest for the advice of the Founding Fathers" is usually inconclusive).
10. Id. at 237-38.
11. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 14-3, at 816 (1st ed. 1978).
12. Id.; see also MARK DEWoLFE HoWE, THE GARDEN AND THE WILDERNESS 6 (1965) (dis-
cussing Roger Williams' view of separation between church and state).
13. TRIBE, supra note 11, § 14-3, at 816; HowE, supra note 12, at 6.
14. TRIBE, supra note 11, § 14-3, at 816; HowE, supra note 12, at 2.
15. TRIBE, supra note 11, § 14-3, at 816; see also Robert C. Casad, The Establishment Clause
and the Ecumenical Movement, 62 MICH. L. REv. 419, 421 (1964) (discussing Madison's view that
the first amendment was designed to "promote a multiplicity of sects").
16. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947) (quoting Reynolds v. United States,
98 U.S. 145, 164 (1879)).
17. TRIBE, supra note 11, § 14-3, at 817.
18. Id.; IX THE WRITINGS OFJAMES MADISON 487 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1910).
19. TRIBE, supra note 11, § 14-3, at 817.
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the religion clauses; second, because the views of Madison and Jefferson
spawned the religion clauses they are necessary to a proper interpretation;
and, third, the Court believes that any connection between church and
state leads to social and political disharmony.20 While the accuracy of the
Court's view of history has been debated both on and off the Court,2 1 this
version has been generally accepted. 22 These conclusions have given rise
to two fundamental principles that drive the Court's analysis of the First
Amendment: separatism and voluntarism.
21
The concept of voluntarism may seem to support a coercion element
of the Establishment Clause. However, the idea attaches to the Free Exer-
cise Clause.2 4 Any compulsory recitation of religious beliefs necessarily
violates the religious freedoms of that clause. 25 The separatist view,
promulgated by Madison, more easily suits itself to the Establishment
Clause. This philosophy demands more than official separation of church
and state. Government behavior should not become enmeshed in religion
at any level.
26
Madison's view of separation embraced a philosophy not of coercion
but of exclusion. 2 7 Under this inquiry government actions violate the Es-
tablishment Clause when citizens in the religious minority have an inferior
status in society because of their beliefs. By keeping church and state com-
pletely separate, an individual's position in society is never compromised
because of his or her religious leanings. The Framers understood the ba-
sic psychological principle that effective democracy would be handicapped
20. Id. at 817-8; see also Everson, 330 U.S. at 1-18. For a discussion of the development of
the theory see the majority opinions of Justice Black in McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S.
203 (1948), Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961), and Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421
(1962).
21. See, e.g., Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 92 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("It is
impossible to build sound constitutional doctrine upon a mistaken understanding of consti-
tutional history.. . ."); ROBERT L. CORD, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE: HIsToPicAL FACT
AND CURRENT FICTION 1-58 (1982); Michael W. McConnell, Coercion: The Lost Element of Estab-
lishment, 27 WM & MARY L. REv. 933, 933 (1986).
22. TRIBE, supra note 11, § 14-3, at 818; see, e.g., Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious
Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 770 (1973); Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 103-04 (1968);
School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 214 (1963); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 437-
43 (1961).
23. TRIBE, supra note 11, § 14-3, at 818.
24. See id.; see alsojames Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assess-
ments, in 5 THE FOUNDERS' CONsTrruTION 82, 84 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds.,
1987) (discussing one's right to free exercise of religion).
25. See Douglas Laycock, "Nonpreferential" Aid to Religion: A False Claim about Original In-
tent, 27 WM & MARY L. REv. 875, 922 (1986) (claiming "[i]f coercion is... an element of the
establishment clause, establishment adds nothing to free exercise").
26. See TRIBE, supra note 11, § 14-3, at 819. But see CORD, supra note 21, at 5 (espousing
separation of church and state only to the extent that would leave the states free to decide
"the matter of religious establishments or disestablishment").
27. Referring to a bill which would have allowed the collection of taxes to be used for
religious teachers, Madison stated:
It degrades from the equal rank of Citizens all those whose opinions in Religion do
not bend to those of the Legislative authority. Distant as it may be in its present
form from the Inquisition, it differs from it only in degree. The one is the first step,
the other the last in the career of intolerance.
James Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments, in 5 THE FOUN-
DERS' CONsTrrTrION 82, 83 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987).
1994]
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if some citizens felt excluded from society-no matter that the govern-
ment behavior may be entirely noncoercive.
28
The Framers intended a broad reading of the Establishment Clause.
29
Madison's view probably exceeded the Court's present interpretation of
the clause. He was against public funding for chaplains in either the mili-
tary or the legislature.3 0 Both of these practices have since been held con-
stitutional.3 1 Thomas Jefferson, while President, would not give
Thanksgiving Day proclamations partly because he believed they impli-
cated the religion clauses.3 2 If Jefferson disapproved of these essentially
noncoercive governmental acts, then it is logical to assume that he would
have disapproved of any state certification of religion.3 3 To Jefferson the
Establishment Clause proscribed "not simply state coercion, but also state
endorsement, of religious belief and observance."3 4 This view supports an
interpretation of the Establishment Clause that is based on exclusion.
While the debate over the Establishment Clause rages on,3 5 there is
enough evidence to support the proposition that the clause should be in-
terpreted broadly. Such a construction furthers the Framers' intent that
state endorsement of religion violates the clause regardless of whether the
governmental behavior is coercive. Nothing in history is so compelling to
demand a reevaluation of the clause3 6 where coercion takes on a disposi-
tive role.
28. See Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649, 2666 n.10 (1992) (quoting SIGMUND FREUD,
GROUP PSYCHOLOGY AND THE ANALYSIS OF THE EGO 51 (1922) ("[A] religion, even if it calls
itself the religion of love, must be hard and unloving to those who do not belong to it.").
29. Lee, 112 S. Ct. at 2672 (Souter, J., concurring).
30. James Madison, Detached Memoranda, in 5 THE FOUNDERS' CONSTrrrUON 103, 104
(Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987).
31. See Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983) (allowing legislative chaplains does not
violate the Establishment Clause); Katcoff v. Marsh. 755 F.2d 223 (2d Cir. 1985) (allowing
military chaplains does not violate the Establishment Clause).
32. See Thomas Jefferson, Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Rev. Samuel Miller, in 5 THE
FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION 98, 98-99 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987).
33. Lee, 112 S. Ct. at 2674 (Souter, J., concurring).
34. Id.
35. A substantial debate exists on whether the Establishment Clause allows "nonprefer-
ential" aid. See LEONARD W. LEvy, THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE 89, 111-14 (1986) (arguing
against nonpreferential aid but claiming the Framers did not recognize a difference between
preferential aid and non-preferential aid); Laycock, supra note 25, at 902-13 (arguing against
nonpreferential aid and believing the Framers knew the difference between nonpreferential
and preferential aid). But see Wallace v. Jaffree, 4'72 U.S. 38, 103 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dis-
senting) (arguing that through the use of a treaty provision allowing public funding of a
priest and church for Indians the Establishment Clause allows nonpreferential aid); THOMAS
J. CURRY, THE FIRST FREEDOMS: CHURCH AND STATE IN AMERICA TO THE PASSAGE OF THE FIRST
AMENDMENT 207-15 (1986) (advancing the view that the Framers intended to allow nonpref-
erential aid although they did not know the difference between nonpreferential and prefer-
ential aid).




The Court first applied Establishment Clause analysis to a state law
3 7
in Everson v. Board of Education.3 8 This case incorporated the Establish-
ment Clause into the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
making it applicable to the states.3 9 The Court considered a New Jersey
statute that provided for reimbursement of funds spent by parents for pub-
lic transportation of their children to private-including parochial-
schools. 40 In deciding the statute did not violate the First Amendment,
4 1
the Court enunciated a fundamental principle of the Establishment
Clause. Government, be it state or federal, may not aid one religion, all
religions, or prefer one religion over another through its laws.
42
While the Court gave specific examples of prohibited government be-
havior,4 3 the opinions show the policies that drive the religion clauses gen-
erally and the Establishment Clause specifically. The religion clauses work
together to create a single profound freedom. 44 The reason for the Estab-
lishment Clause was to further this freedom by causing a complete separa-
tion between religion and the state by "comprehensively forbidding every
form of public aid or support for religion."45 The Court's focus on "sup-
port" or "aid" to religion was a necessarily broader interpretation of the
clause than a strict coercion analysis.
In the late forties and early fifties, the Court decided two cases involv-
ing religion in public schools. In Illinois ex. rel. McCollum v. Board of Educa-
tion,46 the Court dealt with a system whereby a tax-supported public school
allowed private-sector teachers to teach courses in religion. 47 Although
the classes were voluntary, students who chose not to attend were required
to go to another part of the school to study secular topics. 48 At that time
Illinois had a compulsory education law that required children to attend
school while it was in session. 4 9 Here the Court applied a coercion analy-
sis because Illinois's compulsory education law aided the religious educa-
tion program.50 Students "compelled by law" to attend school were set
free from their legal obligation if they would attend religious classes.
5 1
37. There are some earlier cases regarding the Establishment Clause that dealt with fed-
eral laws. See, e.g., Bradfield v. Roberts, 175 U.S. 291 (1899) (building a hospital with public
funds did not violate the Establishment Clause despite the fact that Catholic nuns would run
it); Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333 (1890) (applying the Clause to federal bigamy laws); Reyn-
olds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1879) (accepting Jefferson's concept that the Establish-
ment Clause constituted "a wall of separation between church and state").
38. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
39. Id. at 14-15.
40. Id. at 3.
41. Id. at 8-18.
42. Id. at 15.
43. See id. at 15-16.
44. See id. at 40 (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
45. Id. at 32 (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
46. 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
47. Id. at 207.
48. Id. at 209.
49. Id. at 205.
50. Id. at 209.
51. Id. at 209-10.
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The Court found this practice unconstitutional because Illinois's compul-
sory education system provided the religion classes with their students.
5 2
In Zorach v. Clauson,53 the Court considered a program similar to the
one in McCollum The New York City program allowed public school stu-
dents to be released from school to receive religious education. 54 The
instruction took place outside of public school classrooms and did not
involve public spending.5 5 The Court found that the program was neu-
tral5 6 toward religion and, therefore, not coercive.5 7 In the Court's view a
contrary holding would not further the accommodation of religion al-
lowed by the First Amendment.58 Zorach differs from McCollum because
the New York program merely accommodated religion; the Illinois law, by
providing classrooms, actually aided religion. Until Lee59 these two cases
were the only examples where the Supreme Court based Establishment
Clause determinations upon the question of coercion.
The Court examined the constitutionality of prayer in public schools
for the first time in Engel v. Vitale.60 The Board of Education for New
Hyde Park, New York directed the school district's principal to have a
prayer read at the beginning of the school day.61 Although the prayer was
nonsectarian and participation was voluntary, the Court held the practice
violated the Establishment Clause.6 2 The majority opinion made clear the
principle that a showing of coercion was unnecessary to make an Establish-
ment Clause claim. 63 A coercion inquiry attaches to a Free Exercise
Clause analysis. 64 While recognizing that coercion may be involved in an
Establishment Clause violation, the Court stated that the Clause's protec-
tions encompass more than that.65 It recognized the Madisonian view that
religion and government are afforded greater prosperity when their affairs
52. See id. at 212.
53. 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
54. Id. at 308.
55. Id. at 308-09.
56. The Court has decided other cases using the neutrality principle as the legitimate
opposite of coercion. See, e.g., Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981) (holding that the
Establishment Clause was violated because the state university permitted non-religious
groups to use its facilities while banning religious groups from using them). In response to
the Widmar decision, Congress passed The Equal Access Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 4071-74 (1988).
Under that Act, high schools receiving federal funding must allow religious groups to have
meetings outside of school hours if other groups have the same rights. Id. § 4071 (a)-(c).
The meetings must be "voluntary," "student-initiated," and done without "sponsorship... by
the school." Id. § 4071 (c)(1)-(2).
57. Zorach, 343 U.S. at 314 (1952).
58. See id. (reasoning that a contrary holding "would be preferring those who believe in
no religion over those who do believe").
59. 112 S. Ct. 2649 (1992).
60. 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
61. Id. at 422.
62. Id. at 430.
63. Id. (noting that "[t]he Establishment Clause, unlike the Free Exercise Clause, does
not depend upon any showing of direct governmental compulsion and is violated by the
enactment of laws which establish an official religion whether those laws operate directly to
coerce nonobserving individuals or not").
64. Id.
65. Id. at 431.
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are kept separate. 66 This case firmly stands for the proposition that coer-
cion is an unnecessary element to an Establishment Clause claim.
67
One year later the Court revisited the school prayer arena in School
District of Abington v. Schempp.68 Students began the school day with the
reading of ten verses of the Bible and a recitation of the Lord's prayer.
69
The Court summarized the test for an Establishment Clause violation as it
stood at that time: the purpose and the primary effect of the state action
must not advance or inhibit religion. 70 Because the prayer and Bible read-
ing equated to a state-sponsored religious ceremony, the Court held that
the primary effect was the advancement of religion that violated the Estab-
lishment Clause. 7 1 Also, the Court specifically stated that coercion is not
an element to an Establishment Clause claim. 7
2 In the context of school 73
prayer,74 Engel and Schempp are especially persuasive.
The test for a violation of the Establishment Clause became en-
trenched in Lemon v. Kurtzman.75 The Court considered a Pennsylvania
statute that funded nonpublic schools by reimbursing them for educa-
tional expenses, and a Rhode Island statute that gave nonpublic school
teachers a supplement equal to 15% of their annual salary.7 6 Both statutes
aided educational institutions associated with religion and were found un-
constitutional. 77 The Court settled on a three prong test:78 (1) the statute
in question must have a secular purpose; (2) the primary effect must not
advance or inhibit religion; and (3) the government must not become en-
tangled in religion. 79 If a statute or practice fails any one of these prongs,
66. Id. at 431 n.13.
67. But see McConnell, supra note 21, at 934-35 (arguing that the Court ignored prece-
dent, offered no explanation for its negation of a coercion element, and found the prayer
coercive anyway).
68. 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
69. Id. at 207.
70. Id. at 222.
71. Id. at 223-24.
72. Id. at 223 (recognizing a distinction between the clauses: "a violation of the Free
Exercise Clause is predicated on coercion while the Establishment Clause violation need not
be so attended").
73. The Court has considered Establishment Clause claims regarding the nature of the
curriculum in public schools. See, e.g., Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987) (holding
unconstitutional a Louisiana statute that provided creationism be taught as well as evolution
because the statute was enacted solely for religious purposes); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S.
97 (1968) (holding that the Arkansas law preventing the teaching of evolution violated the
Establishment Clause because it aided religion).
74. The Court has also held "moment of silence" statutes unconstitutional even though
no coercion was involved. See, e.g., Wallace v.Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985) (holding unconstitu-
tional an Alabama statute which called for a one minute peiord of silence beginning each
school day for voluntary prayer or meditation). Many states, however, still have moment of
silence statutes on the books. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 233.062 (West 1989); GA. CODE ANN.
§ 20-2-1050 (1992); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 105 para. 20/1 (Smith-Hurd 1993); INn. CODE ANN
§ 20-10.1-7-11 (Bums 1991); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 72-5308a (1992); TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-6-
1004 (1990).
75. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
76. Id. at 606-07.
77. Id. at 607.
78. Id. at 612-13.
79. Id. The entanglement prong was first promulgated in Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S.
664, 674 (1970).
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then it is unconstitutional. Of the thirty-one Establishment Clause cases
decided since Lemon, the Court has failed to use this test only once.
8 0
The case that did not rely upon the Lemon standards was Marsh v.
Chambers8 l. A chaplain, publicly financed, commenced each session of the
Nebraska Legislature with a prayer.8 2 The Court found this practice to be
constitutional. The Court relied on "history and tradition" in making its
finding.83 Combining this analysis with a neutrality test, the practice was
upheld because it was "nonsectarian," "nonproseltyzing," and did not pre-
fer one religion over another.8 4 The Court was persuaded by the fact
"civil" invocations are used extensively in this country by many public insti-
tutions.8 5 The Court also noted that there was less chance for coercion in
legislative prayer than in school prayer.8 6 Placed in proper perspective
this case is one narrow deviation in a long line of Supreme Court
precedent.
8 7
C. The Split in the Circuits
The Marsh decision created a split in the circuits. In Stein v. Plainwell
Community Schools,8 8 the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit relied on
Marsh and found that public school graduation prayers are not necessarily
unconstitutional.8 9 The court held that graduation prayers are unlike
classroom prayers but similar to the legislative and judicial prayers dis-
cussed in Marsh.90 The court also noted that graduation prayers offer less
chance for coercion than classroom prayers.9 1 While holding that gradua-
tion prayers were not necessarily proscribed by the First Amendment, the
80. Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649, 2663 n.4 (1992) (Blackmun, J., concurring). The
last Establishment Clause decision before Lee occurred in 1990. See Board of Educ. v.
Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 248-253 (1990) (plurality opinion) (analyzing the Equal Access Act
with the Lemon test). For authority that the Court may be interested in a test that asks
whether the government has endorsed religion, see Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S.
1, 16-17 (1989) (plurality opinion).
81. 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
82. Id. at 784.
83. Id. at 786.
84. Id. at 793 n.14.
85. Id. For a detailed discussion of the nature of civil religion see Yehudah Mirsky, Note,
Civil Religion and the Establishment Clause, 95 YALE L.J. 1237 (1986).
86. Marsh, 463 U.S. at 792.
87. Although this opinion is flawed for various reasons, the coercion aspect is contra-
dicted by precedent. See, e.g., County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 593 (1989) (public
schools may not "convey a message that religion or a particular religious belief is favored or
preferred"); School Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 397 (1985) (state system of sending public
school teachers to parochial schools to teach secular subjects struck down despite lack of
coercion because it threatened to express state support for religion); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472
U.S. 38, 72 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment) (reasoning that "[t]he decisions
in-[Engel and Schempp] acknowledged the coercion implicit under the statutory schemes, but
they expressly turned only on the fact that the government was sponsoring a manifestly reli-
gious exercise"); Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 786
(1973) (asserting that "proof of coercion ... [is] not a necessary element of any claim under
the Establishment Clause").
88. 822 F.2d 1406 (6th Cir. 1987).
89. Id. at 1408-09.




court held the specific prayers at issue to be unconstitutional because of
their sectarian nature.
92
In Weisman v. LeP the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit rejected
the Stein court's reasoning.9 4 This holding put the First Circuit in direct
conflict with the Sixth Circuit as to the scope of Marsh and the constitu-
tionality of public school graduation prayers.
The split in the circuits set the stage for the Supreme Court's decision
in Lee v. Weisman.95 Since the adoption of the coercion test in Lee, a fed-
eral circuit court96 and a recent federal district court97 have each allowed
graduation prayers, basing their decision on the new test. These cases il-
lustrate the flaws of the coercion test.
II. INSTANT CASE
A. Facts
Before Lee, principals in the Providence, Rhode Island school system
were allowed to ask members of the clergy to offer invocation and bene-
diction prayers at the graduation ceremonies of middle and high school
students.98 In 1989, principal Robert E. Lee asked a rabbi to offer the
invocation and benediction at the graduation ceremony at Nathan Bishop
Middle School. Principal Lee provided the rabbi with a pamphlet entitled
"Guidelines for Civic Occasions." 99 The pamphlet recommended a style
of prayer that would reflect the sensitive nature of nonsectarian public
ceremonies. Along with the pamphlet the principal told the rabbi that the
prayers should be nonsectarian. 100
Prior to the ceremony Daniel Weisman, acting for himself and his
daughter Deborah, sought a temporary restraining order in federal district
court to prevent the inclusion of prayers at the graduation ceremony.
10 1
The court denied the motion. 10 2 On June 29, 1989, Deborah attended
her graduation accompanied by her family.10 3 Attendance at the cere-
mony was voluntary. 10 4 The prayers were said; they lasted not more than
two minutes.' 0 5 Daniel Weisman then filed an amended complaint seek-
92. Id. at 1410 (noting "[t]hey employ the language of Christian theology and prayer").
93. 908 F.2d 1090 (lst Cir. 1990), aff'd, 112 S. Ct. 2649 (1992).
94. Id. at 1096-97; see infra text accompanying notes 111-17.
95. 112 S. Ct. 2649 (1992).
96. Jones v. Clear Creek Indep. Sch. Dist., 977 F.2d 963 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113
S. Ct. 2950 (1993).
97. Harris v. Joint Sch. Dist., 821 F. Supp. 638 (D. Idaho 1993).
98. Lee, 112 S. Ct. at 2652.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 2653-54.
102. Id. at 2654.
103. Id. at 2653-54.
104. Id. at 2653.
105. Id. at 2653-54. For the complete language of the prayer see id. at 2652-53.
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ing a permanent injunction to prevent school officials of the Providence
public school system from including prayers at future graduations.
10 6
B. Lower Court Rulings
The district court granted the permanent injunction and held the
graduation prayers to be an unconstitutional violation of the First Amend-
ment.10 7 The court applied the three prong Lemon test.108 Finding that
the invocation and benediction practice failed to satisfy the second prong,
the court did not address the first and third prongs of the test.10 9 The
district court concluded that the prayers advanced religion by "creating an
identification of school with a deity, and therefore religion."110 The court
also stated its determination not to follow Stein v. Plainwell Community
Schools,11 1 which had relied on Marsh v. Chambers.
11 2
The First Circuit affirmed the district court's decision to grant a per-
manent injunction in favor of Weisman.113 Judge Torruella, writing the
majority opinion, adopted the district court's opinion.'1 4 Judge Bownes,
in his concurring opinion, concluded that the graduation prayers failed all
three prongs of the Lemon test. 1 ' Judge Bownes also questioned the Stein
decision and found it unpersuasive. 116 Judge Campbell filed a dissenting
opinion based on Marsh and Stein.' 17 With this decision the First Circuit
placed itself in direct conflict with the Sixth Circuit's decision in Stein.
C. The Majority Opinion
Justice Kennedy delivered the opinion for the Supreme Court in Lee
v. Weisman.118 The Court concluded that the religious exercises per-
formed at the graduation ceremony violated the Establishment Clause of
the First Amendment. 119 The opinion was based on the school prayer
cases1 20 and the belief that adolescents are susceptible to peer pressure.
1 2 1
The Court interpreted these cases to forbid the state from compelling par-
ticipation in a religious exercise.
12 2
The Court began by reciting the specific facts that controlled the deci-
sion. State officials directed a religious exercise at a graduation cere-
106. Weisman v. Lee, 728 F. Supp. 68, 70 (D.R.I. 1990), aff'd, 908 F.2d 1090 (1st Cir.
1990), aff'd, 112 S. Ct. 2649 (1992).
107. Id. at 75.
108. Id. at 71.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 72.
111. 822 F.2d 1406 (6th Cir. 1987).
112. 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
113. Weisman v. Lee, 908 F.2d 1090 (lst Cir. 1990), aff'd, 112 S. Ct 2649 (1992).
114. Id. at 1090.
115. Id. at 1094-95.
116. Id. at 1096.
117. Id. at 1097-99 (Campbell,J, dissenting).
118. 112 S. Ct. 2649 (1992).
119. Id. at 2661.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 2659.
122. Id. at 2661.
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mony.' 23 While attendance was voluntary, student participation in the
religious exercise was essentially mandatory.' 24 Because of these facts the
Court determined that it could decide the case based on the precedents of
the school prayer cases.1 25 Therefore, the Court concluded that is was
unnecessary to apply or reconsider the test from Lemon v. Kurtzman.
1 2 6
The Court then addressed the state's involvement in the religious ex-
ercise. 12 7 The principal decided to include prayers, selected a member of
the clergy, and dictated the content of the prayer.' 28 This was accom-
plished by providing the rabbi with the copy of "Guidelines for Civic Occa-
sions" and by advising him that the prayers should be nonsectarian. In the
Court's view these actions were attributable to the state.' 29 While discuss-
ing the state's involvement, the Court dispelled any arguments that would
recognize nonsectarian prayer as legitimate under the Establishment
Clause. 1
30
The court then examined the issue from the student's perspective.
Citing Engel v. Vitale' 3 ' and School District v. Schempp,13 2 the Court ex-
plained that prayer exercises in public schools are particularly likely to
cause indirect coercion. Because students were under public and peer
pressure to stand or maintain a respectful silence, the Court found the
prayers to be an example of the state coercing participation in a religious
exercise.'
3 3
The Court's decision was unaffected by the de minimus character of
the prayers. 134 The Court was also unconvinced by the petitioners' (the
school board and the United States filed a brief as amicus curiae) 13 5 asser-
tion that there was no coercion because attendance at the ceremony was
voluntary. A teenage student has no real choice not to attend one of the
most important occasions of a person's life.'
36
The Court then distinguished Marsh v. Chambers.13 7 Noting the fact-
sensitive nature of Establishment Clause analysis,' 38 the Court found a
graduation ceremony to be different than a legislative session. At legisla-
tive sessions, adults were free to come and go, while a graduation cere-
mony, a significant event in one's life, is conducted with more formality,
123. Id. at 2655.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
127. Lee, 112 S. Ct. at 2655.
128. Id. at 2655-56.
129. Id. at 2655.
130. Id. at 2656.
131. 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
132. 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
133. Lee, 112 S. Ct. at 2658.
134. Id. at 2659.
135. Id. at 2653.
136. Id. at 2659.
137. 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
138. Lee, 112 S. Ct. at 2661.
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giving students less freedom to leave if they wish. 139 The Court concluded
by stating that not every state action involving religion is invalid.
D. The Concurring Opinions
Justice Blackmun filed a concurring opinion in which Justice Stevens
andJustice O'Connor joined. 140 Justice Blackmun applied the Lemon test
to the graduation prayers at issue and found they failed the first two
prongs of the test.14 1 Justice Blackmun then proceeded to show why coer-
cion is not a necessary element to an Establishment Clause claim. First, he
cited Supreme Court precedent that refuted the idea.1 42 Second, he ana-
lyzed the purpose of the Clause through Constitutional history and case
precedent. Citing James Madison, he emphasized the exclusion felt by
those in the minority when the government endorses a particular religious
group. 14 3 Third, he expressed the importance of the separation between
church and state. Justice Blackmun concluded by stating that these princi-
ples, combined with Supreme Court precedent, prohibit government en-
dorsement, sponsorship, or involvement with religion regardless of
whether coercion is involved.
144
Justice Souter filed a concurrence in which Justice Stevens and Justice
O'Connor joined. 145 Justice Souter also analyzed the history of the Estab-
lishment Clause and the relevant Supreme Court precedent to illustrate
that coercion is not a relevant aspect of the Clause. He noted the First
Amendment also contains the Free Exercise Clause.1 46 That Clause con-
tains the coercion element. Any law that coerces support or participation
in a religious exercise would violate the Free Exercise Clause. 147 If coer-
cion were part of the Establishment Clause, then the Establishment Clause
would add nothing to the Free Exercise Clause. Using constitutional his-
tory, Justice Souter urged that the Framers meant the Establishment
Clause to add something to the Constitution. 48 He confirmed that
Supreme Court precedent follows this principle.
149
E. The Dissenting Opinion
Justice Scalia filed a dissenting opinion in which Chief Justice Rehn-
quist, Justice White, and Justice Thomas joined. 150 Justice Scalia's heated
dissent began by referring to tradition and history. He argued that non-
sectarian prayer at public celebrations was such an entrenched tradition
139. Id. at 2660.
140. Id. at 2661.
141. Id. at 2664 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
142. Id. at 2664-65.
143. Id. at 2665-66.
144. Id. at 2667.
145. Id.




150. Id. at 2678 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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that it could not violate the Establishment Clause.1 5 1 Next, Justice Scalia
stated that the real flaw in the Court's opinion was using the version of the
coercion test promulgated by the majority. 152 In his view the Establish-
ment Clause forbids the state from coercing participation in a religious
exercise. However, governmental actions should only be classified as coer-
cive if they are backed by a threat of legal (not psychological) penalty.
153
Justice Scalia distinguished the school prayer cases by arguing that
those decisions stemmed from a legal coercion to go to school.1 54 He
concluded by disparaging the Lemon test and claiming that the expulsion
of that test may have been the one worthy aspect of the decision. 155 Jus-
tice Scalia noted that under the coercion test school prayer would still be
able to take place. School officials need only make some announcement
that no one is compelled to join in the prayers and standing would not
necessarily signify participation. 15 6 As a final note, Justice Scalia argued
that nonsectarian prayers serve a unifying function and should have been
accommodated because a majority of the community desired them and
the inconvenience to the non-believer was minimal.
157
III. ANALYSIS
A. Flaws in the Lee Decision and the Coercion Test
The United States' brief tried to convince the Supreme Court that Lee
v. Weisman158 was not merely a disagreement about the extent of the
Marsh exception to Lemon.159 Instead, the United States, in support of the
petitioner school board, filed a brief calling for Lemon to be overruled.
160
The United States claimed that only state practices coercing religious par-
ticipation or belief can violate the Establishment Clause.
16 1
A majority of the Court was convinced. Mthough the court did not
expressly overrule Lemon, it failed to use the test despite its applicability.
The majority did, however, find the coercion analysis to be the fundamen-
tal inquiry with an Establishment Clause claim. The Court ultimately
found the prayers unconstitutional, but they could have arrived at the
same result using Lemon or accurately applying school prayer precedent.
These methods would have advanced the true goal of the Establishment
Clause-the protection against exclusion. The Court would have struck
a proper balance between the religion clauses.
151. Id. at 2678-79.
152. Id. at 2683.
153. Id. at 2684.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 2685.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 2686.
158. 112 S. Ct. 2649 (1992).
159. Russell M. Mortyn, The Rehnquist Court and the New Establishment Clause, 19 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 567, 585 (1992).
160. Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 6, 20, Weisman v.
Lee, 908 F.2d 1090 (lst Cir. 1990) (No. 90-1014), aff'd, 112 S. Ct. 2649 (1992) (hereinafter
Brief for United States).
161. See Brief for United States at 20-28.
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The petitioners lost this battle, but by convincing the Court to adopt a
coercion standard they moved a long way toward winning the war. This is
born out by recent federal circuit and district court decisions that illus-
trate the flaws in the coercion -test. During this writing the Supreme Court
also ruled in such a way as to magnify those flaws.1
62
The Court could have found the prayers unconstitutional without
adopting a coercion standard. The district court and the circuit court
both found the prayers unconstitutional without leaving the confines of
the Lemon test. Offering a prayer with the word "God" in it has a religious
purpose. That a prayer was given by a member of the clergy at the request
of a state official unquestionably has the primary effect of advancing reli-
gion. By choosing the speaker and directing the content of the prayer, the
state became excessively entangled with religion. The invocations and
benedictions failed all three prongs of the Lemon test. It was unnecessary
for the Court to adopt a coercion standard to reach its conclusion.
Using the Lemon test would have been more faithful to the goals of
the Establishment Clause. The Establishment Clause is violated whenever
a person's citizenship is devalued because he or she is in the religious
minority. That person is pushed toward the fringes of society because he
or she is not part of the religious elite. It is this exclusion against which
the Establishment Clause is meant to guard. 163 The Framers, especially
James Madison, understood this principle. By allowing a coercion stan-
dard to be so important an inquiry, the Court has distanced itself from the
Framers' interpretation of the Clause.
By using a coercion test the Court misapplied its own precedent. The
majority opinion relied heavily on Engle v. Vitale16 4 and School District v.
Schenpp.16 5 Both of these cases,.however, stand for the proposition that
proof of coercion is unnecessary to an Establishment Clause claim. 166
Even though the Court did not apply Lemon, a proper application of these
two cases would have achieved the same result had the majority been more
faithful to the essence of the Establishment Clause. When the state en-
dorses religion by sponsoring school prayer, the fundamental dilemma is
not that students are forced to participate. Instead, the problem lies with
the state's systematic exclusion of those students who do not hold the
State's beliefs or who refuse to participate in its exercise.
When the rabbi offered the invocation and benediction at the request
of Principal Lee, the state endorsed religion. In doing so, the state told
Deborah Weisman that her rights and beliefs were not as cherished as
162. SeeJones v. Clear Creek Indep. Sch. Dist., 977 F.2d 963 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. denied,
113 S. Ct. 2950 (1993).
163. See generally The Supreme Court, 1991 Term-Leading Cases, 106 HAv. L. REv. 163, 259-
69 (1992) (discussing the exclusion principle in relation to the Establishment Clause and
Lee).
164. 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
165. 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
166. Vitale, 370 U.S. at 430; Schempp, 374 U.S. at 223.
[Vol. 71:4
ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
those who approved of the prayer. 16 7 That was why the Establishment
Clause was violated. Such an analysis is consistent with school prayer pre-
cedent and the intent of the Establishment Clause. By adopting the coer-
cion test the Court has distanced itself from its own precedent as well as
the Framers' intent. The result is alienation from the basic principle that
the Establishment Clause protects citizens from exclusion.
By using Lemon or properly applying school prayer precedent, the
Court would have maintained the separate identity of the two religion
clauses. Coercion is an element of the Free Exercise Clause-not the Es-
tablishment Clause. 168 By making an Establishment Clause claim rest on
the existence of coercion, the Court has reduced the need for the Clause.
The Court has made the Establishment Clause a shadow of the Free Exer-
cise Clause.
Instead of using Lemon or accurately applying school prayer prece-
dent, the Court adopted the coercion test. It is important to examine the
flaws of this test, because there is evidence that the Court is unhappy with
Lemon. 169 It may decide to completely abandon Lemon in favor of the coer-
cion test. There are two fundamental problems with the coercion test.
1 70
First, the coercion test is result-oriented. A court may easily manipu-
late the test to produce a desired outcome. This has been illustrated by
two cases decided since Lee. In Jones v. Clear Creek Independent School Dis-
trict,1 7 1 the court held the graduation prayers in question to be constitu-
tional. 172 The key distinction in Jones was that public high school seniors
could select a senior to deliver nonsectarian prayers at their graduation
ceremonies. 173 It should be noted that the court held that the prayers
passed the Lemon test. 174 However, if the Supreme Court had properly
found the prayers in Lee to be unconstitutional due to Lemon, the circuit
court would have had binding precedent that graduation prayers cannot
pass the Lemon test. The circuit court's misuse of the Lemon test magnifies
the error created by the Supreme Court's failure to use that test in Lee.
The most significant aspect of Jones is the court's manipulation of the
coercion test. The court held that the prayers were not coercive because a
majority of the students voted for the prayers. 175 The court could have
found that the prayers were coercive. There is just as much opportunity
for peer pressure in a student election as at a graduation ceremony. The
court found no coercion, however, because a person attending graduation
"should not be surprised to find the event affected by community stan-
167. See Daniel 0. Conkle, Toward a General Theory of the Establishment Clause, 82 Nw. U. L.
REV. 1113, 1168 (1988).
168. Schempp, 374 U.S. at 223.
169. See Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649, 2685 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
170. For a discussion of other problems with the test see Ira C. Lupu, Reconstructing the
Establishment Clause: The Case Against Discretionary Accommodation of Religion, 140 U. PA. L. Ray.
555, 576-80 (1991).
171. 977 F.2d 963 (5th Cir. 1992), ce7. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2950 (1993).
172. Id. at 965.
173. Id. at 964.
174. Id. at 966-68.
175. See id. at 969-72.
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dards." 17 6 The court found no coercion because it wanted to reach a re-
sult that would satisfy-the majority of the community. This case is not an
aberration. In May 1993, in Harris v. Joint School District,177 a federal dis-
trict court upheld the constitutionality of a program similar to the one in
Jones by relying upon the Fifth Circuit's rationale.
178
These holdings give rise to the second problem with the coercion test.
The test is an instrument that can be used by the majority to control the
community. In Jones and Harris, both courts emphasized that if a majority
of the students vote for the graduation prayers the coercion is removed
and the prayers are constitutional. Based on that reasoning, a state could
decide to adopt Christianity as the official state religion if a majority of the
population voted for it. This example may seem extreme but it differs
from the recent federal court holdings only in degree, not in kind.
Finding a practice constitutional because the majority approves of it
violates the whole concept of democracy. The true test of a democracy is
how it treats the least influential of its citizens. 179 The coercion test, as
illustrated by the federal court holdings, shows an utter disregard for the
beliefs and sensitivities of the religious minority. The test gives the major-
ity the means to banish the minority from the privileges of society. The
government endorses these actions by approving of prayer at graduation
ceremonies. By endorsing this behavior the state tells the minority that
their rights are not valued. The Establishment Clause is meant to protect
against this type of exclusion. During this writing the Supreme Court es-
sentially approved of this behavior by denying certiorari to Jones.1 8 0 The
Court told the rest of the country that the rationale in Jones is
constitutional.
The two federal court holdings since Lee and the denial of certiorari
to Jones show the implications of the coercion test. It is unlikely that these
two cases will be isolated incidents. All over the country students and
schools are attempting to have prayers in their graduation ceremonies. 18 1
If those in favor of prayer in each community are in the majority, then
prayer will occur. Justice Scalia's dissent, which predicted that graduation
prayers would still take place, seems prophetic. 182 The prayers will hap-
pen based on the principle of majority rule, while the Constitution will be
conveniently ignored.
B. The Fundamental Conflict
The conflict between majority rule and the authority of the Constitu-
tion pervades the concept of democracy. The power of the majority to
176. Id. at 972.
177. 821 F. Supp. 638 (D. Idaho 1993).
178. Id. at 643.
179. See Stieberger v. Heckler, 615 F. Supp. 1315, 1362-63 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
180. Jones v. Clear Creek Indep. Sch. Dist., 977 F.2d 963, cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2950
(1993).
181. Larry Witham, Schools Get Around Court's Ban on Prayer, WASH. TIMES, May 22, 1993, at
Al.
182. See Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649,-2685 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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shape a democratic society seems rudimentary. Historically, tyranny re-
sulted from the few controlling the many, the poor being "sacrificed to the
rich."1 83 To evade this elitist paradigm, democracy demands that the peo-
ple make decisions about issues regarding their personal rights. Arguably,
putting any limits upon the power of the majority forms a type of elitist
-paternalism that contradicts the nature of republican government. Alter-
natively, by giving the majority unfettered decision-making powers, the
government subjects society to a vigilantism as harmful as any totalitarian
power.
The role of the Constitution as the check against majoritarian tyranny
raises equally serious issues. If the Constitution is imbued with such power
that it cannot be changed by the will of the majority, then it exemplifies
the ultimate form of elitism. The people cannot be trusted with authority.
If, on the other hand, majoritarian forces could vote to disband any or all
constitutional rights, then a minority member's position in society is tenu-
ous. The decisions in Lee and Jones illustrate the need to consider an im-
portant question: whether majority rule is the cornerstone of democracy
or the legal justification of tyranny? As Lee and Jones suggest, can a major-
ity vote to abandon a constitutional safeguard?
A basic principle of a republican form of government is that the ma-
jority is the best protector of both public and private goals.' 8 4 The U.S.
Constitution promulgates such a view. Before the Constitution may be
amended, specific majority criteria must be met to insure a proper "Mode
of Ratification."18 5 However, Framers such as Thomas Jefferson viewed
the Constitution as a baseline which could not be transcended.' 8 6 The
Constitution acts as fundamental, unchangeable law. 187 It may be altered,
however, by an express statement of the majority. 188 The Colorado Con-
stitution expressly vests power in the people, 189 who may change the gov-
ernment unless it is "repugnant to the constitution of the United
183. See GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-1787 410, 413
(1969).
184. See id. at 410.
185. U.S. CONST. art. V. The pertinent part of Article V reads as follows:
The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem it necessary, shall
propose Amendments to this Constitution, or, on the Application of the Legisla-
tures of two thirds of the several States, shall call a Convention for proposing
Amendments, which, in either Case, shall be valid to all Intents and Purposes, as
Part of this Constitution, when ratified by the Legislatures of three fourths of the
several States, or by Conventions in three fourths thereof, as the one or the other
Mode of Ratification may be proposed by the Congress ....
Id.
186. See Kenneth W. Thompson, Religion and Politics in the United States: An Overview, 483
ANNALs AM. AcAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 12, 13 (1986).
187. See U.S. CONsT. art. VI ("This Constitution... shall be the supreme Law of the Land
."); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176 (1803) ([W]ritten constitutions [are]
contemplate[d] . . . as forming the fundamental and paramount law of the nation...
WooD, supra note 183, at 281.
188. See WooD, supra note 183, at 281.
189. COLO. CONsT. art. II, § I ("All political power is vested in and derived from the
people; all government, of right, originates from the people, is founded upon their will only,
and is instituted solely for the good of the whole.").
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States."19 ° Ambiguous results occur from the friction between the power
of the majority and the authority of the Constitution.
When directly confronted with these issues the Supreme Court claims
to side with the Constitution. As the Court stated, "[o]ne's right to life,
liberty, and property... and other fundamental rights may not be submit-
ted to vote; they depend on the outcome of no elections." 19 1 The Colo-
rado Supreme Court echoed this position during the recent litigation over
Amendment 2's prohibition of protected status to homosexuals, lesbians,
or bisexuals. 192 These stands for the minority are appropriate responses
by the judiciary. The federal judiciary in particular possesses a "political
insularity" due to life tenure that makes it an important instrument in
checking the political majority' 9 3-a role mandated by the
Constitution. 1
94
The Court has turned away from an aggressive enforcement of the
Establishment Clause. 195 It has succumbed to the "principles of popular
sovereignty."1 9 6 This acquiescence equates to a reluctance to check the
majority.197 This transfer of authority means that bureaucrats will enforce
the will of the majority making the crucial decisions regarding religion.
198
190. Id. art. II, § 2. The section reads as follows:
The people of this state have the sole and exclusive right of governing themselves,
as a free, sovereign, and independent state; and to alter and abolish their constitu-
tion and form of government whenever they may deem it necessary to their safety
and happiness, provided, such change be not repugnant to the constitution of the
United States.
Id.
191. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943); see also Lucas
v. Forty-Fourth Gen. Assembly, 377 U.S. 713, 736 (1964) (asserting "[a] citizen's constitutional
rights can hardly be infringed simply because a majority of the people choose that it be").
Decisions by the Court in the arena of individual participation in the political process are
numerous. See, e.g., Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968) (holding Ohio election laws
unconstitutional because minority political parties were denied equal protection); Reynolds
v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) (holding that an individual's right to vote may not be diluted);
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) (holding legislative apportionment issues justiciable).
These decisions comport with the basic notion that "[i
] t is emphatically the province and duty
of the judicial department to say what the law is." Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 177. Also, it
should be noted that almost half of the amendments to the Constitution since 1791 deal with
participation in the political process. See U.S. CONST. amend. XII (dictating the procedure
for electing the President and Vice-President); id. amend. XV (prohibiting the denial of vot-
ing rights based upon race, color, or previous condition of servitude); id. amend. XVII (pro-
viding the ability to vote directly for United States Senators); id. amend. XIX (providing the
vote to women); id. amend, XXIII (providing the vote to District of Columbia residents); id.
amend. XXIV (banning the poll tax); id. amend. XXVI (providing the vote to eighteen-year-
olds).
192. See Evans v. Romer, 854 P.2d 1270, 1286 (1993) (citing both Barnette and Lucas
although noting that the Amendment's passage by a majority of voters mandated "great def-
erence"), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 419 (1993).
193. Daniel 0. Conkle, God Loveth Adverbs, 42 DEPAUL L. Rv. 339, 343 (1992); see also
U.S. CoNsT. art. III, § 1.
194. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 177.
195. Conkle, supra note 193, at 339.





In the graduation prayer context weighty constitutional issues will be de-
cided by school administrators and, after Jones, by high school students. 199
By delegating its core function, the Court violates the principle of
separation of powers. The legislative branch provides a vehicle through
which the majority's voice may be heard. The judicial branch checks the
potential excesses of the majoritarian legislative branch. The judicial
branch exists to insure the interests of the minority. When the judiciary
abdicates this duty, the majoritarian forces are free to trample the rights of
the minority. Usually, this stems from an unchecked legislature. In an
Establishment Clause context, the Court's mistaken delegation of deci-
sion-making power results in constitutional rights that are even more frag-
ile than those under an unchecked legislature. By transferring
constitutional decisions to school administrators and students, the Court
delegates power to entities that lack the authority to consider these mat-
ters. The Court delegates to entities that either lack subject matter exper-
tise or who are private parties.
Members of the legislature are elected. They represent an added
layer between the citizen majority and the laws that the legislature passes.
While this majoritarian hierarchy creates a danger of tyranny based upon
popularity, it does not foster the potential for abuse that delegation di-
rectly to citizenry does. The general population, unencumbered by even
the slightest procedural safeguards, reigns free. The majority, shrouded in
the legitimacy of its own existence,2 00 creates or dismisses rights as it
pleases. By abandoning its duty to protect minority rights the Court tacitly
199. See id. (arguing that academics can participate in this process by at least educating
the decision-makers so that they are "apprised of the competing considerations"). Arguably,
a disparaging view of high school students making constitutional decisions exemplifies pater-
nal elitism. To many people, students included, "[r]eligion speaks truth, both inwardly and
outwardly. It tells believers who they are and where they stand." Id. at 344. However, the
Court, by virtue of its position in government and the education of its members, is meant to
make constitutional decisions. It rests above competing interests free to make objective,
knowledgeable decisions. While it would be naive to suggest that the Court exudes objectiv-
ity during every legal consideration, believing that school administrators or high students are
in any better position to decide these sensitive issues trivializes the Constitution.
200. Legitimacy considerations underlie any concept of government. Majority rule ap-
peals to most advocates of democracy because of its apparent legitimacy. If government sup-
ports the most popular beliefs, then it seems to act with the people's consent. Governing
with the consent of the governed characterizes legitimacy. To create this appearance of legit-
imacy, governments seek to obtain a majority. Historically, some governments muscle their
way into power and then claim a majority. In Germany during the 1930's Adolf Hitler seized
power through, among other things, an Enabling Act that provided the Chancellor with the
ability to promulgate laws that violated the constitution. WILLIAM L. SHiRER, THE RiSE AND
FALL OF THE THIRD REICH 229 (1960). On August 19, 1934, 90 per cent of the German
people voted to approve Hitler's control of absolute power. Id. at 229-30. Once empowered
to act on behalf of the majority, Hitler "legitimately" passed the Nuremberg Laws of Septem-
ber 15, 1935, which stripped Jews of their citizenship, outlawed marriage and extramarital
relations between Jews and Aryans, and banned Jews from hiring female Aryans under thirty-
five years of age as servants. Id. at 233.
For further discussions of the relationships between totalitarian governments and the
church see Zdzislawa Walaszek, An Open Issue of Legitimacy: The State and the Church in Poland,
483 ANNALS Am. ACAD. POL. & Soc. SCL 118 (1986); Philip Walters, The Russian Orthodox
Church and the Soviet State, 483 ANNALS Am. ACAD. POL & SOC. SCL 135 (1986). For an illustra-
tion of the extreme actions a "legitimized" law can produce see Murray Sayle, Closing the File
on flight 007, THE NEw YORKER, Dec. 13, 1993, at 90, 95 (discussing two Soviet laws which,
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consents to the majoritarian tyranny. The government gives its stamp of
approval to the popular religious views. This empowers the majority all
the more. Those holding minority religious views are alienated and hu-
miliated. 20 1 This exclusion violates the Establishment Clause.
C. The Majoritarian Tradition in the United States
The democratic tradition in the United States stems from the basic
concept that power is vested in the people. 20 2 The people are, therefore,
free to shape their government. 20 3 Without the people's consent, laws are
invalid and illegitimate.20 4 If a majority votes for a law or acquiesces to
certain conduct, then it is legitimized. When the majority's will is fol-
lowed, justice and fairness are presumed.
This theme pervaded the formation of law in new communities
throughout the expansion of America. 20 5 During the mid-nineteenth cen-
tury as people poured west, transient communities formed based upon the
concept of majority rule. 20 6 This vigilantism did not displace established
institutions.2 0 7 Rather, it created courts and government where before
none existed. 20 8 Even the decisions to be governed by moral standards
were based upon majoritarian principles. 20 9 Possibly because of this
moral homogeneity, these communities led fairly orderly existences. 2 10
Recognition of the flaws of majority rule appeared early in American
history. During the first session of the House of Representatives, James
Madison stated, "the great danger lies not in the Executive, but in the
great body of the people-in the disposition which the majority always
read together, almost mandated shooting down Korean Airlines' Flight 007, which killed
hundreds of innocent people).
201. See Richard S. Kay, The Canadian Constitution and the Dangers of Establishment, 42
DEPAUL L. REV. 361, 367-68 (1992); see also Douglas Laycock, The Benefits of the Establishment
Clause, 42 DEPAUL L. REv. 373,379 (1992) (arguing "[g]overnment observance of the majority
religion does indeed tell religious minorities that they are outsiders and not fully accepted
members of the community").
202. Madison Resolution (June 8, 1789), in CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS 11, 12 (Helen
E. Veit et al. eds., 1991) (saying "all power is originally vested in, and consequently derived
from the people").
203. Id. at 11-12 (asserting that "the people have an indubitable, unalienable, and inde-
feasible right to reform or change their government").
204. See Woon, supra note 183, at 162.
205. See, e.g., DANIEL J. BooRSTIN, THE AMERscANs: THE NATIONAL EXPERIENCE 81-90
(1965) (discussing vigilantism and majority rule as the natural law of the transient communi-
ties of the mid-nineteenth century).
206. See id. at 81-82.
207. See id.
208. Id.
209. See id. at 82. "'We needed no law,' wrote an old pioneer of the mining camps, 'until
the lawyers came.' " Id. at 84.
210. See id. at 85.
Unguarded property was generally safe. In most mining camps a washbasinful of
gold dust could be left on a table in an open tent while the owners were far out of
sight working their claims. Though there were no police, provisions and tools were
seldom stolen. Theft, murder, and all kinds of violence were rare.
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discovers, to bear down, and depress the minority."2 1 1 Alexis De Toc-
queville, who spent a brief nine months in the United States between
1831-32,212 wrote extensively on the tyranny of the majority.2 13 He argued
that the majority possesses the traits of an individual who has absolute
power.2 14 The majority can misuse its power in the same fashion as the
individual.2 15 In the face of this abuse an aggrieved member of a minority
lacks redress to any but the majority.2 16 De Tocqueville cites both
Madison and Jefferson to support his proposition that the real danger in
the United States is the "Omnipotence of the Majority."2 17 These theorists
understood the fragile nature of a minority member's fundamental rights
under majority rule.
Thomas Jefferson viewed the Bill of Rights as necessary for "the legal
check which it puts into the hands of the judiciary."2 18 As an independent
branch removed from majoritarian influences, the judiciary exists to pro-
tect the rights of the minority. By surrendering this duty in its Establish-
ment Clause jurisprudence, the Court betrays and abandons the alienated
member of the religious minority.
D. The Religious Sector Contrasted with Other Factions
Abolishing the whole idea of majority rule would justify a type of feu-
dalism known in Europe from 1500-1800.219 A small percentage of people
211. Gazette of the United States (June 10, 1789), in CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS, 64, 67
(Helen E. Veit et al. eds., 1991). Evidence of Madison's awareness of the potential for
majoritarian tyranny appears in his letters and essays.
"Wherever the real power in a Government lies," [Madison] told Jefferson, "there is
danger of oppression. In our Governments the real power lies in the majority of the
Community, and the invasion of private rights is chiefly to be apprehended, not
from acts of Government contrary to the sense of its constituents, but from acts in
which the Government is a mere instrument of the major number of constituents."
The people, it seemed, were as capable of despotism as any prince; public liberty
was no guarantee after all of private liberty.
WOOD, supra note 183, at 410.
212. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 9 (Richard D. Heffner ed., New
American Library 1956) (1835).
213. Id. (recognizing that "the book's central theme... [is] the tyranny of the majority in
the United States"). Heffner, himself, notes the stubbornness of the belief that majority rule
insuresjustice. "[T]he most pervasive myth to dominate American political thinking has been
our rather naive-and mistaken-equation of equality with freedom, of democracy (or ma-
jority rule) with liberty." Id. at 9-10.
214. See TocQUEviLLE, supra note 212, at 114.
215. See id.
216. See id. at 115.
When an individual or a party is wronged in the United States, to whom can he
apply for redress? If to public opinion, public opinion constitutes the majority; if to
the legislature, it represents the majority, and implicitly obeys it; if to the executive
power, it is appointed by the majority, and serves as a passive tool in its hands. The
public force consists of the majority under arms; the jury is the majority invested
with the right of hearing judicial cases; and in certain States, even the judges are
elected by a majority. However iniquitous or absurd the measure of which you com-
plain, you must submit to it as well as you can.
Id.
217. See id. at 120-21.
218. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Mar. 15, 1789), in CREATING THE
BILL OF RGHTs, 218 (Helen E. Veit et al. eds., 1991).
219. SeeJ. M. ROBERTS, THE PELICAN HISTORY OF THE WORLD 524-25 (1987).
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would possess most of the land, wealth, and power. 220 Fundamental no-
tions of democracy entail some form of power vested in the people. To
deny the largest portion of society a voice in the political and social pro-
cess ignores an essential element of republican government. While some
areas of society may allow for majority rule, others should not.
22 1
Decisions on governmental policy must be made.22 2 A democracy
gives that decision-making power to the majority.223 Because decisions
need to be made on these matters, it is appropriate that the majority
makes them.2 24 This effectively uses majority rule to further republican
government. Decisions on religious matters, however, do not need to be
made by the government.22 5 When the government makes such rulings, it
tells society what the proper religion is.22 6 Citizens who do not espouse
the government's beliefs are "a little bit un-American."
227
Strong emotional and ideological attitudes characterize religious be-
liefs. Multitudes of views span the spectrum of religious thought.
22 8
Whether or not one believes in "God," how one chooses to worship or not
worship, is intensely personal. When government forces its religious views
on society by acquiescing to the majority belief, it invades one's innermost
concept of identity. "Human beings cannot endure emptiness and desola-
tion; they will fill the vacuum by creating a new focus of meaning."229 The
Court's recent Establishment Clause jurisprudence allows government to
"fill the vacuum," a task best left to the individual.
E. An Aggressive View of the Establishment Clause
One commentator argues that the Supreme Court lacks sympathy for
religion 230 and questions why religion cannot persuade society. 231 Such
220. See id.
221. See Ira C. Lupu, Models of Church-State Interaction and the Strategy of the Religion Clauses,
42 DEPAuL L. REV. 223, 228 (1992) (asserting that "[tihe Framers, however, obviously
thought-and many contemporary Americans continue to believe-that religious factions
represent a different kind of phenomenon than political parties or other kinds of
associations").
222. Laycock, supra note 201, at 379-80.
223. See id.
224. See id.
225. Id. at 380.
226. Id.
227. Id.
There is no need for the government to make decisions about Christian rituals ver-
sus Jewish rituals versus no religious rituals at all. For government to make that
choice is simply a gratuitous statement about the kind of people we really are. By
making such statements, the government says the real American religion is watered-
down Christianity, and everybody else is a little bit un-American.
Id.
228. For a discussion of different religious relationships see WILLIAM JAMES, THE VARIETIES
OF RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE (Macmillan Publishing Co. 1961) (1902). The author notes that
"[t] he divine can mean no single quality, it must mean a group of qualities, by being champi-
ons of which in alternation, different... [persons] may all find worthy missions." Id. at 378-
79.
229. KAREN ARMSTRONG, A HISTORY OF Con 399 (1994).




an argument ignores the inherent dangers involved with the mix of
church and state.23 2 To avoid these dangers the Establishment Clause
"implies the affirmative 'establishment' of a civil order for the resolution
of public moral disputes."233 Society agreed upon the "secular mecha-
nism" so religious battles would be avoided.
23 4
Majoritarians likely argue that much is being made over a small mat-
ter. A non-sectarian prayer is inconsequential, especially when supported
by the majority.2 35 This attitude furthers an ignorance of minority views.
Ignorance breeds intolerance. To provide proper protection to the mi-
nority, the Establishment Clause should be interpreted such that constitu-
tional protections are not left to the popular opinion of eighteen-year-
olds. The Clause acts as a barrier that prevents the government's dissemi-
nation of religious views through tacit approval of the majority will. By not
taking an aggressive stance, the Court allows that barrier to erode, forcing
the minority to accept alien beliefs.
CONCLUSION
In Lee the Supreme Court went against the Framers' intent and its
own precedent by adopting a coercion test to determine Establishment
Clause violations. A broad interpretation would properly hold that state
actions violate the Establishment Clause when they endorse religion,
whether those actions are coercive or not. Supreme Court precedent has
consistently held that coercion is not an element of an Establishment
Clause claim.
The Court could have arrived at the same result in Lee by using other
tests. These methods would have been more faithful to the true goal of
the Establishment Clause, which is the protection against exclusion. The
coercion test is flawed because it does not protect this goal.
The test is also result-oriented, and it furthers the concept of majority
rule. Majority rule, while fundamental to democracy, may threaten the
rights of the minority. By allowing crucial constitutional decisions to be
made by non-judiciary entities, the Court abandons its role as protector of
the minority. To insure constitutional safeguards, the Establishment
Clause should be aggressively interpreted. Based upon recent develop-
ments, however, it appears that graduation prayers will be allowed if a ma-
jority approves of them, regardless of any constitutional prohibitions.
Brook Millard
231. See Michael W. McConnell, Christ, Culture, and Courts: A Niebuhrian Examination of
First Amendment Jurisprudence, 42 DEPAUL L. REV. 191, 220 (1992).
232. See Lupu, supra note 221, at 224 ("First, disputes between the state and agents of
religion frequently result in dangers for religious liberty, and second, such disputes may also
threaten injury to the state's legitimate purposes.").
233. Kathleen M. Sullivan, Religion and Liberal Democracy, 59 U. CHi. L. REv. 195, 197
(1992).
234. Id.




SEC V. PTERS. STABILIZING THE REGULATION OF TENDER
OFFER INSIDER TRADING WITHOUT A FIDUCIARY DUTY
INTRODUCTION
The late 1980's saw the convictions for insider trading of high-profile
traders such as Ivan Boesky and Michael Milken. The courts also con-
fronted allegations of insider trading by a variety of less well-known cul-
prits, ranging from financial printers' to Wall Street Journal columnists.
2
Recent decisions in the area reflect a recurring interaction between
Congress, the federal courts and the Securities and Exchange Commission
("SEC") in the area of insider trading. Each legislative, judicial or regula-
tory action that attempted to define the parameters of lawful use of infor-
mation has subsequently faced an expanding or narrowing rebuttal from
another branch.
In October 1992, the Tenth Circuit decided in SEC v. Peters5 that an
insider trading defendant could be held liable under Rule 14e-3 4 without
a breach of any fiduciary duty. This decision reflected the recently broad-
ened scope of insider trading liability.
Section I of this Comment describes the major legislation, regulations
and court decisions governing insider trading. Section II then discusses
the Peters holding in light of these statutes, rules and judicial holdings. In
Section III, the Comment examines the inappropriateness of a fiduciary
duty requirement to liability for insider trading in tender offers and briefly
discusses the future of insider trading liability under Rule 14e-3.
I. BACKGROUND
SEC v. Peters5 squarely confronted whether Rule 14e-3 required the
existence of a fiduciary duty as a prerequisite to insider trading liability.
1. See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
2. See Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19 (1987).
3. 978 F.2d 1162 (10th Cir. 1992).
4. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3 (1993). Rule 14e-3 reads in pertinent part:
(a) If any person has taken a substantial step or steps to commence, or has
commenced, a tender offer (the "offering person"), it shall constitute a fraudulent,
deceptive or manipulative act or practice within the meaning of section 14(e) of the
Act for any other person who is in possession of material information relating to
such tender offer which information he knows or has reason to know is nonpublic
and which he knows or has reason to know has been acquired directly or indirectly
from:
(1) The offering person,
(2) The issuer of the securities sought or to be sought by such tender offer, or
(3) Any officer, director, partner or employee or any other person acting on
behalf of the offering person or such issuer, to purchase or sell or cause to be
purchased or sold any of such securities convertible into or exchangeable for any
such securities or any option or right to obtain or to dispose of any of the foregoing
securities, unless within a reasonable time prior to any purchase or sale such infor-
mation and its source are publicly disclosed by press release or otherwise.
5. 978 F.2d 1162 (10th Cir. 1992).
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The problem at the heart of insider trading is that such insiders commit
fraud by their actions.
Those against promulgating insider trading regulations without a fi-
duciary duty requirement frame their argument in the following manner.
The definition of fraud under Rule 14e-3 is identical to definitions under
other insider trading sections that do not pertain to tender offers,6 and
court decisions have required a fiduciary duty in these contexts. 7 There-
fore, a fiduciary duty requirement under 14e-3 is also appropriate. 8 With-
out such a requirement, the rule may ensnare innocent market traders
engaged in legitimate market research, thereby discouraging the free ex-
change of information and creating a less efficient securities market.
Since Peters was grounded in the notions of insider trading, fiduciary duty
and tender offers, a survey of the historical progression of statutory, regu-
latory and case law on insider trading provides a helpful background. This
history clearly reveals the continuous struggle over the appropriate defini-
tion of insider trading.
A. The Law of Insider Trading Before 1980
The Securities Exchange Act of 19349 provided the first federal legis-
lation aimed at insider trading. This statute, among its other provisions,
required insiders, including corporate directors, officers and ten percent
owners of equity securities, to report their registered equity holdings and
the monthly changes in those holdings to the SEC. 10 These requirements
were followed by what has become known as section 10(b)." The SEC
used this provision to promulgate the regulation that required traders to
either disclose material inside information or abstain from trading on the
basis of the information-Rule lOb-5.12
As discussed earlier, the breach of fiduciary duty requirement for in-
sider trading liability rests on the policy notion that only those who are
6. See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1993) [hereinafter Rule lOb-5] (the general anti-fraud
provision for the purchase and sale of securities).
7. See, e.g., Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980) (takeover bid context).
8. This view was framed in a similar manner in DONALD C. L NGEVOORT, INSIDER T.AD-
INC REGULATION § 7.05, at 217 (1991 ed.).
9. Pub. L. No. 73-291, 48 Stat. 905 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78 (1988 &
Supp. IV 1992)).
10. Securities Exchange Act § 16, 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a) (1988); see also Iman Anabtawi,
Note, Toward a Definition ofInsider Trading, 41 STAN. L. REv. 377, 380 (1989) (discussing these
requirements).
11. Securities Exchange Act § 10, 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1988). Section 10 reads in pertinent
part:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of
any national securities exchange-
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security
registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and
regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the
public interest or for the protection of investors.
12. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1993). For a brief discussion of the "disclose or abstain" im-
pact of Rule 10b-5, see Anabtawi, supra note 10, at 381.
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truly culpable should be penalized.13 If a relationship of trust and confi-
dence between the accused insider and another party has been breached,
it is more likely that the insider has used the information to trade for
personal gain.
Early decisions applying Rule 10b-5 contained a fiduciary duty re-
quirement for insider trading liability. In re Cady, Roberts & Co.,' 4 a 1961
SEC decision, involved a partner in a broker-dealer firm who used advance
knowledge of a dividend reduction in another company in which the part-
ner was also a director to sell shares before the price dropped on the New
York Stock Exchange. 15 In finding the partner liable, the SEC stated that
"corporate 'insiders,' particularly officers, directors or controlling stock-
holders," have a duty to disclose material information before trading on
the basis of that information, 16 a duty based on the fiduciary relationship
between corporate officers and shareholders.
17
The Second Circuit, in SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.,18 noted that
Rule 10b-5 aimed to provide all securities market participants equal access
to material information.' 9 The court stated that corporate insiders such
as directors or officers fell within the rule's ambit. Again, such individuals
have a fiduciary duty to their shareholders not to "take 'advantage of such
information knowing it is unavailable to those with whom [they are]
dealing.' "20
In 1968, Congress recognized the need for stricter insider trading reg-
ulation and passed the Williams Act,2 1 which, among other things,
amended the 1934 Act by lowering the disclosure threshold for equity
shareholders from ten percent to five percent.22 Section 14(e),23 a provi-
sion of the Williams Act, was designed to regulate insider trading related
to tender offers. More specifically, the statute granted the SEC authority
13. See Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 662 (1983) (holding that liability under Rule lOb-5
depended on whether the insider "personally... benefit[ted], directly or indirectly, from his
disclosure").
14. 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961).
15. Id. at 910-11.
16. Id. at 911.
17. See id.
18. 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
19. Id. at 848.
20. Id. (quoting In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 912 (1961)).
21. Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 454 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-(e), 78n(d)-(f)
(1988)).
22. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(1) (1988). This provision should be distinguished from the ten
percent registration requirement in 15 U.S.C. § 78(p)(a) (1988). See also Nathaniel B. Smith,
Note, Defining "Tender Offer" Under the Williams Act, 53 BRoOK. L. REv. 189, 191 (1987) (dis-
cussing congressional intent to mandate disclosure in passing the Williams Act).
23. Pub. L. No. 90-439 § 3(e), 82 Stat. 455 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1988)). Sec-
tion 14(e) reads in pertinent part:
It shall be unlawful for any person ... to engage in any fraudulent, deceptive, or
manipulative acts or practices, in connection with any tender offer or request or
invitation for tenders, or any solicitation of security holders in opposition to or in
favor of any such offer, request, or invitation. The Commission shall, for the pur-
poses of this subsection, by rules and regulations define, and prescribe means rea-
sonably designed to prevent, such acts and practices as are fraudulent, deceptive, or
manipulative.
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to regulate tender offers by "defin(ing], and prescrib[ing] means reason-
ably designed to prevent, such acts as are fraudulent, deceptive, or manip-
ulative." 24 This broad grant of authority seemed to portend stricter
regulation of the financial markets. The Supreme Court took the next
major step in this area; however, it was a step backward.
B. Chiarella v. United States25 and its Progeny: Insider Trading Law Since
1980
The Supreme Court discussed the fiduciary duty requirement in
Chiarella,26 a case which defined the insider trading liability debate for all
subsequent federal court decisions in the area. Chiarella involved an al-
leged violation of Rule 10b-5. The defendant worked for a financial
printer contracted to print takeover documents. The defendant used in-
formation from the documents to purchase shares in the target company
and then sold the shares for a profit after the bids became public.
27
The Supreme Court found the defendant not liable under Rule lOb-5
because he owed no fiduciary duty to the target company's shareholders
and therefore had no duty to disclose the information. 28 The Court bor-
rowed this fiduciary duty requirement from the notion of fraudulent non-
disclosure in the Restatement (Second) of Torts.2 9 Although the Court
framed insider trading as fraudulent nondisclosure that deprived share-
holders of the increased profits to be made after public announcement of
takeover bids, it stated that without a fiduciary duty, there can be no
fraud.
30
A dissent by Chief Justice Burger, however, foreshadowed later fed-
eral court decisions, including Peters (albeit in a Rule 10b-5 context). The
Chief Justice supported the concept of an absolute duty to disclose or ab-
stain based on a defendant's misappropriation of information, without any
breach of a specific fiduciary duty.
3 1
Whether jumping through the window left open by Burger or simply
responding to the narrow majority definition of impermissible insider
trading in Chiarella, the SEC quickly fired back. Using the authority
granted by § 14(e), it promulgated Rule 14e-332 in 1980. This rule prohib-
ited securities trading on the basis of an impending, unannounced tender
offer if knowledge of the offer comes from the offeror, the issuer of securi-
ties or an officer, director, partner or employee of the offering party or
24. Id.
25. 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
26. Id. at 227-28.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 232.
29. See id. at 228 & n.9 (quoting REsrA-EMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 551(2)(a) (1977)).
30. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 235.
31. Id. at 240 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
32. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3 (1993).
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the issuer.3 3 Most significantly, Rule 14e-3 did not require a breach of
fiduciary duty as a prerequisite to liability.
The tender offer has presented a new challenge to the definition of
insider trading liability. The challenge lies not only in the number of par-
ticipants, any one of whom may potentially have access to information
about the tender offer before it is publicly announced, but also in the
potential harm to the vast number of shareholders of the target company.
Although § 14(e) does not contain a definition of the tender offer, several
federal courts, in construing the statute, have identified factors for deter-
mining the presence of a tender offer.
3 4
Several other definitions of a tender offer have been forwarded, most
of which contain overlapping elements.3 5 Tender offers are usually made
for a large percentage of the corporation's stock, for a price above the
shares' market price, and are often open for a limited time.
3 6
In this type of securities transaction, the range of individuals with ac-
cess to inside information could include investment analysts, 3 7 financial
printers contracted to print tender offers,3 8 financial journalists3 9 and
others who have contact with either the acquiring company or the selling
(target) company. In such a context, it is difficult to pinpoint information
sources, and, as a result, the SEC adopted the broadly worded Rule 14e-3.
33. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3(a) (1993). For a discussion of Rule 14e-3's restrictions, see
Anabtawi, supra note 10, at 382.
34. The Fifth Circuit looks to eight factors in determining whether a stock purchase is a
tender offer: (1) active and widespread solicitation of shareholders for an issuer's shares; (2)
solicitation is made for a substantial percentage of the issuer's stock; (3) offer to purchase at
a premium over the prevailing market price; (4) terms of the offer are not negotiated; (5)
offer is contingent on the tender of a fixed minimum number of shares, and perhaps, subject
to a maximum number to be purchased; (6) offer is open for a limited time; (7) offerees are
subject to pressure to sell; and (8) public announcements of a purchasing program concern-
ing the target company precede or accompany a rapid accumulation of large amounts of
target company securities. Pin v. Texaco, Inc., 793 F.2d 1448, 1454 (5th Cir. 1986). Other
decisions incorporating this set of factors include SEC v. Carter Hawley Hale Stores, Inc., 760
F.2d 945, 949-952 (9th Cir. 1985); Energy Ventures, Inc. v. Appalachian Co., 587 F. Supp.
734, 740 (D. Del. 1984); Wellman v. Dickinson, 475 F. Supp. 783, 823-26 (S.D.N.Y. 1979),
affd, 682 F.2d 355 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1069 (1983).
The Second Circuit has used a two-part test to identify tender offers in § 14(d)'s tender
offer disclosure context: (1) "a substantial risk that solicitees will lack information needed to
make a carefully considered appraisal of the proposal put before them;" (2) "whether the
particular class of persons needs the protection of the [Securities] Act." Hanson Trust PLC v.
SCM Corp., 774 F.2d 47, 57 (2d Cir. 1985) (citation omitted).
The Fifth Circuit has incorporated both the preceding tests in determining whether a
tender offer has been made, albeit in a § 14(e) discussion. See Anago Inc. v. Tecnol Medical
Products, Inc., 792 F. Supp. 514, 516-517 (N.D. Tex. 1992), afld, 976 F.2d 248 (5th Cir.
1992), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 491 (1993).
35. See, e.g., Proposed Amendments to Tender Offer Rules, SEC Release Nos. 33-6159,
34-16385, 44 Fed. Reg. 70,349, 70,350-51 (1979) (codified as amended without the proposed
definition at 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-l (b) (1993)). For a discussion of this proposal and others,
see Steve Mather, The Elusive Definition of a Tender Offer, 7 J. Corn'. L. 503, 513 (1982).
36. See Wellman v. Dickinson, 475 F. Supp. 783, 823-26 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (looking to fac-
tors listed supra note 34), aftd, 682 F.2d 355 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1069 (1983).
37. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983).
38. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
39. Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19 (1987).
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Two years later, however, the Court expanded on its Chiarella analysis
in Dirks v. SEC.40 Dirks involved an investment analyst who heard from a
former corporate officer that the company's assets were fraudulently over-
stated. The analyst, wanting to expose the fraud, did his own investigation
by interviewing several company officers and employees. Some of the in-
terviews corroborated the fraud allegation. Dirks discussed his findings
with several clients, who then sold their equity funding shares in the
company.
41
The Court held Dirks breached no fiduciary duty to the corporate
shareholders. 4 2 The Court began its analysis by reemphasizing its Chiarella
holding that it is not illegal to trade on inside information when no fiduci-
ary relationship exists. 43 The Court characterized Dirks as a tippee, be-
cause he received his information from company insiders, and asserted "a
tippee assumes a fiduciary duty . . . when the [tipping] insider has
breached his fiduciary duty... and the tippee knows or should know that
there has been a breach." 4 4 It then found that, since Dirks' sources had
breached no duty, 45 Dirks could not be guilty of a "derivative breach."46
The federal courts of appeals largely followed the Supreme Court's
lead when confronted with opportunities to define insider trading liability.
Situated in the nation's financial center, the Second Circuit spoke first in
United States v. Newman.
47
The defendant in Newman, a securities trader, received secret infor-
mation from investment bankers about proposed acquisitions and mergers
and then passed this information on to individuals who traded and prof-
ited.4 8 The Second Circuit, using the duty requirement from Chiarella,
held that the defendant violated Rule lOb-5 by aiding the tipping invest-
ment bankers in violating the fiduciary duty owed to their employers,
49
since those companies relied on their reputation as safe havens for their
customers' confidence.
50
Three years later, the Second Circuit held a defendant's insider trad-
ing to be a breach of duty in SEC v. Materia,5 1 this time describing a finan-
cial printer's procurement of nonpublic information about a pending
tender offer as a fraud against his employer's reputation. 52 The Third
Circuit adopted the fiduciary duty requirement in Rothberg v. Rosenbloom 
5 3
40. 463 U.S. 646 (1983).
41. Id. at 648-49.
42. Id. at 667.
43. Id. at 654-55.
44. Id. at 660.
45. The court of appeals noted that the tippers derived no monetary gain from the
information given Dirks and had no intent to divulge profitable information. To the con-
trary, "the tippers were motivated by a desire to expose fraud." Id. at 667.
46. Id.
47. 664 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1981).
48. Id. at 15.
49. Id. at 15-16.
50. Id. at 17.
51. 745 F.2d 197 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1053 (1985).
52. Id. at 199, 202.
53. 771 F.2d 818 (3d Cir. 1985).
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According to the court, any insider to a proposed transaction is liable for
insider trading if he or she breaches the fiduciary duty owed to his or her
corporation.
54
Many of the federal district court insider trading decisions during this
era came from the Southern District of New York, whose jurisdiction en-
compasses Wall Street. This court held in O'Connor & Associates v. Dean
Witter Reynolds, Inc.55 that persons other than corporate shareholders have
a duty to abstain or disclose if they acquire material nonpublic informa-
tion.56 This statement approximated a holding that the existence or ab-
sence of fiduciary duty is irrelevant to insider trader liability. Three years
later, however, the same court relied on a breach of fiduciary duty to the
target (selling) company in a takeover bid in SEC v. Musella.57 The court
later expanded the scope of liability slightly in SEC v. Tome58 by holding
the duty may be owed to anyone, not just the target company. 59 Neverthe-
less, the duty requirement remained.
With the Chiarella decision, the subsequent holding in Dirks and the
consistent lower federal court decisions, the judiciary had drawn the most
permissive parameters yet for insider trading. Fear of slanting the securi-
ties market playing field in favor of financial insiders created a situation
ripe for a strengthening the law. Much later, the Supreme Court itself
may have reacted to such a climate in Carpenter v. United States60 when it
viewed a Wall Street Journal columnist's insider trading activity as a breach
of fiduciary duty to the newspaper itself.6 1 Defendant Winans had given
out advance information regarding the content of his column in return
for a share of the profits made by trading on the information.6 2 A divided
Court upheld the defendants' convictions.
63
The Court's decision, however, came seven years after Chiarella and
hardly heralded a wholesale shift in insider trading restrictions. Addition-
ally, its decision in Dirks did not invalidate Rule 14e-3. The Court's silence
left the burden of clarifying the boundaries of insider trading liability
under Rule 14e-3 to the Second Circuit's decision in United States v.
Chestman.
64
In 1990, a panel of the Second Circuit reversed Robert Chestman's
conviction for insider trading in connection with a tender offer.65 In so
54. Id. at 822.
55. 529 F. Supp. 1179 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
56. Id. at 1186. O'Connor also dealt with Rule 14e-3 liability, noting that the rule only
requires " 'substantial . . . steps to commence'" a tender offer to bring an insider trader
within the scope of the rule. Id. at 1189 (quoting 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e.3 (1993)).
57. 578 F. Supp. 425, 436 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
58. 638 F. Supp. 596 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
59. Id. at 618.
60. 484 U.S. 19 (1987) (evenly divided decision).
61. Id. at 27-28.
62. Id. at 25.
63. Id. at 28.
64. 947 F.2d 551 (2d Cir. 1991) (en banc) [hereinafter Chestman II], cert. denied, 112 S.
Ct. 1759 (1992).
65. United States v. Chestman, 903 F.2d 75, 84 (2d Cir. 1990) [hereinafter Chestman I],
vacated on reh'gen banc, 947 F.2d 551 (2d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1759 (1992).
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doing, the panel divided on the issue of the validity of Rule 14e-3.
Although Judge Miner, writing for the court, specifically noted the SEC
was acting within its § 14(e) authority in promulgating the rule,66 two
judges disagreed. Judges Mahoney67 and Carman 68 concluded that the
agency had exceeded its statutory powers in adopting the rule.
Upon rehearing en banc, the Second Circuit reaffirmed Rule 14e-3 as
a valid exercise of the SEC's legislative mandate.69 In the process, the
court quoted the Supreme Court in Schreiber v. Burlington Northern, Inc.
70
for the proposition that the SEC had the authority to promulgate prophy7
lactic rules under § 14(e). 7 1 The Second Circuit explicitly stated that no
fiduciary duty is necessary to create liability for one who trades on material
nonpublic information.
72
With the need in Chestman for an en banc reconsideration of Rule 14e-
3's validity and the absence of any pronouncements from the Supreme
Court, the scope of tender offer-related insider trading liability was far
from resolved. The next opportunity to consider the issue fell to the
Tenth Circuit.
II. SEC V. P TEi s
In a partnership setting, partners have a duty to each other, limited to
the scope of the partnership's business, not to gain advantage through
false statements, failures to disclose, threats or pressure. 74 A partner's fail-
ure to disclose knowledge of information regarding an impending tender
offer was at the center of the Tenth Circuit's discussion of fiduciary duty,
and its validation of Rule 14e-3,
75 in Peters.76
A. Facts
Don Peters and Ivan West were partners in Investment Management
Group ("IMG"). West did consulting work outside the partnership for En-
ergy Resources Group, Inc. ("ERG"). This work included seeking a
friendly acquirer for ERG. 7 7 West found a purchaser. Shortly before the
announcement of the tender offer, Peters allegedly tipped information
about the purchase to individuals who purchased shares of ERG stock.
78
66. Id. at 83-84.
67. Id. at 84 (Mahoney, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
68. Id. at 86 (Carman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
69. Chestman II, 947 F.2d at 559-60.
70. 472 U.S. 1 (1985).
71. Chestman II, 947 F.2d at 563 (qubting Schreiber, 472 U.S. at 11 n.11).
72. Id. at 557 (asserting that Rule 14e-3 "creates a duty in those traders who fall within its
ambit to abstain or disclose, without regard to whether the trader owes a pre-existing fiduci-
ary duty to respect the confidentiality of the information").
73. 978 F.2d 1162 (10th Cir. 1992).
74. 59A AM. JUR. 2D Partnership § 420 (1987) (outlining duties among partners); see Pe-
ters, 978 F.2d at 1168 (discussing some of these principles).
75. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e.3 (1993).
76. 978 F.2d at 1164, 1167-68.




After public announcement, these individuals sold their shares at a profit
of $2.00 to $2.50 per share. 79 Peters allegedly gained access to the infor-
mation from memos in a notebook West left on his desk at the IMG
office.
80
The SEC filed a civil suit against Peters, alleging violations of
§ 10(b) 8 1 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 as well as SEC Rules 1Ob-
582 and 14e-3.83 At trial, the jury found Peters not liable for any violations.
The Tenth Circuit reversed and remanded, finding the district court erred
in instructing the jury that a Rule 14e-3 violation required breach of a
fiduciary duty.
84
B. The Court's Analysis
In holding that Peters could be held liable without any fiduciary duty
to West, the court of appeals found that Rule 14e-3 required no implied
fiduciary duty8 5 and was a valid promulgation under congressional author-
ity granted through § 14(e). 8 6 The court explained that the district
court's erroneous jury instruction was not harmless error, since the jury
might have found for Peters because West's ERG work was outside the
partnership's business and therefore beyond the reach of Peters' fiduciary
relationship with West.
87
The court concluded that § 14(e) granted the SEC liberal rulemaking
authority to promulgate a rule as broad as 14e-3. The court adopted two
policy arguments to support its holding. First, since Rule 14e-3 was aimed
specifically at deterring insider trading in the tender offer context, it is not
subject to the same fiduciary duty requirement as Rule lob-5. 88 To hold
otherwise, the court suggested, would "do nothing more than . . . pro-
scribe conduct already proscribed by Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5." 89
Second, the court ruled that in a tender offer context, where many players
are involved who may have no loyalty to the target company, a fiduciary
duty requirement posed an evidentiary hurdle incompatible with the spirit
of the authority granted to the SEC in § 14(e). 90
79. See Appellant's Brief at 8, SEC v. Peters, 978 F.2d 1162 (10th Cir. 1992) (No. 90-
3346).
80. See SEC v. Peters, 735 F. Supp. 1505, 1512-14 (D. Kan. 1990), rev'd, 978 F.2d 1162
(10th Cir. 1992).
81. 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1988).
82. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1993).
83. Peters, 978 F.2d at 1164.
84. Id. at 1165-68. The court found a second ground for reversal in an evidentiary issue
that will not be discussed in this Comment. See id. at 1168-73; see also id. at 1173-77 (Alley, J,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (agreeing with the majority on the Rule 14e issue).
85. Id. at 1167.
86. Id.; see 15 U.S.C. § 78(n)(e) (1988).
87. Id. at 1167-68.
88. Id. at 1166 n.4. (citing Schreiber v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 472 U.S. 1, 10-11
(1985) (stating that § 14(e) is addressed specifically to disclosure in the tender offer
context)).
89. Id.
90. See id. at 1167; see also H.R. REp. No. 910, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 15 (1988), reprinted in
1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6043, 6052 (making the connection between the investor and inside infor-
mation can be an obstacle to prosecuting insider trading cases).
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The court of appeals buttressed these policy arguments with refer-
ence to the passage of the Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforce-
ment Act of 1988 ("ITSFEA"), 91 which the court saw as a ratification of
Rule 14e-3.92 Although the ITSFEA hearings or reports made no refer-
ence to Rule 14e-3, the court presumed Congress was aware of the exist-
ence of a rule on such a closely related issue. 93 Congress designed the
1988 Act to strengthen the enforcement of existing insider trading laws,
94
and not to abridge the SEC's powers under § 14(e) and Rule 14e-3 to
regulate insider trading.
The Tenth Circuit framed its decision as a natural extension of
emerging insider trading law. It appealed to prior statutory mandate and
legislative history and noted the SEC's need for adequate measures to po-
lice the securities marketplace by holding that insider trading liability in
the tender offer context does not require a breach of fiduciary duty. The
court cited Chestman, which directly stated this proposition. 95 Peters con-
firmed the en banc Chestman validation of Rule 14e-3 and continued the
Second Circuit's broad proscription of insider trading activity.
III. ANALYsis
Congress, the courts, and the SEC have struggled to properly define
insider trading liability parameters. As the Williams Act,9 6 Chiarella v.
United States,97 Rule 14e-3, 98 Dirks v. SEC,99 United States v. Chestman10 0 and
SEC v. Peters10 1 illustrate, these definitions have often taken the form of
sharp reactions to another entity's pronouncements on the subject.
Recent court decisions, however, indicate the parameters may finally
be stabilizing. The Tenth Circuit's refusal in Peters to read a fiduciary duty
requirement into Rule 14e-3 is consistent with Chestman; moreover, the
decision will enhance the integrity of securities markets without inhibiting
legitimate market research and communication.
91. Pub. L. No. 100-704, 102 Stat. 4677 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-1 (1988
& Supp. IV 1992)).
92. Peters, 978 F.2d at 1167.
93. Id.
94. See H.R. REP. No. 910, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 35 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N.
6043, 6072; see also Howard M. Friedman, The Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement
Act of 1988, 68 N.C. L. REv. 465, 475 (1990) (citing legislative history of the 1988 Act as
validation of Rule 14e-3).
95. See United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 557 (2d Cir. 1991) (en banc), cert.
denied, 112 S. Ct. 1759 (1992).
96. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-(e), 78n(d)-(f) (1988).
97. 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
98. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3 (1993).
99. 463 U.S. 646 (1983).
100. 947 F.2d 551 (2d Cir. 1991) (en banc), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1759 (1992).
101. 978 F.2d 1162 (10th Cir. 1992).
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Section 14(e) grants the SEC power to take steps "reasonably
designed" 10 4 to prevent unlawful activities in the tender offer context, and
it contains no evident fiduciary duty requirement. Some writers have
questioned whether Rule 14e-3 is simply a retread of Rule lOb-5 aimed at
preventing fraud. These critics of the Chestman/Peters approach point to
the similarity in language between Rule 10b-5 and Rule 14e-3 and reason
that Rule 14e-3 should be subject to the same duty requirement as has
been read into Rule 10b-5.105
This criticism ignores the difference between § 10(b) and § 14(e) and
the problems they address. The SEC aimed Rule 14e-3 directly at tender
offers. 10 6 The unique trading context of the tender offer creates a need
for different regulatory techniques. In its release accompanying the pro-
mulgation of Rule 14e-3, the SEC clearly stated that Rule 14e-3 addresses a
different concern than Rule 10b-5-tender offers.
10 7
2. Legislative History of Insider Trading Statutes
The legislative history behind § 14(e) and ITSFEA10 8 also supports
the Tenth Circuit's holding in Peters. The SEC provided the Senate Sub-
committee on Securities with a memorandum during the consideration of
§ 14(e).10 9 The memorandum specifically referred to the problem of in-
dividuals trading on undisclosed information regarding an upcoming
tender offer-the exact scenario played out in Peters. Significantly, the
memo contained no mention of a fiduciary requirement in its discussion
of liability for insider trading in tender offer contexts.1 10
It is not surprising that the SEC interpreted the legislation in an ex-
pansive manner. Statements by representatives of the financial commu-
nity before the Senate Subcommittee indicated the group most affected by
this new legislation also agreed on the need for broad SEC regulatory pow-
102. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1993).
103. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1988).
104. Id.
105. Report of the ABA Task Force on Regulation of Insider Trading, Part I Regulation Under the
Antifraud Provisions of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, reprinted in 41 Bus. LAw. 223, 251
(1985).
106. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3(a) (1993).
107. SEC Release Nos. 33-6239; 34-17120, 45 Fed. Reg. 60410, 60412 n.20 (1980); see also
Karen A. Tallman, Note, Private Causes of Action under SEC Rule 14e-3, 51 GEO. WASH. L. REv.
290, 296 (1983) (discussing congressional concern with equal access to material information
concerning tender offers).
108. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-1 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
109. See Additional Consumer Protection in Corporate Takeovers and Increasing the Securities Act
Exemptions for Small Businessmen, Hearing on S. 336 and S. 3431 Before the Subcomm. on Securities
of the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1970) (SEC memoran-
dum submitted to Senate Subcommittee on Securities).
110. See id. For a brief discussion of the SEC memorandum, see Friedman, supra note 94,
at 474.
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ers in the tender offer context. 111  Congress was thus well aware of the
notion of broad authority for the SEC under § 14(e), and the finished
product, as discussed above, indicates no disagreement with such an inter-
pretation-one which presages the Peters decision.
Legislative history of ITSFEA also supports the interpretation that
§ 14(e) does not require a fiduciary duty. Congress designed ITSFEA to
strengthen existing enforcement of securities trading. 112 Committee re-
ports indicate Congress was fully aware of the evidentiary hurdles that hin-
dered the pinpointing of inside information in tender offers.
1 13
Whatever the motive for the original omission, Congress had a clear
opportunity to enact a duty requirement in 1988 if it so desired. During
ITSFEA hearings, the Senate Securities Subcommittee was directly asked
to consider the adequacy of the SEC's regulatory remedies,'1 4 and the
parallel House Subcommittee was given a thorough explanation of the
misappropriation theory, which contains no fiduciary duty require-
ment. 115 With a direct opportunity to reconsider restrictions on insider
trading liability, Congress declined to add a fiduciary duty prerequisite to
liability in the tender offer arena.
B. The Tenth Circuit's Interpretation of Rule 14e-3: Promoting Fairness
Without Discouraging the Lawful Flow of Information
A broad scope of liability, including the absence of the fiduciary duty
prerequisite, should enhance the integrity of the securities market. At the
same time, it should not adversely affect the legitimate communication of
information in the markets.
The need for broader regulatory authority vis-a-vis tender offers is ap-
parent. Tender offers involve any number of shareholders who are right-
fully entitled to the profits generated by selling shares after public
announcement of the offer. Any individual who gains access to informa-
tion about the impending offer, regardless of whether any fiduciary duty is
owed to anyone, can trade (factually, not legally) on that information
before public announcement. If a person does, the person defrauds the
111. See, e.g., Additional Consumer Protection in Corporate Takeovers and Increasing the Securities
Act Exemptions for Small Businessmen: Hearing on S. 336 and S. 3431 Before the Subcomm. on Securi-
ties of the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 116 (1970) (statement of
Craig Severance, Chairman of the Federal Securities Acts Committee, Investment Bankers
Association).
112. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
113. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 910, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 15 (1988), reprinted in 1988
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6043, 6052.
114. "The third and final question I have asked our witnesses to address is this. Does the
SEC currently have adequate resources to do its job correctly and does it possess adequate reme-
dies to deter securities laws violations?" Oversight of the Securities and Exchange Commission and the
Securities Industry: Hearing on the Proper Roles of Government and Self-Regulation in Light of the Shift
in Policy Focus of the SEC in the Past Few Years Before the Subcomm. on Securities of the Senate Commit-
tee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1987) (statement of Sen.
Donald W. Riegle, Jr., Chairman of the Subcomm. on Securities) (emphasis added).
115. SEC and Insider Trading: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of
the House Committee on Energy and Commerce, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 80-81 (1986) (statement of
John Shad, Chairman of the SEC).
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shareholders "as surely as if that person took their money."1 1 6 In fact,
such traders are taking money in the form of potential profits. The pas-
sage of § 14(e) reflected the need to eliminate such fraud, irrespective of
any fiduciary relationship.
17
The language in § 14(e), the legislative history of recent insider trad-
ing statutes, and the trend away from a fiduciary duty requirement in re-
cent tender offer cases all support an absence of the fiduciary duty
requirement under Rule 14e-3. These arguments are buttressed by review-
ing who the fiduciaries generally are-corporate insiders. It is fraudulent
for those insiders to trade on the basis of nonpublic material information
without disclosure in the corporate context, because those insiders owe a
fiduciary duty of disclosure to their shareholders when engaged in
purchases from or sales to those shareholders.'
18
The "insider" relationship which gives rise to the fiduciary duty in the
Rule lOb-5 context' 19 may not be present in tender offers. The tender
offeror is not a director or officer of the target company, and therefore,
the offeror has no fiduciary duty to the shareholders of the target com-
pany. Limiting liability to those with a fiduciary duty to the target com-
pany's shareholders would insulate from liability all those who are privy to
the information because of a relationship with the tender offeror.
The plans of the tender offeror are cloaked in secrecy from the target
shareholders. Just as the Williams Act aimed to protect target sharehold-
ers through disclosure requirements,12 0 the SEC must be able to protect
those shareholders by broadly regulating the insider trading that poten-
tially can be effected by anyone with nonpublic knowledge about a future
tender offer.
This regulatory mandate should not have the effect of trampling the
flow of information, including lawful market research and communication
about transactions. The key to preserving legitimate dissemination of in-
formation is found in Rule 14e-3 itself. The Rule establishes liability only
for those who know, or should know, that the information about the im-
pending tender offer is not yet public and that the information came from
any one of a list of 'insiders' to the upcoming tender offer.12 1 Therefore,
an insider or his tippee is subject to liability. The innocent individual who
gleans information which he or she does not know, and has no reason to
116. United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12, 17 (2d Cir. 1981).
117. See H.R. REp. No. 1711, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2811, 2821 (emphasizing need to prevent fraudulent or manipulative practices and making
no mention of fiduciary duty requirement).
118. See, e.g., Kohler v. Kohler Co., 319 F.2d 634, 637-38 (7th Cir. 1963); Kardon v. Na-
tional Gypsum Co., 73 F. Supp. 798, 800 (E.D. Pa.), opinion supplemented by 83 F. Supp. 613
(E.D. Pa. 1947). For a historic overview of the corporate insider as fiduciary, see
LANGEVOORT, supra note 8, § 2.02, at 35-39.
119. Tippees have a duty to abstain or disclose as well as corporate insiders under Rule
I0b-5. HAROLD S. BLOOMENTHAL, SEcuRTEs LAw HANDBOOK § 19.01[4] (1993 ed.). The tip-
pee's fiduciary duty, however, stems from the fact an insider with a fiduciary duty has dis-
closed the information to the tippee. Id. § 19.01, at 19-10 (quoting Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S.
646, 664 (1983)).
120. See supra note 117, at 2811-13.
121. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3(a) (1993).
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know, is nonpublic, even though it is in fact nonpublic, and who did not
know the information came from someone on the Rule's "list," may still
trade on that information without liability. The duty to abstain or disclose,
however, is still intact under Rule 14e-3, as interpreted by Peters, for those
persons who have "reason to know" that the information is not yet public
or that the information has its source in one of the listed individuals in
Rule 14e-3.
122
The regulation also mandates that a "substantial step or steps to com-
mence" a tender offer be taken before the abstain or disclose rule takes
effect.' 23 Therefore, market analysts making or recommending invest-
ment decisions on the basis of pure research, in the absence of any activity
having been taken regarding the tender offer, are not subject to liability.
The Rule further limits liability by requiring that the nonpublic infor-
mation traded on must be "material."1 24 The SEC notes that information
about intentions to make a tender offer, as well as information about the
withdrawal of tender offers or increases in consideration being offered to
target company shareholders, would be material.
125
The "anti-tipping" provision in Rule 14e-3(d)1 2 6 also allows for some
flexibility. 127 The provision provides for liability only where it was "reason-
ably foreseeable" to the tipper that the tip could result in a Rule 14e-3
violation. 128 This language acts as a safeguard to the innocuous communi-
cation of market information to one, for example, who is not an investor
or associated with investors.
Finally, the Rule provides for two exceptions to the abstain or disclose
requirement. Brokers or agents for the tender offeror may purchase se-
curities for the tender offeror.129 Additionally, target company sharehold-
ers who have received material nonpublic information from the tender
offeror may sell stock to the offeror.
13 0
Rule 14e-3 thus has its intended effect: to enforce prohibitions of
insider trading regarding tender offers without the irrelevant hindrance of
a fiduciary duty prerequisite, while allowing legitimate, untainted market
communication surrounding market transactions to take place.
122. Id.
123. Id. Such steps could include: voting by the offeror's board of directors on a resolu-
tion to make an offer; devising a plan to make such an offer; arrangement of financing for
the offer; preparing tender offer materials; and authorizing negotiations in connection with
a tender offer. SEC Release Nos. 33-6239; 34-17120, supra note 107, at 60,413 n.33.
124. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3(a) (1993).
125. SEC Release Nos. 33-6239; 34-17120, supra note 107, at 60,413 n.35.
126. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3(d) (1993).
127. See LANGEVOORT, supra note 8, § 7.04 (discussing reach of Rule 14e-3(d) liability).
128. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3(d)(1) (1993).
129. Id. § 240.14e-3(c).
130. Id. § 240.14e-3(c) (2). The SEC's rationale for this exception is that the potential for
abuse of the information in such a scenario is "negligible." SEC Release Nos. 33-6239; 34-
17120, supra note 107, at 60,416.
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C. Insider Trading Law After Peters
1. Back to the Future: The Decline of the Fiduciary Duty
Requirement
As noted, the Peters decision follows Chestman in refusing to read a
fiduciary duty requirement into Rule 14e-3. The Supreme Court has yet to
speak on Rule 14e-3 in the wake of Chestman and Peters. In Chiarella and
other earlier lower-level federal decisions, however, one can find clues sug-
gesting future federal decisions will omit the fiduciary duty requirement
altogether.
The Supreme Court's 1980 Chiarella decision specifically laid out the
fiduciary duty prerequisite to insider trading liability. Within that deci-
sion, however, lay a clue to the Court's underlying theory of liability. The
duty to abstain or disclose, according to the Court, arose not just from a
fiduciary relationship but also from "the unfairness of allowing a corporate
insider to take advantage of that information by trading without disclo-
sure." 13 1 The reference to "unfairness" reveals a concern for protecting
honest traders that has at least as much to do with notions of a level play-
ing field of information as it does with fiduciary relationships.
132
The "fairness" basis for liability, although far from fruition at the
Supreme Court level, has been more clearly evidenced in the federal
courts of appeals. By the time of its decision in SEC v. Materia,a3 3 the
Second Circuit was straining to fit notions of duty into a tender offer sce-
nario. The Second Circuit then completely ended its reliance on a fiduci-
ary duty requirement for Rule 14e-3 in United States v. Chestman.134 Seen
in this context, Peters looks a lot less like trail blazing and more like contin-
uing an existing trend toward upholding the broad regulatory authority
Congress intended to give the SEC.
2. Judicial Interpretation of "Reasonably Designed to Prevent"
The Chestman and Peters decisions may also reflect an increased will-
ingness of federal courts to broadly interpret the "reasonably designed to
prevent" language 135 that appears in several other SEC rules. 136 The Sec-
131. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 227 (1980) (citing In re Cady, Roberts & Co.,
40 S.E.C. 907, 912 & n.15 (1961)).
132. For further discussion on the trend away from fiduciary duty and toward "unfair-
ness" as a basis for insider trading liability, even in the Rule lOb-5 context, see LANGEVOORT,
supra note 8, § 2.02[3], at 44-45 (noting the fiduciary duty concept makes little sense in light
of the fact the insider trading law now provides liability for tippees as well as corporate
insiders).
133. 745 F.2d 197 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1053 (1985).
134. 947 F.2d 551 (2d Cir. 1991) (en banc), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1759 (1992).
135. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3(d)(1) (1993) reads:
As a means reasonably designed to prevent fraudulent, deceptive or manipula-
tive acts or practices within the meaning of section 14(e) of the Act, it shall be
unlawful for any person described in paragraph (d) (2) of this section to communi-
cate material, nonpublic information relating to a tender offer to any other person
under circumstances in which it is reasonably foreseeable that such communication
is likely to result in a violation of this section except that this paragraph shall not
apply to a communication made in good faith.
1994]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
ond Circuit held that the delegation of authority to the SEC to make rules
"reasonably designed to prevent" fraudulent trading activity includes the
power to regulate conduct other than fraud. 137 Likewise, the Tenth Cir-
cuit stated that such rulemaking authority allows the SEC to "ease the evi-
dentiary burden" inherent in tender offer insider trading by eliminating
the fiduciary duty requirement.
38
What remains to be seen is whether these broad interpretations of the
"reasonably designed to prevent" language will work their way into cases
involving aspects of securities fraud beyond insider trading, such as the
regulation of both tender offeror practices1 3 9 and target company prac-
tices. 140 The Tenth Circuit's broad interpretation of this language may
have an effect beyond insider trading.
CONCLUSION
Congress, the courts, and the SEC have engaged in a series of insider
trading liability definitions since the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.141
Their definitions have often represented negative reactions to another
branch's definition, so that in recent years the parameters of insider trad-
ing liability have been in flux, particularly with respect to tender offers.
The Tenth Circuit's holding in SEC v. Peters142 discloses a broad-based
theory of insider trading liability in the tender offer context. It approves
the SEC's promulgation of Rule 14e-3 as read on its face, without a re-
quirement of fiduciary duty. This decision represents not an abrupt de-
tour, but a logical extension of recent case law governing insider trading.
Equally importantly, it seems to stabilize the definition of tender offer-
related insider trading liability. At the same time, it may provide a prece-
dent for broadly interpreting the "reasonably designed to prevent" lan-
guage outside the tender offer context.
The Tenth Circuit's so-called "removal" of the fiduciary duty require-
ment was actually a refusal to read such a requirement into Rule 14e-3 and
reflects an appreciation of the uniqueness of tender offers and their po-
tential for abuse by those without a fiduciary duty to the target company
shareholders. Rule 14e-3 contains ample safeguards to ensure that those
making decisions on the basis of legitimate market research are not penal-
ized. The Tenth Circuit's reading of the Rule will help deter fraud perpe-
136. See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-3(b) (2) (1993); 17 C.F.IR § 240.13e-4(b) (2) (1993); 17
C.F.R. § 240.14e-1 (1993); 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-2(a) (1993); 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c2-6(a) (1993);
17 C.F.R. § 240.15c2-11(a) (1993); 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c2-12(a) (1993); 17 C.F.R. § 240.15g-8
(1993).
137. United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 558 (2d Cir. 1991) (en banc), cert. denied,
112 S. Ct. 1759 (1992).
138. SEC v. Peters, 978 F.2d 1162, 1167 (10th Cir. 1992).
139. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-1 (1993).
140. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-2 (1993).
141. 15 U.S.C. § 78 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
142. 978 F.2d 1162 (10th Cir. 1992).
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trated by insider traders in the tender offer context without discouraging
the legitimate dissemination of information.




Federal administrative agencies play a large role in articulating and
implementing public policy in the United States.' Thus, they wield a
power that affects the lives of all Americans. Congress and the courts con-
tinue to develop legal principles that attempt to define the limits of that
power. In doing so, however, they consistently take a deferential approach
to agency action. This broad deference to agency action raises questions
as to whether any meaningful limits on agency action exist.
In its most recent term, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit continued its policy of extending substantial deference to
agency decision-making. The court did so by reaffirming its adherence to
three widely accepted principles of administrative law: (1) deference to
reasonable agency interpretation of its governing statute; (2) limiting re-
view of agency action to "review on the record"; and (3) deference to
agency action that is not "arbitrary or capricious." These highly deferen-
tial standards do not, however, provide a substantial check on agency
power.
In NLRB v. Viola Industries-Elevator Division, Inc.,2 the Tenth Circuit
extended deference to the National Labor Relations Board's decision to
reinterpret a portion of its governing statute.3 The new interpretation dis-
placed a long-standing rule that the Supreme Court had arguably articu-
lated as the law. 4 The agency's adoption of a new, albeit, reasonable
interpretation of the statute raised serious questions under the separation
of powers doctrine.
5
In Bar MK Ranches v. Yuetter,6 the Tenth Circuit limited its review of a
United States Forest Service decision to the "record." The court narrowly
interpreted this "review on the record" limitation to include only those
documents examined by the agency when it made its original determina-
tion. 7 In some cases, this narrow interpretation of the "record" will pre-
clude the court from undertaking a more substantive evaluation of the
legality of the agency's action.
Within the narrow boundaries of "review on the record," the court in
Yuetter only sought to determine if the agency decision was arbitrary or
capricious. 8 This is arguably the most deferential standard of review. This
1. William L. Andreen, An Introduction to Federal Administrative Law Part I: The Exercise of
Administrative Power and Judicial Review, 50 ALA. LAw. 322 (1989).
2. 979 F.2d 1384 (10th Cir. 1992).
3. Id. at 1394.
4. Id. at 1398.
5. Id. at 1397.
6. 994 F.2d 735 (10th Cir. 1993).
7. Id. at 739.
8. Id.
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standard was also strictly applied in Lewis v. Babbitt,9 where the Tenth Cir-
cuit reviewed various decisions by the National Park Service to determine
if they were arbitrary or capricious.
10
These cases illustrate the Tenth Circuit's adherence to broadly ac-
cepted principles of administrative law that extend substantial deference
to agency action. This broadly deferential approach, however, raises ques-
tions as to whether there are meaningful limits on agency power.
I. WHEN AN AGENCY CHANGES ITS MIND: DEFERENCE, RETROACTIVrrY
AND CONSTITUTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS IN ALRB v. VIOLA
INDUSTRIES-ELEVA TOR DnwsIov, INC.1
A. Background
1. Deference to Agency Interpretations
The Administrative Procedure Act 12 ("APA") provides a uniform set
of legal principles to be applied to federal agencies.13 The APA, and the
Supreme Court's interpretation of its various provisions, establish the basis
for judicial review of administrative decisions.
14
From this foundation, Congress and the federal courts have contin-
ued to struggle with exactly how to control the authority of administrative
agencies. Judicial review of agency action is generally considered a neces-
sary check against abuses of agency authority. 15 Yet, judicial intervention
can frustrate an agency's effectiveness.
16
The APA does not explicitly indicate how much deference should be
accorded to agency interpretations. 17 Thus, the question of when courts
should defer to an agency's interpretation of its governing statute has
been the basis of considerable debate. The judiciary's approach has
ranged between two extremes: courts ignoring the administrative view and
employing traditional tools of statutory interpretation to arrive at what
they regard as the best interpretation of the statute; and courts framing
the inquiry in terms of whether the administrative interpretation is one
that a reasonable interpreter might make.18 Under the latter deferential
approach, a court acknowledges that the statute is susceptible to multiple
interpretations.' 9 The court does not attempt to discover the best inter-
9. 998 F.2d 880 (10th Cir. 1993).
10. Id. at 881.
11. 979 F.2d 1384 (10th Cir. 1992).
12. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559, 701-706 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
13. Id.
14. John C. Haas, Survey, Administrative Law, 70 DENV. U. L. REv. 625, 625 (1993); see also
Kenneth W. Starr, Judicial Review in the Post-Chevron Era, 3 YALE J. ON REG. 283, 307-08 (1986)
(stating that courts are mandated by the APA to "check" administrative agencies).
15. Eric M. Braun, Note, Coring the Seedless Grape: A Reinterpretation of Chevron U.S.A.
Inc. v. NRDC, 87 COLUM. L. REv. 986, 987 (1987).
16. Id.
17. See5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559, 701-706 (1988 & Supp. IV 1993).





pretation, but rather seeks to assure that the agency view does not contra-
dict the statute.
20
Prior to the 1984 Supreme Court decision in Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v.
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,21 courts were inconsistent in their
approach toward the issue of deference.2 2 Chevron provided a procedural
formula for courts to follow in determining whether to defer to agency
interpretations. The issue in Chevron was the meaning of the term "statio-
nary source" in the 1970 and 1977 Amendments to the Clean Air Act.23
The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) interpreted the term to
mean that an entire factory could be a single "stationary source" under
certain circumstances. 24 This became known as the "bubble concept"
since an entire factory would be treated as a single stationary source en-
closed in a bubble.
25
The court of appeals held that the EPA's interpretation conflicted
with the statute. 26 The court recognized that neither the statutory lan-
guage nor the legislative history compelled any particular interpretation of
the term "stationary source."2 7 The court reasoned, however, that the cor-
rect meaning of the term could nevertheless be drawn from the overall
statutory purpose.2 8 This approach allowed the court to conclude that the
bubble concept was statutorily prohibited because the general purpose of
the Clean Air Act Amendments was to improve, rather than merely main-
tain, air quality.
2 9
The Supreme Court reversed,3 0 declaring that the appellate court
"misconceived the nature of its role in reviewing the regulations."3 1 The
Court then set out a two-step test for judicial review of agency statutory
interpretations:
First, always, is the question whether Congress has directly spo-
ken to the precise question at issue. If the intent of Congress is
20. Id.
21. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
22. See, e.g., Merrill, supra note 18, at 971; Claude T. Coffman, Judicial Review of Adminis-
trative Interpretations of Statutes, 6 W. NEw ENG. L. REv. 1, 3 (1983); see also Haas, supra note 14,
at 625 (discussing the Supreme Court's inability to develop a consistent position on defer-
ence prior to 1984).
23. 467 U.S. at 840; see Clean Air Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, § 111 (a) (3),
84 Stat. 1676, 1683 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 7411(a) (3) (1988)); Clean Air
Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, § 172(b) (6), 91 Stat. 685, 747 (codified as amended
at 42 U.S.C. § 7502(b) (6) (1988)). The term was important because to construct or modify a
"stationary source" that emitted more than 100 tons of pollution per year and was located in
an area that did not meet federal air quality standards, an applicant had to comply with
rigorous statutory standards. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 864 n.38.
24. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 840; see also 46 Fed. Reg. 50,766 (1981) (notice of a final rule
adopting the "plantwide" definition). The EPA's definition would limit the number of
sources to be reviewed for permits. See id.
25. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 840.
26. NRDC v. Gorsuch, 685 F.2d 718, 726 (D.C. Cir. 1982), rev'd sub nom. Chevron U.S.A.
Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
27. Id. at 726 n.39.
28. Id. at 726.
29. Id. at 726-27.
30. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 866.
31. Id. at 845.
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clear,.., the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the
unambiguously expressed intent of Congress. If, however....
the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific is-
sue, the question for the court is whether the agency's answer is
based on a permissible construction of the statute.
3 2
The Court equated "permissible" with "reasonable."33 In order for an
agency construction to be upheld as reasonable, "[t] he court need not con-
clude that the agency construction was the only one it permissibly could
have adopted.., or even the reading the court would have reached if the
question initially had arisen in ajudicial proceeding."3 4 Under Chevron, if
the meaning of a statute is unclear, the agencies are the preferred gap
fillers.3 5 This is an deferential standard that may, in some cases, conflict
with the separation of powers doctrine.
2. Deference and the Separation of Powers
The United States Constitution grants legislative powers to Con-
gress,3 6 executive power to the president,3 7 and judicial power to the
Supreme Court and its inferior courts.38 Despite this scheme, there is
overlap in the functions of each branch of government.3 9 This overlap is
especially evident in the power delegated to administrative agencies,
which typically serve quasi-legislative, quasi-executive, and quasi-judicial
functions.40
The power of administrative agencies to make determinations of law
is an especially troubling area of overlap. The Chevron doctrine, which
holds that courts must defer to reasonable interpretations of law made by
administrative agencies, has been attacked on the grounds that it violates
the separation of powers principle of the Constitution.4 1 Moreover, the
Chevron doctrine arguably usurps judicial authority and grants excessive
power to administrative agencies.
42
3. Retroactive Application of Administrative Rules
Courts generally favor prospective application of rules when an
agency responds to actions of parties who have relied in good faith on
32. Id. at 842-43.
33. See id. at 844.
34. Id. at 843 n.ll.
35. Id. at 843-44. See generally Robert J. Gregory, When a Delegation is Not a Delegation:
Using Legislative Meaning To Define Statutoy Gaps, 39 CATH. U. L. REv. 725 (1990) (discussing
congressional delegation of rulemaking authority to administrative agencies).
36. U.S. CONsr. art. I, § 1.
37. Id. art. II, § 1, ci. 1.
38. Id. art. III, § 1, cl. 1.
39. See Cass R. Sunstein, Constitutionalism After the New Dea 101 HARv. L. Rav. 421, 430
(1987) (arguing that the notion of separation of powers is in some respects a mischaracteriza-
tion of our constitutional system).
40. See Sanford N. Caust-Ellenbogen, Blank Checks: Restoring the Balance of Powers in the
Post-Chevron Era, 32 B. C. L. Rav. 757, 758-59 (1991).




prior agency pronouncements. 43  However, retroactive application of
rules may be necessary in some cases in order for the agency to carry out
Congress' delegation efficiently.
4 4
There are two different types of retroactive rulemaking. 45 First, an
agency may make a curative rule by retroactively remedying a procedural
defect in an existing rule without substantively changing the content of
the rule.46 Second, an agency may substantively modify an existing rule
regardless of the presence of a prior defect.4 7 This latter type of retroac-
tive rule is more problematic. Its validity generally depends upon a bal-
ancing of congressional intent and the needs of the administrative agency
against potential hardship to persons who have relied on the prior rule.
48
A court may extend deference to any reasonable agency interpreta-
tion.49 This is true even when the agency radically changes its mind.
50
When an agency does so, however, and attempts to apply the new interpre-
tation retroactively, the court should try to avoid hardship to persons who
relied on the prior agency rule.5 1
B. Agency Action
In NLRB v. Viola Industries-Elevator Division, Inc.,52 the National Labor
Relations Board ("NLRB" or "Board") found that Viola Industries-Elevator
Division, Inc., and Viola Industries, Inc. (collectively, Viola Industries), vio-
lated the National Labor Relations Act 53 (the "Act") by not honoring a
prehire agreement 54 it entered into with the International Union of Eleva-
tor Constructors (the "Union").
55
Under the original provisions of the Act, employers were not permit-
ted to bargain with a union that had not been selected by the majority of
the employees. 5 6 Originally, the union could establish majority status only
through voluntary recognition by the employees or formal certification.
5 7
Congress, however, determined that applying these rules to the construc-
tion industry posed some unique problems due to the usual short duration
43. See, e.g., NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 290-95 (1974).
44. For instance, agencies occasionally must adjust public programs retroactively in or-
der to allocate limited funds fairly.
45. Richard J. Wolf, Note, Judicial Review of Retroactive Rulemaking: Has Georgetown Ne-
glected the Plastic Remedies?, 68 WASH. U. L. Q. 157, 163 (1990).
46. Id.
47. Id. at 164.
48. Id.
49. NLRB v. Local Union No. 103, International Ass'n of Bridge, Structural & Ornamen-
tal Iron Workers (Higdon), 434 U.S. 335, 350 (1978).
50. Id. at 351.
51. See Consolidated Freightways v. NLRB, 892 F.2d 1052, 1058 (D.C. Cir. 1989), cert.
denied 498 U.S. 817 (1990).
52. 979 F.2d 1384 (10th Cir. 1992).
53. 29 U.S.C. § 158(0 (1988).
54. "A prehire agreement is an arrangement unique to the construction industry in
which an employer enters into an agreement with a union before the union has been desig-
nated or selected as the representative of the workforce." Viola, 979 F.2d at 1389.
55. Id. at 1389.
56. Id. at 1392.
57. Id.
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of construction jobs.58 Consequently, Congress amended the Act to pro-
vide that it was not an unfair labor practice for a construction employer to
enter into a collective bargaining agreement with a union prior to the
union attaining majority status.59
Thus, the newly adopted Section 8(f) permitted prehire agreements
in the construction industry. In R.J. Smith Construction Co.,60 the NLRB
determined Section 8(f)'s relation to other provisions of the Act. The
doctrine developed in R.J. Smith Construction Co. endured for seventeen
years and has been interpreted to stand for the following rule:
[A] § 8(f) prehire agreement was merely a preliminary step which
contemplated further action [toward] the development of a full
bargaining relationship. During this preliminary stage there was
no presumption of majority status which would protect the signa-
tory union from challenge during the contract's term. The
agreement ... could be repudiated by either party at any mo-
ment ....
However, a prehire agreement could convert into a full Sec-
tion 9(a) [majority status] relationship ... upon a showing that
the signatory union enjoyed majority support, during a relevant
period, among an appropriate unit of the signatory employer's
employees.
6 1
From 1972 to 1982, Viola Industries, an installer and servicer of eleva-
tor equipment, entered into a series of prehire contracts with the Union.
6 2
After entering into the third prehire agreement, which was signed Decem-
ber 14, 1982, and was effective for five years, Viola Industries began several
elevator-installation projects. 63 Viola Industries, however, repudiated this
third prehire agreement on November 4, 1983.64
The Union immediately filed a claim with the NLRB alleging that Vi-
ola Industries violated the Act by repudiating the agreement.6 5 An Ad-
ministrative Law Judge ("ALJ") determined that the Union had attained
majority support from Viola Industries' employees at some point between
1978 and 1980.66 Pursuant to the rule from R.J. Smith Construction Co., the
union was retroactively converted into the full-fledged bargaining repre-
sentative of Viola Industries' employees. 67 Because Viola Industries could
not repudiate this agreement, the ALJ ordered Viola to pay back wages




60. 191 N.L.R.B. 693 (1971), vacated and remanded, Local No. 150, International Union
of Operating Engineers v. NLRB, 480 F.2d 1186 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
61. Vio/a, 979 F.2d at 1392 (citations omitted).
62. Id. at 1389.
63. Id. at 1389-90.







After the decision of the ALJ, the NLRB overruled its prior interpreta-
tion of Section 8(f) in John Deklewa & Sons.69 This new interpretation was
affirmed on appeal by the Third Circuit in International Ass'n of Bridge,
Structural & Ornamental Iron Workers, Local 3 v. NLRB (Iron Workers).70 The
court of appeals enforced the Board's new rule that Section 8(f) agree-
ments were no longer unilaterally voidable, thereby making these agree-
ments enforceable until expiration. 71 The Board also abandoned the
"conversion doctrine," holding that Section 8(f) prehire agreements were
only enforceable during the term of the agreement and could not convert
into traditional collective bargaining agreements without a standard elec-
tion and certification.
72
The Board announced that it would apply the new Section 8 (f) princi-
ples "to all pending cases in whatever stage." 73 Thus, it applied the princi-
ples from Deklewa to Viola and found that the prehire agreement was
binding and could not be repudiated by either party.
74
C. The Tenth Circuit Opinion
1. Majority
Viola Industries argued on appeal to the Tenth Circuit that Deklewa
was not a proper interpretation of the Act.75 It further contended that
those who had relied on the old rule should not be subject to retroactive
application of the new rule, even if that rule was proper.
76
Citing two prior Supreme Court opinions, NLRB v. Local Union No.
103, International Ass 'n of Bridge, Structural & Ornamental Iron Workers (Hig-
don)77 and Jim McNeff Inc. v. Todd,78 Viola Industries argued that without
majority status, the collective bargaining relationship and a union's au-
thorization to represent the employees are not triggered. 79 Thus, it ar-
gued the Board exceeded its statutory authority by granting majority status
under Section 9(a) based solely upon the signing of a prehire
agreement.
80
69. 282 N.L.R.B. 1375 (1987), enforced sub nom. International Ass'n of Bridge, Structural
& Ornamental Iron Workers, Local 3 v. NLRB, 843 F.2d 770 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S.
889 (1988).
70. 843 F.2d 770 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 889 (1988).
71. Id. at 775.
72. Id.
73. Deklewa, 282 N.L.R.B. at 1389.
74. Viola, 979 F.2d at 1390.
75. Id. at 1391.
76. Id. For cases supporting Viola Industries argument see Jim McNeff, Inc. v. Todd,
461 U.S. 260 (1983); Trustees of Wyo. Laborers Health and Welfare Plan v. Morgan & Os-
wood Constr. Co., Inc., 850 F.2d 613 (10th Cir. 1988); Trustees of Colo. Statewide Iron Work-
ers (Erector) Joint Apprenticeship and Training Trust Fund v. A & P Steel, Inc., 812 F.2d
1518 (10th Cir. 1987); New Mexico Dist. Council of Carpenters v. Jordan & Nobles Constr.
Co., 802 F.2d 1253 (10th Cir. 1986).
77. 434 U.S. 335 (1978).
78. 461 U.S. 260 (1983).
79. See Viola, 979 F.2d at 1393 (citing Higdon, 434 U.S. at 346).
80. Id.
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The Tenth Circuit examined Higdon first. In that case, the Supreme
Court affirmed the Board's reliance on its earlier R.J. Smith Construction Co.
decision that established the pre-Deklewa interpretation of Section 8(f).81
The Tenth Circuit noted, however, that the Higdon court upheld the
Board's decision because " '[t]he Board's resolution of the conflicting
claims... represent[ed] a defensible construction of the statute and [was]
entitled to considerable deference.' "82 Therefore, the Higdon court was
not stating the law with regard to Section 8(0, but merely was extending
deference to the Board for a permissible statutory interpretation.
83
In examining McNeff, the Tenth Circuit stated that McNeff simply re-
lied on Higdon and did not reexamine the court's review function in these
types of cases.8 4 Thus, McNeff should not be viewed as a new approach
distinct from the rule of deference in reviewing Board interpretations of
the Act.85 Therefore, the Tenth Circuit concluded that McNeff did not
prevent the court's use of the Dekiewa rule.
8 6
The court then held that the R.J. Smith Construction Co. rule was not
the only reasonable interpretation of the statute, but that the Board's
Deklewa rule was also a reasonable interpretation.8 7 "[I]n administrative
adjudicatory proceedings courts 'will uphold a Board rule [so] long as it is
rational and consistent with the Act.' "88 A mere departure from prece-
dent does not invalidate the Board's Deklewa decision. 89 Moreover, " '[a]n
administrative agency is not disqualified from changing its mind.' "90
81. See Higdon, 434 U.S. at 350-52.
82. la, 979 F.2d at 1393 (quoting Higdon, 434 U.S. at 350).
83. Id.
84. Vw/a, 979 F.2d at 1393 (citing McNeff, 461 U.S. at 265-71). The court went on to
state that since McNeff, the Supreme Court has continued to stress the Higdon principle of
deference. Id. (citing Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984) as an
example).
85. Vw/a, 979 F.2d at 1394.
86. Id. The Tenth Circuit also held that its earlier decisions, see cases cited supra note
76, did not preclude it from adopting Dddewa. Viola, 979 F.2d at 1394. Although each case
upheld the Rj Smith Construction Co. repudiation principle, the court reasoned that because
those cases also relied on McNeff, which does not bar application of the new Deklewa doctrine,
neither do those cases. Id.
The court found the Third Circuit's opinion in Iron Workers, upholding Dekiewa, to be
persuasive. Id. at 1395. The Third Circuit stated that prior Supreme Court decisions involv-
ing the Board's RJ. Smith Construction Co. interpretation simply reviewed the Board's prior
interpretation and did not adopt the R.J. Smith Construction Co. interpretation of the statute
as binding. Id.
The court noted that four other circuits have followed the Third Circuit on this issue.
Id. at 1394 n.3 (citing C.E.K. Indus. Mechanical Contractors, Inc. v. NLRB, 921 F.2d 350, 357
(1st Cir. 1990); NLRB v. Bufco Corp., 899 F.2d 608, 609 (7th Cir. 1990); NLRB v. W.L. Miller
Co., 871 F.2d 745, 748 (8th Cir. 1989); Mesa Verde Construction Co. v. Northern Cal. Dist.
Council of Laborers, 861 F.2d 1124, 1126, 1134, 1137 (9th Cir. 1988)).
87. Id. at 1395.
88. Id. at 1394 (quoting NLRB v. Curtin Matheson Scientific, Inc., 494 U.S. 775, 787
(1990)).
89. Id. at 1395.
90. Id. (quoting Higdon, 434 U.S. at 351).
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Finally, the court addressed the question of whether the new interpre-
tation could be applied retroactively. 91 The court followed the Third Cir-
cuit9 2 and held that the Board's new rule regarding Section 8(f) could be
applied retroactively unless manifest injustice would result. The court
held that any frustrated expectations resulting from the Board's applica-
tion of the new Deklewa rule would not, in general, amount to manifest
injustice.9 3 Eliminating the right to repudiate prehire contracts only
binds the parties to terms which they themselves negotiated.
94
2. Dissent
In his dissent, Judge Baldock neither took issue with whether the new
Deklewa rule was a permissible interpretation of the statute, 9 5 nor with the
argument that the Delkewa rule achieved the goals of the NLRB more ef-
fectively than the rule from R.J. Smith Construction Co.9 6 Judge Baldock's
dissent focused instead on his concern for the separation of power be-
tween the courts and the executive branch. 97 He felt that the majority
"revise[d], ultra vires, the Supreme Court's opinion in [McNefJ] in order to
avoid this substantial constitutional question."9 8 The McNeff court inter-
preted the statute to settle a private lawsuit.9 9 Unlike Higdon, the McNeff
court was not reviewing an agency decision and nowhere limited its inter-
pretation of Section 8(f) to "being merely a defensible construction." 10 0
Judge Baldock stated that "the judicial deference afforded to an
agency's construction of a statute has no place outside of... reviewing an
agency decision." 10 1 To resolve the issue before it, the court in McNeff
construed Section 8(f) and clearly stated that the RJ. Smith Construction Co.
rule was the law.1 0 2 Therefore, until an act of Congress or a Court deci-
sion overrules this precedent, it binds the lower courts as well as the ad-
ministrative agency.
10 3
91. Id. at 1396. "Several Circuits have addressed the question of whether a new rule
announced by an . . . agency in adjudicatory proceedings is to be applied retroactively and
have upheld retroactive application unless manifest injustice would result." Id. (citing NLRB
v. Bufco, 899 F.2d 608, 611 (7th Cir. 1990); Consolidated Freightways v. NLRB, 892 F.2d
1052, 1058 (D.C. Cir. 1989); NLRB v. Semco Printing Cent., Inc., 721 F.2d 886, 892 (2d Cir.
1983); NLRB v. New Columbus Nursing Home, Inc., 720 F.2d 726, 729 (1st Cir. 1983)).
92. See supra note 86.
93. Viola, 979 F.2d at 1396.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 1397.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 1397-98.
99. Id. at 1398.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 1399. "A [Section] 8(f) prehire agreement is subject to repudiation until the
union establishes majority status." Id. (citing McNeff, 461 U.S. at 271). In addition, Judge
Baldock noted that "subsequent cases interpreting McNeff never portended that the meaning
given to [Section] 8(f) was merely a defensible construction; rather the [Tenth Circuit] ap-
plied the McNeff interpretation of [Section] 8(f) as if it were the law." Id. at 1399; see supra
note 76.
103. Viola, 979 F.2d at 1399.
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D. Analysis
Proponents of the deferential approach in Chevron argue, among
other things, that agencies are more competent to interpret the statutes
they administer. 10 4 When administering their governing statutes, agencies
must do more than simply determine congressional intent; administrative
statutory interpretation also involves complicated policy judgements. 0 5
Agencies are more efficient fact-finders, have greater technical expertise,
and should be afforded great deference.
10 6
Chevron, however, arguably went too far. The broad deferential ap-
proach in Chevron raises the question as to whether it will bring about an
erosion ofjudicial review conferred by the constitution and by the APA.
0 7
This is especially true when a court defers to an agency interpretation that
is contrary to a prior judicial interpretation. To defer under these circum-
stances raises serious issues concerning the separation of powers. The
rules of deference should not be applied as an absolute rule, particularly
when deferring might violate fundamental constitutional principles.
The court in Viola deferred to an agency interpretation that was a
reasonable construction of the statute.1 0 8 However, the interpretation
constituted a change from a prior interpretation that had been articulated
in the courts as law. Deference under these circumstances should have
triggered analysis under the separation of powers doctrine. The court
avoided this substantial constitutional question by asserting that the court
in McNeff was operating under some deferential standard of review.10 9
This is arguably an incorrect reading of McNeff. As the dissent indicates,
the court in McNeff recited an interpretation of Section 8(f) in order to
settle a dispute between private parties and was not reviewing an agency
decision.11 0 Therefore, to defer to the NLRB's new interpretation, which
was contrary to the holding in McNeff would allow an agency to overrule
judicial precedent.
While deference is appropriate in some cases, Viola exemplifies the
need for clear limits on its application. The principles of deference
should never be used as a pretext for avoiding substantial constitutional
questions.
In addition, the court in Viola applied the new rule retroactively. Cit-
ing Third Circuit rationale, the court held that to apply the new rule retro-
actively would not result in "manifest injustice."' It reasoned that
application of this rule, which eliminated the right to repudiate prehire
104. See Braun, supra note 15, at 989.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Timothy B. Dyk, The Supreme Court's Role in Not Shaping Administrative Law, 44 ADMIN.
L. REV. 429, 431 (1992); see also Cass R. Sunstein, Law and Administration After Chevron, 90
COLUM. L. REV. 2071, 2075 (1990) (stating that Chevron is widely regarded as a "counter-
Marbury" for administrative law).
108. Viola, 979 F.2d at 1395.
109. See id. at 1394.
110. Id. at 1398.
111. Id. at 1396.
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contracts, would only hold the parties to terms that they themselves nego-
tiated.1 12 Therefore, in the court's mind no manifest injustice occurred.
The court diminished the potential hardship to Viola Industries by
suggesting that Viola Industries would have entered into the agreement
regardless of the Board's new construction of Section 8(f) in Deklewa.
11 3
This is speculative at best. The prior rule from R.J. Smith Construction Co.
had endured for seventeen years. It would have been reasonable for Viola
Industries to have relied on this rule in making its contract decisions with
the Union. The new rule from Deklewa removed the element of flexibility
that the old rule provided employers that contract with unions. Applica-
tion of the new rule in Viola saddled Viola Industries with financial obliga-
tions1 14 it might have been able to avoid under the old rule. Therefore,
retroactive application of the Deklewa rule created a hardship on Viola In-
dustries and, arguably, constituted manifest injustice.
II. JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY DECISIONS AND THE
ADMINISTRATIVE RECORD: BAR MKRNCHFS v. YUE7Fr
a 1 5
A. Background
Administrative agencies impact our society tremendously, and thus ju-
dicial review must provide meaningful checks to agency action. The APA
authorizes judicial review of agency actions. 1 6 Courts, however, review
whether the agency's action was arbitrary or capricious and not whether
the agency should have decided the matter differently. 117 This is a very
deferential standard.
While judicial review provides some protection against the unbridled
power of an administrative agency, the Supreme Court has limited the role
of courts in reviewing agency decisions.1 18 Courts may not substitute their
judgments for those of the agency. 119 In reviewing informal agency ac-
tions,' 20 the APA limits courts to "review on the record." 121 This generally
112. Id. The majority also stated that the ALJ's determination that the Union did have
majority status and, consequently, that the 8(f) agreement became enforceable undermined
Viola Industries' claim of manifest injustice. Id. at 1397. However, it is unclear to what de-
gree the court relied on this rationale in upholding retroactive application in Viola
113. See id. at 1396.
114. Viola Industries' agreement with the Union obligated them to pay wages and bene-
fits. See id. at 1390.
115. 994 F.2d 735 (10th Cir. 1993).
116. 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706 (1988).
117. See id. § 706.
118. See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971); Camp v.
Pitts, 411 U.S. 138 (1973).
119. Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 416.
120. Under the APA, agency action can take the form of formal rulemaking or adjudica-
tion, with specified proceedings including trial hearings, witnesses and administrative law
judges. 5 U.S.C. §§ 554-557 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992). This formal action results in a defined
record similar to that in a court.
Agency rulemakings or adjudications can also be informal. There are sometimes general
requirements for "informal" agency decisions, including proposed rules in the Federal Register,
acceptance of comments from outside parties, and publication of a statement of purpose
with final rules. Id. §§ 553(b)-(c). While formal types of administrative action define the
record more clearly, informal agency actions often do not; the APA provides little guidance
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means that courts should never examine an agency decision de novo; but
rather, courts should limit the review to those documents examined by the
agency when it made its original determination.
122
For administrative agency decisions, the APA provides "thorough re-
view" based on the "whole record" of a case. 123 The APA, however, does
not explicitly define what that "record" should include. The statute and its
legislative history provide little guidance as to the meaning and scope of
this term. 124 In informal adjudication, the APA only requires a "brief
statement of the grounds" for an agency's action.1 25 This requirement,
however, is so ambiguous as to provide little practical guidance in deter-
mining the scope of the "record" on review.
The Supreme Court has struggled with this ambiguous language and
has chosen to define the scope of the record very narrowly. In Citizens to
Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe,12 6 the Supreme Court instructed the
lower court to look only at what the agency relied upon in the record as
the basis for its rationale. 127 In Camp v. Pitts,12 8 the Court applied the rule
of Overton Park and held that an agency's failure to explain adequately its
final decision does not warrant a completely new hearing consisting of
additional oral testimony before the court.129 Rather, the reviewing court
should require the agency to explain its action by submitting only neces-
sary additional evidence in the form of affidavits or written testimony.
130
Overton Park and Camp provide the general scope of the doctrine of
"review on the record." Despite the Supreme Court's narrow approach,
the doctrine has developed over time to include various far-reaching ex-
ceptions that permit the admission of additional evidence that the agency
claimed was not part of the record. 13 1 It has been argued that these broad
beyond requiring a "brief statement of the grounds" for the agency action. Id. § 555(e).
Courts have responded to this ambiguous language by requiring the agency whose conduct is
being challenged to assemble the record for the court.
121. Id. § 706 (requiring the court to "review the whole record").
122. See, e.g., Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 420; Camp, 411 U.S. at 142. The record is more
difficult to determine when the court reviews informal rather than formal agency actions. See
supra note 120.
123. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1988).
124. See William F. Pedersen, Jr., Formal Records and Informal Rulemaking, 85 YALE L.J. 38,
40-41 (1975); see also supra note 120 (comparing the unclear APA provisions for informal
agency actions with the statute's more defined provisions for formal agency actions).
125. 5 U.S.C. § 555(e) (Supp. IV 1992).
126. 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
127. Id. at 420.
128. 411 U.S. 138 (1973).
129. Id. at 142-43.
130. Id. at 143.
131. See Steven Stark & Sarah Wald, Setting No Records: The Failed Attempts to Limit the Record
in Review of Administrative Action, 36 ADMIN. L.J. 333, 343-54 (1984). Stark and Wald note:
[T]he exceptions which have developed to allow extra-record evidence are the fol-
lowing: (1) when agency action is not adequately explained in the record before
the court; (2) when the agency failed to consider factors which are relevant to its
final decision; (3) when an agency considered evidence which it failed to include in
the record; (4) when a case is so complex that a court needs more evidence to
enable it to understand the issues clearly; (5) in cases where evidence arising after
the agency action shows whether the decision was correct or not; (6) in cases where
agencies are sued for a failure to take action; (7) in cases arising under the National
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exceptions essentially erode the Overton Park-Camp rule.1 3 2 The Tenth Cir-
cuit, however, reaffirmed the viability of that rule in its most recent term.
B. Agency Action
In Bar MK Ranches v. Yuetter,1 33 a group of landowners who held na-
tional forest grazing permits challenged the decision of the Forest Service
to move 150 elk to the Manti-LaSal National Forest near Monticello,
Utah. 134 Following regulatory procedure,1 35 the landowners appealed the
decision to the Regional Forester.13 6 After the Regional Forester affirmed
the original decision, the landowners appealed to the next administrative
level. 137 The Chief of the Forest Service also affirmed, and the decision
became final after the Secretary of Agriculture refused discretionary
review. 
138
The landowners then filed for judicial review of the Forest Service's
decision in federal district court. 139 The Forest Service accordingly filed
its Administrative Record 140 along with a motion for summary judg-
ment.1 41 The landowners responded, arguing that the Forest Service did
not comply with its regulations concerning the development of the agency
appeal record' 42 and that the Administrative Record was not adequately
developed. 143
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Forest
Service, concluding that the Forest Service had complied with its own reg-
ulations and that the Administrative Record was adequate to evaluate the
agency's decision. 144 The agency appeal record and the Administrative
Record issues were then presented on appeal to the Tenth Circuit.
145
C. The Tenth Circuit Opinion
The landowners first contended that the Forest Service improperly
interpreted the regulatory provision, which states that "an appeal decision
Environmental Policy Act; and (8) in cases where relief is at issue, especially at the
preliminary injunction stage.
Id. at 344.
132. See id. at 358. But see, Dave Sive, The Problem of the "Record" in Judicial Review of Environ-
mental Administrative Action, C637 ALI-ABA 29, 39 (1991) (stating that in his opinion the
doctrine is still viable).
133. 994 F.2d 735 (10th Cir. 1993).
134. Id. at 737.
135. See36 C.F.R. § 211.18(0 (1987).
136. Yuetter, 994 F.2d at 737.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 738.
139. Id.
140. The administrative record constitutes the record filed in the district court by the
Forest Service for judicial review of the Forest Service's decision. Id.
141. Id.
142. The agency appeal record constitutes the record developed through the internal
agency review process. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 737.
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will be based only on the record."146 They argued that the Forest Service
violated the regulation by basing its decision on information not con-
tained in the agency appeal record. 147 Thus, the agency appeal record
was improperly developed.148 The Tenth Circuit disagreed, holding that
the Forest Service's interpretation and application of its regulation were
"reasonable and consistent with the regulation's plain meaning."1 49
The landowners also alleged that the Administrative Record filed with
the district court included some documents not considered by the agency
and failed to include other documents that were considered by the
agency, thereby preventing the court from adequately reviewing the Forest
Service's actions. 150 The Tenth Circuit addressed this issue by returning
to the principles set forth in Overton Park and Camp.15 1 The court stated
that a district court reviews an agency action to determine if it was "arbi-
trary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance
with the law."1 52 This review is based on the record that was before all
administrative decision makers, including the Deciding Officer and the
Reviewing Officers. 153 Theref3re, the Administrative Record submitted to
the district court was sufficient if it contained all documents considered at
all stages of the Forest Service's decision process.
154
The court held that the landowners failed to establish that the Admin-
istrative Record in this case was developed improperly. 155 While the land-
owners could verify that certain documents included in the Administrative
Record and filed with the district court were not part of the agency appeal
record, they failed to show that these documents were not part of the doc-
uments considered by the Deciding Officer.
15 6
146. 36 C.F.R. § 211.18(r) (1987); Yuetter, 994 F.2d at 738.
147. Yuetter, 994 F.2d at 738.
148. See id.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 739.
151. See id.
152. Id. (citing 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (A)).
153. Id. (citing Overton Pa, 401 U.S. 402, 420 (1971)). The Tenth Circuit further stated
the law as follows:
The district court must have before it the "whole record" on which the agency ac-
ted. "[TIhe focal point for judicial review should be the administrative record al-
ready in existence, not some new record made initially in the reviewing court." The
complete administrative record consists of all documents and materials directly or
indirectly considered by the agency.
An agency may not unilaterally determine what constitutes the Administrative
Record, nor can the agency supplement the Administrative Record submitted to the
district court with post hoc rationalizations for its decision. However, the designa-
tion of the Administrative Record, like any established administrative procedure, is
entitled to a presumption of administrative regularity. The court assumes the
agency properly designated the Administrative Record absent clear evidence to the
contrary. When a showing is made that the record may not be complete, limited
discovery is appropriate to resolve that question. The harmless error rule applies to
judicial review of administrative proceedings, and errors in such administrative pro-
ceedings will not require reversal unless Plaintiffs can show they were prejudiced.
Id. at 739-40 (citations omitted) (quoting Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 142 (1973)).
154. Id. at 739.




Finally, the landowners alleged that certain documents submitted to
the district court by the Forest Service were "post hoc rationalizations" for
its decision. 15 7 The court held, though, that the landowners made no
showing of prejudice from the alleged post hoc rationalizations.15 8
D. Analysis
Bar MK Ranches v. Yuetter clearly indicates that the Overton Park-Camp
approach to judicial review on the record is still viable in the Tenth Cir-
cuit. The Yuetter court declared that the administrative record submitted
to the district court is complete if it contains "nothing more and nothing
less" than the full record considered and developed at all stages of an
agency's decision process. 159 This language echoes the narrow standard
of record review articulated in Overton Park and Camp.
The doctrine of review on the record stems from the concern that
courts should not replace administrative agencies' decisions with their
own. 160 Courts might begin acting more as independent decision makers
if they are able to consider materials that were not before the agency when
it made its decision.
161
A broader notion of the record for informal agency decisions, how-
ever, does not necessarily suggest unacceptable court involvement.
1 62
With informal agency action, many of the procedural protections of the
APA are unavailable. 16 3 Therefore, courts should "undertake a more
searching review of the record and the merits in order to assure that
agency action is lawful."1 6 4 Without a broader notion of record review,
agencies have almost unreviewable authority, which frustrates the objec-
tives of judicial review. 165 Thus, like the Chevron doctrine, "review on the
record" provides little opportunity for the court to limit agency action.




The APA provides standards to be applied by courts reviewing agency
action. 167 These standards are intended to ensure that "the courts do not
improperly usurp the prerogatives of the legislature" to administer the ac-
tivities of agencies or hinder the agency's ability to exercise authority
157. Id. at 740.
158. Id. "Although allegations of a post hoc addition to the Administrative Record suffi-
ciently alleges procedural error, an allegation of a post hoc addition does not in itself suffi-
ciently allege prejudice." Id.
159. Id. at 739.
160. See Stark & Wald, supra note 131, at 334.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 361.
163. Id. at 362.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. 998 F.2d 880 (10th Cir. 1993).
167. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1988).
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properly entrusted to it. 168 The APA applies the "substantial evidence"
standard of review to formal rulemaking and formal adjudication. 169 In
situations where an agency acts through informal rulemaking or informal
adjudication, the APA requires a reviewing court to decide whether the
agency's action was "arbitrary, capricious, [or] an abuse of discretion.
170
The substantial evidence and arbitrary and capricious standards of review
are both reasonableness standards simply requiring that the administrative
record reflect sufficient facts to support the agency's decision.
17 1
The "arbitrary and capricious" standard permits a court to set aside an
agency decision only if it is "so clearly outside the range of action expected
from responsible decision makers that [it] cannot successfully be defended
as an exercise of reasoned judgment."172 This standard of review is argua-
bly the most deferential form of review. The Supreme Court in Citizens to
Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe,173 held that a court must determine
whether the agency decision was based on a
consideration of the relevant factors and whether there has been
a clear error ofjudgment .... Although this inquiry into the
facts is to be searching and careful, the ultimate standard of re-
view is a narrow one. The court is not empowered to substitute
its judgment for that of the agency.
17 4




In Lewis v. Babbitt,176 Lewis contested the National Park Service's
("NPS") interpretation of the National Park System Concessions Policy
Act 177 and the NPS's decision not to negotiate a new permit with him.
178
Lewis sold firewood as the concessioner in Yellowstone National Park from
1976 to 1989.179 In 1989, the NPS received two proposals for the conces-
sion permit for the next four-year period, including Lewis's, and ulti-
mately decided to award the permit to Firebox Inc. ("Firebox") after
determining that Lewis could not demonstrate the ability to finance his
amended proposal. °8 0 After review, the district court granted the NPS's
motion for summary judgment.18 1
168. ARTHUR E. BONFIELD, STATE ADMINISTRATIVE RULE MAKING § 9.2.12(f) (1986).
169. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 556, 557 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
170. Id. § 706(2) (A).
171. Melissa A. Dick, Survey, Administrative Law, 69 DENV. U. L. REv. 791, 791-92 (1992).
172. BONFIELD, supra note 168, § 9.2.12(b).
173. 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
174. Id. at 416.
175. Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 142 (1973); see supra part III.A.
176. 998 F.2d 880 (10th Cir. 1993).
177. 16 U.S.C. §§ 20-20g (1988).






C. The Tenth Circuit Opinion
The Tenth Circuit established at the outset that it was reviewing the
agency decision to "determine whether it was 'arbitrary, capricious, an
abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.' ",182 Apply-
ing this standard, the court held that the NPS did not act unreasonably in
determining that Firebox's proposal was responsive to the Statement of
Requirements ("SOR") for the permit or by requiring Lewis to match Fire-
box's proposal. 183 The Tenth Circuit held that the NPS's findings sur-
vived the arbitrary and capricious standard of review.
184
The court also held that the NPS did not arbitrarily and capriciously
determine that Lewis's amended proposal failed to satisfy the SOR's finan-
cial requirements. 185 Lewis was notified that Firebox had submitted a pro-
posal to sell firewood from vending machines twenty-four hours a day.
1 86
Lewis then submitted an amended proposal which indicated that he also
intended to sell firewood through vending machines and that he would
match the terms of Firebox's proposal.18 7 The amended proposal, how-
ever, did not provide information on how Lewis intended to finance the
machines.
88
On February 20, 1990, Lewis identified two possible sources of financ-
ing.189 The next day, the NPS contacted both potential lenders and dis-
covered that Lewis had not yet contacted either lender about his
proposal.1 90 On March 5, 1990, Lewis sent a letter to the NPS stating that
he was also prepared to lease the vending machines in the event his loans
were denied. 19 1 The NPS, however, did not receive the letter until the day
after it had determined that Lewis was without adequate financing to im-
plement his proposal.' 9 2 Given these circumstances, the Tenth Circuit de-
termined that the NPS's decision was not arbitrary or capricious.'
9 3
Finally, the court held that the NPS did not act arbitrarily by allowing
Firebox, but not Lewis, to supplement its proposal with additional finan-
cial information. 194 The court found this argument unconvincing be-
cause the SOR stated, "[t]he National Park Service may verify information
182. Id. (citing 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1988)).
183. Babbitt, 998 F.2d at 882. The SOR provided:
To be responsive, proposals must be accompanied by a signed letter and must con-
tain sufficient information to convince the Secretary acting through the Superintendent
that the proponent meets the principal and secondary factors in the following para-
graph. All responsive proposals will be further reviewed and evaluated to determine









191. Id. at 882-83.
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and clarify points as it feels necessary. It will not evaluate supplemental
information or alterations of the proposal made that are submitted after
the closing of the time period for receipt of proposals."1 95 Based on its
review of evidence in the administrative record, the court concluded that
the NPS did not act "arbitrarily or capriciously" in rendering its decisions
and thus affirmed the district court's decision to grant the NPS's motion
for summary judgment. 19 6
D. Analysis
Agencies are accorded substantial deference when they act through
informal rulemaking or informal adjudication. It is thought that these ac-
tions typically require the agency to retain a high degree of discretion in
order to exercise its congressionally delegated authority. LXWis v. Babbitt is
a clear illustration of the Tenth Circuit's approval of this deferential
approach.
Agencies should have some discretion in administering agency affairs
because they are more knowledgeable in their delegated area of authority
than the courts. This point is well illustrated in Babbitt. It is also true,
however, that the power delegated to administrative agencies since the
New Deal has increased dramatically. 19 7 Thus, agency decisions have a
tremendous impact on contemporary life. In view of this trend, courts
should reevaluate their role as reviewing bodies to ensure that agency
power does not go unchecked.
Because the arbitrary and capricious standard of review is so deferen-
tial, agencies enjoy a great deal of latitude in informal decision making.
This standard does not permit the court to disagree with an agency deci-
sion that is arguably wrong unless the decision rises to this heightened
level of error. Thus the court is restricted in its ability to protect those
aggrieved by an agency decision.
CONCLUSION
During the Tenth Circuit's most recent term, the court reviewed sev-
eral agencies' decisions. The broad principle of deference to agency ac-
tion remained a cornerstone of the Tenth Circuit's review. This
deferential approach was reflected in the court's deference to an agency's
reinterpretation of its governing statute, its upholding retroactive applica-
tion of agency decisions, its adherence to the "review on the record" doc-
trine, and its application of the "arbitrary and capricious" standard of
review.
Application of these deferential standards, however, while broadly ac-
cepted, does raise questions under the separation of powers doctrine in
certain instances. In addition, given the broad impact that administrative
agencies have on society, the deferential approach towards review of
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. See Andreen, supra note 1.
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agency action should be reconsidered in light of the need for meaningful
limits on agency power.




During the survey period, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals ad-
dressed a variety of bankruptcy issues. The cases in this Survey were cho-
sen because they modified, rather than reaffirmed, existing precedent.
Two cases clarify prior decisions by this circuit about the non-dis-
chargeability of debts under Section 523 of the Bankruptcy Code, and one
case discusses the preclusion of judicial review of trustees' fees under
Chapter 12.
The first case, In re Sampson,' reconciles two inconsistent rulings by
the Tenth Circuit respecting the actual nature of post-marital obligations.
Under the Bankruptcy Code, property settlements between former
spouses are dischargeable while support payments are not.2 Often, how-
ever, these post-marital obligations have characteristics of both a property
settlement and support. The Tenth Circuit has now articulated a rule to
deal with such payments.
The second case, In re Pasek,3 deals with the non-dischargeability ex-
emption of debts that arise from a "willful and malicious injury by the
Debtor to another entity or to the property of another entity."4 This Sur-
vey examines the evolution of the "willful" and "malicious" standards of
this exemption and clarifies the types of acts that satisfy this exemption.
Finally, In re Schollet6 demonstrates how the failure of Congress to
expressly provide for judicial review of trustees' fees under Chapter 12
manifests an intent by Congress to preclude judicial review of such fees.
I. THE DISCHARGEABILITY OF DEBTS OWED BETWEEN FORMER SPOUSES
A. Background
The Bankruptcy Code of 1978 allows a debtor to seek a discharge of
most debts that arise before the date of the order for relief.6 The dis-
charge extinguishes any personal liability of the debtor and is intended to
further the "fresh start"7 policy contained in the Bankruptcy Code.8 Abso-
lution, or a "fresh start," means that debtors may use the Bankruptcy Code
to "reorder their affairs, make peace with their creditors, and enjoy 'a new
1. 997 F.2d 717 (10th Cir. 1993).
2. See 11 U.S.C. § 523 (1988 & Supp. IV. 1992).
3. 983 F.2d 1524 (10th Cir. 1993).
4. Id. at 1526.
5. 980 F.2d 639 (10th Cir. 1992).
6. 11 U.S.C. § 727(b) (1988); In re Sampson, 997 F.2d 717, 721 (10th Cir. 1993); see
also 11 U.S.C. § 523 (exceptions to discharge).
7. Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934).
8. See 11 U.S.C. § 524(a) (1988); Shaver v. Shaver, 736 F.2d 1314, 1315-16 (9th Cir.
1984); see generally Kenneth T. Fibich & Ben B. Floyd, Impact of Bankruptcy on Family Law, 29 S.
TEx. L.J. 637, 646 (1988) (discussing § 524(a) discharge).
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opportunity in life and a clear field for future effort, unhampered by the
pressure and discouragement of preexisting debt.' "9
An individual debtor, however, does not receive a discharge for debts
owed "to a spouse, former spouse, or child . . . for alimony to, mainte-
nance for, or support of such spouse or child" if the debt is "actually in the
nature of alimony, maintenance, or support."10 This exception reflects a
predominant public policy that favors the enforcement of familial obliga-
tions.'1 The policy rests on three rationales: (1) a spouse who lacks job
skills or is incapable of working needs protection from destitution; (2)
minor children may suffer if the custodial parent is forced into the work
force due to the non-custodial parent's bankruptcy filing; and (3) society
should abate the potential increased burden upon the welfare system
which results from a debtor avoiding familial obligations through
bankruptcy.
2
Although post-marital obligations can be categorized as nondis-
chargeable support or dischargeable property settlement,13 sometimes
the exact characterization of post-marital obligations is unclear. In these
cases, the final clause of 11 U.S.C. § 523(a) (5) requires the post-marital
obligation to actually be in the nature of support to be nondischargeable.
However, determining the actual nature of the obligation has proven
difficult.14
B. Prior Case Law in the Tenth Circuit Regarding the Characterization of Post-
Marital Obligations
In In re Yeates, 15 the Tenth Circuit stated that the "intention of the
parties" is "the initial inquiry" into the actual nature of the post-marital
obligation, 16 and the parties' intent is dispositive on the question of
nondischargeability under Section 523(a) (5). 17 The court also remarked
that "[a] written agreement between the parties is persuasive evidence of
intent, [and] if the agreement between the parties clearly shows that the
parties intended the debt to reflect either support or a property settle-
ment, then that characterization will normally control."' 8 The Yeates court
9. Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 286 (1991) (quoting Local Loan Co., 292 U.S. at
244).
10. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a) (5) (B) (1988); Shaver, 736 F.2d at 1315.
11. Shaver, 736 F.2d at 1316; see generally Madison Grose, Comment, Putative Spousal Sup-
port Rights and the Federal Bankruptcy Act, 25 UCLA L. REV. 96 (1977) (discussing the purpose
of the Bankruptcy code); Carl D. Young, Note, Dissolution of Marriage and the Bankruptcy Act of
1973: "Fresh Start"Forgotten, 52 IND. L.J. 469 (1977) (discussing the proposed Bankruptcy Act
of 1973).
12. Shaver, 736 F.2d at 1316 n.3; Grose, supra note 11, at 96-97 n.7; see also Audubon v.
Shufeldt, 181 U.S. 575 (1901)(debts arising out of a husband's natural legal duty to support
his wife are not dischargeable under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898).
13. See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5); In reYeates, 807 F.2d 874, 876 (10th Cir. 1986); see also
Fibich, supra note 8, at 647.
14. See Fibich, supra note 8, at 650-51.
15. 807 F.2d 874 (10th Cir. 1986).





further declared that resorting to extrinsic evidence of the parties' intent
is necessary only when the agreement between the parties is ambiguous.19
Shortly after Yeates was issued, the Tenth Circuit articulated a seem-
ingly different standard in In re Goin.20 Instead of finding the intent of the
parties in the expressed terms of the agreement, the Coin court stated "a
bankruptcy court must look beyond the language of the [agreement] to
the intent of the parties and to the substance of the obligation."2 1 The
court then enumerated four factors "pertinent" to the inquiry of whether
an obligation is support:
1) if the agreement fails to provide explicitly for spousal support,
the court may presume that the property settlement is intended
for support if it appears under the circumstances that the spouse
needs support; (2) when there are minor children and an imbal-
ance of income, the payments are likely to be in the nature of
support; (3) support or maintenance is indicated when the pay-
ments are made directly to the recipient and are paid in install-
ments over a substantial period of time; and (4) an obligation
that terminates on remarriage or death is indicative of an agree-
ment for support.
22
C. Clarification of the Inquiry: In re Sampson
23
1. Facts
Ira N. Sampson and Katherine Lavonne Sampson divorced in 1984
after nine years of marriage. 24 As part of the divorce proceedings, the
parties incorporated an agreement entitled "Property Settlement and Per-
manent Orders Agreement"25 into the final judgment. Article I of the
Agreement was entitled "Maintenance (Spousal Support)," in which Ira
agreed to pay Katherine a specific monthly amount over an eight-year pe-
riod.26 Article III of the Agreement specifically dealt with the property
settlement between the parties.
27
In November 1990 Ira Sampson filed a voluntary petition under
Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code.2 8 He claimed at an evidentiary hear-
ing that the parties intended the payments specified in Article I of the
Agreement to be a part of the property settlement but designated them as
maintenance so Ira could deduct the payments from his gross income for
tax purposes. 29 This claim was supported by testimony from his attorney
and accountant. Katherine Sampson testified that she did not remember
such an intention, but her testimony was unsupported because her attor-
19. Id.
20. 808 F.2d 1391 (10th Cir. 1987).
21. Id. at 1392.
22. Id. at 1392-93.
23. 997 F.2d 717 (10th Cir. 1993).
24. Id. at 719.
25. Id.
26. Id at 719-20.
27. Id. at 720.
28. Sampson, 997 F.2d at 720.
29. Id.
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ney from the divorce proceeding had died. Therefore, she was unable to
refute the testimony of Ira Sampson's attorney and accountant.3 0
The bankruptcy court found for Katherine Sampson, stating that the
Agreement unambiguously provided that the subject payment obligation
was for Katherine's support, and reasoned that extrinsic evidence to the
contrary should be precluded under Yeates.31 The bankruptcy court did
recognize that the Yeates decision conflicted with the Tenth Circuit's hold-
ing in Goin, which required a "bankruptcy court [to] look beyond the lan-
guage of the [agreement] to the intent of the parties and the substance of
the obligation."
32
2. The Court's Opinion
The Tenth Circuit reconciled Yeates and Goin in Sampson. The court
reasoned that a written agreement is persuasive evidence of the parties'
intent at the time the obligation arose.3 3 Additionally, in Sampson the
Agreement" 'did more than simply label payments as alimony or property
settlement; [iut exhibited a structured drafting that purported to deal with
separate issues in totally distinct segments of the document.' ",34 While
recognizing that the language of the document "erected a substantial ob-
stacle" for the party challenging the expressed terms to overcome, the
court added that the express language was not determinative.3 5
The court then examined the extrinsic evidence surrounding the
Agreement. The court found that the alimony and support provisions of
the Agreement would survive Katherine's remarriage, which is suggestive
of a property settlement.36 The payments terminated on her death, how-
ever, which is characteristic of a support obligation.3 7 The alimony and
support payments also could be modified depending on their tax benefit
to Ira, thereby strengthening Katherine's position that the payments were
in the nature of alimony and support.38 Finally, the court recognized that,
at the time of the divorce, Katherine had an obvious need for support.
She had no job, no marketable skills, little education, a health condition,
no income, and monthly living expenses of $4165.0039 Therefore, the
court ruled that the parties' expressed intent, coupled with a functional
analysis of the nature of the payments, demonstrated that the payments




32. See id. at 720 n.3.
33. See Sampson, 997 F.2d at 723.
34. Id (quoting Tilley v. Jessee, 789 F.2d 1074, 1077-78 (4th Cir. 1986)).
35. Sampson, 997 F.2d at 723.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 724.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 725.




The court seemed concerned that Ira Sampson was attempting to
benefit under the tax and bankruptcy codes by arguing inconsistent posi-
tions. Like the Fifth Circuit in a similar case, the Tenth Circuit relied
upon a "quasi-estoppel" doctrine that prevents a party from accepting the
benefit of a statute and then taking an inconsistent position to avoid any
deleterious effects. 41 The court emphasized that inconsistent positions
would amount to a manipulation of the bankruptcy and tax codes.42 The
Tenth Circuit also found that proof of detrimental reliance, though not
necessary, was an important factor in overturning Ira Sampson's posi-
tion. 43 Sampson demonstrates a willingness on the part of the Tenth Cir-
cuit to look beyond the four Goin factors to other surrounding
circumstances.
II. THE DISCHARGEABILITY OF DEBTS THAT ARISE FROM WILLFUL OR
MALICIouS AcTs
A. Background
Section 523(a)(6) of the Bankruptcy Code of 1978 provides that a
debtor is not discharged from any debt "for willful and malicious injury by
the debtor to another entity or to the property of another entity."4 4 The
language "willful and malicious" is identical to the original exceptions
from discharge found in the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, which provided a
debtor "[a] discharge in bankruptcy.., from all his provable debts, except
such as ...are ...for willful and malicious injuries to the person or
property of another."
45
One of the first cases to deal with the non-dischargeability of debts for
"willful and malicious" injuries was Tinker v. Colwell 46 In Tinker, the
debtor sought discharge in bankruptcy for a $50,000 judgment against
him for the act of criminal conversation with Colwell's wife. 4 7 The United
States Supreme Court held that the $50,000judgment was for a willful and
malicious injury, stating, "a willful disregard of what one knows to be his
duty, an act which is against good morals and wrongful in and of itself, and
41. Id. at 724 n.6 (quoting In re Davidson, 947 F.2d 1294, 1297 (5th Cir. 1991)).
42. See Sampson, 997 F.2d at 724-25 n.6 (citing Davidson, 947 F.2d 1294, 1297).
43. See Sampson. 997 F.2d at 726 ("Plaintiff had an obvious need for support at the time
of the divorce.. [and] (d]efendant was clearly in a position to provide support."). See also
Davidson, 947 F.2d at 1297. For other decisions within the Fifth Circuit explaining this
"quasi-estoppel" theory, see Neiman-Marcus Group, Inc. v. Dworkin, 919 F.2d 368, 371 (5th
Cir. 1990); Kaneb Serv., Inc. v. FSLIC, 650 F.2d 78, 81 (5th Cir. 1981).
44. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6) (1988).
45. Bankruptcy Act of 1898 § 17(a)(2), 11 U.S.C. § 35(a)(2) (1941) (current version at
11 U.S.C. § 523 (a)(16) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992); seeJeffrey H. Weinberg, Comment, Acciden-
tal "Willful and Malicious Injury" : The Intoxicated Driver and Section 523(a)(6), I BAuiut. DEv. J.
135, 139 (1984).
46. 193 U.S. 473 (1904).
47. Id. at 474.
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which necessarily causes injury and is done intentionally, may be said to be
done willfully and maliciously."
48
After Tinker, the ensuing decisions by bankruptcy courts evolved into
two separate interpretations of "willful and malicious" injury. One inter-
pretation focused on whether the debtor acted "deliberately and inten-
tional [ly]" in causing injury.49 The other focused on whether the debtor
acted with "reckless disregard" of the known rights of others.50 Thereaf-
ter, in drafting the current Bankruptcy Code, Congress explicitly rejected
the "reckless disregard" standard under the new Section 523(a) (6).51
The Tenth Circuit defines the willful component as "deliberate and
intentional."52 To define "malicious," the court inquires into the debtor's
actual knowledge, or reasonable foreseeability that his conduct will result
in injury to the creditor. 53 The malice inquiry is not upon "abstract and
perhaps moralistic notions of the 'wrongfulness' of the debtor's act."
54
Malicious intent can be demonstrated two ways: (1) through direct evi-
dence that the debtor's conduct was specifically intended to harm the
creditor; and (2) by evidence, inferred from the debtor's experiences,
acts, or admissions that he "had knowledge of the creditor's rights and
that, with that knowledge, proceeded to take action in violation of those
rights."'55 Therefore, in light of these two components, the Tenth Circuit
has ruled that not every intentional act falls within the exception to dis-
charge if that act is not malicious.
5 6
B. In re Pasek
57
1. Facts
Debtor Gregory James Pasek was an accountant employed by a CPA
firm. On the firm's request, Pasek signed a covenant not to compete
within fifty miles of a city where the firm had an office for a period of
three years should Pasek leave the firm.58 Liquidated damages for viola-
tion of this covenant were set at "150% of the amount billed by [the firm]
48. Id. at 487.
49. SeeIn re Compos, 768 F.2d 1155, 1157 (10th Cir. 1985) (discussing different interpre-
tations of the "willful and malicious" injury provision).
50. See id.; Weinberg, supra note 45, at 140.
51. H.R. Rep. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 362-65 (1977), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5865 ("[t]o the extent that Tinker v. Colwell, 193 U.S. 473 (190[4]), held
that a less strict standard is intended, and to the extent that other cases have relied on Tinker
to apply a 'reckless disregard' standard, they are overruled."); see Weinberg, supra note 45, at
140.
52. Compos, 768 F.2d at 1158; see In rePosta, 866 F.2d 364, 367 (10th Cir. 1989) ("[w]illful
conduct is conduct that is volitional and deliberate and over which the debtor exercises
meaningful control."); cf RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs, § 8A, cmt. b (1965) (acts "sub-
stantially certain" to cause harm are treated as intentional).
53. Posta, 866 F.2d at 367 (citing In re Egan, 52 B.R. 501, 507 n.4 (Bankr. D. Minn.
1985)).
54. Posta, 866 F.2d at 367.
55. Id. (citations omitted).
56. See Posta, 866 F.2d at 367; Compos, 768 F.2d at 1158.
57. 983 F.2d 1524 (10th Cir. 1993).
58. Id. at 1525.
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to the client for services rendered in the prior twelve months."59 Soon
afterward, the CPA firm began to make additional demands of Pasek. The
firm decided that the accountants and their spouses should project a cer-
tain image to the community and clients. The image required conformity
in home decoration, automobile selection, spousal attire, grooming, and
manners. 60 The firm was particularly critical of Pasek's wife. 6 1 The firm
also assigned Pasek one of the two highest billing quotas, even though
Pasek had two children with serious, time-consuming medical problems.
62
Pasek disagreed with the firm's decisions about client allocation, leverage,
and what he perceived as inequitable enforcement of the non-competition
covenant.
63
Eventually, Pasek left the firm for the sake of his family. 64 He opened
a competing office and several of his clients followed him. 65 The CPA
firm sued Pasek. Several days before the trial commenced, Pasek filed a
voluntary petition for bankruptcy and sought discharge of the damages
alleged by his former firm.
66
2. Opinion
The bankruptcy court found that, although Pasek was aware of the
covenant not to compete, 67 the CPA firm had not established a "willful
and malicious" injury partly because Pasek acted due to severe economic
and family needs. 68 On appeal, the Tenth Circuit opined that non-dis-
chargeability under Section 523(a) (6) requires proof of deliberate and in-
tentional injury.69 Malicious intent may be demonstrated by evidence that
the debtor knew of the creditor's rights and, with that knowledge, acted in
violation of those rights. 70 Therefore, " 'the debtor's actual knowledge or
the reasonable foreseeability that his conduct will result in injury to the
creditor'[is] highly relevant."'7' Nevertheless, the Pasek court ruled that
such knowledge or reasonable foreseeability does not automatically re-
quire a finding of "willful and malicious" injury. The court reasoned that
any asserted motivation, justification, or excuse must also be examined to
discover the malice in addition to willfulness. 72 In the case at bar, the
bankruptcy court's ruling that Pasek had adequate justifications and ex-
59. Id. at 1525-16.






66. Pasek, 983 F.2d at 1526.
67. id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 1527.
70. Id. at 1527; see Posta, 866 F.2d at 367; see also In re Grey, 902 F.2d 1479, 1481 (10th
Cir. 1990).
71. Pasek, 983 F.2d at 1527 (quoting Posta, 866 F.2d at 367).
72. Pasek, 983 F.2d at 1527; see Posta, 866 F.2d at 367 ("willfulness" is straightforward;
"maliciousness" is more complex).
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cuses for his conduct was affirmed. 73 Given the justification, the conclu-
sion of the bankruptcy court that the CPA firm's injury was not the result




Before Pasek, the "willful and malicious" standard applied to a debtor
who knew or could reasonably foresee that his conduct would cause in-
jury.75 Under this old standard, it was clear that Pasek's intentional acts
(of opening his own office and taking clients with him) were "willful and
malicious" because Pasek knowingly violated the CPA firm's contractual
rights.
In Pasek, however, the Tenth Circuit viewed the debtor's personal ex-
cuse as a defense to the non-dischargeability of alleged "willful and mali-
cious" injuries. Pasek thus expands on Posta, which rejected consideration
of "abstract and perhaps moralistic notions of the 'wrongfulness' of the
debtor's act" when analyzing the malice component.76 The Tenth Circuit
has significantly broadened the "malice" inquiry, and has done so in a
manner that furthers the Bankruptcy Code's policy of "fresh start."7 7 In
this case, the discharge of Pasek's debts to the CPA firm will allow him to
start his life over, free from any "pressure or discouragement"78 from the
covenant not to compete.
III. THE PRECLUSION OF JUDICIAL REVIEW OVER TRUSTEE'S FEES UNDER
CHAPTER 12: IN RE S cuarg7r.
7 9
A. Background
Bankruptcy courts handled both judicial and administrative functions
prior to the passage of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978.80 These ad-
ministrative functions included: organizing and scheduling meetings of
creditors, composing creditors' committees, appointing trustees, and set-
ting trustees' fees. 8 1 Under the former statutory scheme, the bankruptcy
court had the power to review and adjust the trustee's fee in individual
cases.82 Congress believed this combination ofjudicial and administrative
functions eroded public confidence in bankruptcy proceedings and un-
73. Pasek, 983 F.2d at 1528. These justifications and excuses included the material alter-
ations of the partnership agreement by the CPA firm including: the attempt to regulate
debtor's personal affairs, imposing unreasonable billable hour quotas, and the reasonable
reliance by the debtor on a legal opinion that the covenant not to compete was unenforce-
able. Id.
74. Id.
75. Posta, 866 F.2d at 367.
76. I
77. Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934).
78. Id.
79. 980 F.2d 639 (10th Cir. 1992).





necessarily burdened bankruptcy judges. 83 Therefore, Congress created
the United States Trustee "pilot program" as part of the Bankruptcy Code
of 1978 to address these concerns. 84 Under this "pilot program," a limited
number of bankruptcy jurisdictions transferred their administrative func-
tions under Chapter 13 to the United States Trustees.
85
The United States Trustees, appointed by the United States Attorney
General,8 6 are authorized to appoint private trustees for all bankruptcy
cases arising under Chapters 7 and 13, and where appropriate to appoint
standing trustees for all Chapter 13 cases within a given judicial district.
87
Over time, this "pilot program" appointment of standing trustees "resulted
in a more efficient... Chapter 13 program than the appointment of dif-
ferent trustees to serve in particular Chapter 13 cases."
88
The "pilot program" was such a success that it was included in the
BankruptcyJudges, United States Trustees, and Family Farmer Bankruptcy
Act of 198689 for phase-in nationwide under the newly created Chapter 12
bankruptcy. 90 Under the 1986 Act, certain judicial districts are chosen by
the Attorney General for implementation of the United States Trustee Sys-
tem. Once a district is certified, the United States Trustee for that district
determines the district's need for a standing trustee. 9 1 Compensation for
the standing trustee is determined by the Attorney General after consulta-
tion with the United States Trustee.
92
Under the compensation plan, a standing trustee receives a fee set by
a fixed percentage of the payments to the trustee by the debtor.93 This fee
is not to exceed ten percent of payments up to $450,000 under a Chapter
12 reorganization plan. 94 If the payments exceed $450,000, then the
trustee's fee is reduced to three percent for the surplus payments. 95 The
total fees collected from all debtors is limited to the basic pay for level V
employees on the executive schedule.9 6 Excess fees are then used to fund
the United States Trustee System.
97
83. Id. (citing H.R. Rep. No. 764, 99th Cong. 2nd Sess. 17-18 (1988), reprinted in 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N 5227, 5230).
84. See In re Savage, 67 B.R. 700, 702 (Bankr. D.RI. 1986).
85. Schollett, 980 F.2d at 641.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 642; 28 U.S.C. § 586(b) (1988).
88. Savage, 67 B.R. at 702 (quoting 5 COLLIER ON BANRuvrcv 1 1302.01 at 1302-20 (15th
ed. 1984)).
89. Pub.L. No. 99-554, 100 Stat. 3088 (1986).
90. Scholett, 980 F.2d at 642.
91. See id.
92. 28 U.S.C. § 586(e) (1988).
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B. In re Schollett
1. Facts
The day the 1986 Act took effect, the bankruptcy judge for the Dis-
trict of Wyoming appointed Sharon Dunivent as standing trustee for all
Chapter 12 cases in the district.98 Wyoming was eventually certified by the
Attorney General, and the United States Trustee determined that a stand-
ing trustee in Wyoming was warranted.99 Therefore, Sharon Dunivent was
immediately reappointed on August 31, 1987 as standing trustee1 0 0 with a
fee arrangement of ten percent as set by the Attorney General. 10
Andrew and Lynn Schollett filed a Chapter 12 reorganization plan for
their family farm with the bankruptcy court for the District of Wyoming on
April 15, 1987. This plan required the Scholletts to make five annual pay-
ments of approximately $30,000 to the standing trustee, Sharon Dunivent,
who would then pay their various creditors. 10 2 Although the reorganiza-
tion plan was approved before the Attorney General certified Wyoming,
the plan was to take effect after certification. Therefore, the Attorney
General's fee schedule applied to the standing trustee.'
0 3
The first payment by the Scholletts was made to Dunivent on August
4, 1988, but Dunivent refused to pay the creditors until the Scholletts paid
the ten percent fee as well. 10 4 On September 23, 1988, the bankruptcy
court issued an order to the Scholletts, requiring them to pay Dunivent
her ten percent fee. The Scholletts refused. 10 5 They appealed to the dis-
trict court, arguing that the ten percent fee of $15,000 was unreasonable
since Dunivent's duties, involving writing seven checks over the next five
years, would take no more than a total of fifteen hours. 10 6 The district
court determined that Dunivent's fee was unreasonable, reduced the fee
to five percent, and remanded the case. 10 7 The district court reasoned
that, even though 11 U.S.C. § 326(b) and 28 U.S.C. § 586 removed the
bankruptcy court's authority to appoint standing trustees, the statute did
not explicitly preclude a review of the trustees' fees. Since the bankruptcy
court did have the power to review the fees prior to the 1978 and 1986
Acts, and since those acts failed to explicitly preclude review, the court
reasoned that "the power to review trustees' fees for reasonableness had
not been stripped from the courts." 108 Dunivent appealed. 10 9
98. Schollett, 980 F.2d at 642.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id; see supra text accompanying note 80.
102. Schollett, 980 F.2d at 640.
103. Id. at 642.
104. Id. at 640.
105. See id. at 641.
106. Id.






In Schollett, the Tenth Circuit had to decide whether the 1986 Act re-
moved the power of federal courts to review the fees set by the Attorney
General for standing trustees. 10 The Scholletts argued that preclusion of
review would be contrary to the legislative intent of the 1986 Act, which
was to provide family farmers advantages not available in other forms of
bankruptcy.1 "' They further argued the ten percent fees added cost to a
reorganization plan, risking the destruction of an otherwise viable oppor-
tunity for reorganization.'
1 2
The Tenth Circuit recognized that the Chapter 12 statutory scheme
did not expressly preclude judicial review of trustees' fees.1 13 Neverthe-
less, the court decided that the statutory language and structure indicated
that such review was not possible. The court reviewed the "clear and cate-
gorical"' 14 language of 28 U.S.C. § 586(e) regarding the Attorney Gen-
eral's explicit duty to set fees for trustees. This language "[did] not suggest
an oversight function for the courts."1 15 The court noted that "28 U.S.C.
§ 586(e)(1) requires the Attorney General to 'fix' the maximum annual
compensation of trustees . . . [and] § 586(e) (2) states that the standing
trustee 'shall collect such percentage fee from all payments under the
plan.' 1116 This explicit language differs from the language for Chapter 7
and 11 bankruptcy cases. Under these Chapters, the trustee's fees are spe-
cifically committed to the discretion of the bankruptcy courts, 1 17 and the
reasonableness of the trustee's fees are to be "based on the nature, the
extent, and the value of such services."' 1 8 Thus, the Tenth Circuit con-
cluded that when Congress wanted judicial review of trustees' fees under
Chapter 7 and 11 it made that intent clear, and that the absence of similar
language for Chapter 12 reflected a congressional intent to preclude such
review of trustees' fees.'
19
Finally, the court reasoned that because the amount of the trustee's
fee depends upon the total of the payment by the debtor to the trustee,
most trustees' fees will be reasonable in each particular case. 120 Also, the
fee reduces to three percent once the payments exceed $450,000. This
reduction reflects a method to reduce fees when the trustee enjoys "econ-
omies of scale." 121 Therefore, the statutory reduction to three percent
limits the possibility of abuse for large fees, thereby lessening the need for
110. Id.
111. Id. at 642.
112. Scholett, 980 F.2d at 642. The Scholletts cited In re Kline, 94 B.R. 557 (Bankr. N.D.
Ind. 1988) in support of this argument.
113. Schollett, 980 F.2d at 643.
114. Id.
115. Id. (citing In re Savage, 67 B.R. 700, 705-6 (D.R.I. 1986)).
116. Schollett, 980 F.2d at 644.
117. Id.; 11 U.S.C. § 326 (1988).
118. 11 U.S.C. § 330(a)(1) (1988); Schollett, 980 F.2d at 644.
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judicial review.1 22 The court reversed the district court and remanded the




The Scholltt decision departs from the bankruptcy policy of "fresh
start."1 24 The decision to preclude judicial review of trustees' fees places
the burden of financing the United States Trustee System upon those
debtors who can afford to pay the fee. The court found that large fees in
cases where payments are high, but where work is small, will subsidize
other cases where the debtor's payments are low but involve a great deal of
work. 125 The Schollett court noted that it would be unfair to the trustee,
who has agreed to serve in all cases regardless of the compensation, to
impose another layer of review. 126 However, the court omitted mention
of the unfairness to debtors who, already in financial difficulty, are forced
to bear the administrative cost of other debtors. This is contrary to the
policy of "fresh start"1 2 7 because the debtor under Chapter 12 retains "the
pressure and discouragement of [their] preexisting debt"128 in the form of
unreasonably high trustee fees when compared to "the nature, the extent,
and the value"129 of the trustee's services.
IV. CONCLUSION
The cases surveyed reveal the federal judiciary's awareness of other
policy considerations beyond the original bankruptcy policy of "fresh
start." This is particularly clear in In re Pasek, where the court discharged a
facially "willful and malicious" injury by the debtor when the debtor had
an excuse for the conduct. However, In re Sampson shows that the "fresh
start" policy must give way when an overriding policy exists, such as the
enforcement of familial obligations. Finally, In re Schollett demonstrates
that certain policies regarding the efficient administration of the bank-




123. Id at 645.
124. See Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934).
125. See Scholkt, 980 F.2d at 644-45.
126. See id at 645.
127. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
128. Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 286 (1991) (quoting Local Loan Co., 292 U.S. at
244).




In 1993 and the latter part of 1992, the Tenth Circuit addressed sev-
eral procedurally significant issues. Two rules are of particular interest
due to the current debate surrounding them: Rule 111 and Rule 16.2
Rule 11 is controversial this year because it was recently amended. 3 Rule
16 also has been subject to recent debate among judges and scholars.
4
Although some of the Rule 16 requirements are fairly well established,
5
questions have arisen as to whether Rule 16 is serving its purpose and
whether new standards are needed.
6
The Tenth Circuit decided two Rule 11 cases that exhibit the court's
reluctance to impose sanctions. The court appears weary of the satellite
litigation surrounding Rule 11 motions. In Coffey v. Healthtrust, Inc.,7 the
Tenth Circuit reversed the district court's imposition of Rule 11 sanctions
on an attorney who testified falsely concerning his research. 8 In Griffen v.
Oklahoma City,9 the Tenth Circuit joined other circuits that have refused to
impose a continuing obligation on an attorney to update previously filed
pleadings.10 These decisions demonstrate that federal courts are becom-
1. FED. R. Civ. P. 11 governs sanctions for the filing of frivolous pleadings, motions,
and other papers in federal court.
2. FED. R. Crv. P. 16 covers the scheduling and management of pretrial conferences.
3. See Denis F. McLaughlin, New Federal Rules of Civil Procedures, [sic] N.J. LAw., Jan. 1994,
at 1. See also HenryJ. Reske, A New Rule 11? Court Oks Procedural Amendments, A.B.A.J.,July
1993, at 26 (noting the controversy surrounding the rule changes). The full text of the new
rule can be found at 61 U.S.L.W. 4365 (Apr. 22, 1993).
4. See Charles R. Richey, Rule 16: A Survey and Some Considerations for the Bench and Bar,
C829 ALI-ABA 177, 183 (1993) (viewing Rule 16 litigation as an indication of the tension
between the roles ofjudging and lawyering); David L. Shapiro, Federal Rule 16: A Look at the
Theory and Practice of Rulemaking, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 1969, 1970-71 (1989) (noting that Rule 16
was innovative when it was drafted and that it has since been a focal point in the continuing
debate over the judge's pretrial role).
5. For instance, the rule states that a final pretrial order shall be modified only to
prevent manifest injustice. FED. R. Crv. P. 16. As this survey will discuss, however, courts have
had difficulty determining exactly when manifest injustice is likely to occur. See infra note
164 and accompanying text.
6. See generally John P. Frank, The Rules of Civil Procedure-Agenda for Refornt, 137 U. PA.
L. Rav. 1883 (1989) (reviewing the successes and failures of the first 50 years of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure); see alsoJack B. Weinstein, After Fifty Years of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure: Are the Barriers to Justice Being Raised , 137 U. PA. L. Rv. 1901, 1916-17 (1989) (argu-
ing that Rule 16 is ripe for judicial reconsideration, because it is vulnerable to a myriad of
new questions and interpretations).
7. 1 F.3d 1101 (10th Cir. 1993). The first time this case reached the Tenth Circuit, the
court vacated and remanded for further findings. Coffey v. Healthtrust, Inc., 955 F.2d 1388
(10th Cir. 1992). References to this earlier case are Coffey L References to Coffey v. Health-
trust, Inc. 1 F.3d 1101 (10th Cir. 1993), the subject of this discussion, are Coffey H.
8. Coffey I, 1 F.3d at 1103.
9. 3 F.3d 336 (10th Cir. 1993).
10. Id. at 339.
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ing less likely to impose Rule 11 sanctions because many judges think the
rule in action has defeated its purpose in theory.1 '
The Tenth Circuit dealt with Rule 16 in two cases involving the modi-
fication of pretrial orders. In Joseph Manufacturing Co. v. Olympic Fire
Corp.,12 the court reversed a decision allowing a party to modify a pretrial
order. The court determined that preventing modification would not re-
sult in manifest injustice, even though the result was the exclusion of a
state claim preclusion defense that would have settled the litigation.13 In
Moss v. Feldmeyer,14 the court affirmed the district court's decision allowing
a witness to testify as an expert even though the witness had not been so
designated in the pretrial order.' 5 Further, the court allowed another wit-
ness to testify about matters that had not been specified in the order.
16
These cases demonstrate some conflict in the court's interpretation of
manifest injustice under Rule 16. To avoid further conflict, a new stan-
dard should be implemented to give courts clearer guidance in determin-
ing when a pretrial order should be modified.
I. RULE 11
A. Background
The revised Rule 11 went into effect on December 1, 1993.1 7 The
United States Supreme Court approved the revisions in April 1993,18 and
implemented them when Congress made no move to change the rule
prior to the December 1, 1993 deadline. 19 Under the revised rule, a party
must be notified in writing that the rule may have been violated before
opposing counsel can move for sanctions. 20 Upon notice, the party may
withdraw or correct the pleading, claim, or defense to avoid a penalty.
2 1
Other changes to Rule 11 include allowing parties to make factual
assertions they believe will be supported after reasonable discovery.2 2 This
is a change from the prior requirement that assertions be "well grounded
in fact" at the time the pleadings are filed.23 Also, the revised rule gives
11. SeeJames R. Simpson, Note, Why Change Rule 11? Ramifications of the 1992 Amendment
Proposal, 29 CAL. W. L. REv. 495, 498 (1993) (noting that many judges view Rule 11 as only
the fifth most effective method to manage frivolous suits); Carl Tobias, New Rule in Need of
Trial Run, NAT'L L.J.,June 21, 1993, at 15 (stating that numerous federal judges think Rule
11 has detrimental side effects and is not a very effective deterrent to frivolous cases).
12. 986 F.2d 416 (10th Cir. 1993).
13. Id. at 418.
14. 979 F.2d 1454 (10th Cir. 1992).
15. Id. at 1456-57.
16. Id.
17. FED. R. Civ. P. 11; see also supra note 3 and accompanying text.
18. John F. Rooney, Revamped Sanctions Among Largest Federal Rules Changes in 20 Years,
CHI. DAiLY L. BULL., Nov. 30, 1993, at 1.
19. Robert E. Bartkus, Rule 11"s New Teeth Have a Broader Bite, N.J.L.J., Dec. 20, 1993, at
11.
20. FED. R. Crv. P. 11.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 (28 U.S.C. app. (1988)).
[Vol. 71:4
CIWL PROCEDURE
judges more discretion in imposing sanctions and allows fines to be paid
to the court instead of to the opposing side.
2 4
These changes occurred because of the controversy that has sur-
rounded Rule 11 since its initial amendment in 1983.25 The majority of
the commentary criticizes Rule 11 for defeating its own purpose, which is
to decrease the amount of frivolous litigation. 26 Instead, the amount of
satellite litigation surrounding sanctions has increased. 2 7 Rule 11 is also
criticized for its vague description of exactly what behavior is subject to
sanctions.2 8 Another problem is the extent of an attorney's duty to cor-
rect or withdraw frivolous filings. Circuits are split over whether the attor-
ney has a duty to update previously filed pleadings.
29
The following two Tenth Circuit opinions illustrate the court's reluc-
tance to apply Rule 11 sanctions, perhaps in anticipation of the rule
changes, and its interpretation of continuing duty under the rule.
B. Tenth Circuit Opinion
1. Coffey v. Healthtrust, Inc.
30
a. Facts
David High represented a radiologist, Kenneth Coffey, in an antitrust
suit against Edmond Memorial Hospital. 3 ' Coffey was part of a group that
provided exclusive radiology services to the hospital. 32 In 1988, the hospi-
tal entered into an exclusive contract with another doctor, thereby
preventing Coffey from treating patients at the hospital. 3 3 Dr. Coffey's
argument depended on a finding that the hospital's geographic market
was the City of Edmond. 34 High submitted the deposition of Dr. James
Horrell, an expert economist, who stated that since the hospital was the
only one in Edmond, it had market power over that area.3 5 Defendants
24. FED. R. Cry. P. 11.
25. Victor H. Kramer, Viewing Rule 11 as a Tool to Improve Professional Responsibility, 75
MINN. L. REv. 793, 793 (1991) (noting that since Rule 11 was amended, it has generated over
a thousand judicial opinions and a growing number of articles that fiercely debate the advan-
tages and disadvantages of the rule); Melinda G. Baum, Note, The Seven Year Itch: Is it Time to
Reamend Rule 11 ? 40 WASH. U.J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 227, 247 (1991) (arguing that the use of
Rule 11 increased dramatically after the 1983 amendment, but such use has brought with it
inconsistent application and enforcement).
26. Tobias, supra note 11, at 15.
27. Id. (reporting that the amended Rule 11 has engendered much expensive, unneces-
sary satellite litigation); Simpson, supra note 11, at 500 (arguing that Rule 11 has created
destructive satellite litigation).
28. See Baum, supra note 25, at 234.
29. E.g., Brubaker v. City of Richmond, 943 F.2d 1363 (4th Cir. 1991) (no continuing
liability of attorney after the pleading is signed); contra Mann v. G. & G. Mfg., 900 F.2d 953
(6th Cir. 1990) (after the complaint is filed, attorney has continuing responsibility to review
pleadings and modify them to conform to Rule 11), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 959 (1990).
30. 1 F.3d 1101 (10th Cir. 1993) (Coffey Ii).
31. Id. at 1103.
32. Coffey v. Healthtrust, Inc, 955 F.2d 1388, 1390 (10th Cir. 1992)(Coffey 1).
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offered contradictory evidence and moved for summary judgment.3 6 The
district court took judicial notice of the short distance between Edmond
and eight Oklahoma City hospitals, leading to a probable finding that Ed-
mond Memorial Hospital did not have the necessary geographic market to
support Dr. Coffey's argument.
3 7
At this point, High submitted, as newly discovered evidence, a study
conducted by Health Care Investment Analysts, Inc. ("Health Care"). The
study considered urban and suburban hospitals to be in the same competi-
tive market only if they were within five miles of each other.38 High at-
tached an affidavit of Dr. Horrell stating that the study supported High's
position.
3 9
Defendants filed for Rule 11 sanctions against High, presenting affi-
davits of Health Care officials stating that they told High his intended use
of the study was misguided. 40 The officials told High that the study used
an arbitrary market definition which did not support his position as to the
relevant geographic area.4 1 At the Rule 11 hearing, High testified he had
not been so informed.
4 2
The district court imposed sanctions.43 On the first appeal, the
Tenth Circuit vacated and remanded because it could not tell whether the
court had imposed sanctions based on High's filing of the pleading or for
having testified falsely.4 4 On remand, the district court again imposed
sanctions based on knowingly filing a false and misleading pleading.
4 5
The court relied on High's testifying falsely simply to support its finding
that High knew the pleading was false when he filed it.
4 6
b. Opinion of the Court
The Tenth Circuit reversed the district court's imposition of Rule 11
sanctions.4 7 The Tenth Circuit held that testifying falsely was punishable
under different rules; thus, the determination of Rule 11 sanctions would
be no different if High had testified truthfully.48 The court stated that
"while lying may be a disciplinary problem, it is not a subject for Rule 11
sanctions." 49 The court then held that High reasonably relied on Dr. Hor-
rell's expert opinion that the study supported his argument.5 0 Therefore,
36. Id.
37. Id. Although not stated in the opinion, it is helpful to know that Edmond is approxi-
mately 15 miles from Oklahoma City. RAND McNALLY ROAD A'TAs 79 (1991).






44. Coffey v. Healthtrust, Inc., 955 F.2d 1388, 1395 (10th Cir. 1992)(Coffey 1).
45. Coffey II, 1 F.3d at 1103.
46. Id. at 1103-04.
47. Id. at 1104-05.









The Tenth Circuit decided Coffey II by relying almost exclusively on
one prior case, Schring Corp. v. Vitarine Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,52 which held
that conflict of opinion alone is an insufficient basis for Rule 11 sanc-
tions.5" This is problematic, because after examining the facts of Coffey II,
it does not appear that the district court's imposition of sanctions was
based on conflict of opinion alone. As previously stated, the district court
based its sanctions on High's filing of a misleading pleading. Further,
High's testimony concerning what he knew at the time of filing was proven
to be a lie. In fact, the district court had responded to High's motion for
rehearing as follows:
[I] n its prior Order, the Court sought to put its finding gently. In
view of the instant motion, the time has come to be more
blunt.... The finding: HCIA [Health Care] witnesses told the
truth when they said that they told High his... exhibit could not
be legitimately proffered for the purpose he proposed. Mr. High
did not tell the truth when he denied this.
54
The Tenth Circuit found that it could not impose sanctions based on
High's lie to the court. The Tenth Circuit ignored the United States
Supreme Court's holding in Chambers v. NASCO, Inc.5 5 That case dealt
with an attorney who defrauded the district court by putting property sub-
ject to a pending temporary restraining order (TRO) out of the court's
reach. 56 The district court sanctioned the attorney, using its inherent
power to impose sanctions for "attempts to deprive the Court of jurisdic-
tion, fraud, misleading and lying to the Court."5 7 The court, however,
could not use Rule 11 because it did not directly apply to the attorney's
actions.58 The United States Supreme Court upheld the district court's
51. Id.
52. 889 F.2d 490 (3d Cir. 1989).
53. Id. at 499. This case dealt with attorneys who relied on four medical articles and
published FDA ratings to support their argument that the substitution of an advertised ge-
neric drug for another drug could cause serious health risks. The court found that the attor-
neys reasonably relied on this information to make their claim, even though the attorneys
were aware of a study that neither proved nor disproved the health risk from substitution.
This case seems to differ from Coffey II because David High had only one source of informa-
tion to support his argument; he was clearly told the study did not support his argument; and
the study in Schering Cop. was inconclusive.
54. Coffey v. Healthtrust, Inc., 955 F.2d 1388, 1394 (10th Cir. 1992) (Coffey 1).
55. 111 S. Ct. 2123 (1991).
56. The attorney was notified by opposing counsel on a Friday that a TRO order against
the property at issue was pending, and would be heard by the court on Monday. That week-
end, the attorney and his client began transferring the property to the client's sister in order
to deprive the court of jurisdiction to issue the TRO. During the TRO hearing, the judge
telephoned the attorney to ask about the possibility that the property was in the process of
being sold. The attorney made no mention of the recordation of the deeds earlier that
morning. Later, after the transfer of the property was complete, the attorney informed the
judge he had intentionally withheld the information from the court. Id. at 2128-29.
57. Id. at 2131.
58. Id.
1994]
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imposition of sanctions. 59 The Court held that the sanctioning scheme of
the Federal Rules does not displace the inherent power of a court to im-
pose sanctions for bad-faith conduct.60 This is true even if procedural
rules exist that sanction the same conduct.
61
The district court in the Coffey cases sanctioned High once and rein-
stated the sanctions on remand. Even if the district court had not felt
High's actions fell under Rule 11, it could have used its inherent power to
sanction High's conduct. The United States Supreme Court's decision in
Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp.62 makes the Tenth Circuit's reversal even
more surprising. In Cooter, the Court held that an appellate court should
use an abuse of discretion standard when reviewing a district court's award
of sanctions.63 The Court stated that district courts are in the best posi-
tion to determine whether a sanction is warranted because such a determi-
nation is fact-intensive and based on some assessment of the signer's
credibility.
64
The Tenth Circuit did address Cooter in the first Coffey decision. In
fact, the court quoted Cooter's holding by stating a court's inquiry in deter-
mining Rule 11 sanctions is rooted in factual determinations. 65 Neverthe-
less, in the second Coffey decision, the Tenth Circuit completely
backtracked, stating that "[a]lthough imposition of Rule 11 sanctions is
subject to an abuse of discretion standard of review, . . [Rule 11] is an
evolving area of the law" 66 The court further asserted that "it is difficult
for a district court to predict accurately the development of the law in
light of the various decisions that are being made."
67
This last statement by the Tenth Circuit warrants the conclusion that
the court was anticipating the changes to Rule 11. For instance, the old
rule required that pleadings be supported by existing law or by a good
faith argument for its extension. 68 The new version calls for a non-frivo-
lous, rather than good faith, argument.6 9 Courts have interpreted "frivo-
lous" to mean the absence of any basis for the proffered argument-a
lower standard than the previous good faith requirement. 70 Some com-
mentators have said this change is in response to Rule lI's chilling effect
59. Id. at 2136.
60. Id.
61. The Court addressed Rule II as follows:
It is true that the District Court could have employed Rule 11 to sanction Chambers
for filing "false and frivolous pleadings" . . . and that some of the other conduct
might have been reached through other rules. Much of the bad-faith conduct by
Chambers, however, was beyond the reach of the rules.., and the conduct sanc-
tionable under the rules was intertwined within conduct that only the inherent
power could address.
Id. This language seems directly applicable to the facts in the Coffey cases.
62. 496 U.S. 384 (1990).
63. Id. at 405.
64. Id. at 402, 404.
65. Coffey v. Healthtrust, Inc., 955 F.2d 1388, 1393-94 (10th Cir. 1992)(Coffey 1).
66. Coffey v. Healthtrust, Inc., 1 F.3d 1101, 1104 (10th Cir. 1993)(Coffey fl).
67. Id.
68. Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 (28 U.S.C. app. (1988)).
69. FED. R. Crv. P. 11.
70. Simpson, supra note 11, at 505.
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on creative advocacy. 71 Arguably, knowledge of this new direction helped
the court get around High's bad faith in not mentioning that the writers
of the study did not think it supported his argument. Further, the court
gave great weight to Dr. Horrell's testimony at the Rule 11 hearing. Dr.
Horrell stated that "even when presented with the contradictory conclu-
sion of the authors of the study," he did not change his belief that the
study supported High's position. 72 Therefore, the court felt that some ba-
sis existed for High's argument despite his bad faith in presenting it.
Even if the Tenth Circuit did not specifically gear its decision to the
revised Rule 11, perhaps it was merely expressing its weariness with the
litigation surrounding the old rule. The Coffey case was appealed to the
Tenth Circuit twice. The court appeared to see the irony in the amount of
litigation surrounding a rule that is supposed to reduce the amount of
filings in the legal system. Future decisions will reveal whether the revised
rule will alleviate this problem, perhaps through the provision calling for
sanctions to be paid to the court, rather than to the opposing party.
73
2. Griffen v. Oklahoma City
7 4
a. Facts
The plaintiffs were employees of the Oklahoma CityJail who filed suit
against the City in state court alleging negligent infliction of emotional
distress, as well as several Constitutional claims.75 The plaintiffs claimed
that the City knowingly exposed them to asbestos fibers contained in the
insulation on water pipes in the jail, causing anxiety, mental anguish, and
an increased risk of cancer.7 6 The City removed the action to federal
court based on the Constitutional claims.77 The court granted the City's
motion for summary judgment on the merits, determining that the plain-
tiffs failed to present any evidence of compensable injury. 78 The City then
filed a motion for sanctions under Rule 11, 28 U.S.C. § 1927, 79 and title
12, section 2011 of the Oklahoma Code.8 0 The court denied the motion,
71. Id. See also Stephen B. Burbank, The Transformation of American Civil Procedure: The
Example of Rule 11, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 1925, 1938 (1989) (noting that in a one-year period in
the Third Circuit, Rule 11 had a disproportionately adverse impact on civil rights plaintiffs).
72. Coffey v. Healthtrust, Inc., 1 F.3d 1101, 1104 (10th Cir. 1993)(Coffey I).
73. FED. R. CIrv. P. 11. The rule states that sanctions may consist of an order to pay a
penalty into court. Penalties will be paid to the other party only if "warranted for effective
deterrence." Id.
74. 3 F.3d 336 (10th Cir. 1993).
75. Id. at 337. The Constitutional claims were based on the First, Fourth, Sixth, Eighth,
and Fourteenth amendments to the U.S. Constitution. Id.
76. Id. at 337-38.
77. Id. at 338.
78. Id. at 338 n.2.
79. The City appealed the trial court's denial of its claim for attorney's fees, costs, and
sanctions under 28 U.S.C. § 1927. This section provides that an attorney who manipulates
proceedings "unreasonably and vexatiously may be required by the court to satisfy personally,
the excess costs, expenses and attorney's fees reasonably incurred because of such conduct."
The Tenth Circuit remanded this issue back to the district court for a finding in support of
its denial. Id. at 342 n.13.
80. Griffen, 3 F.3d at 338. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12 § 2011 (West 1993) is the state's
counterpart to Rule 11.
1994]
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holding that the plaintiffs had not violated any of the rules.8 1 The City
appealed, contending the court abused its discretion by concluding the
rules had not been violated.
8 2
b. Opinion of the Court
The Tenth Circuit reversed and remanded, but only with regard to
whether the district court should have applied the state counterpart to
Rule 11 and 28 U.S.C. § 1927. The Tenth Circuit agreed with the district
court that Rule 11 sanctions did not apply to the pleadings filed in state
court.8 3 The court divided the case into three separate issues: 1) Whether
the plaintiff could be subject to Rule 11 sanctions based on the plaintiff's
original complaint, which was filed in state court prior to removal to fed-
eral court; 2) Whether the district court abused its discretion in failing to
impose Rule 11 sanctions based on pleadings filed after removal; and 3)
Whether the district court had the authority to impose sanctions for the
filing of the original complaint based on title 12, section 2011 of the
Oklahoma Code.
84
Regarding the first issue, the court followed precedent holding that
Rule 11 does not apply to a pleading made in state court, even if the case is
later removed to federal court.8 5 The court went further, however, and
established the Tenth Circuit's stance on whether there is a continuing
duty to update previously filed pleadings. The court noted that the re-
moval of an action to federal court supports the imposition of Rule 11
sanctions only if the rule imposes a continuing obligation on the signer to
update previously filed pleadings.8 6 The Tenth Circuit went on to assert,
"today we join those circuits that have concluded that Rule 11 does not
impose such an obligation."
87
Secondly, the court addressed whether the district court abused its
discretion in refusing to impose sanctions on those pleadings made by the
plaintiff after removal.88 The Tenth Circuit noted that the district court
had not made any findings or given any explanation for its denial of sanc-
tions on this basis. Therefore, the Tenth Circuit had no way to judge the
exercise of the court's discretion, and remanded for those findings.
89
81. Griffen, 3 F.3d at 338.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 340.
84. Id. at 338.
85. Id. at 339 (following Dahnke v. Teamsters Local 695, 906 F.2d 1192 (7th Cir. 1990),
Foval v. First Nat'l Bank of Commerce, 841 F.2d 126 (5th Cir. 1988) and Kirby v. Allegheny
Beverage Corp., 811 F.2d 253 (4th Cir. 1987)). These cases derived their decisions from two
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. FED. R. Crv. P. 1 states that the rules govern the
procedure in the United States district courts, and FED. R. Civ. P. 81 (c) dictates that the rules
apply to civil actions removed to the United States district courts from the state courts and
govern procedure aJer removal (emphasis added).
86. Griffen, 3 F.3d at 339.
87. Id.




Finally, the court addressed whether the district court could impose
sanctions under Oklahoma's counterpart to Rule 11. The court noted
that the few courts addressing this issue had decided a district court pos-
sessed this authority.90 The Tenth Circuit, finding no authority to the
contrary, agreed, and again instructed the district court to state its reasons
on remand for the denial of sanctions under the state counterpart to Rule
11.91
c. Analysis
Griffen answered two previously unaddressed questions concerning
Rule 11 in the Tenth Circuit. First, the Tenth Circuit aligned itself with
those circuits holding an attorney does not have a continuing duty to up-
date previously filed pleadings. 92 The court will need to reinterpret this
holding in light of the revised Rule 11. The Griffen court based its decision
on the old requirement that the pleading be evaluated at the time of sign-
ing the pleading.93 Under the revised Rule 11, this language now reads:
"by presenting to the court (whether by signing, filing submitting or later ad-
vocating) a pleading ... ."94 Some commentators who have reviewed the
revisions and the advisory comments have concluded that this new lan-
guage, while broader than the current rule, does not impose a continuing
duty to amend or withdraw previously filed pleadings. Rather, the attor-
ney merely cannot advocate that specific pleading in later argument.9 5
Nevertheless, this new requirement most likely will be open to interpreta-
tion by the courts, and a few commentators say the language is confus-
ing.9 6 Further, even if there is not a continuing duty to update a pleading,
the attorney would be wise to withdraw that pleading and avoid the unin-
90. Id. at 341; see Harrison v. Luse, 760 F.Supp. 1394, 1401 (D. Col.), aff'd, 951 F.2d 1259
(10th Cir. 1991); Schmitz v. Campbell-Mithun, Inc., 124 F.D.R. 189, 192 (N.D. Il1.); 1989
Crowell v. Holy Order of Mans, 39 Fed.R.Serv. 2d 1223, 1224 (D. Mass. 1984).
91. Id. at 342.
92. See Brubaker v. City of Richmond, 943 F.2d 1363 (4th Cir. 1991); Schoenberger v.
Oselka, 909 F.2d 1086 (7th Cir. 1990); Hilton Hotels Corp. v. Banov, 899 F.2d 40 (D.C. Cir.
1990); Corporation of the Presiding Bishop v. Associated Contractors, Inc., 877 F.2d 938
(11th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1079 (1990).
93. Griffen, 3 F.3d at 339.
94. FED. R. Crv. P. 11 (emphasis added).
95. See Simpson, supra note 11, at 508 (stating that the proposal does not impose a con-
tinuing duty); Georgene M. Vairo, Civil Practice and Litigation Techniques in the Federal Courts,
C837 ALI-ABA 21, 26 (May 20, 1993) (reporting that the new language does not incorporate
the continuing duty to withdraw papers, but means an attorney could not continue to press a
position that was no longer tenable). Both sources note an earlier version of the proposed
rule change, which would have imposed a continuing duty, that was met with severe criticism.
The proposed rule was then modified to the present language. Simpson, supra note 11, at
508, Vairo, supra, at 26-27.
96. See, e.g., J. Stratton Shartel, Litigators Say Rule 11 Proposal Will Lead to Gamesmanship, 6
No. 11 PH-INLIT 1 (Nov. 1992). Shartel reports that some litigators think the new require-
ment remedies nothing and creates a problem, because it fails to define "later advocating."
An advantage of having no continuing obligation is that you have a "clear benchmark." One
attorney surveyed says that the extension of the obligation to any point in the litigation could
require "eternal notification of the countless number" of Rule 11 controversies that could
arise. Id.
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tentional mention of it later in the proceedings. 97 It is likely, however,
that the Tenth Circuit, having just decided there is no continuing duty to
amend or withdraw previously filed pleadings, would interpret the new
Rule 11 consistently with that opinion.
Second, the Griffen court decided that a federal court can apply a state
sanction rule after the case is removed to federal court. This case did not
trigger an Erie98 question, because it was removed to federal court under a
federal question, rather than diversity jurisdiction. It is unclear, however,
whether the Griffen holding would apply to a case removed to federal court
under diversity jurisdiction. The Tenth Circuit, by its reliance on Schmitz
v. Campbell-Mithun, Inc.,99 a diversity jurisdiction case, appeared to indicate
that it would apply Griffen in the diversity context. The Schmitz court dis-
cussed Erie, but found it irrelevant because "Rule 11 does not apply to the
filing of a complaint in state court."100 The court reasoned that since
there was no conflict between state and federal law, Erie did not apply.10 1
The Schmitz court rationalized that if a federal court could not apply the
state counterpart to Rule 11, plaintiffs could file baseless papers in state
court and escape sanctions if the defendant removed the case to federal
court. 10 2 The Tenth Circuit also relied on other federal cases which held
that a federal court could apply state rules of procedure to conduct occur-
ring prior to removal.
1 03
Although, at first glance, the Tenth Circuit's reasoning and reliance
on other decisions seems well-grounded, the outcome in a future diversity
case is uncertain due to the confusion surrounding the Erie doctrine.
1 0 4
At least one scholar has argued that federal courts should not apply state
procedural rules in a federal court setting.1 0 5 This is because Erie gener-
ally dictates the application of state substantive rules and federal procedural
97. See Vairo, supra note 95, at 27 (noting that although there is no duty under the new
rule to formally withdraw the paper or position taken, withdrawal of the paper generally will
immunize the target from sanctions). Cf McLaughlin, supra note 3, at 12 (interpreting the
new Rule 11 as imposing an affirmative duty to withdraw a frivolous claim regardless of
whether a subsequent paper has been filed).
98. Erie RR. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). The case is generally thought to hold
that federal courts must apply state substantive law to cases brought before them under diver-
sityjurisdiction. See DAVID W. LoUISELL ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON PLEADING AND PROCE-
DURE 569 (6th ed. 1989).
99. 124 F.R.D. 189 (N.D. 11. 1989) (employment discrimination action in which sanc-
tions were requested on pleadings filed prior to removal to the federal district court).
100. Id. at 192.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. McKenna v. Beezy, 130 F.R.D. 655 (N.D. Ill. 1989) (applying Illinois law concerning
failure to prosecute for conduct which occurred prior to removal); Winkels v. George A.
Hormel & Co., 874 F.2d 567 (8th Cir. 1989) (holding that Minnesota rule governing com-
mencement of actions applied to action removed to federal court); Nealy v. Transportacion
Maritima Mexicana, S.A., 662 F.2d 1275 (9th Cir. 1980) (state service of process rule applied
to service made while action was in state court prior to removal).
104. SeeJohn B. Corr, Thoughts on the Vitality of Erie, 41 AMER. U. L. REV. 1087, 1130 (1992)
(noting that many scholars have described Erie as "confused").
105. Jeffrey A. Parness, Choices About Attorney Fee-Shifting Laws: Further Substance/Procedure
Problems Under Erie and Elsewhere, 49 U. Prrr. L. REv. 393, 395-96 (1988). Parness asserts that
state procedural rules were intended to be used in state courts and have no business being
applied in a federal court. Id.
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rules in federal courts. 10 6 Additionally, state rules of procedure arguably
are not intended for use in federal courts, since states usually have a fairly
small interest in the conduct of federal litigation. 10 7 In sum, the Erie issue
concerning a federal court's application of a state procedural rule appears
open for further interpretation.
II. RULE 16
A. Background
Although it has not spawned as much controversy as Rule 11, Rule 16
has generated its own share of criticism and commentary.1 0 8 The goal of
the original rule promulgated in 1938 was to encourage, but not require,
judges to participate in sharpening and simplifying the issues to be liti-
gated at trial. 10 9 The broad language of the original rule 110 resulted in a
great range of practices amongjudges.1 11 As a result, judges began ques-
tioning the rule and suggesting reform.1 12 Judge Charles E. Clark, for-
merly of the Second Circuit Federal Court of Appeals, criticized the rule
because it was so cumbersome that judges were spending more time or-
ganizing pretrials than actual trials.1 13 He suggested the rule should be
reformed to focus on the conference, rather than the pretrial pleadings,
and that pretrial should be kept in perspective as an accessory rather than
a substitute for trial.1 1 4 Judge Milton Pollack, District Judge, Southern
District of New York, argued that pretrial should serve to narrow issues
and expedite trials. Therefore, the rule needed to be streamlined in order
to allow judges to take control early in the case. 115 One purpose of the
1983 amendment to Rule 16 was to increase judicial control of litiga-
106. Id. at 395 (emphasis added). The author argues that federal courts have misinter-
preted footnote 31 of Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240 (1975),
which states that when a state law does not run counter to a valid federal statute or rule of
court, a state law concerning attorney's fees that reflects a substantial policy of the state
should be followed. Alyeska, 421 U.S. at 259 n.31. Parness interprets this language as apply-
ing to state substantive laws concerning attorney's fees, but not to state procedural rules gov-
erning attorney's fees. Parness, supra note 105, at 414. For instance, a rule related to
conduct triggering a cause of action is substantive, but a rule related to conduct during litiga-
tion is procedural. Id. at 401.
107. Parness, supra note 105, at 395.
108. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
109. Shapiro, supra note 4, at 1978.
110. The original rule provided in part:
The court shall make an order which recites the action taken at the conference, the
amendments allowed to the pleadings, and the agreements made by the parties as
to any of the matters considered . . . and such order when entered controls the
subsequent course of the action, unless modified at the trial to prevent manifest
injustice. The court in its discretion may establish by rule a pre-trial calendar on
which actions may be placed for consideration as above provided ....
FED. R. Crv. P. 16 (1983); Shapiro, supra note 4, at 1970 n.2.
111. Shapiro, supra note 4, at 1981. Shapiro reports that surveys done between the rule's
introduction and amendment revealed that some judges made little use of the rule while
others invented elaborate local rules requiring pretrial conferences in most cases. Id.
112. Charles E. Clark, To an Understanding Use of Pre-Tria, 29 F.R.D. 191, 454 (1962);
Milton Pollack, Pretrial Conferences, 50 F.R.D. 427, 451 (1971).
113. Clark, supra note 112, at 458.
114. Id. at 461.
115. Pollack, supra note 112, at 451-52.
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tion.1 1 6 The amendment authorized early scheduling conferences, called
for "the elimination of frivolous claims or defenses," and provided for
sanctions against parties for failing to comply with pretrial orders.
1 17
Since the amendment, questions have arisen as to the imposition of
sanctions, the judge's role in settlement, and the modification of pretrial
orders.' 18 One commentator has questioned whether the authorization
of sanctions has made matters worse by adding a layer of tactical maneu-
vering by lawyers.1 19 The judge's role in settlement was hotly debated af-
ter the Seventh Circuit's decision in G. Heileman Brewing Co. v. Joseph Oat
Corp.120 That case held that ajudge has authority under Rule 16 to sanc-
tion parties for failing to appear at a settlement conference. 12 1 One critic
of the holding argues that it allows judges to force alternative dispute reso-
lution on parties in order to avoid sanctions.
122
The most heavily litigated aspect of Rule 16 is the modification of
pretrial orders. 123 This aspect of the Rule is the subject of the following
Tenth Circuit opinions.
B. Tenth Circuit Opinion
1. Joseph Manufacturing Co. v. Olympic Fire Corp.1
2 4
a. Facts
Joseph Manufacturing Company ('Joseph") contracted with Olympic
Fire Corporation ("Olympic") to inspect and service Joseph's two fire ex-
tinguishers. 125 Olympic serviced and pressurized the extinguishers, and
Joseph paid for the service. 126 A month later, a fire broke out, causing
extensive property damage to Joseph's property. Neither extinguisher
functioned.
127
Joseph filed a diversity action against Olympic in federal court, claim-
ing breach of contract and implied warranty in negligently maintaining
the extinguishers.' 28 A week later, the owner of the building leased by
Joseph filed suit in state court against Joseph, as her lessee, and against
116. Richey, supra note 4, at 182; Shapiro, supra note 4, at 1985.
117. FED. R. Civ. P. 16.
118. See Richey, supra note 4; see also E. Donald Elliott, Managerial Judging and the Evolution
of Procedure, 53 U. CHI. L. REv. 306, 314-18 (1986) (reviewing the debate between those who
think increased managerial judging is needed to increase efficiency in the system, and those
who oppose increased judicial involvement because it forces litigants to abandon positions
on the merits);Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARv. L. R~v. 376 (1982) (generally op-
posing managerial judging).
119. Elliott, supra note 118, at 319-20.
120. 871 F.2d 648 (7th Cir. 1989).
121. Id. at 656-57.
122. Kelly J. Applegate, Note, G. Heileman Brewing Co. v. Joseph Oat Corp.: The Use of
Inherent Judicial Power Within the Limitations of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 17J. CONTEMP.
L. 159, 165-69 (1991).
123. Richey, supra note 4, at 191.
124. 986 F.2d 416 (10th Cir. 1993).
125. Id. at 417.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Joseph Mfg. Co., v. Olympic Fire Corp., 781 F.Supp. 718 (D. Kan. 1991).
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Olympic.1 2 9 In August 1990, the state court granted Joseph's motion for
directed verdict based on a lease provision exoneratingJoseph from liabil-
ity to the owner.1 30 Despite the directed verdict, the court permitted the
jury to compare fault between Joseph and Olympic.13 1 The jury found
that Olympic was 55% at fault and Joseph was 45% at fault.
13 2
On September 6, 1990, Olympic asked the federal court for permis-
sion to modify its pretrial order so Olympic could file for summary judg-
ment based on the state court judgment.' 33 However, the federal court
had set February 5, 1990, as the date of the final pretrial conference and
April 16, 1990, as the deadline for filing all dispositive motions.1 34 Joseph
objected to the motion to amend, but in November 1991, the district court
granted the motion to amend and entered summary judgment in favor of
Olympic. Joseph appealed.
135
b. Opinion of the Court
The Tenth Circuit began by reviewing the district court's analysis in
order to determine whether the court had abused its discretion. 13 6 The
Tenth Circuit concluded that the district court had muddled its analysis by
failing to separate two distinct issues: first, whether the order should have
been modified, and second, whether the district court was required to give
judgment to Olympic because the state court had done so.t37 The Tenth
Circuit stated that the "keystone" of this case was Rule 16(e),13 8 because
before Olympic could even raise the state preclusion defense, it had to
demonstrate it was entitled to modify the pretrial order. 139
The Tenth Circuit conceded that the district court had correctly fol-
lowed the language of Rule 16, which requires that a pretrial order shall
not be modified absent a showing of manifest injustice. 140 According to
the Tenth Circuit, however, the district court allowed the order to be mod-
ified without any explanation of the manifest injustice that would have
otherwise resulted.' 4 ' The Tenth Circuit, upon reviewing the facts of the
case, decided that if anyone suffered from manifest injustice, it wasJoseph,
129. Id. at 719.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 720. This was done in accordance with KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-258a(c) (1991).
Joseph Mfg. Co., 986 F.2d at 418 n.2.




136. Id. The court relied on the holding of Burnette v. Dresser Indus., 849 F.2d 1277,
1282 (10th Cir. 1988) that an abuse of discretion standard is to be used when reviewing the
district court's decision to modify a pretrial order.
137. Joseph Mfg. Co., 986 F.2d at 418.
138. Id. Rule 16(e) reads, "After any conference held pursuant to this rule, an order shall
be entered reciting the action taken. This order shall control the subsequent course of the
action unless modified by a subsequent order. The order following a final pretrial confer-
ence shall be modified only to prevent manifest injustice." FED. R. Cirv. P. 16(e).
139. Joseph Mfg. Co., 986 F.2d at 418-19.
140. Id. at 419. See supra note 138 for the pertinent text of Rule 16(e).
141. Id.
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rather than Olympic. 142 The court noted that when the federal pretrial
order was concluded, Olympic knew of the pendency and status of the
state action, but failed to mention this at the hearing. 143 Further, Joseph's
counsel claimed he was not apprised of the state action's status at that
time. 144 The court indicated it was Olympic's duty to bring the matter up
at the pretrial hearing, and not having done so, it could not later have the
order amended. 145 The Tenth Circuit concluded that the district court's
modification of the pretrial order effectively denied Joseph a fair day in
court, and reversed and remanded the case.
146
c. Analysis
As the Tenth Circuit noted, a district court's decision whether to
modify a pretrial order is subject to an abuse of discretion standard.'
47
Several cases have held that a court of appeals generally should not inter-
fere with a district court's finding in this area.' 48 The Tenth Circuit's re-
versal was thus somewhat unusual. Although the court stated it was basing
reversal on the district court's mixing of two separate issues,149 the court's
main disagreement was with the district court's findings of fact concerning
manifest injustice.'5 0 The district court had decided to modify the order
based on the following facts:
The district court thought it was important that when Joseph filed its
original answer in state court, Joseph failed to include a crossclaim against
Olympic.' 5 1 The district court noted that Kansas courts adhere to an "ex-
tremely tenacious" one-trial-of-issues policy in cases subject to comparative
fault. 15 2 The district court held thatJoseph was required by Kansas law to
bring its crossclaim against Olympic in the state court action. 153 Because
Joseph neglected to do so, the federal court interpreted Kansas law to dic-
tate thatJoseph was barred from re-litigating the issue in federal court.
154
142. Id. at 420. The court quoted from 6A CHARLEs A. WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER,
FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 1527, at 287-89 (1990): "[I]f the evidence or issue was
within the knowledge of the party seeking modification [of the pretrial order] at the time of
the [pretrial] conference or if modification would place a great burden on the opposing
party, then it may not be allowed." The court concluded that if any injustice ever arose from
these facts, it was the effect of Olympic's silence on Joseph. Joseph Mfg. Co., 986 F.2d at 420.
143. Joseph Mfg. Co., 986 F.2d at 419.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 419-20.
146. Id. at 420-21.
147. See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
148. Nickerson v. G.D. Searle & Co., 900 F.2d 412, 422 (1st Cir. 1990) (stating that the
handling and enforcement of pretrial orders is an area in which appellate courts are, quite
properly, loathe to tread); Daniels v. Bd. of Education, 805 F.2d 203, 210 (6th Cir. 1986)
(describing the decision whether to modify a final pretrial order as a matter within the sound
discretion of the district court). See also Ramires Pomales v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 839
F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1990); Allen v. United States Steel Corp., 665 F.2d 689 (5th Cir. 1982).
149. Joseph Mfg. Co., 986 F.2d at 418-20.
150. Id. at 419.
151. Joseph Mfg. Co. v. Olympic Fire Corp., 781 F.Supp. 718, 720-22. (D. Kan. 1991),
rev'd, 986 F.2d 416 (10th Cir. 1993).
152. Id. at 721.
153. Id. at 722.
154. Id. at 721-22.
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The court so held despite Joseph's argument that Olympic waived the
right to rely on the preclusive state judgment by failing to discuss that
possible defense in the pretrial order. 155 The court based its holding on
Kansas decisions which held that the triggering event for a one-action de-
fense was an actual verdict in a state court.156 Therefore, the district court
concluded that Olympic did not waive the defense by not bringing up the
state court action when no verdict had been rendered at the time of the
pretrial hearing.
1 57
Although the district court never explicitly stated its finding of mani-
fest injustice, it is apparent the court found manifest injustice would result
to Olympic if it were not allowed to raise its state preclusion defense, espe-
cially in light of Joseph's failure to adhere to the Kansas one-trial rule. It
appears likely that the court concluded it would do manifest injustice to
Kansas law by not recognizing that state's strong belief in the one-trial
rule.
The Tenth Circuit took a differing view of the facts, arguing that Jo-
seph did attempt to make a late cross-claim in state court, but Olympic
opposed the motion. 15 8 The Tenth Circuit stated that Olympic could not
advocate a "double standard" regarding the joinder of claims by taking
"diametrically opposed positions in state and federal court.' 59 The Tenth
Circuit also disagreed with Olympic's argument that it did not mention
the state action at the pretrial hearing because the verdict had not yet
been rendered at that time. The court relied on Rule 16 to come to this
conclusion, stating, "[n] othing in Rule 16 prevents a party from identifying
a potentially controlling legal principle simply because it is inchoate at the
time the pretrial order is drafted."' 6 The court dismissed the district
court's reliance on Kansas precedent in determining that Olympic could
not waive its preclusion defense by its failure to address the defense at the
pretrial hearing. The court reasoned that the question presented did not
require consideration of whether Olympic could waive its preclusion
defense.'
6 '
Although the Tenth Circuit never stated exactly how the district court
abused its discretion, it appears that the court thought the district court
misinterpreted the facts surrounding manifest injustice. This exposes the
problem with the language of Rule 16, because if determining manifest
injustice is merely a fact-specific inquiry, little guidance is provided to
practitioners as to exactly when a pretrial order can be modified.
Commentators have recognized that Rule 16 allows judges broad dis-
cretion.' 6 2 However, when judges decide cases on a fact-specific basis, the
155. Id. at 722-23.
156. Id. at 723.
157. Id.
158. Joseph Mfg. Co. v. Olympic Fire Corp., 986 F.2d 416, 419 (10th Cir. 1993).
159. Id.
160. Id. at 419-20.
161. Id. at 420.
162. See Richey, supra note 4, at 177 (arguing that Rule 16 effectively lays to rest the
historical model of the passive judge); Shapiro, supra note 4, at 1992-93 (noting that "flexibil-
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drafters corresponding goal of uniformity in the Federal Rules 163 seems to
go by the wayside. An examination of decisions regarding the modifica-
tion of pretrial orders reveals that the Tenth Circuit and other circuits
have not been consistent in determining the meaning of manifest
injustice. 1 6 4
A few decisions provide a better method of determining this elusive
requirement, at least when dealing with the exclusion of witnesses or testi-
mony not specified in a pretrial order. 165 The following Tenth Circuit
case illustrates the application of a balancing test to define manifest
injustice.
2. Moss v. Feldmeyer1
66
a. Facts
Amanda Moss sued Dr. Seeley Feldmeyer for malpractice, claiming
that his failure to hospitalize her mother, Linda Fincham, led to
Fincham's death. 1 67 On August 10, 1990, the district court issued a pre-
trial order. 68 The order listed Dr. David Dejong as a witness, and Drs.
Dennis Kepka and Roger Evans as expert witnesses for Feldmeyer. 169 The
order provided that a list of all witnesses and exhibits which the parties
failed to describe in the order should be filed not later than October 5,
1990.170 Trial was set for October 9, 1990.171 In August of 1990,
Feldmeyer provided Moss with Dr. Evans' report, but Moss did not depose
Dr. Evans. 17 2 On September 24, 1990, Feldmeyer notified Moss that he
intended to call Dr. Dejong, designated only as a witness in the pretrial
order, as an expert witness. 173 Moss objected on the basis that the time
permitted to name expert witnesses had expired, and Dr. Dejong was
ity and discretion were major themes of the rulemakers, and thus they should not have been
surprised that many judges used that flexibility to implement ideas the rulemakers did not
wholly share").
163. 4 CHARLEs A. WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 1002-
04 (1987), Charles E. Clark &James W. Moore, A New Federal Civil Procedure, 44 YALE L. J. 387,
389 (1935), Michael E. Smith & Stephen N. Subrin, Federal Rules, Local Rules, and State Rules:
Uniformity, Divergence, and Emerging Procedural Patterns, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1999, 2002-06
(1990).
164. Burnette v. Dresser Indus., 849 F.2d 1277, 1282-84 (10th Cir. 1988) (engaging in a
two-page factual inquiry to determine whether disallowing modification to add a design and
manufacturing defect claim would result in manifest injustice); Pope v. Savings Bank of Puget
Sound, 850 F.2d 1345, 1347 (9th Cir. 1988) (deciding that although an amendment to a pre-
trial order did prejudice the nonmoving party, since the moving party acted in good faith,
the lower court correctly granted the amendment); In re Delagrange, 820 F.2d 229, 232 (7th
Cir. 1987) (weighing "possible hardships" to the parties, "the need for doing justice," and the
need for "orderly procedural arrangements").
165. See infra section (B) (2) (c) and accompanying notes 192-203.
166. 979 F.2d 1454 (10th Cir. 1992).









named outside the time permitted by the pretrial order.1 74 At a hearing
on October 4, 1990, the court ruled that Dr. Dejong would not be allowed
to testify. 175
Prior to trial on October 9, 1990, the court conducted an in camera
hearing to consider a new report submitted by Dr. Evans. 176 Feldmeyer
argued that since Dr. Dejong, a pathologist, had not been permitted to
testify, Dr. Evans now needed to use the new report in order to testify
concerning pathology. 17 7 Moss objected, stating that Dr. Evans was a car-
diologist, and now Feldmeyer wanted to "make him" a pathologist.17 8 The
court ruled that both Dr. Dejong and Dr. Evans could testify, as long as
they would be available for Moss to conduct discovery concerning their
proposed testimony.' 79 Moss did not ask for a continuance, and although
she deposed Dr. Dejong, she did not depose Dr. Evans.18 0 Feldmeyer won
the trial, and Moss appealed, contending that the court abused its discre-
tion in allowing Feldmeyer to add Dr. Dejong as an expert and to expand
Dr. Evans' testimony.'
8 '
b. Opinion of the Court
In affirming the district court, the Tenth Circuit rejected Moss' argu-
ment that the district court's actions were in direct violation of Smith v.
Ford Motor Co.182 Smith held that a district court had abused its discretion
by allowing a medical doctor, designated in the pretrial order as an expert
on treatment and prognosis, to testify about proximate causation between
seatbelts and injury.' 83 In Smith, the Tenth Circuit adopted a four-part
test to determine whether a district court has abused its discretion in ex-
cluding or allowing testimony not specified in a pretrial order:
(1) the prejudice or surprise in fact of the party against whom
the excluded witnesses would have testified; (2) the ability of that
party to cure the prejudice; (3) the extent to which waiver of the
rule against calling unlisted witnesses would disrupt the orderly
and efficient trial of the case or of other cases in court; and (4)
bad faith or willfulness in failing to comply with the court's
order. 184
The Tenth Circuit distinguished Moss from Smith, noting that first:
Moss was not prejudiced or surprised because both Dr. Evans and Dr.
174. Id. Although the pretrial order specified October 5, 1990, as the deadline for
amending the order to add new witnesses or exhibits, the order was issued August 10, 1990.
Moss most likely argued that if the order was to be amended between August and October, it
should be amended only to prevent manifest injustice.
175. Id.





181. Id. at 1458.
182. 626 F.2d 784 (10th Cir. 1980), cert denied, 450 U.S. 918 (1981).
183. Id. at 798.
184. Id. at 797 (quoting Myers v. Pennyback Woods Home Ownership Ass'n., 559 F.2d
894, 904-05 (3d Cir. 1977)).
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Dejong were listed as witnesses in the pretrial order; Moss received a sum-
mary of their reports prior to their testimony; and both doctors were avail-
able for discovery prior to testifying.' 8 5 Further, Moss, at her option, did
not depose Dr. Evans. 18 6 Second, while the attorney in Smith had only
eleven minutes to prepare for cross-examination, Moss had over two weeks
to prepare for Dr. Dejong and eight days to prepare for Dr. Evans.'
8 7
Therefore, her "ability to cure was not significantly impaired. 18 8 Third,
the challenged testimony in Smith was revealed in the middle of the trial,
whereas Moss was aware of both doctors' testimony prior to trial.' 8 9
Therefore, no disruption of the trial was threatened in Moss.190 Finally,
the court did not find bad faith, because the lower court knew it was "deal-
ing with good lawyers who [knew] the subject," and who could inquire into
the testimony to avoid surprise. 19 1
c. Analysis
While the Tenth Circuit's determination of manifest injustice in Moss
was fact-specific, the court followed a test identified in prior case law to
reach its decision. Unfortunately, the test seems to apply only to the ex-
clusion of witnesses or testimony, rather than to the exclusion or inclusion
of a claim or defense. When dealing with the latter, the Tenth Circuit has
often used a fact-specific inquiry such as the one in Griffen v. Oklahoma
City.' 9 2 Other circuit decisions have varied, sometimes relying on whether
an amendment would change the result as a matter of law, 193 or even
whether a party is proceeding pro se.19 4 Again, if uniformity is a desired
goal of Rule 16, a test like that used in Smith might assist judges in making
consistent determinations concerning the exclusion or inclusion of claims
not set out in the pretrial order.
A second concern is that, although the test articulated in Smith has
been around since 1980, courts have not consistently applied it to cases on
point with Smith. The Tenth Circuit has applied the Smith factors in a
fairly consistent manner to cases involving the inclusion or exclusion of
witnesses. 195






191. Id. at 1460.
192. 3 F.3d 336 (10th Cir. 1993); see supra section (B)(1)(c) and accompanying note 165.
193. Malhiot v. Southern Cal. Retail Clerks Union, 735 F.2d 1133, 1137 (9th Cir. 1984),
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1189 (1985).
194. Carter v. Hutto, 781 F.2d 1028 (4th Cir. 1986).
195. See, e.g., Denison v. Swaco Geolograph Co., 941 F.2d 1416, 1425 (10th Cir. 1991);
Miller v. Union Pacific R. Co., 900 F.2d 223, 225 (10th Cir. 1990); MacCuish v. United States,
844 F.2d 733, 736-37 (10th Cir. 1988). All directly applied the Smith factors to determine if
manifest injustice would occur from the exclusion or inclusion of witnesses or testimony not
specified in the pretrial order.
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There are a few exceptions, however. In Grant v. Brandt,196 the Tenth
Circuit addressed whether the lower court abused its discretion in exclud-
ing the testimony of a witness not specified in the pretrial order.' 97 The
Tenth Circuit quoted Smith's abuse of discretion standard, but did not util-
ize the Smith test in making its determination. The court appeared to
weigh only the prejudice to the nonmoving party against the loss of the
witness's testimony.' 98 In LeMaire v. United States,19 9 the Tenth Circuit ad-
dressed whether an expert witness who was designated in the pretrial or-
der as testifying about one matter should have been allowed to testify
about another topic. 20 0 The court relied on Perry v. Winspur,2 01 stating
that the complaining party should have anticipated the witness's testimony
based on the issues in the case, even though the testimony was not specifi-
cally identified in the pretrial order.2 0 2 The court also noted that the
complaining party had failed to ask for a continuance upon learning of
the testimony.2 0 3 It is therefore somewhat difficult for a practitioner to
anticipate how the Tenth Circuit will weigh an appeal of the district
court's exclusion or inclusion of witnesses or testimony not designated in
the pretrial order.
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were intended to promote uni-
formity in all federal courts. 204 Federal courts could advance this goal by
interpreting Rule 16 with some sort of consistency. The balancing test
such as the one in Smith for cases involving the exclusion or inclusion of
witnesses, is just one attempt at a useful test. Other cases illustrate that
there are also other tests. In Lirette v. Popich Bros. Water Transport Inc.,
205
the court held that the lower court did not abuse its discretion in refusing
to modify a pretrial order to allow a witness not specified in the order to
testify.20 6 The court placed the most emphasis on the moving party's fail-
ure to explain why the witness was not listed in the order.20 7 The court
also addressed "unfairness" to the other party.20 8 In Bradley v. United
States,20 9 the court based its determination of manifest injustice on: 1) the
importance of the experts' testimony; 2) potential prejudice to the non-
moving party; 3) the possibility of a continuance; and 4) the moving
party's explanation for its conduct.2 10 The court concluded that witnesses
not specified in the pretrial order should have been precluded from testi-
196. 796 F.2d 351 (10th Cir. 1986).
197. Id. at 354-55.
198. See id. at 355.
199. 826 F.2d 949 (10th Cir. 1987).
200. Id. at 951-52.
201. 782 F.2d 893 (10th Cir. 1986).
202. LeMaire, 826 F.2d at 952.
203. Id. at 953.
204. See supra note 163 and accompanying text.
205. 660 F.2d 142 (5th Cir. 1981).
206. Id. at 144-45.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 145.
209. 866 F.2d 120 (5th Cir. 1989).
210. Id. at 125-26.
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fying.2 1 1 Finally, in Nickerson v. G.D. Searle & Co., 2 1 2 the court determined
no manifest injustice occurred solely on the basis that the nonmoving
party had an opportunity to depose witnesses prior to the issuance of the
pretrial order.
21 3
Given the above variations, it remains unclear how a particular federal
court will address the modification of pretrial orders to exclude or include
witnesses.
CONCLUSION
During the survey period, the Tenth Circuit followed the latest trend
to reevaluate Rule 11 sanctions. The court showed a reluctance to impose
sanctions against an attorney whose actions seemed to warrant them. The
Tenth Circuit also joined other circuits that have refused, under Rule 11,
to impose a continuing obligation on attorneys to update previously filed
pleadings. With respect to Rule 16, the Tenth Circuit illustrated that while
Smith provides a viable test, greater consistency is needed in determining
the meaning of manifest injustice under the rule. Further guidance from
the court in this area would be welcome.
Kathryn A. Plonsky
211. Id. at 127.
212. 900 F.2d 412 (1st Cir. 1990).




During the 1992-93 survey period, the Tenth Circuit dealt with impor-
tant procedural issues affecting the ability of both individual litigants and
administrative agencies to bring civil rights claims. In Castner v. Colorado
Springs CablevisionI the Tenth Circuit followed other circuits by requiring
district courts to give "serious consideration" to requests for appointed
counsel in employment discrimination cases.2 This may enhance the abil-
ity of disadvantaged parties to bring claims pursuant to Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964.3 The subpoena power of the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") was expanded by EEOC v. Citicorp Din-
ers Club.4 Holding that the EEOC can compel an employer to compile
information within the employer's control, the Tenth Circuit has arguably
given the EEOC the power to require employers to manufacture or create
previously undocumented information.5 In Baker v. Board of Regents of Kan-
sa.s6 the Tenth Circuit, utilizing the rationale of Garcia v. Wilson,7 held that
claims brought under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 19648 and section
504 of the Rehabilitation Act9 should be governed by a state's general per-
sonal injury statute of limitations.
10
I. ACCESS TO THE COURT SYSTEM FOR DISADVANTAGED LITIGANTS
THROUGH DISCRETIONARY APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL IN
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LITIGATION
A. Background
Section 706(f) of the Civil Rights Act of 196411 deals with enforce-
ment of the equal opportunity employment provisions. In conjunction
with the power for an aggrieved party to file a civil action, section
706(f) (1) provides that in employment discrimination cases, the district
court has the discretion to appoint an attorney upon the plaintiff's re-
quest. 12 This power to appoint counsel in employment discrimination
1. 979 F.2d 1417 (10th Cir. 1992).
2. Id. at 1421.
3. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits employment discrimination on the
basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1988).
4. 985 F.2d 1036 (10th Cir. 1993).
5. Id. at 1041 (Kelly, J., dissenting).
6. 991 F.2d 628 (10th Cir. 1993).
7. 731 F.2d 640 (10th Cir. 1984), aff'd, 471 U.S. 261 (1985). See infra text accompany-
ing notes 146-54.
8. Title VI prohibits discrimination on the basis of race, color, or national origin by any
program or activity receiving federal funding. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1988).
9. Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act prohibits discrimination against handicapped
persons by programs or activities receiving federal funding. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1988).
10. Baker, 991 F.2d at 632-33.
11. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) (1988).
12. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (1988).
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cases is in addition to the more general provisions of the in forma
pauperis statute.
13
Section 706(f) (1) provides little guidance to courts to determine
when a request for an appointed attorney is just.14 This lack of guidance,
however, does not diminish the importance of the provision within the
statute; legislative history indicates that the provision was a valued part of
the legislation. 15 The provision's continued presence, despite numerous
amendments to the Act as a whole, also indicates consistent congressional
support. 16 In fact, a House Report on the Equal Employment Opportu-
nity Act of 1972 indicates that Congress continues to include the provision
because the "nature of Title VII actions more often than not pits parties of
unequal strength and resources against each other."17 Early cases indicate
the importance for courts, through the exercise of sound discretion, to
support the implicit intentions of Congress when making a decision to
appoint counsel.' 8
Judicial interpretation of section 706(f)(1) has established that the
appointment of counsel in an employment discrimination case is not a
statutory or constitutional right.1 9 The decision rests solely upon the dis-
cretion of the district courtjudge.2 0 Generally, circuits will only reverse a
trial court's failure to appoint counsel if the trial court abuses its discre-
tion.2 1 The decision may also be reviewable, however, if "the district
13. The general in forma pauperis provision found at 28 U.S.C. § 1915 authorizes court
discretion to allow proceedings to commence without court costs and allows the court to
request an attorney to represent any such person unable to employ counsel." 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(d) (1988).
In Edmonds v. E.I. duPont deNemours & Co., 315 F. Supp. 523 (D. Kan. 1970) the
United States District Court for the District of Kansas held that when a plaintiff requests an
appointed attorney in an employment discrimination case the governing statute is 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5(f)(1) as opposed to 28 U.S.C. § 1915. Edmonds, 315 F. Supp. at 525.
14. Poindexter v. F.B.I., 737 F.2d 1173, 1179 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
15. 110 CONG. REac. 12,722 (1964) (indicating the necessity of the provision because "the
maintenance of the suit may impose a great burden on the poor individual complainant");
id. at 14,196 (rejection by Senate of Act that would have taken away the courts' power to
appoint attorneys under Title VII); id. at 14,201 (rejection by Senate of amendment that
would have allowed appointment of attorneys contingent to the consent of the attorney).
16. Hilliard v. Volcker, 659 F.2d 1125, 1128-29 n.24 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
17. H.R. REP. No. 238, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 12 (1971), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2137, 2148.
18. See Bradshaw v. Zoological Soc'y of San Diego, 662 F.2d 1301, 1319 (9th Cir.
1981) (concluding that a possible award of attorney's fees may be insufficient incentive for
counsel to take a case); Edmonds v. E.I. duPont deNemours, 315 F. Supp. 532, 525 (D.Kan.
1970) (indicating that a proceeding in employment discrimination is one in which "the pub-
lic has a substantial interest").
19. See, e.g., Poindexter v. F.B.I., 737 F.2d 1173, 1179 (D.C. Cir. 1984);Jenkins v. Chemi-
cal Bank, 721 F.2d 876, 879 (2d Cir. 1983); Ivey v. Board of Regents of Univ. of Alaska, 673
F.2d 266, 269 (9th Cir. 1982); Caston v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 556 F.2d 1305, 1309 (5th Cir.
1977).
20. Poindexter, 737 F.2d at 1179.
21. White v. United States Pipe & Foundry Co., 646 F.2d 203, 205 (5th Cir. 1981);
Spanos v. Penn. Central Transp. Co., 470 F.2d 806, 808 (3d Cir. 1972).
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court's decision does not represent the reasoned judgement necessary to
application of that standard."
22
Many circuits have established three factors to be considered when
determining a need to appoint counsel in employment discrimination
cases:23 (1) the ability of the plaintiff to afford an attorney; (2) the efforts
of the plaintiff to secure counsel; and (3) the merits of the plaintiff's
case. 24 In addition, a number of circuits have established a fourth fac-
tor-the plaintiff's ability to prepare and present the case without aid of
counsel.
25
B. Castner v. Colorado Springs Cablevision26
1. Facts
Susan Castner filed a charge with the EEOC alleging that her em-
ployer, Colorado Springs Cablevision, violated provisions of Title VII and
the Equal Pay Act.2 7 Although the EEOC dismissed the charges, Ms.
Castner pursued her Title VII claim in the United States District Court for
the District of Colorado alleging gender discrimination and retaliation.
2 8
At the time of filing she was unemployed, lived in Oregon, and had no
savings. 29 She had contacted a number of attorneys, none of whom
agreed to represent her.30 She applied for leave to file in forma pauperis,
and for the appointment of counsel pursuant to both section 706(f) (1)
and 28 U.S.C. § 1915.31 The district court allowed her to proceed without
paying court costs but denied the appointment of counsel.
32
Ms. Castner made three more attempts to acquire appointed counsel.
One week after the first denial she wrote to the court explaining her situa-
tion, including her inability to pay for an attorney, her absence from Colo-
rado, her lack of familiarity with law, and her inability to obtain counsel on
a contingency basis. 33 The court denied the motion stating, "[a] plaintiff is
not entitled to court-appointed counsel in a civil action."3 4 Next, in re-
22. Bradshaw, 662 F.2d at 1318. See also Caston, 556 F.2d at 1310 (remanding because the
court was "unable to conclude that the district exercised a reasoned and well informed
discretion").
23. See Poindexter, 737 F.2d at 1180 n.10 (discussing the importance of having guidance
when a decision is left to the "informed decision of the District Court").
24. Gadson v. Concord Hosp., 966 F.2d 32, 35 (1st Cir. 1992); Gonzalez v. Carlin, 907
F.2d 573, 580 (5th Cir. 1990); Henry v. City of Detroit Manpower Dep't, 763 F.2d 757, 760
(6th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1036 (1985); Slaughter v. City of Maplewood, 731
F.2d 587, 590 (8th Cir. 1984); Bradshaw v. Zoological Soc'y, 662 F.2d 1301, 1318 (9th Cir.
1981); Jones v. WFYR Radio/RKO Gen., 626 F.2d 576, 577 (7th Cir. 1980).
25. Poindexter, 737 F.2d at 1185; Jenkins v. Chemical Bank, 721 F.2d 876, 880 (2d Cir.
1983); Hudak v. Curators of Univ. of Mo., 586 F.2d 105, 106 (8th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440
U.S. 985 (1979).
26. 979 F.2d 1417 (10th Cir. 1992).
27. Id. at 1419.
28. Id.
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sponse to a scheduling conference being set, Ms. Castner motioned for a
ninety-day extension and a reconsideration of the court's denial of ap-
pointed counsel.3 5 The motions were again denied.3 6 Finally, seven days
before the scheduling conference, she again requested appointed counsel
and informed the court that she would be unable to pay for a flight to
Denver for the conference.3 7 The court issued a show cause order requir-
ing Ms. Castner to explain why the case should not be dismissed for failure
to prosecute.3 8 Her response detailed her inability to travel between Ore-
gon and Colorado and stated that the difficulties could be remedied by
appointment of local counsel.3 9 The court dismissed the case and ad-
dressed the repeated requests for appointed counsel stating that this was
"a civil case and plaintiff simply has no right to prosecute her claim at
government expense."40 Ms. Castner appealed the court's denial of ap-
pointed counsel and the dismissal of her action for lack of prosecution.
41
2. Tenth Circuit Opinion
Articulating the factors utilized by other circuits, the Tenth Circuit
Court of Appeals held that a plaintiff seeking appointed counsel "must
make affirmative showings of (1) financial inability to pay for counsel, (2)
diligence in attempting to secure counsel and (3) meritorious allegations
of discrimination."4 2 In addition, the court indicated that the fourth fac-
tor, "capacity to present case without counsel," should be considered by
courts in close cases to "aid in exercising discretion."
43
With respect to the reviewability of the decision not to appoint coun-
sel, the court indicated that the general rule limited review to abuses of
discretion. 44 The court reasoned that this would presuppose "the applica-
tion of a reasoned and well informed judgement, guided by sound legal
principles."45 Finding that the district court failed to give an adequate
reason for denying appointed counsel, the court of appeals held that the
record did not contain sufficient information to determine whether there
was an abuse of discretion, and remanded. 46 The court also vacated the
dismissal of the action because the failure to prosecute appeared to be







41. Id. at 1419.
42. Id. at 1421.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 1422-23.
45. Id. at 1423.
46. Id.





In addition to articulating and accepting the four factors utilized by
the majority of the circuits in determining the need for appointed coun-
sel, the Tenth Circuit further explained these standards and their applica-
tions. Concerning the "ability to afford" factor, the court stated that a
party need not be destitute for counsel to be appointed.48 In fact, the
court indicated that a qualification for in forma pauperis constitutes a
clear indication of inability to pay.49 According to the Tenth Circuit, the
proper inquiry was the ability of the plaintiff to hire counsel and still meet
daily expenses. 50 This concrete standard allows courts to consider specific
facts and make more accurate decisions,
The court provided an analytical base to determine adequate "efforts
to secure counsel," by enumerating that lower courts consider the number
of attorneys contacted, the availability of appropriate counsel, and the
plaintiff's level of skill at acquiring help.5 1 This base is helpful because it
illustrates a number of reasons why a person may be unable to obtain
counsel that are unrelated to the merits of the claim or the plaintiff's
financial needs.
52
With respect to the "merits" factor, the court made clear that trial
courts should not give preclusive effect to an EEOC finding of a lack of
evidence to support a claim of discrimination.53 The court stated that
while an EEOC decision should be a "highly probative" factor in making a
determination on the merits, the district court should always make an in-
dependent determination. 54 This treatment of the effect of the EEOC de-
termination seems consistent with congressional intent, since the statute
provides that a plaintiff can bring a civil suit upon a dismissal of the claim
by the EEOC.55
The Tenth Circuit indicated that in close cases, courts should utilize
the fourth factor, the plaintiff's ability to present the case without coun-
sel.5 6 The use of this factor as a type of tiebreaker is different from a
number of decisions in other circuits that have treated the plaintiff's abil-
ity to present a case equally with the other factors.5 7 Other circuits have
48. Id. at 1421-22.
49. Id. at 1422.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. SeePoindexter v. F.B.I., 737 F.2d 1173, 1181 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (providing a discussion
of the competing notions of the role of the attorney in weeding out frivolous claims); see also
Bradshaw v. Zoological Soc'y of San Diego, 662 F.2d 1301, 1319 (9th Cir. 1981) (arguing that
accepting failure to obtain counsel as evidence the claim is without merit directly contradicts
the congressional mandate and purpose of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) (1)); Caston v. Sears, Roe-
buck, & Co., 556 F.2d 1305, 1309 (5th Cir. 1977) (indicating that a plaintiff with a meritori-
ous claim may be unable to obtain counsel due to unpopularity or unfamiliarity).
53. Castner, 979 F.2d at 1422.
54. Id.
55. See 110 CONG. REc. 12,722 (1964).
56. Castner, 979 F.2d at 1421.
57. SeefHunterv. Department of Air Force Agency, 846 F.2d 1314,1317 (1lth Cir. 1988)
(citing ability of plaintiff to understand procedural and substantive issues as factor for court
consideration); Poindexter v. F.B.I., 737 F.2d 1173, 1185 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (articulating all
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recognized that a plaintiff with the ability to represent oneself pro se
should be precluded from appointed counsel despite the fact the first
three factors are met.5 8 In the Tenth Circuit, the fourth factor serves as an
additional guide for lower courts only when the first three factors do not
clearly indicate that appointed counsel is appropriate.
The articulation of these four important factors, and the remand of
the case, give rise to a number of differing viewpoints on lower courts' use
of discretionary power. 59 In this case, the Tenth Circuit rightly concluded
that trial judges need to indicate the underlying considerations used in
making the decision to deny appointed counsel.60 Although it is impor-
tant to allow trial courts flexibility in exercising discretion, 61 Congress has
indicated its policy intentions in employment discrimination cases,6 2 and
it is important for courts to interpret the statute in light thereof.63 Con-
sidering the difficulties caused by coercive appointments of counsel, a flex-
ible application of balanced discretion is needed to both support the
intentions of Congress and protect the scarce resources of the court
system.
6 4
Pro se litigants are saddled with numerous difficulties. 65 The trial
court's terse rejection of the plaintiff's request for counsel in Castner is
evidence of but one of the hurdles such litigants face.6 6 By articulating
the four factors and requiring the "serious consideration" of requests for
counsel, the Tenth Circuit has sent a strong message to the district courts,
namely, that the discretionary appointment of counsel is a valued and nec-
essary part of the employment discrimination legislation.
four factors as important for consideration);Jenkins v. Chemical Bank, 721 F.2d 876, 880 (2d
Cir. 1983) (indicating that the additional considerations of the plaintiffs legal ability were
needed to expand the inquiry for a more flexible approach).
58. See Hudak v. Curators of Univ. of Mo., 586 F.2d 105, 106 (8th Cir. 1978) (former law
professor denied appointed counsel despite meeting the criteria for the first three factors),
cert. denied, 440 U.S. 985 (1979).
59. The Honorable HenryJ. Friendly contends that there are at least a "half dozen dif-
ferent definitions of 'abuse of discretion'." HenryJ. Friendly, Indiscretion About Discretion, 31
EMORY LJ. 747, 763 (1982).
60. Castner, 979 F.2d at 1423.
61. Friendly, supra note 59, at 764 (concluding that different definitions of discretion
are "not only defensible but essential").
62. Castner, 979 F.2d at 1421; see also Jenkins, 721 F.2d at 879 (indicating Congress' con-
cern for representation in Title VII actions).
63. Friendly, supra note 59, at 783.
64. See Cooper v. A. Sargenti Co., 877 F.2d 170, 172-73 (2d Cir. 1989) (discussion of
disadvantages to indiscriminate appointment of counsel in civil cases). See generally William
B. Fisch, Coercive Appointments of Counsel in Civil Cases in Forma Pauperis: An Easy Case Makes
Hard Law, 50 Mo. L. Rav. 527 (1985) (discussion specific to coercive appointments through
the Missouri in forma pauperis statute).
65. See Steven C. Tempelman, Survey, Civil Procedure Survey, 70 DENY. L. Rv. 665, 668-70
(1993) (outlining difficulties pro se litigants face in the court system).
66. See text accompanying note 34.
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II. ExPANSION OF THE INVESTIGATORY POWERS OF THE EQUAL
EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION
A. Background
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") is a fed-
eral administrative agency that was established by Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964.67 One of the EEOC's purposes is to investigate allega-
tions of discrimination against employees in violation of Title VII. 68 Pur-
suant to a charge being filed, Title VII of the 1964 Act allows the EEOC
"access to, for the purposes of examination, and the right to copy any
evidence . . . relevant to the charge under investigation." 69 The 1964 Act
gave the commission the power to "examine witnesses under oath and to
require documentary evidence relevant and material to the charge under
investigation."
70
The 1972 amendments to Title VI1 71 conferred additional powers on
the commission. The amendments replaced the 1964 language that au-
thorized testimony of witnesses and production of documentary evi-
dence 72 with a statement making a provision of the National Labor
Relations Act ("NLRA") applicable to all hearings and investigations by
the commission. 73 This provision made the investigatory powers of the
EEOC equivalent to those of the National Labor Relations Board.
74
Similar to the 1964 Act, section 161 of the NLRA addresses "access,
for the purpose of examination, and the right to copy" relevant evidence
in the possession of the employer.75 Section 161 also grants the power to
issue subpoenas and to request enforcement of those subpoenas by the
federal district courts.76 This subpoena power includes "requiring the at-
tendance and testimony of witnesses and production of any evidence in
such proceeding or investigation requested in such application." 77 The
provision states further that any person served with a subpoena "requiring
production of any evidence in his possession or under his control" may
petition to have a subpoena revoked. 78 The distinction between docu-
mentary evidence and "any evidence" in a party's possession or control has
created confusion as to whether the EEOC has the power to force employ-
ers to compile evidence not in documentary form.
67. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4(a) (1988).
68. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (1988).
69. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 709(a), 78 Stat. 241, 264 (1964) (codi-
fied as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-8(a) (1988)).
70. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 710(a), 78 Stat. 241, 264 (1964) (as
amended 1972).
71. Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 7, 86 Stat. 103,
109 (1972) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-9 (1988)).
72. Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 709(a).
73. Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972 § 7.
74. National Labor Relations Act § 11, 29 U.S.C. § 161 (1988).
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. (emphasis added).
78. Id.
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In determining the limits of the EEOC's power to enforce Title VII,
courts have generally interpreted the Act and its investigatory provisions
broadly. 79 Some cases prior to the 1972 amendments, however, held that
the statutory language of the Civil Rights Act did not empower the EEOC
to force employers to compile information.8 0 Since the 1972 amend-
ments, a number of jurisdictions have concluded that the amendments
expanded the EEOC's power, allowing it to force an employer to compile
information.8 1 Other jurisdictions have drawn a distinction between an
order to compile existing information, and one that requires the manufac-
ture and compilation of previously undocumented information.8 2 The
Tenth Circuit has not previously addressed these specific issues.8 3
B. Citicorp Diners Club v. EEOC
8 4
1. Facts
Deborah Hinson, a black female employee of Citicorp Diners Club,
Inc., filed a charge with the EEOC alleging that she was denied a promo-
tion because of her race and sex.8 5 The EEOC commenced an investiga-
tion, and Diners Club initially complied with requests for information
concerning their promotion policies.86 However, when the EEOC made
79. See Motorola Inc. v. Mclain, 484 F.2d 1339, 1344 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S.
936 (1974).
80. SeeJoslin Dry Goods Co. v. EEOC, 336 F. Supp. 941, 947 (D. Colo. 1971) (holding
that "no statute requires the employer to compile anything"); Georgia Power Co. v. EEOC,
295 F. Supp. 950, 953-54 (N.D. Ga. 1968) (holding that the EEOC could not compel compila-
tion or preparation of research or summary), aff'd, 412 F.2d 462 (5th Cir. 1969). But see
Local No. 104, Sheet Metal Workers Int'l v. EEOC, 439 F.2d 237, 243 (9th Cir. 1971) ("Local
104 contends that there is something unique about an order to compile lists. Local 104 is
mistaken.").
81. SeeEEOC v. Maryland Cup Corp., 785 F.2d 471, 478 (4th Cir. 1986) (concluding that
the EEOC had the power to both compel production of evidence not presently in documen-
tary form and require an employer to compile evidence), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 815 (1986);
EEOC v. Bay Shipbuilding Corp., 668 F.2d 304, 313 (7th Cir. 1981) (stating that the argu-
ment against the power to force compilation has been correctly rejected in other cases); New
Orleans Public Serv., Inc. v. Brown, 507 F.2d 160, 164-65 (5th Cir. 1975) (holding that a
subpoena is not invalid simply because it requires compilation of evidence by the employer).
82. See EEOC v. Gladieux Refinery, Inc., 631 F. Supp. 927, 935 n.2 (N.D. Ind. 1986). In
a case discussing the scope of pre-trial discovery in which a number of EEOC cases were cited
to support the contention that courts can require defendants to compile information, the
Second Circuit drew a distinction between compiling information and manufacturing evi-
dence. See Parents' Comm. of Pub. Sch. 19 v. Community Sch. Bd., N.Y., 524 F.2d 1138, 1141-
42 (2d Cir. 1975).
83. Although Joslin Dry Goods Co. v. EEOC, 336 F. Supp. 941 (1971), did come up on
appeal, the Tenth Circuit did not address the issue of the power of the EEOC to require
compilation of evidence. Joslin Dry Goods Co. v. EEOC, 483 F.2d 178 (10th Cir. 1973). Also,
although Circle K Corp. v. EEOC, 501 F.2d 1052 (10th Cir. 1974), is cited as a case support-
ing the power of the EEOC to compel compilations of evidence, in fact the case was limited
to the issues of the "unduly burdensome" and "scope" aspects of the evidence subpoenaed.
See Rich v. Martin Marietta Corp., 522 F.2d 333, 344 (10th Cir. 1975) (stating that the court in
Circle K refused "to recognize the objections that the information lacked relevancy and was
too burdensome").
84. 985 F.2d 1036 (10th Cir. 1993).




further requests concerning Diners Club's "within promotion"8 7 policy,
Diners Club refused to comply, contending that the information did not
exist.88
The EEOC issued and served a subpoena to compel Diners Club to
produce the information regarding "within promotion" policies.
8 9
Among other things, the subpoena required descriptions of positions
awarded as "within promotions"; the name, race, and sex of employees
awarded those positions as well as those who selected and/or recom-
mended them; the name, race, and sex of individuals in a position to rec-
ommend a "within promotion"; and a statement detailing reasons for
using the "within promotion" policy. 90 Diners Club requested that the
EEOC modify or revoke the subpoena.9 1 The EEOC refused and Diners
Club then notified the EEOC that it would not comply with the
subpoena.
92
The EEOC petitioned the United States District Court for the District
of Colorado for an order to enforce the subpoena.93 At the hearing, to
show cause why the order should not be enforced, Diners Club argued
that the EEOC had no authority to compel development and compilation
of information not then in existence. 94 In an affidavit presented at the
hearing, an employee of Diners Club explained that the information re-
quested was not "retrievable in any existing and/or accessible format."
9 5
The district court rejected the argument that the EEOC was without au-
thority to require compilation stating that the fact "that some of the infor-
mation sought exists in the minds of Citicorp employees does not absolve
Citicorp from compiling the information." 96 Citicorp Diners Club
appealed.
97
On appeal, Diners Club argued that the EEOC does not have the
power to force employers to interview employees and review files to pre-
87. "Within promotion" refers to promotion of current employees selected by managers
as opposed to posting the position. Id. at 1037 n.1.
88. Id. Diners Club also refused to give the EEOC information regarding promotions
outside Ms. Brown's workgroup because they did not feel it was relevant to Ms. Brown's
charge. Diners Club agreed only to provide information it felt was relevant and not unduly
burdensome. Id.
89. Id. The subpoena also required information regarding Diners Club's facilities
outside of Colorado. Id.
90. Id. at 1042-43 (Attachment A).
91. Id. at 1038.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. Diners Club had three other arguments. First, they argued that requests for in-
formation on nationwide facilities were overbroad. Second, they argued that because Ms.
Brown had individually settled her claim and requested a withdrawal of the charge, that the
subpoena was moot. Third, they argued that the requests to develop and compile informa-
tion were burdensome and overbroad. Id.
95. Id. at 1044 (Attachment B).
96. Id. at 1039 n.3. With respect to Diners Club's other arguments, the district court
agreed that the requests for information regarding nationwide facilities was overbroad. The
district court rejected Diners Club's contention that the subpoena was moot because Ms.
Brown had settled individually. The district court also rejected the contention that the sub-
poena was burdensome and overbroad. Id. at 1038.
97. Id. at 1038.
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pare summaries. 98 Diners Club contended that the subpoena power of the
EEOC was limited to requiring production of documents in existence for
the purposes of examination and copying.99 Diners Club asserted that the
Tenth Circuit opinion in Joslin Dry Goods Co. v. EEO0C0 0 established this
limit on the Commission's subpoena power.
10 1
2. Tenth Circuit Majority Opinion
The majority opinion of the Tenth Circuit rejected the argument that
Joslin limited the subpoena power of the EEOC. 10 2 The court agreed that
the district court in Joslin held that the EEOC could not compel compila-
tion of information. 10 3 As the court pointed out, however, the issue was
not brought up on appeal and thus was not addressed in the Tenth Circuit
opinion. 10 4 The court considered Circle K Corp. v. EEOC'0 5 to be instruc-
tive on the issue of the subpoena power of the EEOC. 10 6 Despite the fact
that the Circle K opinion did not use the word "compile," the court argued
that the subpoena enforced by the court in Circle K required the employer
to develop and compile information.
10 7
The court added that other circuits have held that the EEOC can re-
quire an employer to compile information within its control and that the
power is not limited to production of already existing documents. 10 8 The
Tenth Circuit held that the EEOC could require Diners Club to compile
the requested information, including information existing solely in the
minds of employees.
10 9
98. Id. Diners Club brought two other matters up on appeal as well. First, it argued that
since Ms. Brown's alleged discrimination was based on race and sex, the EEOC should not be
allowed to subpoena documents and information on possible discrimination by national ori-
gin. Second, it argued that the subpoena requests were unduly burdensome. Id.
99. Id.
100. 483 F.2d 178 (10th Cir. 1973).
101. Diners Club, 985 F.2d at 1038.
102. Id. at 1038-39.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 1039.Joslin involved a subpoena requiring the employer to review thousands of
personnel files and information index cards and compile the information for the EEOC. 336
F. Supp. at 945. The district court held that the power of the EEOC was limited to production
of documentary evidence and that the EEOC could not force employers to compile anything.
Id. at 947. On appeal, the EEOC did not dispute the district court's holding regarding compi-
lation of information. Joslin, 483 F.2d at 183.
105. 501 F.2d 1052 (10th Cir. 1974).
106. Diners Club, 985 F.2d at 1039.
107. Id. The subpoena in Circle K required the following:
a list of all applicants and present employees subjected to the polygraph examina-
tion, their racial ethnic identity and whether they were accepted or rejected; docu-
mentation of the nature, standardization and validity of the polygraph test and a list
of questions asked of each applicant; qualifications of the examiners who adminis-
tered the tests; testimony under oath of all knowledgeable employees and officers;
and all related matters.
Circle K 501 F.2d at 1054.
108. Diners Club, 985 F.2d at 1039. The court cited cases from the Fourth and Seventh
circuits.
109. Id. at 1039 n.3. The court added that nothing in the order required Diners Club to
track down and interview former employees. Id.
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3. Tenth Circuit Dissenting Opinion
Judge Paul J. Kelly dissented from the part of the court's opinion re-
quiring interviews of employees and production of documents resulting
from those interviews. 110 The dissent did not agree that the EEOC's sub-
poena power includes the authority to require the development or crea-
tion of new information. 111 Addressing the use of Circle Kby the majority,
the dissent pointed out that Circle K was limited on appeal to the issues
regarding the "unduly burdensome" and "scope of investigation" aspects
of the evidence subpoenaed.1 12 With respect to the subpoena enforced by
Circle K, the dissent concluded that the court only required compilation of
data already in existence and under the control of an employer. 113 Draw-
ing a distinction between compiling statistical information and creating
new information, the dissent contended that the information requested by
the EEOC in this case required Diners Club to conduct interviews and
produce new documents from those interviews.1 14 The dissent argued that
this "manufacturing of evidence" is not the proper function of a sub-
poena 15 and that the information may be properly pursued through sub-
poena of witnesses.
1 16
In support of these conclusions, the dissent pointed directly to the
statutory language of the Civil Rights Act and distinguished the request in
this case from those requests in the cases cited by the majority. 117 Despite
the amendments to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act and 29 U.S.C. § 161,
the dissent relied on the fact that the first sentence of section 161 still
limits access to evidence "for the purpose of examining or to copy."
11 8
Distinguishing EEOC v. Maryland Cup Corp.t1 9 from the present case, the
dissent argued that requesting previously non-existent position statements
is far different from simply requesting lists of former employees and their
race. 12 0 The dissent concluded that at least some of the requests by the
With respect to the other issues on appeal the Tenth Circuit held that the EEOC could
request information on possible discrimination based on national origin and that the sub-
poena request was not unduly burdensome. Id. at 1039-40.
110. Id. at 1041-42. Judge Kelly concurred with the court holdings regarding the exten-
sion of the investigation to include possible discrimination based on national origin and the
employer's failure to make a showing regarding the unduly burdensome nature of the sub-
poena. Id. at 1040.
111. Id. at 1040.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 1041.
114. Id.
115. Id. (quoting Parents Comm. v. Community Sch. Bd., 524 F.2d 1138, 1141 & n.7 (2d
Cir. 1975)).
116. Id. at 1041.
117. Id. See infra text accompanying notes 128-31.
118. Id. The implication being that the terms "copy" and "examination" refer solely to
documentary evidence.
119. 785 F.2d 471 (4th Cir. 1986).
120. Diners Club, 985 F.2d at 1041. In Maryland Cup the EEOC requested the employer to
compile information about the race and sex of former employees through examination of
photographs and interviews with current employees. Maryland Cup, 785 F.2d at 478.
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An important congressional concern with the passage of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 was that the EEOC not have the power to conduct "fish-
ing expeditions."1 22 Given this concern, it is questionable whether the in-
tent of the 1972 amendment was to expand the power of the EEOC to the
point at which the Commission can compel employers to conduct their
own investigations against themselves. 123 In fact, Congress did not amend
section 709 of Title VII, which still, with respect to evidence, authorizes
"access to, for the purposes of examination, and the right to copy."12 4
This language implies that authorization is limited to documentary
evidence.
125
A careful reading of the majority's opinion illuminates flaws in the
foundation of its argument. First, the majority patently rejected the use of
Joslin because the compilation issue was not addressed at the appellate
level. 126 However, the court in Circle K Corp. v. EEOC did not discuss the
issue on appeal either. 127 The court argued that the subpoena enforced by
the Tenth Circuit in Circle K required compilation of information. 12 8 Re-
gardless, the majority's application of Circle K undermines its basis for not
applying Joslin.
A second flaw in the majority's argument is pointed out in the dissent-
ing opinion. The information required in Diners Club is much different
than the information sought in the cases that the majority used to support
its conclusion. 12 9 For example, Maryland Cup required inspection of
photo identification badges and interviews with employees to determine
the race of former employees;' 30 Local 104 involved an order to compile a
list of names;13 ' and Circle K involved information about the administra-
tion of polygraph examinations. 132 In contrast, the subpoena in Diners
Club required the employer to interview employees and develop position
121. Diners Club, 985 F.2d at 1041-42.
122. The term "fishing expedition" refers specifically to the concern that the scope of
investigations be limited to evidence relative to the charge. See 110 CONG. REc. 6449 (1964)
(illustrating Senator Dirksen's concerns that the scope of EEOC investigations be limited).
However, it could be argued that the scope of an investigation is directly affected by the
investigatory powers utilized.
123. Diners Club, 985 F.2d at 1041 (Kelly, J., dissenting).
124. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-8(a) (1988).
125. See Maryland Cup, 785 F.2d at 478.
126. Diners Club, 985 F.2d at 1038-39.
127. Id. In fact, the district court in Circle Kset aside the EEOC subpoena on the grounds
that the information sought was not relevant to the charge and was too burdensome and
broad. Circle K 501 F.2d at 1054. Therefore, the only issues on appeal were the relevancy and
the burdensome aspects of the subpoena.
128. Id. at 1039.
129. See Diners Club, 985 F.2d at 1041 (distinguishing between compiling statistical infor-
mation and creating new information).
130. 785 F.2d at 479.
131. 439 F.2d 237, 240 (9th Cir. 1971).
132. 501 F.2d at 1054.
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papers with respect to a "within promotion" policy.133 The dissent's dis-
tinction between compiling information and creating information is an
important point that is not addressed by the majority.
Another issue ignored by the majority is whether the EEOC utilized
the most appropriate investigatory tool for the type of information sought.
When the pieces of information sought by the EEOC are undocumented
policies allegedly existing in the minds of employees, it would seem that
the more appropriate investigatory tool is a subpoena of witness testimony.
In this case, the information sought by the EEOC could have more easily
been obtained through the testimony of witnesses.
13 4
Despite any concern as to how the decision was reached, the major-
ity's opinion clearly supports the contention that the expanded power of
the EEOC includes the power to compel employers to compile existing
information that includes information not presently in documentary form.
III. APPLICATION OF GENERAL PERSONAL INJURY STATUTES OF
LIMITATION TO FEDERAL CrVIL RIGHTS CLAIMS
A. Background
Enactment of federal legislation creating a civil cause of action, but
without a specified statute of limitations, is not uncommon in federal stat-
utory law.13 5 When federal legislation is without a statute of limitations an
appropriate state statute of limitations is borrowed.13 6 Section 1988 pro-
vides in part that where the provisions of federal civil rights laws are insuf-
ficient to provide remedies, the laws of the jurisdiction in which the case is
filed should apply, so long as they are not inconsistent with the Constitu-
tion and the laws of the United States.
13 7
Section 1983 is an example of federal legislation enacted without a
statute of limitations.13 8 In applying the provisions of section 1988 to sec-
tion 1983 claims the courts have required a three-step inquiry.13 9 First, the
court must determine that a federal rule does not apply.140 Second, the
court selects and borrows an analogous state rule. 141 Third, if the state
rule is consistent with federal law, it is applied.
142
133. 985 F.2d at 1037.
134. Id. at 1041. The EEOC has the power to subpoena both documents and witness. 29
U.S.C. § 161(1) (1988).
135. Board of Regents of N.Y. v. Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478, 483 (1980).
136. See Paul Rathburn, Amending a Statute of Limitations for 42 U.S. C. § 1983: More Than 'A
Half Measure of Uniformity', 73 MINN. L. REV. 85, 90-91 (1988) (discussing the borrowing of
state limitations periods for federal claims under § 1983).
137. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1988). The practice of applying state limitations periods so long as
not inconsistent with the Constitution, treaties, or laws of the United States is also sanctioned
by the Rules of Decision Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1988).
138. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988). Section 1983 allows persons whose rights have been de-
prived under color of state law to seek redress by the courts. Id. See also Rathburn, supra note
136, at 87 (arguing that Congress should set a statute of limitations for § 1983).
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Prior to Wilson v. Garcia143 the Supreme Court advised federal courts
to apply the state statute of limitations that was "most appropriate" 144 or
"most analogous."' 45 The approaches utilized by different states to apply
these tests and determine the "most appropriate" or "most analogous" stat-
ute of limitations created a large amount of confusion and inconsistency
among the circuits.
14 6
The Supreme Court attempted to minimize confusion and increase
uniformity and certainty in section 1983 litigation with its holding in Wil-
son v. Garcia.147 Applying the standards set in Board of Regents of N.Y. v.
Tomanio and Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, the Court reiterated that the
statute most analogous to section 1983 claims should borrowed. 148 Since
federal law governs the choice of statutes of limitation, the court reasoned
that federal law should govern the decision as to which state cause of ac-
tion is most analogous to section 1983.149 In the interests of "uniformity,
certainty, and minimization of unnecessary litigation," the Court con-
cluded that the inquiry should no longer be on a case-by-case basis and
that the state statute most analogous to all section 1983 claims should be
applied. °50 Affirming the Tenth Circuit Garcia opinion, the Supreme
Court held that the appropriate statute of limitations for all § 1983 claims
was the state statute applicable to personal injury tort claims.
15
The Garcia opinion has not been completely accepted as the solu-
tion to the statute of limitation dilemma. 52 Legal theorists have pro-
posed a number of solutions to the problems still remaining.153 Never-
theless, the rule from Wilson has been extended by a number
of courts to include claims under 42 U.S.C § 1981154 and 42 U.S.C
143. 471 U.S. 261 (1985).
144. Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454, 462 (1975).
145. Board of Regents of N.Y. v. Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478, 488 (1980).
146. See Lee L. Cameron, Note, Civil Rights: Determining the Appropriate Statute of Limitations
for Section 1983 Claims, 61 NoRE DAME L. REV. 440, 442-43 (1986); Lawrence K. Hoyt, Survey,
Civil Rights, 62 DENy. U. L. REv. 59, 67 (1985); Rathburn, supra note 136, at 91-97.
147. 471 U.S. 261 (1985). Wilson v. Garcia came out of the Tenth Circuit. Gary Garcia
brought a § 1983 claim against a police officer for violating his civil rights and against the
police chief for negligently hiring and failing to train the officer. 731 F.2d 640, 642 (1984).
The defendants moved to dismiss, asserting that the suit was time barred. Id. The only issue
on appeal was which limitations period should be applied to the § 1983 federal claim. Id.
148. Wilson, 471 U.S. at 268.
149. Id. at 269-70.
150. Id. at 272-73.
151. Id. at 277.
152. In her dissenting opinion Justice O'Connor considered the majority's "half baked
uniformity ... a poor substitute for the careful selection of the appropriate state law anal-
ogy." 471 U.S. at 286.
153. See Robert M. Jarvis & Judith Anne Jarvis, Commentary, The Continuing Problem of
Statutes of Limitations in Section 1983 Cases: Is the Answer Out at Sea?, 22J. MARSHALL L. REv.
285, 291 (1988) (proposing the use of the laches doctrine); Rathburn, supra note 136, at 113-
14 (proposing congressional legislation).
154. Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 482 U.S. 656 (1987); EEOC v. Gaddis, 733 F.2d 1373
(10th Cir. 1984).
Section 1981 guarantees to all persons in the United States equal rights under the law
"as is enjoyed by white citizens." 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1981 and Supp. 1992).
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§ 1985.155 This continuing extension of the Wilson holding is indicative of
ajudicial intent to characterize all civil rights claims as actions in personal
injury.
B. Baker v. Board of Regents of the State of Kansas
1 56
1. Facts
Marvin Baker, a Kansas state resident, was denied admission to the
1986 class of the University of Kansas Medical School. 15 7 The letter in-
forming Mr. Baker of his rejection was dated January 29, 1986.158 On Feb-
ruary 12, 1986, Mr. Baker met with the school's associate dean to discuss
the reasons for the denial of admission. 159 At this meeting, Mr. Baker was
informed that he was not accepted due to his poor performance at his
admission interview.16 0 On December 1, 1987, Mr. Baker's counsel re-
ceived a letter from the University of Kansas stating that Mr. Baker had the
highest GPA and MCAT score of any Kansas resident that was denied ad-
mission for the 1986 class.16 1 Mr. Baker filed suit against the Board of
Regents of the State of Kansas and the University of Kansas Medical
School on June 14, 1988.162
Mr. Baker initially sought a temporary injunction directing the Board
of Regents and the University of Kansas to admit him as a first year medi-
cal student pending the outcome of a trial.163 Mr. Baker filed four claims,
including reverse discrimination on the basis of race alleging a violation of
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.164 Although the defendants argued
155. Marquis v. U.S. Sugar Corp., 652 F. Supp. 598, 602 (S.D. Fla. 1987). See also Williams
v. City of Atlanta, 794 F.2d 624, 625 n.1 (11th Cir. 1986); Mulligan v. Hazard, 777 F.2d 340,
343-45 (6th Cir. 1985).
Section 1985 provides redress for persons injured by conspiracies to deprive equal pro-
tection or equal privileges and immunities under the law. 42 U.S.C. § 1985 (1988).
156. 721 F. Supp. 270 (D. Kan. 1989).
157. Id. at 272. Mr. Baker had also been denied admission in 1984 and in 1985. Id.
158. Baker v. Board of Regents of Kansas, 768 F. Supp. 1436, 1437 (D. Kan. 1991).
159. Id. at 1438.
160. Id. During his interview, conducted by a panel of four people, Mr. Baker was asked
questions concerning abortion, religion, family history, and financial need. Mr. Baker felt
many of the questions were inappropriate and that no procedure governed the format or
substance of the interview. Baker, 721 F. Supp. at 273.
161. Baker, 768 F. Supp. at 1438. Admissions at the University of Kansas Medical School
are based on four criteria: GPA, MCAT, advisor's recommendation, and interviews. Baker, 721
F. Supp. at 272.
162. Id. at 274.
163. Id. at 271.
164. Id. at 272. Mr. Baker also alleged violations of the 14th amendment of the U.S.
Constitution, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 1 of the Bill of
Rights of the State of Kansas Constitution, and due process of law guaranteed by the U.S.
Constitution. Id. The district court stated that claims cannot be brought under the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments and that the plaintiff was limited to actions pursuant to federal
statutes enforcing the Constitution. Id. at 273. Also, relief was not available under Title VII
because it is reserved for employment discrimination. Id. at 274. Finally, the court stated that
Mr. Baker's claims under § 1981 and the Kansas Constitution were barred by the Eleventh
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. Id. Mr. Baker was left with only his claim under Title
VI. Id.
The district court also noted that Mr. Baker had filed a motion to add claims under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 and the Rehabilitation Act, § 504, 29 U.S.C. § 794. Id.
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that a private citizen could not sue under Title VI, the court ruled that it
was proper to imply a private cause of action.
165
There is no federal statute of limitations for an implied cause of ac-
tion. 16 6 The defendants argued that the state's two-year statute of limita-
tions, which is routinely borrowed for civil rights actions under 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1981 and 1983, should also be applied for Title VI claims.' 6 7 Seeing no
reason why the same statute should not be applied to a claim which could
have been prosecuted under section 1981 or section 1983, the district
court applied the two-year personal injury statute of limitations to the Title
VI claim. 168 The court concluded that Mr. Baker knew or had reason to
know of the possible violation of his rights when he first learned of his
denial of admission.' 69 Mr. Baker had received his rejection letter more
than two years before the filing of the action. 170 For this reason, among
others, Mr. Baker was denied injunctive relief.
17 1
At trial, the court continued to hold that the two-year statute of limita-
tions period should apply to Mr. Baker's claims asserted under Title VI
and section 1981.172 The court also stated that the two-year statute of limi-
tations would apply to the claims asserted under section 1983 of the Civil
Rights Act and section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act which Mr. Baker
moved to add to his complaint.' 73 Holding that Mr. Baker filed his case
after the limitations period for his federal claims had expired, the district
court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment.
174
2. Tenth Circuit Opinion
The Tenth Circuit agreed with the trial court's analysis that the two-
year statute of limitation should be applied to the federal civil rights claims
asserted by Mr. Baker.1 75 Citing 42 U.S.C. § 1988, the court stated that
Congress has directed courts to apply state statute of limitations to federal
claims so long as they are not inconsistent with the Constitution or the
laws of the United States. 176 Utilizing the rule of Wilson, the court ex-
plained that the first step in selecting an appropriate statute of limitations
is to characterize the essential nature of the federal action, which is a mat-
165. Id. at 274.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 275. The court reasoned that in Garcia the Tenth Circuit held that § 1983 civil
rights claims should be characterized as personal injury actions. Id. at 274. Additionally, the
Tenth Circuit indicated that the same analysis should apply to § 1981 claims in EEOC v.
Gaddis, 733 F.2d 1373, 1377 (10th Cir. 1984). Id. at 275. Finally, most courts have held that
under Title VI or analogous statutes state statutes of limitation should apply. Id. (citing a
number of cases). According to the court, Pike v. City Mission, 731 F.2d 655 (10th Cir. 1984)
established that Kansas' two-year statute was the appropriate limitation to apply. Id. at 275.
169. Id. at 275.
170. See text accompanying notes 145-49.
171. Baker, 768 F. Supp. at 1438.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 1442.




ter of federal law. 17 7 The court pointed out that Wilson characterized all
section 1983 claims as actions of injury to personal rights.1 78 The court
also pointed out that section 1981 claims have likewise been characterized
as actions of injury to personal rights.179 According to the court, Kansas'
two-year statute of limitations is appropriate for claims under sections
1981 and 1983 because they are claims based on injury to the rights of
others.
18 0
The Tenth Circuit next considered whether the two-year statute of
limitations appliable to the other civil rights claims should apply to Title
VI claims.181 In characterizing the nature of the claim, the court focused
on the elements of a cause of action under Title VI, as opposed to the
remedy, because the elements more fully describe a claim's essence.
18 2
The elements for Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 are: "(1) that
there is racial or national origin discrimination and (2) the entity engag-
ing in discrimination is receiving federal financial assistance."' 83 The
court stated that Title VI is a civil rights statute closely analogous to sec-
tions 1981 and 1983 because it specifically refers to discrimination against
a "person," which is similar to the language in sections 1981 and 1983
protecting "persons" from deprivation of rights, and because it provides
equal rights under the law to all "persons."
18 4
The court concluded that Title VI claims are best characterized as
actions for injury to personal rights. 185 Citing directly from the Tenth Cir-
cuit decision in Garcia, the court stated that this decision would promote a
"consistent and uniform framework by which suitable statutes of limita-
tions can be determined for civil rights claims."
186
The court next considered Mr. Baker's claim pursuant to section 504
of the Rehabilitation Act. 18 7 The court, citing other districts, stated that
section 504 is a "civil rights statute . . . closely analogous to section
1983."188 Since the Supreme Court held that all section 1983 claims are
best characterized as claims for personal injuries, and as section 504 claims
are closely analogous to section 1983 claims, the court held that section
504 claims are also best characterized as claims for personal injuries.
189
Therefore, the court concluded that Mr. Baker's section 504 claim was





180. Id. (citing Pike v. City of Mission, Kan., 731 F.2d 655, 658 (10th Cir. 1984)).
181. Id. at 631.
182. Id. (citing Garcia, 731 F.2d at 650-51).
183. Id. (citingJackson v. Conway, 476 F. Supp. 896, 903 (E.D.Mo. 1979), aff'd 620 F.2d
680 (8th Cir. 1980)).
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id. (citing Garcia, 731 F.2d at 643).
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 632.
190. Id.
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C. Analysis
An initial concern with the Tenth Circuit's decision in Baker is the
lack of depth with which the court considered the proper characterization
of the federal civil rights claims. In Wilson, the Supreme Court focused on
the intent of the legislature when enacting the Civil Rights Act of 1871.
The Supreme Court examined the issue as a question of legislative intent,
arguing that Congress "intended the identification of the appropriate stat-
ute of limitations to be an uncomplicated task."191 Examining the catalyst
of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, and the violence and deprivation of rights
in the South, the court concluded that the "atrocities that concerned Con-
gress in 1871 plainly sounded in tort."192 No such examination of legisla-
tive intent was relied on by the Tenth Circuit in Baker. On the contrary,
the Baker decision is grounded solely in similarities of the elements and
language of Title IV and section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act to section
1983 of the Civil Rights Act.193 Despite the meticulous inquiry modeled in
Wilson, the Tenth Circuit barely addresses the intent of Congress in enact-
ing Title VI and section 504.
The extension of the Wilson rationale in Baker highlights a concern
initially articulated after the Wilson decision. By applying state statutes of
limitation a conflict may arise between federal and state interests.1 9 4 State
statutes of limitation are determined by state legislatures according to state
policy.1 9 5 A state statute of limitations may be so short as to undermine the
federal interest in protecting civil rights. Although the Supreme Court has
indicated that the state statute should not be borrowed if it conflicts with
federal law or federal interest, 196 neither Wilson nor Baker provide any gui-
dance as to when a state statute of limitations is so short that it infringes
on federal interests.
197
An overriding concern in Wilson and Baker is uniformity. 19 8 Both the
Tenth Circuit and the Supreme Court characterize uniformity as an im-
portant federal interest vindicated by the civil rights statutes at issue.
199
On the other hand, the dissent in Wilson argued that the need for uni-
formity is simply a judicial perception that the courts have seized as an
opportunity to legislate.2 0 0 Subsequent decisions consistent with Wilson
191. Wilson, 471 U.S. at 275.
192. Id. at 277.
193. With respect to Title VI, the Tenth Circuit focuses on the use of the word "person"
in both Title VI and §§ 1983 and 1981. Baker, 991 F.2d at 631. With both Title VI and § 504 of
the Rehabilitation Act, the court relies on the fact that they are analogous to § 1983 claims.
Id. at 631-32.
194. See Cameron, supra note 146, at 448-50.
195. Id. at 449.
196. Id. at 451.
197. There are cases that have articulated that federal policy should establish a minimum
limitation period so as not to infringe on federal interests. See Pauk v. Board of Trustees, 654
F.2d 856, 862 (2d Cir. 1981) (advocating a two-year floor for § 1983 statutes of limitation).
198. See Wilson, 471 U.S. at 275-76; Baker, 991 F.2d at 631.
199. Wilson, 471 U.S. at 279; Baker, 991 F.2d at 631.
200. Wilson, 471 U.S. at 284 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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have solved some remaining uniformity problems.2 0 1 Nevertheless, these
decisions fail to address the disparity of limitations periods among differ-
ent states.
2 02
It has been argued that the only viable solution to the uniformity
problem is congressional legislation.203 In 1990 Congress enacted a four-
year statute of limitations but limited its use to federal claims and causes of
action created by Congress after December 1, 1990.204 However, a
Supreme Court decision arguably opened the door to apply the statute to
other federal claims. In Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assoc. the
court stated that "when a rule from elsewhere in federal law clearly pro-
vides a closer analogy than available state statutes.., we have not hesitated
to turn away from state law."20 5 Using Agency to apply the 1990 legislation
to all federal civil rights statutes without limitations periods is another pos-
sible solution to the uniformity problem that both the Tenth Circuit and
the Supreme Court find so disturbing. Any movement in this direction by
the courts would arguably be contrary to the express intent of Congress
that the statute only apply to federal claims enacted after 1990. It is not
likely that the Tenth Circuit or the Supreme Court is willing to go that far
for uniformity.
CONCLUSION
During the 1993 survey period the Tenth Circuit addressed some pro-
cedural issues affecting the ability of parties to bring civil rights claims.
Castner enhanced the ability of the disadvantaged to pursue employment
discrimination claims by supporting the value of discretionary appoint-
ments of counsel. Baker affects the ability of any party to bring a civil rights
claim under Title VI or section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act by extending
Wilson and applying a state's general personal injury statute of limitations
to these federal claims. Finally, the Tenth Circuit enhanced the ability of
the EEOC to investigate employment discrimination in Diners Club by en-
forcing an EEOC subpoena to compile previously undocumented
information.
Daniel E. Rohner
201. See Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235 (1989) (holding that states with more than one
personal injury statute of limitations should apply the general or residual statute).
202. See Rathburn, supra note 136, at 108-09 n.154 (illustrating a hypothetical forum-
shopping situation where the disparity in limitations for same claim ranges from one to six
years).
203. See Rathburn, supra note 136, at 113-14.
204. Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, § 1658 (Pub. L. No. 101-650). See David D. Sie-
gal, The Statute of Limitations in Federal Practice, Including the New "General" One in Federal Ques-
tion Cases, 134 F.R.D. 481 (1991).
205. Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assoc., 483 U.S. 143, 148 (1987) (applying






During the 1993 survey period, notable Tenth Circuit commercial law
decisions addressed banking and corporate law issues. Part I of this Survey
examines recent banking law decisions. In 1993, the Tenth Circuit vari-
ously restricted and expanded federal banking regulators' powers under
the D'Oench doctrine' and § 1823(e) 2 of the Financial Institutions Reform,
Recovery, and Enforcement Act ("FIRREA").s In Oklahoma Radio Associates
v. FDIC,4 the court restricted federal superpowers by endorsing a complete
innocence exception to the D'Oench estoppel doctrine and by refusing to
give retroactive effect to FIRREA's extensions of § 1823(e). In contrast,
Castleglen, Inc. v. RTC5 enlarged federal superpowers by applying D'Oench
and § 1823(e) to bar debtor defenses to liability based on affirmative tort
claims as well as those based on unwritten agreements or verbal
misrepresentations.
Part II of this Survey discusses a recent corporate law decision. NLRB
v. Greater Kansas City Roofing6 summarizes the Tenth Circuit's stance con-
cerning piercing the corporate veil with the federal common law alter ego
doctrine. While the decision adds little to the substantive law, it merits
attention for its clairification and explanation of the alter ego doctrine.
I. BANKING LAW
In response to the savings and loan crisis of the eighties, Congress
passed FIRREA. 7 FIRREA extensively revised federal regulation of the
savings and loan industry to insure its integrity, safety and stability.8
Among its specific purposes, FIRREA sought to improve federal supervi-
sion of financial institutions and to strengthen federal regulators' enforce-
ment powers.9 Towards these ends, Congress expanded the application of
1. The D'Oench doctrine was articulated in D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. FDIC, 315 U.S.
447 (1941), reh'g denied, 315 U.S. 830 (1942). See infra notes 16-29 and accompanying text
for an explanation of the D'Oench doctrine.
2. 12 U.S.C. § 182 3(e) (Supp. IV 1992) partially codifies the common law D'Oench doc-
trine. See infra notes 25-30 and accompanying text for an explanation of § 1823(e).
3. Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989, Pub. L. No.
101-73, 103 Stat. 183 (codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).
4. 987 F.2d 685 (10th Cir. 1993).
5. 984 F.2d 1571 (10th Cir. 1993).
6. 2 F.3d 1047 (10th Cir. 1993).
7. H.R. REP. No. 54, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., pt. I at 291-94 (1989), reprinted in 1989
U.S.C.C.A.N. 86, 87-90 (discussing the history of the savings and loan industry and the gene-
sis of the crisis). See aso James F. Hogg, Section 1823(e) and the D'Oend, Duhme Doctrine, 16
HAMLINE L.Rv. 55, 55-56 (1992).
8. See Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act, Pub. L. No. 101-
73, § 101, 1989 U.S.C.C.A.N. (103 Stat.) 187.
9. Id. § 101(2), (9).
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FIRREA's special enforcement provisions contained in section 1823(e). 10
FIRREA's special enforcement provisions prohibit debtors from asserting
nearly every defense in a lawsuit by federal regulators to collect an institu-
tion's outstanding loan obligations.
11
These statutory provisions, combined with the common law enforce-
ment powers available to the FDIC and the RTC, give federal banking
regulators a substantial advantage in debt collection litigation. 12 Some
commentators, troubled by the magnitude of these prerogatives, and the
manifest injustice they frequently work, have called upon courts to restrain
their scope. 13 Recent decisions leave it uncertain whether the Tenth Cir-
cuit is prepared to answer this call.
A. Scope of the D'Oench Estoppel Doctrine and FIRREA § 1823(e): Oklahoma
Radio Associates v. FOIL 14 and Castleglen Inc. v. RTC
15
When the FDIC or the RTC takes over a failed financial institution's
assets and sues to collect debts still owed to the institution, a growing body
of statutory and common law strips debtors of most otherwise valid de-
fenses or counterclaims against liability. These "superpowers" are
designed to enhance federal regulators' ability to deal effectively with the
failure of a financial insitution. 16 During the 1993 Survey period, the
Tenth Circuit addressed two of the FDIC's and RTC's most commonly em-
ployed superpowers: the D'Oench estoppel doctrine and FIRREA
§ 1823(e).
17
The Supreme Court articulated the D'Oench doctrine in D'Oench,
Duhme & Co. v. FDIC.18 In that case, the FDIC sued to collect on a promis-
sory note obtained from a bank as collateral for a loan.' 9 The maker of
the note denied liability based on a written agreement by the bank promis-
10. 12 U.S.C. § 1823(e) (Supp. IV 1992). FIRREA specifically extended § 1823(e) to
cover the FDIC and the RTC in their capacity as either conservator or receiver. Prior to
FIRREA, § 1823(e) only applied to the FDIC in its receivership capacity. GREGORY PULLES ET
AL., FIRREA: A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY AND SECTION-BY-SECTION ANALYSIS OF THE FINANCIAL IN-
STITUTIONS RECOVERY, REFORM AND ENFORCEMENT ACT 255 (1993).
11. See infra part II.A.
12. See Fred Galves, FDIC and RTC Special Powers in Failed Bank Litigation, 22 COLO. LAW.
473 (1993).
13. See generally Richard E. Flint, Why D'Oench, Duhme? An Economic, Legal and Philosophi-
cal Critique of a Failed Bank Policy, 26 VAL. U. L. REv 465 (1992) (arguing for the repeal of
§ 1823(e) and the overruling of D'Oench and its progeny); Hogg, supra note 5, at56 ("[wlith
Congress' enthusiasm for reform, it is not surprising that the reform pendulum... may have
swung too far in favor of the federal banking agencies.").
14. 987 F.2d 685 (10th Cir. 1993).
15. 984 F.2d 1571 (10th Cir. 1993).
16. The best known of the FDIC's and RTC's superpowers are the D'Oench doctrine, 12
U.S.C. § 1823(e), and the federal Holder in Due Course Doctrine. Galves, supra note 12, at
473.
17. Between 1989 and 1992, 12 U.S.C. § 1823(e) was cited in over three hundred cases.
See Hogg, supra note 7, at 56 (describing the level of citation as "extraordinary. . . compared
to other FIRREA sections"). Likewise, D'Oench and its extensions are "uniformly accepted in
failed bank litigation." See Calves, supra note 12, at 474.
18. 315 U.S. 447 (1941), reh'g denied, 315 U.S. 830 (1942).
19. Id. at 454.
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ing that the note would not be enforced.20 The FDIC lacked knowledge
of the agreement until after demand for payment.2 1 The Supreme Court
deemed the maker to have participated in a scheme to misrepresent the
bank's assets to the FDIC by executing a facially unqualified note.2 2 Not-
ing that federal legislation reflected a strong policy in favor of protecting
the FDIC and the public funds it administers from such misrepresenta-
tions, the court estopped the maker from asserting the agreement as a
defense to liability.
23
Justice Douglas' majority opinion specifically provided that the FDIC
is not required to prove either intent to deceive or specific injury.24 It
would suffice that the maker had "lent himself to a scheme or arrange-
ment whereby the banking authority . . .was likely to be misled."
25
Schemes subject to estoppel under D'Oench have expanded well beyond
oral agreements to encompass defenses such as failure of consideration,
26
fraud in the inducement,27 and unconscionability,28 among others.
2 9
Section 1823(e) of FIRREA partially codifies the D'Oench doctrine.
3 0
The section also adds specific requirements prohibiting assertion of agree-
ments tending to diminish or defeat the interest of the FDIC in any asset it
acquires unless the agreement is: (1) in writing, (2) executed by the bank
and the obligor, (3) established as approved in the board or loan commit-
tee minutes and (4) continuously part of official records.3 1 Section
1823(e) essentially bars the same defenses as D'Oench.3
2
Courts have recognized a narrow set of potential exceptions to both
D'Oench and section 1823(e). These exceptions include fraud in the fac-
tum,33 forgery or material alteration,34 and defenses based on breach of
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 459-61.
23. Id. at 457, 461.
24. Id. at 461.
25. Id. at 460. See also Langley v. FDIC, 484 U.S. 86 (1987). Although decided under
§ 1823(e), Langley held that neither fraud in the inducement nor the FDIC's knowledge of
the agreement bars section 1823(e)'s applicability. Id. at 94-95.
26. Taylor Trust v. Security Trust Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 844 F.2d 337, 342 (6th Cir.
1988).
27. Mainland Say. Ass'n v. Riverfront Ass'n, 872 F.2d 955, 956 (10th Cir.) (per curiam),
cert. denied, 493 U.S. 890 (1989).
28. Clay v. FDIC, 934 F.2d 69, 72-73 (5th Cir. 1991).
29. D'Oench bars most tort claims used either affirmatively or defensively. For a compre-
hensive listing, see PULLES ET AL., supra note 1012, at 256.1-256.4(2).
30. Authorities conflict on whether § 1823(e) represents a parallel authority to the
D'Oench doctrine, a codification of the doctrine, or a partial codification of the doctrine.
PULLES ET AL., supra note 10, at 256.
31. 12 U.S.C. § 1823(e)(1988 & Supp. IV 1993).
32. See, e.g., Langley v. FDIC, 484 U.S. 86, 94 (1987) (using section 1823(e) to bar de-
fense of fraudulent inducement). It is uncertain whether or not section 1823(e), like
D'Oench, bars defenses based on failure of consideration. The Sixth Circuit, at least, finds
that it does not. FDIC v. Leach, 772 F.2d 1262, 1266 (6th Cir. 1985) (failure of consideration
is not barred by § 1823(e), since the statutory bar applies only to unwritten agreements, and
the defense was based on the lack of any enforceable agreement).
33. See Langey, 484 U.S. at 92-93 (recognizing possible exception for fraud in the factum
as there would be no agreement to enforce in the first place).
34. See FDIC v. Turner, 869 F.2d 270 (6th Cir. 1989) (discussing a material alteration).
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bilateral obligations where the payee's obligation clearly appears in the
bank's loan files.3 5 A few courts recognize the "wholly innocent maker"
defense as an additional exception to D'Oench estoppel.3 6 Courts gener-
ally cite FDIC v. Meo37 as establishing this defense. In Meo, the Ninth Cir-
cuit held that D'Oench did not estop a debtor from asserting a defense
where he was "neither a party to any deceptive scheme involving, nor neg-
ligent with respect to, circumstances giving rise to the claimed defense."
3 8
The exception is not uniformly recognized; some courts have character-
ized it as an outdated understanding of the D'Oench doctrine.
39
D'Oench and § 1823(e) contribute towards FIRREA's overriding goal
of maintaining confidence and stability in the banking system by ensuring
the accuracy of the records of federally insured financial institutions
under the FDIC's regulation.40 The FDIC must be able to determine
quickly which institutions are failing and how best to protect depositors
once the institution has failed.4 1 To this end, the FDIC must have accu-
rate information regarding the financial condition of the institution.
42
"Neither the FDIC nor state banking authorities would be able to make
reliable evaluations if bank records contained seemingly unqualified notes
that are in fact subject to undisclosed conditions."
43
The D'Oench doctrine and its statutory codification have expanded
considerably in their application. Commentators have criticized the broad
scope of both D'Oench and section 1823(e) as allowing the FDIC to impose
draconian measures against unwary debtors who naively trust oral agree-
ments made with lending institutions.
44
1. Tenth Circuit Decision: Oklahoma Radio Associates v. FOIL
4 5
The Comptroller of Currency closed Citizens Bank ("Citizens") and
appointed the FDIC as receiver in August of 1986.46 When the FDIC
chose to liquidate the bank, it demanded payment of a $175,000 loan Citi-
35. Howell v. Continental Credit Corp., 655 F.2d 743, 746-47 (7th Cir. 1981).
36. See, e.g., Oklahoma Radio Assoc. v. FDIC, 987 F.2d 685, 693-94 (10th Cir. 1993); Agri-
Export Coop. v. Universal Say. Ass'n, 767 F. Supp. 824, 832 (S.D. Tex. 1991).
37. 505 F.2d 790, 793 (9th Cir. 1974).
38. Meo, 505 F.2d at 793. The defendant had executed a promissory note to a bank in
exchange for 1000 shares of the bank's stock. The bank issued 1000 voting trust certificates
rather than stock. Id. at 791. The court found the defendant not negligent in failing to
discover the misexecution of his order and wholly unaware of the failure of consideration
until the FDIC, as receiver for the bank, filed suit to collect the note. Id. at 792.
39. FDIC v. Payne, 973 F.2d 403, 407 (5th Cir. 1992); Capital Bank & Trust v. 604 Co-
lumbus Ave. Realty Trust (In re Columbus Ave. Realty Trust), 968 F.2d 1332, 1347-48 (lst Cir.
1992); FSLIC v. Gordy, 928 F.2d 1558, 1567 n.14 (11th Cir. 1991).
40. Additionally, bars from statutory and common law safeguard federal insurance funds
from depletion by preventing debtors from pleading participation in a deceptive scheme as a
defense to their obligation to a failed financial institution. Hogg, supra note 7, at 57-60.
41. Id at 59.
42. "One purpose of § 1823(e) is to allow federal... bank examiners to rely on a bank's
records in evaluating the worth of the bank's assets." Langley v. FDIC, 484 U.S. 86, 91
(1987).
43. Id at 91-92.
44. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
45. 987 F.2d 685 (10th Cir. 1993).
46. Id. at 688.
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zens had made to Oklahoma Radio Associates ("ORA") which had come
due.47 ORA brought suit against the FDIC claiming that the FDIC's de-
mand for repayment in full breached Citizens' agreement to renew that
note over five years with a series of one-year notes.48 As evidence of the
agreement, ORA introduced a letter from Citizens' vice president confirm-
ing the terms of the agreement. 49 These terms mirrored those stated in
ORA's loan application. 50 ORA countered the assertion that the renewal
agreement constituted a secret side agreement by introducing an affidavit
from Citizens' vice president indicating that he had ordered both the con-
firmation letter and the loan application to be placed in the bank's files.
5 1
The FDIC counterclaimed for payment of the loan.52 The FDIC ar-
gued that, under the D'Oench doctrine, ORA could not assert its secret side
agreement with Citizens and avoid its obligation under a facially unquali-
fied note.53 As to ORA's contention that the confirmation letter was in
Citizens' files at the time of failure, the FDIC presented evidence that its
examiner had located ORA's loan application, but no qualifying letter, in
the bank's loan files.
54
The district court found the D'Oench doctrine applicable to ORA's
defense. 55 The court emphasized that the promissory note, on which the
FDIC relied, clearly indicated the instrument's maturity date. 56 The con-
firmation letter represented "[a]t best a secret agreement that Citizens
would not enforce the note on its express maturity date."5 7 The court
held that D'Oench applied directly to these facts because such an agree-
ment would tend to indicate deceptively to bank examiners that Citizens
had committed its assets for one year while it had, in reality, committed
them for five years.
58
On appeal, ORA challenged the district court's ruling on two
grounds. First, ORA asserted that the FDIC failed to establish that the
renewal agreement was deceptive or would tend to deceive. 59 Second,
ORA argued that the FDIC failed to establish in the record that ORA's
conduct was even slightly culpable.
60
47. Id.
48. Id. at 688-89.
49. Id. at 689. The letter confirmed that upon the original note's 90 day maturity "the
note [would] be renewed on a 60 month basis with a series of one year notes." Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 688.
52. Id. at 689. There were actually two promissory notes relating to the loan in question.
The first note carried a maturity date of October 15, 1985. Citizens later renewed ORA's
note with a new one carrying a stated maturity date of no later than August 15, 1986. Id. at







59. Id. at 692.
60. Id. at 693.
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The Tenth Circuit agreed with ORA's first argument because the
presence or absence of the confirmation letter in Citizens' files remained
a disputed issue. 61 Establishing the letter's existence in Citizens' files
would prevent the FDIC from asserting D'Oench, since the manifestation of
both parties' obligations in the records would protect banking authorities
from deception.
6 2
The court also endorsed ORA's second challenge. While agreeing
that the D'Oench doctrine did not require an intent to deceive, the Tenth
Circuit observed that it did not bar all defenses to attempts to collect on
promissory notes.63 The court endorsed Meo's "wholly innocent maker"
rationale and found summary judgement based on D'Oench erroneous
where the record failed to indicate any culpability on the part of the
obligor.
64
The Tenth Circuit dealt with one final issue in Oklahoma Radio Associ-
ates: whether to afford retroactive effect to FIRREA's extension of 12
U.S.C. § 1823(e). Throughout the district court proceedings, § 1823(e)
covered the FDIC in its corporate capacity but not in its capacity as re-
ceiver.65 While the case awaited appeal, FIRREA extended section
1823(e)'s protection to the FDIC as receiver.6 6 FDIC argued that the
court should give retroactive effect to FIRREA's extension of § 1823(e)
and bar ORA's assertion of the alleged renewal agreement. 67 According
to the FDIC, the renewal agreement's failure to comply with § 1823(e)'s
strict requirements, prevented ORA from using the agreement as a de-
fense to the FDIC's counterclaim. 68 Noting that its recent opinions re-
fused to give retroactive effect to statutes and Supreme Court principles




Oklahoma Radio Associates is noteworthy for its adoption of the com-
plete innocence exception to the D'Oench doctrine. As noted earlier,
courts do not uniformly endorse this exception. 70 Recognition that
D'Oench requires some showing of culpable conduct on the obligor's part
narrows the doctrine's scope. Unfortunately, the Tenth Circuit provided
little guidance for applying its precedent. The court furnished no indica-
61. Id. Both sides introduced conflicting evidence on this point. See supra notes 48, 49,
and 51, and accompanying text.
62. Oklahoma Radio Assocs., 987 F.2d at 692-93. The decision itself merely held that if
ORA can establish that the renewal agreement was manifest in Citizens' records, D'Oench will
not apply. Id. at 693. The court explained the basis for its holding while exploring defenses
not barred by D'Oench. Id. at 691-92 (citing Howell v. Continental Credit Corp., 655 F.2d 743,
746 (7th Cir. 1981)).
63. Oklahoma Radio Assocs., 987 F.2d at 693.
64. Id. at 694.




69. Id. at 695-96.
70. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
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don of what type or degree of culpability would foreclose the complete
innocence exception and invoke the D'Oench bar.
3. Tenth Circuit Decision: Castleglen, Inc. v. RTC7'
The Tenth Circuit also addressed the scope of the D'Oench Doctrine
and § 1823(e) of FIRREA in Castleglen. In that case, the court extended
both doctrines' reach beyond contract defenses to preclude those based
on affirmative tort claims.
72
Castleglen, Inc. ("Castleglen") brought action against Commonwealth
Savings ("Commonwealth") based on numerous affirmative state law tort
claims.7 3 These claims arose from Commonwealth's alleged misrepresen-
tations regarding the profitability of an apartment project purchased by
Castleglen. During the pendency of that action, Commonwealth was de-
clared insolvent and the RTC, as conservator, was substituted as defend-
ant.7 4 The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the RTC,
holding that both FIRREA § 1823(e) and D'Oench estoppel barred
Castleglen's claims.
75
On appeal, Castleglen challenged the district court's finding that
both D'Oench and § 1823(e) barred affirmative tort claims. 76 Castleglen
relied on the Tenth Circuit's holding in Grubb v. FDIC77 in arguing that
D'Oench prohibits contract claims based on misleading agreements, not af-
firmative claims of fraud.
78
Because defenses sounding in tort have the same practical effect as
those sounding in contract, the Tenth Circuit agreed with the district
71. 984 F.2d 1571 (10th Cir. 1993).
72. Id. at 1577. The Tenth Circuit's decision in Castleglen also dealt with several other
issues. Among the most important, to the scope of § 1823(e) and D'Oench, the court struck
down Castleglen's attempt to take the case beyond the reach of the common law and the
statutory doctrines by characterizing the transaction as a "credit enhancement transaction"
rather than a loan. Id. at 1581. Regardless of appellation, D'Oench and § 1823(e) bar any
oral agreement which contradicts what the bank has told banking authorities, or which forms
any part of an effort to mislead banking authorities as to the bank's financial condition. Id.
73. Castleglen v. Commonwealth Say. Ass'n, 728 F.Supp. 656 (D. Utah 1989).
Castleglenn's state law tort claims included: fraud, misrepresentation, negligent misrepresen-
tation, negligence, breach of fiduciary duty, and breach of an implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing. Id. at 659-60.
74. The events unfolded as follows. The Federal Home Loan Bank Board ("FHLBB")
declared Commonwealth insolvent and appointed the FSLIC as conservator. Id at 660.
FHLBB then replaced the FSLIC as conservator with the FSLIC as receiver. Id. FSLIC
chartered a new institution, Commonwealth Federal Savings ("Commonwealth Federal"),
which it placed under its conservatorship. The FSLIC then caused Commonwealth Federal
to purchase Commonwealth's assets. Id. The passage of FIRREA abolished the FSLIC and
replaced it with the RTC. Id. at 660-61. Thus, the RTC as conservator for Commonwealth
Federal was substituted as a defendant in this action for the insolvent Commonwealth. Id. at
661.
75. Id. at 678.
76. Castleglen, 984 F.2d at 1575.
77. 868 F.2d 1151 (10th Cir. 1989).
78. Castleglen, 984 F.2d at 1577. While Grubb did involve an affirmative fraud claim, the
court in Castlegten denied that Grubb subjects the RTC (or FDIC) to such claims. Id, at 1578.
Rather, the misrepresentation claim in Grubb resulted in a judgment invalidating notes held
by the bank before the FDIC took over. Id. Hence, the invalidated notes failed to constitute
FDIC assets in the first place. Id.
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court that the D'Oench doctrine barred tort claims as well as contract de-
fenses. 79 "If the D'Oench doctrine is to have any force, courts cannot per-
mit debtors to evade its prohibitions simply by recasting their contract
defenses as affirmative tort claims."8 0
Moreover, the court noted that while fraud in the factum provides a
defense not subject to either D'Oench or § 1823(e), fraud in the induce-
ment does not.8 1 Casdeglen's claim that Commonwealth's misrepresenta-
tion of the venture's profitability induced Castleglen to enter the
agreement sounded in fraud in the inducement, as the misrepresentation
did not prevent Castleglen from understanding the nature of the agree-
ment.8 2 The court concluded that in either a contract defense or an af-
firmative tort claim, D'Oench bars the obligator from asserting fraud in the
inducement.
8 3
Castleglen next argued that the district court drew improper infer-
ences against it in granting summary judgment.8 4 Castleglen pointed to
several documents in Commonwealth's official records which supported
an inference that a written agreement existed which guaranteed the ven-
ture's profitability.85 With such an agreement allegedly manifested in
Commonwealth's records, both parties' obligations would be apparent
and banking authorities would not be deceived.8 6 Absent deception,
Castleglen concluded that it should prevail irrespective of whether D'Oench
and § 1823(e) bar affirmative tort claims.
8 7
While acknowledging that the evidence could suggest that Common-
wealth expressed a certain belief regarding the venture's profitability, the
court concluded that such evidence did not amount to a valid written
agreement.8 8 Noting that § 1823(e) and D'Oench serve to promote cer-
tainty in bank records, the court found that "[s] cattered evidence in corpo-
rate records from which one could infer the existence of an agreement"
fails to promote certainty.8 9
4. Analysis
Unlike Oklahoma Radio Associates, which restrained D'Oench through a
strict construction of the doctrine, Castleglen reflects an expansion of both
D'Oench and § 1823(e). While Oklahoma Radio Associates indicates that
79. See id. at 1578.
80. Id. at 1577.
81. Id. at 1577-78.
[V]oid contracts are not "assets" at all and so do not fall under the scope of
§ 1823(e)'s prohibition against side agreements "which tend to diminish or defeat
the interest of the Corporation in any asset," while voidable contracts are true agree-
ments and as such invoke the full force of the statute.
Id. at 1577.
82. Id. at 1578.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 1578-79 & 1578 n.4.
86. See id. at 1578.
87. Id.




D'Oench requires some proof of culpability, Castleglen counters that the
level of culpability need rise no further than allowing oneself to be fraudu-
lently induced into an agreement. This result is consistent with the
Supreme Court's decisions in D'Oench and Langley. An obligor "can be
very ignorant and ill-informed of the character of the transaction" 90 and
yet be precluded from using that ignorance to defeat the FDIC's or RTC's
claim. Where an obligor fails to comprehend the terms of an agreement
through no negligence on his part, however, neither an agreement nor an
asset exists for D'Oench to shield.
Oklahoma Radio Associates also indicates that where a bilateral agree-
ment may be shown to exist in a bank's records, a court cannot grant
summary judgment to the FDIC based on D'Oench estoppel. Castleglen cau-
tions that the written documents in a bank's files must unambiguously
show the agreement rather than merely infer one. These holdings are
consistent with the Langley and D'Oench purposes of ipholding the reliabil-
ity and certainty of financial institution records.
5. Conclusion
The Tenth Circuit's decisions in Oklahoma Radio Associates and
Castleglen reflect the pro-regulatory bias inherent in both D'Oench and its
statutory counterpart. That bias appears most vividly when prohibiting af-
firmative tort claims under the legal fiction that they represent agreements
tending to deceive regulatory officials or to diminish assets in which either
the FDIC or RTC has an interest. Only that rare debtor who qualifies as
"wholly innocent" appears capable of eluding the D'Oench bar.
II. CORPORATE LAW
Despite the Supreme Court's broad proclamation in Erie Railroad v.
Tompkins9 t that "there is no federal general common law,"92 a growing
body of federal common law governs piercing the corporate veil ("PCV")
in areas of federal preeminence. 93 During the survey period, the Tenth
Circuit addressed piercing through the alter ego doctrine in a case involv-
ing federal labor law issues. NLRB v. Greater Kansas City Roofing 4 adds to
the quantity of federal PCV precedent in the circuit but does not apprecia-
bly alter the state of the law.
90. Oklahoma Radio Assocs. v. FDIC, 987 F.2d 685, 693 (quoting D'Oench, Duhme &
Co. v. FDIC, 315 U.S. 447, 458-59 (1942)).
91. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
92. Id. at 78.
93. E.g., United Elec., Radio & Mach. Workers v. 163 Pleasant Street Corp., 960 F.2d
1080 (1st Cir. 1992) (ERISA); NLRB. v. Fullerton Transfer & Storage Ltd., 910 F.2d 331 (6th
Cir. 1990) (federal labor dispute); Seymour v. Hull & Moreland Eng'g, 605 F.2d 1105 (9th
Cir. 1979) (suit to enforce labor contract under federal labor statute). See generally 1 WiLLIAM
M. FLETCHER, FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 41.90 (perm.
ed. rev. vol. 1990) (discussing federal common law).
94. 2 F.3d 1047 (10th Cir. 1993).
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A. Federal Common Law of Piercing the Corporate Veil and the Alter Ego
Doctrine: NLRB v. Greater Kansas City Roofing
9 5
A corporation is a legal entity, separate from its shareholders.
96
Among other things, this separateness-a fundamental principle of Amer-
ican corporate law-permits the limitation of shareholder liability to the
amount of their investment in the corporation and consequently encour-
ages individual investment in enterprise where it would otherwise fail for
risk.9 7 When use of this corporate form is sufficiently improper, however,
the court may pierce the corporate veil to hold individual shareholders
personally liable for the corporation's obligations. 98 Federal common law
governs when a PCV issue arises in association with an area of federal pre-
eminence. 99 State law may be used for guidance but does not control the
outcome.
100
The alter ego doctrine provides one formulation for piercing the cor-
porate veil.10 1 The term alter ego generally signifies that a corporation is
merely an indistinguishable conduit for the shareholder's affairs. 10 2 Most
federal courts agree that the alter ego doctrine permits piercing where:
(1) there is such unity of ownership and interest among the shareholder
and the corporation that the corporation no longer has a separate exist-
ence 10 3 and (2) recognition of the corporation's separate existence would
sanction fraud or otherwise promote injustice. 10 4 Some circuits divide this
last element into two parts, requiring proof of both fraud and injustice.
10 5
95. Id.
96. 18 C.J.S. Corporations § 8 (1990); 1 FLETCHER, supra note 91, § 41.
97. Cathy S. Krendl &James R. Krendl, Piercing the Corporate Veil: Focusing the Inquiy, 55
DENY. U. L. REv. 1, 1-2 (1978).
98. 1 FLETCHER, supra note 93, § 41.
99. See NLRB v. Fullerton Transfer & Storage Ltd., 910 F.2d 331, 335 (6th Cir. 1990).
100. Id.
101. While it is uncertain whether the alter ego doctrine forms part of PCV law or exists
as an independent ground for holding a shareholder personally liable, numerous commenta-
tors and courts have considered the doctrine in the context of PCV law and this survey shall
follow the same convention. See, e.g., Note, Piercing the Corporate Law Veil: The Alter Ego Doc-
trine Under Federal Common Law, 95 HARv. L. REv. 853 (1982).
102. Greater Kansas City, 2 F.3d 1047, 1052 (10th Cir. 1993); 18 C.J.S. Corporations § 12
(1990).
103. The rationale behind this element is that if the shareholder disregards the separate
identity of the corporation, the law likewise disregards the corporation's separateness to the
extent necessary to protect the corporation's creditors. Faithfulness to corporate formalities
"is the price paid for the corporate fiction, a relatively small price to pay for limited liability."
Labadie Coal Co. v. Black, 672 F.2d 92, 97 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
104. See, e.g., Greater Kansas City, 2 F.3d at 1052; Pepsi-Cola Metropolitan Bottling Co., 754
F.2d 10, 16 (1st Cir. 1985);John Mohr & Sons v. Apex Terminal Warehouses, Inc., 422 F.2d
638, 642 (7th Cir. 1970); see also I FLETCHER, supra note 91, § 41.10. One author attacks this
standard as a mere rehash of state law and suggests a particularized test for cases involving
federal law. Note, supra note 101, at 865-66.
105. United Elec., Radio and Mach. Workers v. 163 Pleasant Street, 960 F.2d 1080, 1093
(1st Cir. 1992); United Steel Workers v. Conners Steel Co., 855 F.2d 1499, 1507 (11th Cir.
1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1096 (1989).
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1. Tenth Circuit Decision: NLRB v. Greater Kansas City Roofing'0 6
The Greater Kansas City Roofing Company ("GKC") operated as a
sole proprietorship until November of 1985.107 Labor law violations and
financial difficulties contributed to the business' eventual demise. In
1983, the National Labor Relations Board ("NLRB") found GKC guilty of
unfair labor practices and entered a monetary judgement of $133,742.47
against GKC.10 8 Adding to its predicament, GKC had borrowed a signifi-
cant amount from the proprietor's sister in law, Tina Clarke, to cope with
its monetary troubles.' 09
Convinced that GKC would fail, Tina Clarke accepted business assets
in lieu of foreclosure.'1 0 In October of 1985, she incorporated The New
Greater Kansas City Roofing Company ("New GKC") in order to continue
the business operations of GKC.111 At the time she formed New GKC,
Tina Clark did not know that GKC had committed unfair labor prac-
tices, 112 nor did she know that the NLRB had an outstanding judgment
against GKC. 113 GKC's unfair labor practices came to haunt Tina Clark
when New GKC substantially continued GKC's business and when she
failed to adhere to corporate formalities in operating New GKC. 114
In 1988, the NLRB General Counsel attempted to collect on the judg-
ment from New GKC and its sole shareholder, Tina Clarke. An adminis-
trative law judge (ALJ) found that New GKC, as the alter ego of its
predecessor, should assume GKC's obligations but refused to pierce New
GKC's veil to hold Tina Clarke personally liable. 115 The NLRB General
Counsel filed exceptions, and a three-member NLRB panel overturned
the ALJ's refusal to pierce New GKC's veil. 16 Declaring itself not "limited
to piercing the corporate veil only in cases where the corporate status is
used to perpetrate fraud," 1 7 the NLRB based its decision to pierce on
Tina Clark's intermingling of her affairs with those of New GKC t1 8 and
her failure to follow corporate formalities. 19
106. 2 F.3d 1047 (10th Cir. 1993).
107. Id. at 1049.
108. Id. at 1049 & n.3.






115. Id. The ALJ saw no justification for piercing New GKC's veil as he concluded that
Tina Clarke did not sufficiently intermingle her affairs with those of New GKC and did not
use New GKC's corporate form " 'to perpetrate fraud, evade existing obligations, or circum-
vent a statute.' " Id. (quoting the ALJ without citation).
116. Id. at 1051.
117. Id. (citing Supplemental Decision & Order, at 3).
118. For example, Tina Clarke paid the corporate payroll using personal funds, without
making a formal loan agreement, and received corporate funds in repayment of that infor-
mal loan. Id. at 1050. Moreover, she intermingled the business affairs of New GKC with her
escort service, Affaire d'Amiour. Id.
119. New GKC apparently had no bylaws, accounts, stock, or corporate records and held
no meetings. Id. The NLRB based its decision on its precedent in NLRB v. Concrete Mfg.
Co., 262 N.L.R.B. 727, 729 (1982). While that case cited intermingling of affairs to the point
1994]
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The case came before the Tenth Circuit on application for enforce-
ment of the NLRB order. 120 After noting that federal law governed the
issue, 12 1 the court overruled the NLRB decision.'
22
Piercing the veil under the alter ego doctrine required proof of two
elements. The first element considered was whether there existed "such
unity of interest and lack of respect given to the separate identity of the
corporation that the personalities and assets of the corporation by its
shareholders and the individual are indistinct."123 The second element
inquires if "adherence to the corporate fiction [would] sanction a fraud,
promote injustice, or lead to an evasion of legal obligations."124
After announcing the appropriate test, the court provided instruc-
tions for its application. The court broke the first element down into two
further considerations: (1) the degree to which shareholders have ob-
served corporate formalities and (2) the degree to which shareholders
have commingled their assets and affairs with those of the corporation. 125
Regarding the second prong, the court explained that the requisite
showing of inequity must "flow from the misuse of the corporate form.' 26
Moreover, the individual sought to be held personally liable "must have
shared in the moral culpability or injustice that is found to satisfy the sec-
ond prong of the test."'
27
Applying the test to the facts of the case, the court found the evidence
insufficient to establish the second element and on that basis alone re-
fused to enforce the NLRB order. 128 While Tina Clarke may have failed to
observe corporate formalities, her failure neither constituted fraud nor
created injustice. Since she formed New GKC long after the unfair labor
practices had occurred, the court found "no link between Tina Clarke's
sloppy manner of conducting business under New GKC and any fraud,
injury or injustice to the former employees of GKC... with regard to the
unfair labor practices that gave rise to this back-pay order."1 29
2. Analysis
The Tenth Circuit's decision in Greater Kansas City does not depart
from precedent. As noted in the decision, prior Tenth Circuit decisions
of inseparableness as one instance in which the Board would disregard the corporate form, it
listed numerous other instances involving fraud or injustice as well. The case turned on the
defendants knowingly siphoning off corporate assets to avoid satisfying a back-pay judge-
ment. Id.
120. Greater Kansas City, 2 F.3d at 1049.
121. Id. at 1051 (citing NLRB v. Fullerton Transfer & Storage Ltd., 910 F.2d 331, 335 (6th
Cir. 1990)).
122. Id. at 1051.
123. Id. at 1052.
124. Id.
125. Id
126. Id. at 1053.
127. Id.
128. See i& at 1055 & n.4.
129. Id. at 1055.
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have utilized the two-part test for piercing the corporate veil under the
federal common law alter ego doctrine.
130
Greater Kansas City is notable for its emphasis of the test's second ele-
ment. In support of its two prong test, Greater Kansas City cites United States
v. VanDiviner13 1 and Milgro Electronics v. United Business Communications.
13 2
These decisions provide detailed tests for determining "separateness" and
make specific findings under those tests. 133 Neither decision, however,
provides a similar test for evaluating fraud, unfairness, or evasion of a legal
obligation.1 3 4 Moreover, while VanDiviner makes specific findings regard-
ing injustice,1 3 5 Milgro Electronics holds that proof of fraud is unnecessary
to establish injustice.
136
Thus, Greater Kansas City's reliance on the absence of fraud, injustice,
or evasion of a legal obligation in refusing to pierce1 3 7 emphasizes that
these elements must be present in a successful cause of action under the
federal common law alter ego doctrine. It also specifies the that the requi-
site showing under the second prong must prove a nexus between the
improper use of the corporate form, the resultant injustice, the party
sought to be charged, and the injured party.
CONCLUSION
Past commercial law Surveys have noted the Tenth Circuit's tendency
to broadly construe federal banking regulators' authority in order to en-
hance their ability to remedy the savings and loan debacle.13 8 While
Castleglen continues this tradition, Oklahoma Radio Associates may signal a
130. See, e.g., Anderson v. Deere & Co., 852 F.2d 1244, 1247 (10th Cir. 1988); United
States v. VanDiviner, 822 F.2d 960, 964 (10th Cir. 1987); Milgro Elec. Corp. v. United Busi-
ness Communications, Inc., 623 F.2d 645, 659 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1066
(1980).
131. 822 F.2d 960 (10th Cir. 1987).
132. 623 F.2d 645 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1066 (1980).
133. VanDiviner, which addresses the application of the alter ego doctrine to a closely
held corporation, provides an eight factor test for analyzing "separateness." VanDiviner, 822
F.2d at 965. These factors include:
(1) whether the corporation is operated as a separate entity; (2) commingling of
funds and other assets; (3)failure to maintain adequate corporate records or min-
utes; (4) the nature of the corporation's ownership and control; (5) absence of
corporate assets and undercapitalization; (6) use of a corporation as a mere shell,
instrumentality or conduit of an individual or another corporation; (7) disregard of
legal formalities and the failure to maintain an arms-length relationship among re-
lated entities; and (8) diversion of the corporation's funds or assets to non-corpo-
rate uses.
Id
Milgro Electronics provides a similar test for application to parent-subsidiary relationships.
Milgro, 623 F.2d at 660 (citing Fish v. East, 114 F.2d 177, 191 (10th Cir. 1940)).
134. VanDiviner, 822 F.2d at 964-65; Milgro Electronics, 623 F.2d at 658-62.
135. VanDiviner, 822 F.2d at 965. No evidence supported finding that the defendant "mis-
used or abused the corporate form in a way that would threaten injustice to the government."
Id.
136. See Milgro Electronics, 623 F.2d at 662.
137. See supra notes 128-30 and accompanying text.
138. Timothy K. Jordan, Survey, Commercial Law, 70 DENY. U. L. Rev. 685 (1993);
Michelle Rabouin & Anthony M. Leo, Survey, Corporate and Commercial Law, 69 DENy. U.
L. REv. 907 (1992).
1994]
886 DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 71:4
restrictive trend. The Tenth Circuit's willingness to limit the FDIC's and
RTC's enforcement powers, however, should not be overstated. Although
Oklahoma Radio Associates endorsed the complete innocence exception to
D'Oench estoppel, this exception applies to an extremely narrow category
of debtors.
In the area of corporate law, the Tenth Circuit examined piercing the
corporate veil under the alter ego doctrine. Greater Kansas City faithfully
adhered to established precedent. The decision's primary contribution





During the survey period, the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
handed down three important constitutional decisions. Adolph Coors Co. v.
Bentsen' and Cannon v. City and County of Denver2 gave the Tenth Circuit an
opportunity to better define its approach to freedom of speech under the
First Amendment. The Coors case addressed whether a federal ban on
beer labels that announced alcohol content violated commercial speech
rights. 3 In Cannon, abortion protestors arrested for carrying signs that
read "The Killing Place" claimed the arrests violated their speech rights.
4
The case presented the Tenth Circuit with its first opportunity to apply
and define the 'fighting words' doctrine. The third case involved the nas-
cent constitutional right of familial association. In Griffin v. Strong,5 the
Tenth Circuit grounded the right in the Fourteenth Amendment and con-
sequently altered the analytical approach on which it had relied in earlier
cases.
6
I. COMMERCIAL SPEECH: ADOLPh Coows Co. v. BEA'TsEA,
A. Background
In 1942, the Supreme Court in Valentine v. Chrestensen8 refused to rec-
ognize constitutional limitations on government's ability to prohibit
speech of a "purely commercial" nature.9 In spite of its categorical dispo-
sal of the issue, the Court spent the next thirty-five years retreating from
this holding. During this period, the Court published a series of decisions
suggesting that speech made for commercial purposes should receive
some protection. 10
1. 2 F.3d 355 (10th Cir. 1993). This case reached the Tenth Circuit first as Adolph
Coors Co. v. Brady, 944 F.2d 1543 (10th Cir. 1991), in which the court remanded for further
factual findings. References to this earlier case are Coors . References to Adolph Coors v.
Bentsen, 2 F.3d 355 (10th Cir. 1993) are Coors II.
2. 998 F.2d 867 (10th Cir. 1993).
3. Coors II, 2 F.3d at 356.
4. Cannon, 998 F.2d at 869.
5. 983 F.2d 1544 (10th Cir. 1993).
6. Id. at 1547.
7. 2 F.3d 355 (10th Cir. 1993).
8. 316 U.S. 52 (1942). In Valentine, an entrepreneur brought suit to enjoin the New
York City Police from enforcing a law which prohibited distribution of "commercial... ad-
vertising matter" in public places. Id. at 53 n.1.
9. Id. at 54. Oddly, the brief opinion (less than three pages) offered no supporting
precedential authority. For further discussion of the Court's cursory handling of Valentine,
see Alex Kozinski & Stuart Banner, The Anti-History and Pre-History of Commercial Speech, 71
TEx. L. Rv. 747, 754-58 (1993). Among other peculiarities, Kozinski and Banner note that
Valentine ranks among the most quickly decided cases in the Court's history. Id. at 757 (opin-
ion released 13 days after oral arguments and only 9 days after conference).
10. See, e.g., Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 822 (1975) (giving newspaper right to
publish advertisement for abortion referral service); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S.
254, 266 (1964) (upholding right of newspaper to publish paid political advertisement);
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The Court's retreat from Valentine culminated in the 1976 decision,
Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,"1 in
which the Court found unconstitutional a state law that prohibited phar-
macists from advertising the prices of their drugs.1 2 The Court balanced
the governmental and private interests but stopped short of articulating an
actual test for determining when government action violated commercial
speech rights.' 3 In Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Com-
mission,14 the Court resumed where it had left off in Virginia Citizens by
articulating a four-part test for determining when a challenged commer-
cial speech regulation is constitutional. First, the speech must "concern
lawful activity and not be misleading."15 Second, the government must be
asserting a "substantial" interest.16 If these two threshold tests are met,
then the court must, third, "determine whether the regulation directly ad-
vances the governmental interest asserted," and fourth, "whether it is not
more extensive than is necessary to serve that interest.'
7
In a 1986 decision, the Court created some confusion with its treat-
ment of Central Hudson's third prong. In Posadas de Puerto Rico Associates. v.
Tourism Co.,' 8 the Court found that a ban on casino gambling advertise-
ments satisfied Central Hudson's third prong because the Puerto Rico Leg-
islature reasonably believed that the ban would directly advance its asserted
interest. 19 To some commentators, the Court's reliance on the reasonable
Commarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498, 513-14 (1959) (Douglas, J., concurring) (assert-
ing the holding in Valentine had not "survived reflection");Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343
U.S. 495, 501 (1952) (recognizing that motion pictures are protected by the First Amend-
ment); Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 148-49 (1943) (invalidating city ordinance
that prohibited door-to-door solicitation for the purpose of distributing handbills as applied
to advertisements for a religious meeting). The Court distinguished most of these types of
cases from Valentine based on the additional presence of other clearly protectable interests.
See, e.g.,Jamison v. State, 318 U.S. 413, 417 (1943) (distinguishing distribution of commercial
handbills from Valentine because challenged handbills invited the purchase of religious
literature).
11. 425 U.S. 748 (1976). Virginia Citizens put squarely before the Court the issue of
"whether speech which does no more than propose a commercial transaction .. .lacks all
[constitutional] protection." Id. at 762 (quotation marks and citations omitted).
12. Id. at 770. For a discussion of the Court's retreat from Valentine leading up to its
decision in Virginia Citizens, see LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTTrUrIONAL LAW § 12-15,
at 890-92 (2d ed. 1988). See also EDWIN P. ROME & WILLIAM H. ROBERTS, CORPORATE AND
COMMERCIAL FREE SPEECH 41-49 (1985).
13. Virginia Citizens, 425 U.S. at 762-70 (1976). The Court strongly suggested, however,
that commercial speech deserved less constitutional protections than other varieties. Id. at
770-73. For example, the Court said that false or misleading commercial speech would not
be protected. Id. at 771. For some of the policy concerns underlying the Court's insistence
on treating commercial speech differently than other types, see Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar
Ass'n, 436 U.S 447, 456 (1978) (fear that giving equal protection to commercial speech
would ultimately dilute the traditional protections afforded non-commercial speech).
14. 447 U.S. 557 (1980). In Central Hudson, a public utility company challenged a regu-
lation that prohibited it from advertising to promote the use of electricity. Id. at 558-61.
15. Id. at 566.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. 478 U.S. 328 (1986).
19. Id. at 341-42. The ban in question only affected advertising aimed at residents of
Puerto Rico, not tourists. Id. at 330. The Court found that the Puerto Rico Legislature's
asserted interest of protecting its citizens from the harmful effects of gambling was substan-
tial, thus satisfying the second prong of the Central Hudson test. Id. at 341.
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belief standard signalled the beginning of a more deferential approach
toward government limitations on commercial speech.
2 0
Recently, the Court indicated that Central Hudson's third prong still
provided significant constitutional protection to commercial speech. In
Edenfleld v. Fane,2 1 the Court held that to satisfy the third prong of Central
Hudson the government must show that a challenged restriction "will in
fact alleviate [the recited harms] to a material degree."2 2 The Court em-
phasized that challenged legislation could not be based on mere legislative
"speculation."2 3 The Edenfield decision directly contradicted Posadas with
respect to Central Hudson's third prong, but the Court made no effort to
reconcile the two decisions.
B. Adolph Coors Co. v. Bentsen: 24 The Tenth Circuit Gives Strong
Protection to Commercial Speech
In 1987, Adolph Coors Company ("Coors") made a request to the
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms ("BATF") seeking approval to
incorporate the alcohol content of its beer into advertisements and label-
ing.25 Pursuant to 27 U.S.C. § 205(e) (2) and (f) (2) (1988), the BATF re-
fused to grant the approval. 26 Congress enacted the challenged bans to
prevent malt beverage brewers from engaging in "strength wars" over the
alcohol content of their beers.2 7 Coors sued, claiming unconstitutional
infringement of its speech in violation of the First Amendment.
28
Coors's case against the BATF came before the Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals for the first time as Adolph Coors Co. v. Brady.29 The court of ap-
peals remanded the case to the district court because genuine issues of
material fact existed as to whether the challenged regulation "directly ad-
20. See Terrence Leahy, A Game of Chance: Commercial Speech After Posadas, A.B.A J., Sept.
1, 1988, at 58, 60. More recently, the fourth prong of the Central Hudson test has come under
undoubted revisionary weakening. In the 1989 case, Board of Trustees v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469
(1989), the Supreme Court held that the fourth prong of the test only requires that there be
a reasonable "fit" between the legislative means and its asserted goal. Id. at 480. The Court
rejected the idea that Central Hudson requires that the challenged regulation be "the least
restrictive means" available. Id.; see Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 564 ("[i]f the governmental
interest could be served as well by a more limited restriction ..., the excessive restrictions
cannot survive"). One critic has argued that, taken together, the decisions in Posadas and Fox
effectively lower the standard of review in commercial speech cases from intermediate scru-
tiny to a rational basis review. See Albert P. MauroJr., Commercial Speech After Posadas and Fox:
A Rational Basis Wolf in Intermediate Sheep's Clothing, 66 TUL. L. REv. 1931, 1951-54 (1992).
21. 113 S. Ct. 1792 (1993).
22. Id. at 1800.
23. Id.
24. 2 F.3d 355 (loth Cir. 1993) (Coors I).
25. Id. at 356. Coors's request to make public the alcohol content of its beer stemmed
from its desire to end its reputation as a brewer of weak beer. Adolph Coors Co. v. Brady,
944 F.2d 1543, 1549 (10th Cir. 1991) (Coors 1), appeal after remand, 2 F.3d 355 (1993).
26. Coors II, 2 F.3d at 356. Section 205(e) (2) prohibits malt beverage brewers from in-
cluding in their labeling "statements of, or statements likely to be considered statements of,
alcohol content of malt beverages." 27 U.S.C. § 205(e)(2) (1988). Section 205(f)(2) pros-
cribes the same statements from inclusion in advertising. 27 U.S.C. § 205(f)(2) (1988).
27. Coors II, 2 F.3d at 356.
28. Id.
29. 944 F.2d 1543 (10th Cir. 1991) (Coors 1), appeal after remand, 2 F.3d 355 (1993).
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vance[d] the government's asserted interest.., and whether the complete
prohibition of such advertising result[ed] in a 'reasonable fit' between the
legislature's goal and the means chosen to reach it."30 On remand, the
district court found the ban constitutional with respect to advertising but
unconstitutional in its prohibition against' including statements of alcohol
content in labeling.3 1 The trial court concluded that the labeling ban
failed the third and fourth prongs of Central Hudson in that it neither di-
rectly advanced nor reasonably fit the legitimate government goal of
preventing strength wars.3 2 The Government appealed.
The Government placed the Supreme Court's holding in PosadaS3 at
the heart of its appeal. The Government argued that as long as Congress
reasonably believed the labeling ban would help prevent strength wars, the
ban satisfied Central Hudson's third prong.3 4 After the Government filed
its appellate brief, the Supreme Court handed down its decision in Eden-
field v. Fane.3 5 This development gave the Tenth Circuit the opportunity
to determine unequivocally the degree to which it would protect commer-
cial speech.
36
The court of appeals did not hesitate in asserting its preference for
the decision in Edenfield over the one in Posadas. After noting with ap-
proval the Supreme Court's decision in Edenfield, the court said that the
Government had the burden of showing that the labeling ban "in fact alle-
viate[s]" the harm of strength wars "to a material degree."
3 7
The court of appeals went on to discuss why the labeling ban did not
directly advance the legitimate government goal of preventing strength
wars. The court noted that Coors only requested permission to publish
purely factual information, as opposed to the kinds of descriptive labeling
devices that would arguably lead to strength wars.
3 8
30. Id. at 1554. In other words, the court of appeals found that issues of fact remained
with respect to the third and fourth prongs of the Central Hudson test.
31. Coors II, 2 F.3d at 357.
32. Id. The district court held that the ban failed to satisfy the first and second prongs
of the Central Hudson test.
33. 478 U.S. 328 (1986).
34. Coors 11, 2 F.3d at 358.
35. 113 S. Ct. 1792 (1993).
36. In Coors I, the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit's language strongly suggested
that it favored a more stringent reading of Central Hudson's third prong than the Supreme
Court had adopted in Posadas. Focusing on the Supreme Court's original articulation in
Central Hudson, the court asserted that "[t]here must be an 'immediate connection' between
the prohibition and the government's asserted end." Coors , 944 F.2d at 1549 (quoting Cen-
tral Hudson, 447 U.S. at 569). However, until Edenfiedd Posadas was the Supreme Court's most
recent interpretation of Central Hudson's third prong. Under Posadas, the government's argu-
ment appeared sound.
37. Coors 11, 2 F.3d at 357 (quoting Edenfie/d, 113 S. Ct. at 1800).
38. Id. at 358-59. Part of the Government's argument relied on its experiences in the
relatively small malt liquor industry. See id. at 358 n.4 (malt liquors represent three percent
of total market). Malt liquor is a generic description used to designate those malt beverages
with the highest alcohol content. Id. It has been the BATF's experience that consumers of
malt liquor favor it precisely because of this attribute. Accordingly, brewers have often tried
illegally to advertise and label their malt liquors in a manner that is strongly suggestive of




The court then pointed to three reasons why the Government's ban
on purely factual labeling would not achieve its asserted goal. First, evi-
dence elicited at trial suggested that strength wars did not pose a problem
in states or other countries that required alcohol content labeling.
39 Sec-
ond, according to undisputed evidence, American brewers had no inten-
tion of increasing the alcohol content of their beers, because increased
alcohol detracts from taste and increases calories, both of which concern
American consumers.40 The court based its third reason on the fact
Coors' request to publish the alcohol content of its beers was motivated by
its reputation as a brewer of weak beers. 4 1 The court of appeals reasoned
that if the BATF permitted Coors to publish this information on its labels,
any incentive Coors might have to strengthen its beers would disappear.
4 2
In light of these weaknesses, the court of appeals found the Govern-
ment's assertion that the labeling was necessary to prevent strength wars
"based on mere speculation and conjecture." 43 Continuing in the lan-
guage of Edenfield, the court said the Government had failed "to show that
the prohibition advances the Government's interest in a direct and mate-
rial way." 44 The court of appeals concluded that the challenged ban did
not satisfy the third prong of Central Hudson and therefore unconstitution-
ally infringed on Coors' First Amendment rights.
45
C. Analysis
One of the most pervasive themes in the debate over how much pro-
tection commercial speech should receive has been the tension between
government's role as a protector of its citizens and the opposing notion
that consumers in a free market economy should be able to make their
own decisions as to what is in their best interest. 46 The test devised by the
39. Id. at 358. Section 205(e) (2) makes an exception for when alcohol content labeling
is required by state law. See 27 U.S.C. § 205(e)(2) (1988).
40. Coors I 2 F.3d at 359.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.; see supra note 27 and accompanying text.
44. Coors II, 2 F.3d at 359 (footnote omitted).
45. Id. at 359 n.6.
46. Nowhere in commercial speech commentary is this theme more evident than in the
debate over restrictions on cigarette advertising. See, e.g., Daniel Hays Lowenstein, "Too Much
Puff': Persuasion, Paternalism, and Commercial Speech, 56 U. CIN. L. REV. 1205 (1988) (arguing
that cigarette advertising can and should be constitutionally banned); Remarks by Michael Gart-
ner; 56 U. CIN. L. REv. 1173, 1178-79 (1988) (arguing that there should be no limitations on
commercial speech, including cigarette advertising). Collateral to the paternalism/con-
sumer choice theme is the issue of whether commercial speech is the type of speech the
authors of the First Amendment intended to protect. The Supreme Court tackled this issue
in Virginia Citizens with the following reasoning:
So long as we preserve a predominantly free enterprise economy, the allocation of
our resources in large measure will be made through numerous private economic
decisions. It is a matter of public interest that those decisions, in the aggregate, be
intelligent and well informed. To this end, the free flow of commercial information
is indispensable .... And if it is indispensable to the proper allocation resources in
a free enterprise system, it is also indispensable to the formation of intelligent opin-
ions as to how that system ought to be regulated or altered. Therefore, even if the
First Amendment were thought to be primarily an instrument to enlighten public
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Supreme Court in Central Hudson provided a balanced approach to this
tension. Since Central Hudson, the Supreme Court has allowed this bal-
ance to slip in favor of government regulation.
4 7
In recognizing that commercial speech is entitled to First Amend-
ment protection, the Supreme Court did not hold that commercial speech
"is wholly undifferentiable from other forms."48 Despite its emphasis on
the public's interest in being well informed, the Court asserted that com-
mercial speech should not be entitled to the same protections as non-com-
mercial varieties.49 The justifications for this distinction were well-
founded. Even though consumers may be seen as the end beneficiaries of
commercial speech protection, 50 the demand for this protection is primar-
ily driven by corporate profit motives. This characteristic, combined with
consumer reliance on offered information, creates a serious threat of
harm if the government is not able to regulate commercial speech. Part of
the government's role in this respect is to keep the commercial informa-
tion given to consumers from becoming disinformation. As the Supreme
Court asserted in Central Hudson,5 1
[t] he First Amendment's concern for commercial speech is based
on the informational function of advertising. Consequently,
there can be no constitutional objection to the suppression of
commercial messages that do not accurately inform the public
about lawful activity. The government may ban forms of commu-
nication more likely to deceive the public than to inform it.5
2
The paternalistic role of government, however, is tempered by the
libertarian notion that citizens of a democratic society should be free to
make enlightened decisions as "to their own best interests."53 A founda-
tional principle captured by the Court's rationale in Virginia Citizens is that
consumers are the ultimate profiteers from commercial speech protec-
tion. It should be noted that the plaintiffs in Virginia Citizens were consum-
decisionmaking in a democracy, we could not say that the free flow of information
does not serve that goal.
Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens, 425 U.S. 748, 765 (1976)(citations
omitted).
47. See Bd. of Trustees v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469 (1989); Posadas de Puerto Rico Assocs. v.
Tourism Co., 478 U.S. 328 (1986); see also Mauro, supra note 20.
48. Virginia Citizens, 425 U.S. at 771 n.24.
49. Id. Distinguishing between speech that is commercial and other varieties is a com-
plete issue in itself. The Court in Virginia Citizens said that the difference is a matter of
.commonsense," id., a means of distinction on which the Court continued to rely. See
Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 455-56 (1978). For a brief discussion of this
issue, see TRiBE, supra note 12, at 894.
50. See infra notes 54-56 and accompanying text.
51. 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
52. Id. at 563 (citations omitted). The Supreme Court has also shown a concern for the
diluent effect that might occur from treating commercial and non-commercial speech
equally.
To require a parity of constitutional protection for commercial and noncommercial
speech alike could invite dilution, simply by a leveling process, of the force of the
Amendment's guarantee with respect to the latter kind of speech. Rather than sub-
ject the First Amendment to such a devitalization, we instead have afforded com-
mercial speech a limited measure of protection. ...
Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978).
53. Virginia Citizens, 425 U.S. at 770.
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ers of prescription drugs, not sellers.54 These consumers claimed "they
would greatly benefit if the prohibition were lifted and advertising freely
allowed."55 The Court emphasized that a "particular consumer's interest
in the free flow of commercial information" is often greater "than his in-
terest in the day's most urgent political debate."56 When the Supreme
Court articulated the test in Central Hudson, it recognized that govern-
ment's ability to regulate commercial speech should be carefully restricted
to insure that consumers' interest in self-determination is protected.
57
The third prong of the Central Hudson test now acts as the primary reposi-
tory of this protection. 58 According to the Court's decision in Central Hud-
son, this third prong requires direct advancement of the substantial
government interest.59
When the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit decided Adolph
Coors Co. v. Bentsen,6 0 the opposing parties presented conflicting Supreme
Court precedent in support of their arguments. The government argued
Posadas de Puerto Rico Associates v. Tourism Co.,6 1 a decision that offered a
weakened version of Central Hudson's third prong. Coors countered by
arguing that the more recent Edenfield v. Fane6 2 decision reinvigorated the
Central Hudson test. Unfortunately, the Supreme Court made no efforts to
distinguish its decision in Edenfield from the irreconcilable position in
Posadas. The Tenth Circuit had a choice between two interpretations of
the law. It rightfully chose to follow the Supreme Court's lead in Edenfield,
and consequently gave commercial speech the protection that consumers
deserve.
54. Id. at 753. The consumers challenged the validity of a state law forbidding licensed
pharmacists from advertising the prices of prescription drugs. Id. at 749-50.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 763.
57. See Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 561-66.
58. Since the Court's decision in Board of Trustees v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469 (1989), which
held that Central Hudson's fourth prong requires only a reasonable "fit" between the legisla-
tive means and the asserted goal, the third prong of the test is arguably left as the only
significant check on government regulation of commercial speech. Most commentators
agree that Fox severely weakened the fourth prong. See Mauro, supra note 20, at 1951-54;
Todd J. Locher, Comment, Board of Trustees of the State University of New York v. Fox:
Cutting Back on Commercial Speech Standards, 75 IowA L. REv. 1335 (1990); David F. McGowan,
Comment, A Critical Analysis of Commercial Speech, 78 CAL. L. REV. 359, 378-80 (1990); David
Rownd, Comment, Muting the Commercial Speech Doctrine: Board of Trustees of the State Uni-
versity of New York v. Fox, 38 WAsH. U. J. U". & CoNTEMP. L. 275 (1990).
59. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566.
60. 2 F.3d 355 (10th Cir. 1993).
61. 478 U.S. 328 (1986).
62. 113 S. Ct. 1729 (1993).
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II. THE FIGHTING WoRDs DOCTRINE: CANNON V. C7YANlD COUN-Y OF
A. Background
A fundamental and settled principle of constitutional law declares
that government cannot limit speech because of its content.64 This princi-
ple, however, is not absolute. There are circumstances in which the
Supreme Court has given its approval to content-based limitations on
speech.65 In its 1940 decision Cantwell v. Connecticut,66 the Supreme Court
set the foundation for such an exception when it said that "[r]esort to epi-
thets or personal abuse is not in any proper sense communication of infor-
mation or opinion safeguarded by the Constitution, and its punishment as
a criminal act would raise no question under [the Constitution]."67
In Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,6 8 the Supreme Court borrowed this
language from Cantwell to support its decision denying Constitutional pro-
tection to words "which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to
incite an immediate breach of the peace." 69 The Court termed such utter-
ances "fighting words."70 The Court reasoned, " [i] t has been well observed
that such utterances are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and
are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be
63. 998 F.2d 867 (10th Cir. 1993).
64. Police Dept. of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972) ("above all else, the First
Amendment means that government has no power to restrict expression because of its
message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content").
65. See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S.
748, 771 (1976) (untruthful or misleading commercial speech not protected); Roth v.
United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957) (obscenity not constitutionally protected); Beauhar-
nais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 263 (1952) (upholding state stature that prohibited libel);
Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315, 321 (1951) (speech that is an "incitement to riot" not
constitutionally protected).
66. 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
67. Id. at 309-10. In Cantwel a man was convicted for a breach of the peace for his
solicitation of people on a public street to listen to a phonograph that contained strong
verbal attacks on Catholicism, the religion of the listeners. Id. at 308-09. The phonograph
provoked the listeners to near-violent reactions. Id. In reversing the defendant's conviction,
the Court found that the defendant's conduct involved:
no assault or threatening of bodily harm, no truculent bearing, no intentional dis-
courtesy, no personal abuse. On the contrary, we find only an effort to persuade a
willing listener to buy a book or to contribute money in the interest of what
Cantwell, however misguided others may think him, conceived to be true religion.
Id. at 310.
68. 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
69. Id. at 572 (footnote omitted). In Chaplinsky, the Court upheld the conviction of a
man who called a police officer "a God damned racketeer" and a "damned Fascist." Id. at
569.
The quoted statement of the law has been interpreted as articulating a two-part disjunc-
tive test. See TRIBE, supra note 12, § 12-8, at 837-39. The Court based its decision in Chaplinsky
on the tendency of the arrested speaker's words to "cause a breach of the peace." Chaplinsky,
315 U.S. at 574. The part of the test that denies protection to those words "which by their
very utterance inflict injury" has never been the basis of a Supreme Court decision to validate
speech suppression. Note, The Demise of the Chaplinsky Fighting Words Doctrine: An Argument for
its Interment, 106 HARv. L. REV. 1129, 1137 (1993).
70. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572.
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derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and
morality."
7 1
The Court's decision in Chaplinsky established what is known as the
"fighting words doctrine."72 Prior to this survey period, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit had not taken an opportunity to
apply this exception to content-based limitations on speech.
73
B. Cannon v. City and County of Denver:7 4 The Tenth Circuit Definitively
Applies the Fighting Words Doctrine
The issues in Cannon arose when police arrested two abortion protes-
tors for carrying signs that read "The Killing Place" on the sidewalk in
front of an abortion clinic.75 The man and woman arrested sued the two
arresting officers under § 1983 claiming that the arrests violated their First
Amendment right to free speech. 76 The officers based their defense on
qualified immunity, claiming that the plaintiffs' First Amendment rights
were not clearly established at the time of the arrests. 7 7 They argued that
signs reading "The Killing Place" constituted fighting words and were,
therefore, not entitled to First Amendment protection.
78
71. Id. (citing ZECHARIA CHAFEE., FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 150 (5th prtg.
1941)).
72. See Beth C. Boswell-Odum, Note, The Fighting Words Doctrine and Racial Speech on Cam-
pus, 33 S. TEX. L. REv. 261 (1992).
73. The Tenth Circuit has mentioned fighting words in three cases prior to the survey
period, but in all three the court discussed the doctrine briefly and only in passing. See
United States v. Rising, 867 F.2d 1255, 1258 (1989);Jones v. Wilkinson, 800 F.2d 989, 994
(1986), aft'd, 480 U.S. 926 (1987); Fisher v. Walker, 464 F.2d 1147, 1160 (1972).
74. 998 F.2d 867 (10th Cir. 1993).
75. Id. at 869. The officers charged the plaintiffs with disturbing the peace, and the city
later dismissed the charges. Id. The day of the arrests was only one of many in an ongoing
protest against the abortion services of the Rocky Mountain Planned Parenthood clinic at the
corner of East 20th Avenue and Vine Street in Denver. Id.; Ann Carnahan, Protestors, Denver
Settle, RocKv MTN. NEWS, Sept. 29, 1993, at 4A. Police had arrested one of the plaintiffs
several months before for assaulting a patient. Cannon, 998 F.2d at 869. Officer Ryan-
Fairchild, one of the defendants, was an off-duty police officer whom the clinic had hired as a
private security guard. Id. On the day of the arrests, Officer Ryan-Fairchild had to restrain a
man who became incensed by the plaintiffs' signs. Id. The other officer, Officer Baca, was
on duty and became involved in the arrest when he stopped to monitor the situation. Id. It
is not clear from the court's presentation of the facts if the signs in question had always been
part of the protests, but their content clearly provoked the arrests. Id. at 871 ("the activity
which the police found objectionable was not the picketing itself but the specific content of
the protestors' signs").
76. Cannon, 998 F.2d at 869. Section 1983 provides a federal tort remedy when persons
acting under color of state law deprive a plaintiff of a federally protected right. 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 (1988); Parrat v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535 (1981).
77. Cannon, 998 F.2d at 871. A government official who is performing a discretionary
duty is exempt from liability for civil damages under § 1983 so long as her conduct "does not
violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would
have known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982) (emphasis added).
78. Cannon, 998 F.2d at 872. The police officers arrested the plaintiffs with the under-
standing that Denver CountyJudge Soja had ruled that words such as "killer" would be con-
sidered "fighting words." Id. at 869. Officer Ryan-Fairchild heard of this supposed ruling
from another officer, Officer Yates, who had spoken with Judge Soja about abortion protes-
tors and their legal rights. Id. at 869, 875 n.8. In fact, Judge Soja made no such ruling. Id. at
875 n.8. In the conversation on which Officer Ryan-Fairchild relied, Judge Soja was not
speaking in his official judicial capacity but merely giving some informal advice to Officer
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The federal district court granted the defendants qualified immu-
nity.79 The plaintiffs' appealed the issue of whether they had a clearly
established constitutional right to carry signs reading "The Killing Place"
at the time of their arrests. 80 A finding that the plaintiffs did have a clearly
established right would remove the defendants' qualified immunity.8 1
Resolving this issue required the court of appeals to determine whether
the plaintiffs' signs fell within the definition of fighting words. If the de-
fendant officers could make "a showing sufficient to establish the fighting
words defense,"8 2 then the plaintiffs' rights would be judged as not clearly
established and the grant of qualified immunity would be upheld.
The court of appeals first turned its attention to the Supreme Court
cases in an effort to synthesize the prior holdings into its own cogent state-
ment of the law. The court looked for guidance from its Chaplinsky v. New
HampshireM3 decision and three subsequent Supreme Court decisions.
84
From Chaplinsky the court of appeals found the idea that fighting words
"are no essential part of any exposition of ideas."8 5 Looking at Cohen, the
court emphasized that the alleged fighting words must be "directed to the
person of the hearer."8 6 From Terminiello and Feiner the court of appeals
borrowed the notion that it is not enough for the suspect speech to arouse
"some people to anger."87 The speaker must exceed the "bounds of argu-
ment or persuasion" and undertake an "incitement."88 The Tenth Circuit
concluded that "[f] ighting words are thus epithets (1) directed at the per-
son of the hearer, (2) inherently likely to cause a violent reaction, and (3)
playing no role in the expression of ideas."
89
Yates, who then relayed the conversation to Officer Ryan-Fairchild. Id. at 869, 875 n.8. Judge
Soja told Officer Yates that there may be times when protestors' expressions could rise to the
level of 'fighting words,' but his informal comments fell short of a ruling. See id. at 875 n.8.
Officers Ryan-Fairchild and Baca raised a second defense based on their good faith reli-
ance on "a legal ruling or advice." Id. at 871; see V-1 Oil Co. v. Wyoming Dept. of Envt'l
Quality, 902 F.2d 1482, 1488 (10th Cir. 1990) (good faith reliance on legal advice can create
an "extraordinary circumstance" under which a defendant "should not be imputed with
knowledge of an admittedly clearly established right") (quotation marks and citations omit-
ted), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 920 (1990). This aspect of Cannon did not involve a constitutional
issue and is not addressed by this survey.
79. Cannon, 998 F.2d at 870. The district court granted summary judgment on the fed-
eral claims. It then used its discretionary power to dismiss without prejudice the plaintiffs's
collateral state tort claims. Id.
80. See id. at 870.
81. See id. at 870-71; see also supra note 77 (statement of law on qualified immunity).
82. Cannon, 998 F.2d at 872.
83. 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
84. See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971) (reversing the conviction of a man ar-
rested for wearing ajacket that read "Fuck the Draft" in a county courthouse); Feiner v. New
York, 340 U.S. 315 (1951) (upholding conviction of man who encouraged violent uprising in
support of civil rights); Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 5 (1949) (reversing conviction of
man under city ordinance which allowed conviction for speech which "stirred people to an-
ger, invited public dispute, or brought about a condition of unrest").
85. Cannon, 998 F.2d at 873 (quoting Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572).
86. Id. (quoting Cohen, 403 U.S. at 20).
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. (footnote omitted)
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The court of appeals applied each leg of this tri-partite test to the facts
in Cannon and accordingly found that the plaintiffs' signs did not rise to
the level of fighting words. First, the court found that the plaintiffs did
not focus their signs on a particular person, but instead aimed their pro-
tests at the activities of everyone involved in the abortion process. 90 Sec-
ond, the court declared that although the signs tended to be offensive to
people entering the clinic, they were not "inherently likely to cause an
immediate breach of the peace."9 1 Finally, the court found the signs
served a role in the dialogue of ideas, because they asserted one of the
anti-abortion movement's fundamental principles-that abortion is
murder.
9 2
Based on this analysis, the court of appeals found the plaintiffs had a
clearly established constitutional right to employ signs that read "The Kill-
ing Place" in their lawful picketing of the abortion clinic.93 The court
reversed summary judgment in favor of the defendants and remanded the
case back to the district court.
94
C. Analysis
Cannon v. City and County of Denver95 presented the Tenth Circuit
Court of Appeals with its first attempt to apply the fighting words doc-
trine. 96 Alleged fighting words most often arise in extremely controversial
situations, and the facts in Cannon held true to this stereotype. The abor-
tion debate has become one of the most divisive issues in American soci-
ety.97 Clinic protests serve as the front lines of this debate, and these
protests often become the sources of the most acrimonious exchanges be-
tween abortion rights opponents and advocates. 98
In Cannon, one of the court's unarticulated tasks required it to take a
disinterested approach to the political controversy underlying the issues9 9
before it. The court rose to this task100 and articulated a narrowly tailored
test in order to avoid placing unnecessary restrictions on the important
role of controversial speech in American society.
According to the Tenth Circuit, fighting words are "epithets (1) di-




93. See id. at 874.
94. Id. at 879.
95. 998 F.2d 867 (10th Cir. 1993).
96. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
97. See generally LAURENCE H. TRIBE, ABORTION: THE CLASH OF ABSOLUTES (1990) (dis-
cussing two centuries of the abortion debate).
98. See generally Clinic Blockades: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime and CriminalJustice of
the House Comm'n on the Judiciay, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992) (taking testimony on who
prevails when competing constitutional rights are asserted in the abortion debate).
99. The Court focused on the issues of fighting words, immunity, and the standards for
summary judgment. Cannon, 998 F.2d at 867.
100. Throughout its opinion, the court avoided any comment on the propriety of the
plaintiffs' conduct. Neither did it indulge in any language indicative of its stance on the
abortion issue.
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reaction, and (3) playing no role in the expression of ideas." 10 1 Taken
individually, none of these three elements added anything new to the
fighting words doctrine. 10 2 Never before, however, had the Supreme
Court combined all three requirements into a precise conjunctive test.'
0 3
The result of the Tenth Circuit's holding is that only a very narrow
type of public expression is left unprotected by the First Amendment.
While each prong of the test plays a part in protecting speech, the require-
ment that the challenged speech play "no role in the expression of ideas"
is clearly the farthest reaching. The potential of words, even obscene and
offensive words, to contribute toward the expression of ideas is immense.
Such contributions can be achieved even when a word's literal meaning
adds little to the exposition of ideas. Aside from a detached definitional
meaning, words can also convey an emotional quality that "may often be
the more important element of the overall message."
10 4
A twist on the facts in Cannon shows the value of emotion-laden
words. For example, suppose the defendants arrested the plaintiffs, not
for carrying signs, but for telling a prospective clinic client, 'You're a
damned murderer!" In this instance, the plaintiffs' conduct is undoubt-
edly "directed at the person of the hearer,"' 0 5 as set forth in the Cannon
fighting words test. Assume, arguendo, that the statement is inherently
violence provoking, thus satisfying the second prong of the court of ap-
peals' test. The question then becomes whether the epithet still plays a
role in the expression of ideas. The statement undeniably makes a pas-
sionate and "forceful presentation of the anti-abortion viewpoint."10 6 The
words are raw and crude, but they convey an emotive element that would
be difficult to achieve with niceties, an emotive element to which speech is
entitled.
Controversial speech, while it may be provocative, serves important
functions in our society. As the Supreme Court noted in Terminiello v.
Chicago, speech often "invite[s] dispute"10 7 and "stirs people to anger.'
0 8
This is especially true if the speech relates to a politically controversial
issue, but these results should not be thwarted. By giving broad protection
to controversial speech, despite creating strong reactions in listeners,
101. Cannon, 998 F.2d at 873.
102. See supra notes 83-89 and accompanying text.
103. Although the Supreme Court's articulation of the fighting words doctrine has never
been as precise as that used by the Tenth Circuit in Cannon, the Court has consistently used a
very narrow definition of fighting words. Boswell-Odum, supra note 72, at 270-75. In the half
century since the Court decided Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942), it has
not upheld another conviction under the fighting words doctrine. Boswell-Odum, supra note
72, at 274. In fact, some commentators suggest the fighting words doctrine exists in the
present only as a historical remnant that is no longer employed except perhaps in a constitu-
tionally impermissive manner. See Stephen W. Gard, Fighting Words as Free Speech, 58 WASH U.
L.Q. 531, 580 (1980); Thomas F. Shea, "Don't Bother to Smile When You Call Me That "--Fighting
Words and the First Amendment, 63 Ky. L.J. 1, 1-2 (1975).
104. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971).
105. Cannon, 998 F.2d at 873.
106. Id.




courts ensure that political dialogue is a true exchange of views. A demo-
cratic form of government requires leaving the public forum open to all
ideas, no matter how controversial or how offensive. 10 9 As the Tenth Cir-
cuit implicitly recognized in Cannon, the continued health of the Ameri-
can democratic system is inextricably bound to the ability of American
citizens to vent their frustrations, their dislikes, and their disagreements.
The court of appeal's narrow interpretation of the fighting words doctrine
helps protect speech that often makes the most poignant contribution to
the highly-valued exchange of ideas.
III. THE RIGHT OF FAMILIAL ASSOCIATION: GRIFIN V. STRON G1 1 0
A. Background
The right of familial association is relatively new to constitutional ju-
risprudence. 1 11 This new constitutional right has several distinguishing
hallmarks. First, the right is virtually always asserted in the context of a
§ 1983112 action. 113 Second, and most importantly, a cause of action is
created in a person who is not the primary target of state conduct.'1 4 Typ-
ically, a plaintiff asserts that a state actor's conduct toward her family mem-
ber impermissibly interfered with her relationship with that family
member.' 15 The right of familial association is similar to the common law
tort claim of loss of consortium, because the plaintiff is related to the pri-
mary victim. t1 6
109. Alexander Meiklejohn, one of the founders of this position, makes the point more
eloquently than I:
When men govern themselves, it is they-and no one else-who must pass judg-
ment upon unwisdom and unfairness and danger. And that means that unwise
ideas must have a hearing as well as wise ones, unfair as well as fair, dangerous as
well as safe, un-American as well as American. Just so far, at any point, the citizens
who are to decide an issue are denied acquaintance with information or opinion or
doubt or disbelief or criticism which is relevant to that issue, just so far the result
must be ill-considered, ill-balanced planning for the general good. It is that mutila-
tion of the thinking process of the community against which the First Amendment to the Consti-
tution is directed. The principle of the freedom of speech springs from the
necessities of the program of self-government. It is not a Law of Nature or of Rea-
son in the abstract. It is a deduction from the basic American agreement that pub-
lic issues shall be decided by universal suffrage.
ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM 27 (1979).
110. 983 F.2d 1544 (10th Cir. 1993).
111. See Wrigley v. Greanias, 842 F.2d 955, 957 n.3 (7th Cir.) (noting that most familial
association cases were decided since 1980), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 850 (1988).
112. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988).
113. See Michael S. Bogren, The Constitutionalization of Consortium Claims, 68 U. DET. L.
REv. 479, 479 (1991). There do not appear to be any published decisions involving the right
of familial association that arose outside of the § 1983 context.
114. Id.
115. See, e.g., Manarite v. City of Springfield, 957 F.2d 953 (1st Cir.), (upholding grant of
summary judgment against daughter who sued police chief for failing to prevent the suicide
of her father while he was in protective custody), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 113 (1992). Different
types of fact patterns have given rise to familial association claims. See, e.g., Hameetman v.
City of Chicago, 776 F.2d 636, 642-43 (7th Cir. 1985) (dismissing fireman's claim that city
ordinance requiring him to live within city limits interfered with his filial relationship with his
hyperkinetic son whose well-being required that he stay in a familiar environment).
116. See Bogren, supra note 112, at 479.
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The circuits are split over the recognition of the right of familial asso-
ciation. The Seventh, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits are the leading propo-
nents of the right,1 17 while the First Circuit is its most steadfast
opponent.1 18
In 1984, the United States Supreme Court upheld the application of a
state law requiring the United States Jaycees to accept women as regular
members. 119 In distinguishing the rights asserted by the Jaycees from
those relationships protected under the Constitution, the Court empha-
sized that "[f] amily relationships, by their nature, involve deep attachments
and commitments to the necessarily few other individuals with whom one
shares not only a special community of thoughts, experiences, and beliefs
but also distinctively personal aspects of one's life."
120
A year later, in Trujillo v. Board of County Commissioners,12 1 the Tenth
Circuit used the Court's reasoning in Roberts122 as a springboard for its
decision to recognize the constitutionally protected right of "familial
association." 
12 3
In Trujillo, a woman and her daughter sought relief under § 1983,124
claiming that the wrongful death of their son and brother, Richard Tru-
jillo, while in custody at the Santa Fe County jail, deprived them of their
constitutional right of familial association. 125 The plaintiffs claimed that
this right existed under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. 126 After
holding that the plaintiffs had standing to assert this claim, 127 the court of
appeals declared that the Trujillos "had constitutionally protected inter-
ests in their relationship with their son and brother."
128
117. See, e.g., Trujillo v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 768 F.2d 1186, 1188-89 (10th Cir. 1985);
Kelson v. City of Springfield, 767 F.2d 651, 653-55 (9th Cir. 1985); Bell v. City of Milwaukee,
746 F.2d 1205, 1243-50 (7th Cir. 1984).
118. See, e.g., Manarite, 957 F.2d at 960; Pittsley v. Warish, 927 F.2d 3, 7-9 (1st Cir.), cert.
denied, 112 S. Ct. 226 (1991); Valdivieso Ortiz v. Burgos, 807 F.2d 6, 7-10 (1st Cir. 1986).
119. See Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984). In Roberts, the Jaycees
argued that the application of the act denied its members the freedom of association pro-
tected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments. See id. at 617-18.
120. Id. at 619-20. TheJaycees raised two separate constitutional claims: freedom of asso-
ciation as a personal liberty under the Fourteenth Amendment and freedom to associate, as a
guarantee of the rights to speech, assembly, and religion, under the First Amendment. See id.
at 617-18. The Court analyzed these claims individually. Id. at 618-29.
121. 768 F.2d 1186 (10th Cir. 1985).
122. 468 U.S. 609 (1984).
123. Trujillo, 768 F.2d at 1188. The language and reasoning that the court of appeals
borrowed in Trujillo comes from the section in Roberts in which the Supreme Court analyzed
the Fourteenth Amendment claim, freedom of association, as a personal liberty interest. See
id. at n.4.
124. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988).
125. Trujillo, 768 F.2d at 1187.
126. Id. The Trujillos' complaint apparently relied upon the First Amendment for its
substantive foundation and the Fourteenth Amendment to apply this claim to the state ac-
tion. Id. at 1188 n.4. Importantly, the court of appeals liberally read the complaint "as an
assertion of the [Fourteenth Amendment] liberty interest discussed in Roberts v. United
States Jaycees." Id.
127. Id. at 1187-88.
128. Id. at 1189. The court of appeals cited to a number of decisions in support of this
declaration. See id. at 1188-89. One of the sub-issues presented by these cases was whether a
liberty interest in familial association should be extended beyond the parental relationship to
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The court of appeals then turned to the issue of what conduct would
constitute a deprivation of this right. Having recognized a nascent right,
the court found itself without a test for when this right had been violated.
The court opted to look to other well established constitutional protec-
tions for some guidance.1 2 9 It found a satisfactory analytical analogy in
the freedom of expressive association protected by the First Amend-
ment.'3 0 Based on this analogy, the court of appeals concluded that for a
plaintiff to establish a deprivation of the right of familial association, a
showing must be made that the defendant had the "intent to interfere
with a particular relationship."131
Because the plaintiffs in Trujillo failed to allege intent in the com-
plaint, the court affirmed the district court's decision to dismiss the
claims.13 2 The court refined its holding by stating that any intent which
the defendants might have had with respect to the harms done to the
victim could not be transferred to establish the intent to deprive the plain-
tiffs of their constitutional rights.13 3 In the court's words, "[t]he alleged
conduct by the State, however improper or unconstitutional with respect
to the son, will work an unconstitutional deprivation of the freedom of
intimate association only if the conduct was directed at that right."'
3 4
Until the survey period, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals followed
Trujillo faithfully. It continued to insist that the defendant's conduct be
intentionally directed at the plaintiff.13 5 In the process, the court of ap-
peals failed to address an important issue left open by its decision in Tru-
jillo, where it categorized the plaintiffs' claim as a Fourteenth Amendment
liberty interest,'3 6 while formulating a test borrowed from First Amend-
ment jurisprudence.13 7 This dichotomous treatment created an unan-
swered question: what is the constitutional source for the right of familial
association?' 3 8 The importance of this question is not merely academic.
include sibling relationships. Id. The Seventh Circuit, although it was among the first cir-
cuits to recognize a right of familial association, refuses to extend this right to siblings. See
Bell v. City of Milwaukee, 746 F.2d 1205, 1245-48 (7th Cir. 1984). The Tenth Circuit de-
clined to follow this lead. Refusing to let other intimate relationships go unprotected, the
court of appeals in Trujillo recognized a right of familial association in Richard Trujillo's
sister. Trujillo, 786 F.2d at 1189. The court even suggested that the types of intimate relation-
ships falling under this protection would not be limited to familial ones. Id. at 1189 n.5. The
Eleventh Circuit has gone so far as to recognize a protected liberty interest in dating. See
Wilson v. Taylor, 733 F.2d 1539, 1542-44 (11th Cir. 1984).
129. See Trujillo, 768 F.2d at 1189-90.
130. Id. at 1189 (stating "that freedom of expressive association provides the most appro-
priate analogy for freedom of intimate association").




135. See, e.g., Archuleta v. McShan, 897 F.2d 495, 499 (10th Cir. 1990).
136. Trujillo, 768 F.2d at 1188 n.4.
137. See supra notes 129-31 and accompanying text.
138. See Griffin v. Strong, 983 F.2d 1544, 1546 (10th Cir. 1993). The Tenth Circuit's
failure to resolve this issue created confusion and inconsistency among courts who looked to
Trujillo for guidance. For example, the Fourth Circuit has cited Trujillo for the proposition
that the right of familial association arises out of the First Amendment in Rucker v. Harford
County, 946 F.2d 278, 282 (4th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1175 (1992), while the
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The typical liberty interest test under the Fourteenth Amendment is mark-
edly different than the intent-based test applied by the Tenth Circuit in
Trujillo. According to the United States Supreme Court, determining
whether an individual's Fourteenth Amendment liberty interests have
been violated requires balancing the asserted liberty interest against the
governmental interests.
1 3 9
B. Griffin v. Strong'
40
In 1986, Salt Lake County Deputy Sheriff James Strong arrested
Steven Griffin for alleged sexual abuse of a child. 14 1 Mr. Griffin's wife,
Dorothy, filed a § 1983 complaint alleging that Officer Strong violated her
constitutional rights by the manner in which he conducted the investiga-
tion and arrest of her husband.1 42 The jury returned special verdicts in
favor of Mrs. Griffin, finding that Officer Strong had violated her rights of
familial association.1 4 3 Officer Strong appealed. He argued that the jury's
finding was not sufficiently supported by the evidence.14 4 His appeal
raised important unresolved questions about the right of familial associa-
tion, one concerning its constitutional foundations and a second concern-
ing the proper test for determining when the right of familial association
has been violated.
The court began its analysis by exploring the jurisprudential history of
the right of familial association. Judge Ebel, writing for the court, quickly
returned to the issue left open by Trujillo and refused to continue the
court's reliance on the analogy it drew between the First Amendment
right of expressive association and the right of familial association. In-
stead, the court retreated from its reasoning in Trujillo and found that "the
Seventh Circuit contends that Trujillo based this same right on the Fourteenth Amendment.
See Mayo v. Lane, 867 F.2d 374, 375 (7th Cir. 1989). The Tenth Circuit itself has not been
immune to this confusion. In Apodaca v. Rio Arriba County Sheriff's Dept., 905 F.2d 1445
(10th Cir. 1990), the court of appeals perfunctorily suggested that Trujillo established a First
Amendment right. Id. at 1448.
139. Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 320-21 (1982).
140. 983 F.2d 1544 (10th Cir. 1993).
141. Griffin v. Strong, 739 F. Supp. 1496, 1497-98 (D. Utah 1990), rev. 'd, 983 F.2d 1540
(10th Cir. 1993). Thejury in the criminal trial convicted Mr. Griffin of two counts of sexual
abuse of a child, but two years later the Utah Court of Appeals reversed the conviction and
remanded the case for a new trial. Id. at 1498 (citing State v. Griffin, 754 P.2d 965 (Utah Ct.
App. 1988)). The Utah Court of Appeals found that of two confessions Mr. Griffin gave to
Officer Strong, one was given under coercion and the second was given without a valid waiver
of his Miranda rights. Id. (citing Griffin, 754 P.2d at 971).
142. Id. For the alleged conduct on which Dorothy Griffin based her claim, see infra
notes 155-59 and accompanying text. Mrs. Griffin also sued a social worker, Dennis Gale, but
because the jury found Gale not liable for any of the plaintiff's claims, the Court of Appeals
for the Tenth Circuit concerned itself only with the claim against Strong. See Griffin, 983 F.2d
at 1545 (10th Cir. 1993).
143. Griffin, 983 F.2d at 1545. Steven Griffin and the Griffin's daughter, Angie, also
brought § 1983 claims. The jury found no violation of Steven's or Angie's constitutional
rights, so the only issues before the court on appeal concerned the violation of Dorothy
Griffin's rights. See id.
144. Id. at 1546.
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familial right of association is properly based on the 'concept of liberty in
the Fourteenth Amendment.' "145
The court of appeals characterized the right of familial association as
a "subset" of intimate association. 146 It then asserted that to determine
whether a violation of this right has occurred requires balancing the "lib-
erty interests against the relevant state interests."1 47 The court articulated
the necessary weighing in terms of the facts before it.
[W]e must weigh two factors: the state's interests in investigating
reports of child abuse, which is the interest served by Strong's
conduct in investigating the claims against Steven Griffin, and
Dorothy Griffin's interest in her familial right of association. Ini-
tially, we examine these factors objectively, that is, outside of the
facts or subjective positions of the parties. Nonetheless . . .
[u] Itimately, we must examine the parties' interests in light of the
facts of this particular case.
148
Thus, the court purported to set up a two-part balancing test that evalu-
ated the asserted interests first objectively and then subjectively.
The court of appeals looked first to the state's overarching interest in
investigating potential child abuses. Based on the typically covert nature
of child abuse and society's well-founded disdain for such crimes, the
court placed great importance on the state's "traditional and 'transcen-
dent' investigatory interests" in protecting the welfare of children. 149 The
court recognized that " [t] he right to associate with one's family members is
a very substantial right."15 0 After establishing the individual importance
of these rights, however, the court of appeals made no effort to compare
their importance relative to each other.
15 1
Next, the court of appeals turned to the subjective portion of its test
and focused on "the facts surrounding the parties' interests." 152 The
court broke this analysis into two parts. First, it looked to Trujillo and as-
serted that for a defendant's behavior to become unconstitutional, it must
be directed "at the intimate relationship with knowledge that the state-
ments or conduct will adversely affect that relationship."15 3 Second, the
court indicated that it must "also examine the evidence to determine [1]
145. Id. at 1547 (quoting Mayo v. Lane, 867 F.2d 374, 375 (7th Cir. 1989)).
146. Id. (citing Shondell v. McDermott, 775 F.2d 879, 865-66 (7th Cir. 1985)).
147. Id. (quoting Youngberg v. Romero, 457 U.S. 307, 321 (1982)) (internal quotation
marks omitted). The court called this balancing "classic fourteenth amendment liberty anal-
ysis." Id.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 1548 (citing Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 855 (1990)); see also New York v.
Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 757 (1982); State v. Jordon, 665 P.2d 1280, 1285 (Utah 1983), appeal
dismissed, 464 U.S. 910 (1983)).
150. Griffin, 983 F.2d at 1548 (citing Mayo v. Lane, 867 F.2d 374, 375 (7th Cir. 1989)).
151. See id. But see id. at 1549 (court concludes the infringement of these important rights
is slight).
152. Id. at 1548.
153. Id. (citing Trujillo, 768 F.2d at 1190). The court does not indicate why it felt com-
pelled to retain the Trujillo First Amendment intent test after spending the first part of the
opinion explaining why familial association claims properly derive from the Fourteenth
Amendments' substantive due process protections. See id. at 1546-47. For further discussion
of the issue, see infra notes 178-182 and accompanying text.
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the severity of the alleged infringement, [2] the need for the defendant's
conduct, and [3] any possible alternatives."
1 54
The court began by presenting the evidence supporting Dorothy Grif-
fin's allegation that Strong directed his conduct at the spousal relationship
with knowledge that his conduct would adversely affect the relationship.
First, the defendant lied when he told Dorothy Griffin that her husband
had already confessed to child abuse.15 5 Second, the defendant doubted
Mrs. Griffin's morals when she told him that she did not believe her hus-
band committed child abuse.1 56 Third, during an interview in which
Steven Griffin finally confessed, the defendant told him that he had not
heard from his wife "because you won't confess to what you've done and
get the help that you need." 15 7 Fourth, the defendant encouraged Mrs.
Griffin to move to another state and start her life over.1 58 Fifth, Mrs. Grif-
fin testified that the defendant used her against her husband when she
tried to explain to Steven "she was told to leave him not help him."
15 9
The court of appeals next turned to the second half of its subjective
test and examined the "severity of the alleged infringement."1 60 Noting
that both Steven and Dorothy Griffin consensually talked to the defend-
ant, the court said that "consensual interviews are less likely to infringe on
familial interviews because the parties can always decline to talk." 16 1 The
court next asserted that Dorothy Griffin presented no evidence indicating
that the defendant acted with "physical coercion or conduct that shocks
the conscience." 162 The court conceded that Strong's lie to Dorothy Grif-
fin about her husband confessing to child abuse increased the severity of
the alleged infringement. 1 63 Although the court of appeals asserted that
additionally it would examine "the need for the defendant's conduct, and
any possible alternatives,"' 6 4 these examinations did not make it into the
court's opinion.'
65
After this analysis of the facts, the court of appeals concluded, amidst
scanty and elusive reasoning, that no reasonable juror could appropriately
balance the competing interests and determine that the defendant vio-
lated the plaintiff's rights.' 66 In support of this conclusion, the court sim-
154. Griffin, 983 F.2d at 1548.
155. Id. at 1549.






162. Id. at 1548-49 (citing Pittsley v. Warish, 927 F.2d 3, 6 (lst Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct.
226 (1991)). In its prior familial association decisions, the Tenth Circuit had never indicated
that a showing of physical coercion or conduct that shocks the conscience is necessary to a
successful claim. See Apodaca v. Rio Arriba County SherifFs Dept., 905 F.2d 1445 (10th Cir.
1990); Bryson v. City of Edmond, 905 F.2d 1386 (10th Cir. 1990); Archuleta v. McShan, 897
F.2d 495 (10th Cir. 1990); Trujillo v. Board of County Comm'rs, 768 F.2d 1186 (10th Cir.
1985).
163. Griffin, 983 F.2d at 1549 n.5.
164. Id. at 1548.
165. See id. at 1548-49.
166. Id. at 1549.
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ply stated, "on the balance, the infringement of familial rights of
association in this case is slight."1 6 7 Based on these findings, the court of
appeals remanded the case to the district court with a direction to enter
judgment in favor of the defendant, Officer Strong.
1' s
C. Analysis
While Griffin v. Strong169 might have ended the confusion concerning
the right of familial association's constitutional source,170 the resulting
modification of the law left familial association jurisprudence more per-
plexing than ever.17 The court of appeals' definitive placement of famil-
ial association among the Fourteenth Amendment's substantive due
process protections led it to alter its legal analysis. 172 According to the
Supreme Court, determining if someone's Fourteenth Amendment liberty
rights have been violated requires balancing the claimed "liberty interests
against the relevant state interests."' 73 After noting that courts have ap-
plied this balancing test in intimate association cases,' 74 the Griffin court
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. 983 F.2d 1544 (10th Cir. 1993).
170. See supra note 144 and accompanying text (court explicitly placed right of familial
association under the Fourteenth Amendment's substantive due process protection).
171. Although Trujillo v. Board of County Commissioners, 768 F.2d 1186 (10th Cir.
1985), created confusion with respect to the constitutional source of the right of familial
association, it is worth noting that the court of appeals' statement of the law lent itself to easy
application. In the three familial association cases heard by the Tenth Circuit since Trujillo
and prior to Griffin, the court applied the law with appreciable consistency. See Apodaca v.
Rio Arriba County Sheriff's Dept., 905 F.2d 1445, 1147 (10th Cir. 1990) (refusing to reverse
dismissal of plaintiff's claim because no evidence of defendant's intent to interfere with the
plaintiff's protected relationship); Bryson v. City of Edmond, 905 F.2d 1386, 1393-94 (10th
Cir. 1990) (upholdingjudgment for defendant because intent cannot be transferred and no
allegation of intent directed at family relationship); Archuleta v. McShan, 897 F.2d 495, 498-
99 (10th Cir. 1990) (emphasizing necessity of intent and that plaintiff be "deliberate object"
of conduct). Nor did the Tenth Circuit's district courts have much trouble applying the
court's Trujillo holding. See Sollars v. City of Albuquerque, 794 F. Supp. 360, 362 (D.N.M.
1992) (granting motion to dismiss because plaintiff did not allege intent); Beck v. Calvillo,
671 F. Supp. 1555, 1557-58 (D. Kan. 1987) (granting summary judgment because no allega-
tion of intent); White v. Talboys, 635 F. Supp. 505, 507 (D. Colo. 1986) (motion to dismiss
denied because plaintiff alleged intent to interfere with particular family relationship); Trejo
v. Wattles, 636 F. Supp. 992,997 (D. Colo. 1985) (denying motion to dismiss because plaintiff
alleged intent directed at relationship). But see Franz v. Lytle, 791 F. Supp. 827, 832-33 (D.
Kan. 1992) (refusing to recognize right of family integrity based on Trujillo), affd, 997 F.2d
784 (10th Cir. 1993).
However, the Tenth Circuit's decision to place definitively the right of familial associa-
tion among the Fourteenth Amendment's liberty interest was a good one. The First Amend-
ment's protection of associational rights is ancillary to its protection of speech, religion, and
assembly. Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 618 (1984). These rights do not
embrace the relationship shared by family members nearly as well as the right of intimate
association that has been recognized under the Fourteenth Amendment's substantive due
process protections. See Bell v. City of Milwaukee, 746 F.2d 1205, 1243-45 (7th Cir. 1984).
The court of appeals' decision to position the right of familial association as a subset of the
right of intimate association is also consistent with the Seventh Circuit's approach. See Griffin,
983 F.2d at 1547.
172. Griffin, 983 F.2d at 1547.
173. Id. (quoting Youngberg v. Romero, 457 U.S. 307, 321 (1982)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
174. See id. at 1547.
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articulated its two part balancing test.175 The first part of the test, which
objectively examines the interests represented by each party, poses little
difficulty. 176 The problems arise primarily out of the second half of the
test, that part which requires courts to examine subjectively "the facts sur-
rounding the parties' interests."
1 77
The court of appeals broke this second prong into two stages of analy-
sis. First, it returned to the familiar Trujillo test and asserted that "to rise
to the level of a constitutional claim, the defendant must direct his or her
statements or conduct at the intimate relationship with knowledge that
the statements or conduct will adversely affect the relationship."1 78 Sec-
ond, the court claimed it would look at three things: the severity of the
alleged infringement, the necessity of the defendant's conduct, and any
alternatives to the defendant's conduct. The examinations into each of
these two prongs presents problems.
After categorically placing familial association among Fourteenth
Amendment liberty interests, the court asserted that appropriately it
would apply a balancing test.1 79 However, the court called upon the Tru-
jillo test,180 an inquiry into the defendant's state of mind that admits to no
semblance of balancing. The court listed five allegations supported by the
record that taken together easily satisfied Trujillo.18 1 Oddly, the court of-
fered no explanation as to how the Trujillo standard fit into balancing "the
facts surrounding the parties interests."1 82 In light of the fact the court
decided in favor of Officer Strong, it is undeniable that it relied on some
counterbalance to Trujillo's satisfaction-intending to balance the Trujillo
inquiry against its subsequent examination into the severity of the alleged
infringement.
18 3
175. See supra notes 153-54 and accompanying text.
176. It can be argued the aspect of the test that asks the court to evaluate objectively the
interest of the plaintiff is redundant. By recognizing that familial association is a protected
liberty interest, the Tenth Circuit is already concluding that in the abstract relationships
between family members are important. The court's reason for including this objective
threshold test may be out of a felt need for a limitation on the types of familial relationships
that are protected. If this is the court's concern, then it should articulate absolute limita-
tions, not leave it up to a discretionary balancing test. For example, the Seventh Circuit has
categorically declined to recognize a protected relationship between siblings. See Bell v. Mil-
waukee, 746 F.2d 1205 (7th Cir. 1984).
177. Griffin, 983 F.2d at 1548.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 1547.
180. Id. at 1548.
181. See supra notes 155-59 and accompanying text. By pulling from the record five sepa-
rate ways in which the defendant allegedly used Mrs. Griffin against her husband in an at-
tempt to get him to confess, the court all but conceded that Officer Strong's conduct
satisfied the Trujillo test.
182. Griffin, 983 F.2d at 1549.
183. Along with examining the severity of the alleged infringement, the court of appeals
also claimed that it would look into the necessity of the defendant's conduct and possible
alternatives to the conduct. The court made no attempt at the last two inquiries and offered
no explanation for this noticeable failure. See id. at 1548-49. Without becoming to specula-
tive, the argument can easily be made that deceptively using a wife against her husband to
secure his unwilling confession is not necessary to a child abuse investigation. Furthermore,
less egregious alternatives are probably available to the properly trained investigator.
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The court of appeals concluded the defendant only slightly infringed
on Dorothy Griffin's rights. 184 The court supported this conclusion by
looking to two considerations. First, the Griffins talked with officer Strong
consensually. 185 Second, no evidence suggested that Strong used "physi-
cal coercion or conduct that shocks the conscience." 186 The Tenth Cir-
cuit has never indicated that the presence of physical coercion or
conscience shocking conduct is an element of a successful familial associa-
tion claim. 187 The Tenth Circuit borrowed the notion that the defend-
ant's conduct must shock the conscience from Pittsley v. Warish,188 a First
Circuit decision.1 89 The court's reliance on Pittsey is improper.
In Pittsley, the First Circuit found that conduct which shocks the con-
science is only necessary when a plaintiff is unable to identify a specifically
recognized Fourteenth Amendment liberty interest. 190 In Griffin, the
Tenth Circuit spent an entire section of its opinion explaining that famil-
ial association is included within the Fourteenth Amendment's substantive
due process protections. 19 1 The court specifically characterized familial
association as a "subset" of intimate association. 192 Inexplicably, the court
of appeals held Dorothy Griffin responsible for an evidentiary showing
that is appropriate only when the plaintiff is unable to identify a specific
liberty interest.
The Tenth Circuit's reliance on Pittsley also becomes suspect in light
of the fact the First Circuit does not recognize familial association as a
protected right. Concerned with the possibility of an unlimited source of
claims, the First Circuit held in Pittsley that "only the person toward whom
the state action was directed, and not those incidentally affected, may
maintain a § 1983 claim." 193 There is something amiss when a court de-
nies a plaintiff relief under a recognized claim and then bolsters its hold-
184. Id. at 1549.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. See Apodaca v. Rio Arriba County Sheriff's Dept., 905 F.2d 1445 (10th Cir. 1990);
Bryson v. City of Edmond, 905 F.2d 1386 (10th Cir. 1990); Archuleta v. McShan, 897 F.2d 495
(10th Cir. 1990); Trujillo v. Board of County Commr's, 768 F.2d 1186 (10th Cir. 1985).
188. 927 F.2d 3 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 226 (1991).
189. Griffin, 983 F.2d at 1549 (citing PittsIey, 927 F.2d at 9). The court does not indicate
where it got the idea that the presence of physical coercion is necessary to show a violation of
the right to familial association. The Pitisley opinion does not discuss physical coercion. See
Pittsley, 927 F.2d 3 (1st Cir), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 226 (1991).
190. Pitts/ey, 927 F.2d at 6 (citing Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172-73 (1952)). The
First Circuit articulated two theories under which a plaintiff could proceed in a substantive
due process claim:
Under the first theory, it is not required that the plaintiffs prove a violation of a
specific liberty or property interest; however, the state's conduct must be such that
it "shocks the conscience." To succeed under the second theory, a plaintiff must
demonstrate a violation of an identified liberty or property interest protected by the
due process clause.
Id. (citations omitted).
191. See Griffin, 983 F.2d at 1546-47 (section III of the court's opinion).
192. Id. at 1547.
193. Pitts/y, 927 F.2d at 8. The First Circuit seems to define "those incidentally affected"
very broadly to mean all those who were not the primary victim of state action. See id. at 7-8;
Ortiz v. Burgos, 807 F.2d 6, 8 (1st Cir. 1986).
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ing with precedent from a court that has refused to recognize that the
plaintiff's interest is even entitled to protection.
The Tenth Circuit ultimately held that "no reasonable juror, when
confronted with balancing the interests on the record before us under the
appropriate standard, could determine" that Officer Strong unduly violated
Dorothy Griffin's right of familial association.19 4 This holding does not
satisfy because it strikes a sustained chord of injustice. The court's arrival
at this holding leaves the appropriate legal analysis nearly unintelligible.
Although a clear statement of the law proves elusive, important ideas
emerge. Even if a plaintiff satisfies the Trujillo test, the Tenth Circuit is
likely to approach a defendant's conduct with great deference unless it
amounts to physical coercion or is so egregious that it shocks the con-
science. Perhaps the most important lesson that can be gleaned from Grif-
fin is that the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit does not favor the
right of familial association. A plaintiff has never prevailed on a familial
association claim at the appellate level in the Tenth Circuit,19 5 and the
court's jurisprudential gymnastics in Griffin v. Strong suggest that this tradi-
tion is likely to continue.
CONCLUSION
The Tenth Circuit's decisions in the two speech cases exhibit a lauda-
ble recognition of the importance of speech in American society. The-
matic to both opinions is the idea that participants in a democratic society
can make proper decisions as to what is in their best interest only if they
are exposed to the full breadth of ideas. The court's decision in Griffin v.
Strong'9 6 suggests that the court of appeals may be having second thoughts
about its decision to recognize the right of familial association. The
court's confusing modification of the law combined with its opaque rea-
soning casts a pessimistic cloud over the likelihood of plaintiff success in
the future.
J Bartlett Johnson
194. Griffin, 983 F.2d at 1549 (emphasis added). The court of appeals said that the trial
judge should have directed a verdict or granted a judgement N.O.V. Id. at 1549 n.6.
195. See Apodaca v. Rio Arriba County Sheriff's Dept., 905 F.2d 1445, 1447 (10th Cir.
1990) (refusing to reverse dismissal of plaintiff's claim because no evidence of defendant's
intent to interfere with the plaintiff's protected relationship); Bryson v. City of Edmond, 905
F.2d 1386, 1393-94 (10th Cir. 1990) (upholding judgment for defendant because intent can-
not be transferred and no allegation of intent directed at family relationship); Archuleta v.
McShan, 897 F.2d 495, 498-99 (10th Cir. 1990) (emphasizing necessity of intent and that
plaintiff be "deliberate object" of conduct).




This Survey focuses on three issues addressed by the United States
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in 1993. First, whether a blanket
policy of strip searching misdemeanants violates the Fourth Amendment's
prohibition against unreasonable searches? Second, what is the correct
method of determining an appropriate version of a foreign sentence
under the Prisoner Transfer Treaty between the United States and Mex-
ico? Third, whether a defendant's interest in access to a child abuse vic-
tim's confidential social service records outweighs the state's legitimate
interest in preserving the confidentiality of those records?
I. STRIP SEARCHING MISDEMEANANTS
A. Background
1. Inspections of the Body
In United States v. Robinson,1 the U.S. Supreme Court held that full
body searches incident to custodial arrest are not only an exception to the
warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment, 2 but that such searches
are "reasonable" under that Amendment.3 The Court also held that such
searches are constitutional even without probable cause that weapons or
evidence may be found. 4 The Court, however, did not hold that all possi-
ble searches of a person's body are permissible. In discussing the search
in Robinson, the Court distinguished the constitutional search in that case
from the unconstitutional search conducted in Rochin v. California.5
1. 414 U.S. 218 (1973). See generally, Wayne R. LaFave, "Case-By-Case Adjudication" Versus
"Standardized Procedures": The Robinson Dilemma, 1974 Sup. CT. REV. 127 (analyzing Robinson
and suggesting measures to prevent arbitrary exercise of police power); 2 WAYNE LAFAvE,
SEARCH AND SEXzuRE": A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 5.3(c) (1978 & Supp. 1986)
(discussing search and seizure law). Barbara C. Salken, The General Warrant of the Twentieth
Century? A Fourth Amendment Solution to Unchecked Discretion to Arrest for Traffic Offenses, 62
TEMP. L. REV. 221 (1989) (arguing that the scope of permissible searches of traffic offenders
needed to be limited).
2. The Fourth Amendment provides: "The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated ... ." U.S. CoNs-r. amend. IV.
3. Robinson, 414 U.S. at 235.
4. The Court rejected the requirement of probable cause for searches incident to law-
ful custodial arrest. The Court stated, "[t]he standards traditionally governing a search inci-
dent to lawful arrest are not, therefore, commuted to the stricter Terry standards [referring to
protective frisks for weapons based on reasonable suspicion in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1
(1968)] by the absence of probable fruits or further evidence of the particular crime for
which the arrest is made." Robinson, 414 U.S. at 234.
5. 342 U.S. 165 (1952). Under the Rochin doctrine, government conduct violates due
process when the means used are egregious and "shock the conscience" of the court. Id. at
172.
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In Rochin6 the police forced an emetic into the defendant's stomach
against his will. The emetic caused the defendant to vomit and allowed
the police to recover evidence. The Robinson Court characterized this type
of police conduct as both extreme and abusive and, therefore, in violation
of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 7 The Court
explicitly recognized that some body searches would be unconstitutional
due to their character. 8
In United States v. Edwards,9 the Court reaffirmed the wide latitude
given to law enforcement officers to search a person after a lawful custo-
dial arrest. The Court, however, left open the possibility that certain
searches "might 'violate the dictates of reason either because of their
number or manner of perpetration.' "10
2. The Bell Balancing Test
In Bell v. Wolfish,1 the Court articulated a test of reasonabieness to be
used under the Fourth Amendment in analyzing the constitutionality of a
search. 12 In Bell the Court derived a balancing test because reasonable-
ness "is not capable of precise definition or mechanical application."
13
The Court fashioned a test which balanced the state's need for a search
against the invasion of the searched person's rights. 14 The Court set forth
factors to be considered in determining whether a search is reasonable:
(1) the scope of the intrusion; (2) how the search is conducted; (3) the
justification for initiating it; and (4) the location where the search is con-
ducted. 15 In applying these factors in Bell the Court held that visual body-
cavity searches could be conducted with less than probable cause because
of the security interests of a detention center.' 6
3. Courts' Approaches To Strip Searching Misdemeanants
Blanket policies of strip searches were first condemned in Tinetti v.
Wittke.1 7 In Tinetti, the defendant was arrested for speeding and detained
6. Id.
7. Robinson, 414 U.S. at 236.
8. See infra notes 11-16 and accompanying text.
9. 415 U.S. 800 (1974).
10. Id. at 808 n.9 (citing Charles v. United States, 278 F.2d 386, 389 (9th Cir. 1960)).
11. 441 U.S. 520 (1979). See generally, Gerald G. Ashdown, The Fourth Amendment and the
"Legitimate Expectation of Privacy", 34 VAND. L. R. 1289 (1981) (discussing the Supreme Court's
approach to balancing government police power with privacy rights of individuals); Note,
Protecting Privacy Under the Fourth Amendment, 91 YALE L.J. 313 (1981) (rejecting the concept of
reasonable expectations to define the scope of Fourth Amendment protection).
12. Bell specifically addressed visual body-cavity strip searches of federal pretrial detain-
ees following contact visits. Bel4 441 U.S. at 520. See also David C. James, Note, Constitutional
Limitations on Body Searches in Prisons, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1033 (1982) (analyzing Bell and its
consequences).
13. Bell, 441 U.S. at 559.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 560.
17. 479 F. Supp. 486 (E.D. Wis. 1979), aff'd, 620 F.2d 160 (7th Cir. 1980). For a general
discussion of circuit court cases see, Robin Lee Fenton, Comment, The Constitutionality Of
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in the county jail because he was unable to post bail.18 The defendant was
strip searched according to the jail's blanket policy. The court recognized
a legitimate interest in discovering weapons or contraband, but
concluded:
Unlike pretrial detainees charged with a criminal offense there is
little reason to suspect that traffic violators will conceal contra-
band or weapons. . . . Defendant's blanket strip search policy
cannot be maintained when to do so intrudes into the personal
dignity of traffic violators without any relation to the likelihood
of his concealment .... 19
In Mary Beth G. v. Chicago,20 the Seventh Circuit addressed a blanket
strip search policy for all female detainees in Chicagojails. The defendant
was jailed for not paying parking tickets and strip searched while she
waited for bail money. The Seventh Circuit rejected extending the Robin-
son rationale. 2 1 The court, relying on Bel4 stated that strip searches must
be guided by a test of reasonableness and found that the jail's security
interests did not outweigh the assault on the defendant's privacy.2 2 Addi-
tionally, the court distinguished Mary Beth G. from Bell in three ways: (1)
the Bell detainees were charged with serious federal offenses while the de-
tainees in Mary Beth G. were charged with minor offenses; (2) the Bell de-
tainees were confined longer; and (3) the Bell detainees were strip
searched after contact visits, which could facilitate smuggling of weapons
or contraband.
2 3
The Tenth Circuit first addressed the strip searching of misdemean-
ants in Hill v. Bogans.2 4 In Hil4 the defendant was arrested for a traffic
violation and subsequently strip searched in a lobby with approximately
twelve other people present.2 5 The Tenth Circuit applied the Bell balanc-
ing test and balanced the need for the search against the invasion of the
defendant's privacy rights. 26 The court found that the offenses involved
in Hill were not typically associated with the concealment of weapons or
contraband in a body cavity. After balancing the state's need for the un-
usually invasive search with the defendant's privacy interest, the court held
that the search was unreasonable and unconstitutional under the
circumstances.
27
Policies Requiring Strip Searches of All Misdemeanant and Minor Traffic Offenders, 54 U. CIN. L.
REv. 175 (1985).
18. Tinetti, 479 F. Supp. at 486.
19. Id. at 491.
20. 723 F.2d 1263 (7th Cir. 1983). See generally, Frank C. Lipuma, Casenotes, Mary Beth
G. v. City of Chicago: How "Reasonable" Can A Strip Search Be?, 18 J. MARsHALL L. REv. 237
(1983).
21. See supra notes 1-5 and accompanying text.
22. Mary Beth G., 723 F.2d at 1273.
23. Id. at 1272.
24. 735 F.2d 391 (10th Cir. 1984).
25. Hil4 735 F.2d at 392-93.
26. Id. at 393.
27. Id. at 394.
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B. Tenth Circuit Cases in 1993
In 1993, the Tenth Circuit extended its earlier ruling in Hill through
two cases: Chapman v. Nichols28 and Cottrell v. Kaysville City.29 In these
cases, the court held that if an officer lacks reasonable suspicion that a
particular misdemeanant is concealing either weapons or contraband,
strip searching is unreasonable under the Bell balancing test and violates
the Fourth Amendment. The privacy of the search, an important factor in
Hil was not determinative for the court in either Chapman or CottrelL
1. Chapman v. Nichols
Four women were arrested for minor traffic violations and subse-
quently confined in the Creek County Jail in Sapulpa, Oklahoma.3 0 The
women were searched pursuant to a blanket strip searching policy of all
jail detainees.3 1 The jail officials acted without reasonable suspicion to
believe that the women were either concealing weapons or contraband on
their persons.3 2 The plaintiffs brought suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
3
against the Sheriff of Creek County, Doug Nichols, both individually and
in his official capacity. 34 In district court both sides moved for summary
judgment.3 5 The district court concluded that the searches were unconsti-
tutional under the established law but that the issue of "whether an 'objec-
tively reasonable' officer could have believed that conducting the search
in private comported with the Fourth Amendment is a question which may
have to be submitted to the jury."36 Sheriff Nichols appealed the denial of
his qualified immunity claim and the plaintiffs appealed the district court
holding that questions of fact regarding the qualified immunity claim
needed to go to the jury.
37
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals began its analysis with the reason-
ableness test articulated by the Supreme Court in Bell v. Wolfish.38 The
court noted several undisputed facts: the plaintiffs were arrested for minor
28. 989 F.2d 393 (10th Cir. 1993).
29. 994 F.2d 730 (10th Cir. 1993).
30. Chapman, 989 F.2d at 394.
31. A female jail employee strip searched each plaintiff in a small laundry room. One
was asked to stand with her hands over her head, one was subjected to a visual inspection of
her pubic area, one was required to bend over and grab her ankles and the last one had to
bend over and pull her underwear down to her ankles and be searched while the door to the
laundry room was open. Id.
32. Id.
33. "Every person who under color of any statute ... of any State ... subjects... any
citizen of the United States . . .to the deprivation of any rights, privileges or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured at law .... " 42
U.S.C. § 1983 (1988).
34. Chapman, 989 F.2d at 394.
35. The district court denied plaintiff's claim for summary judgment against the sheriff
individually but granted summary judgment against the sheriff in his official capacity. Id. at
395 n.2.
36. Id. at 395
37. Id.
38. See supra notes 11-16 and accompanying text. This is a balancing test weighing the
.need for the particular search against the invasion of personal rights that the search entails."
BelL 441 U.S. at 559.
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traffic violations, no reasonable suspicion existed that these individuals
were likely to be concealing weapons or drugs, and the plaintiffs were strip
searched solely because of the jail's blanket policy.39 The court then
noted that every circuit court, including the Tenth Circuit, has used the
Bell balancing test and under the same circumstances has found such strip
searches unconstitutional.
40
The court, relying on the analysis in Mary Beth G. and Hil4 stated, "a
strip search is an invasion of personal rights of the first magnitude."4 1 The
sheriff's contention that the private location of the strip searches distin-
guished this case from previous cases was rejected.42 The court cited
other cases where similar strip searches, found unconstitutional, were con-
ducted in private. 43 The court concluded that it was not objectively rea-
sonable for the sheriff to believe that strip searching minor offense
detainees was constitutional merely because the searches were conducted
in private and were not extensive.
44
Next, the court turned to the principles of qualified immunity.
Under qualified immunity, an official is protected from personal liability if
allegedly unlawful official action was objectively reasonable in light of the
legal rules established at the time of the action. 45 The court observed that
"no circuit case has upheld the grant of qualified immunity when asserted
against a claim based on an across-the-board policy of strip searching mi-
nor offense detainees."4 6 The court affirmed the district court's ruling
that the strip search policy was unconstitutional. The court also held that
the law was clearly established at the time of the illegal searches and that
the sheriff's belief that the policy was constitutional was not objectively
reasonable as a matter of law.
47
2. CottreU v. Kaysville City48
The plaintiff, Lisa Cottrell, brought an action pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 to recover damages for alleged constitutional violations that oc-
It should be noted that Belldid not involve a search incident to arrest, rather it dealt with
strip searches of pretrial detainees. However, the Bell balancing test provides guidance to
courts on the reasonableness of searches. As the Bell court stated, a balancing test is neces-
sary because reasonableness as a standard "is not capable of precise definition or mechanical
application." Id.
39. Chapman, 989 F.2d at 395.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. The sheriff's position was that because the searches were conducted in private and
did not involve visual body cavity inspections, the unlawfulness of the county's policy was not
apparent. The Court rejected these arguments. Id. at 397-98.
43. See, e.g., Watt v. City of Richardson Police Dep't, 849 F.2d 195, 196 (5th Cir. 1988);
Weber v. Dell, 804 F.2d 796, 799 (2d Cir. 1986);Jones v. Edwards, 770 F.2d 739, 742 (8th Cir.
1985); Giles v. Ackerman, 746 F.2d 614, 616 (9th Cir. 1984).
44. Chapman, 989 F.2d at 398.
45. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 639 (1987).
46. Chapman, 989 F.2d at 398.
47. By characterizing the Sheriff's belief that the policy was constitutional as unreasona-
ble per se, the Tenth Circuit removed it from the jury's purview. This holding effectively
resolved the plaintiffs cross-appeal that the issue should not have gone to the jury. Id. at 399.
48. 994 F.2d 730 (10th Cir. 1993).
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curred when she was arrested for driving under the influence and strip
searched preceding confinement. 49 Police officers had received informa-
tion that an individual was operating a vehicle while under the influ-
ence. 50 The officers were dispatched and stopped Cottrell.51 The police
asked her to perform roadside tests and the results of those tests were
disputed; the police maintained that she had not performed them satisfac-
torily and the plaintiff maintained that she had.52 The officers arrested
the plaintiff and she allowed them to take a blood sample to prove she was
not intoxicated.5 3 She was strip searched and confined until her parents
posted bond.5 4 The blood test subsequently revealed that the plaintiff had
not been under the influence of alcohol or drugs, except for legal
amounts of the plaintiff's prescription medicine.
55
The district court concluded that under Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure 56(c) 5 6 the defendants were entitled to judgment as a matter of law
because no genuine issues of material fact were in dispute. 57 The district
court analyzed all of the plaintiff's claims from the single issue of
"whether or not the strip search of the plaintiff violated her Constitutional
rights."58
On appeal, the court noted that the district court's approach did not
deal with each of the plaintiff's claims separately, but dealt with them all
under the strip search analysis.59 The appellate court first addressed the
§ 1983 claims, starting with wrongful arrest.60 The court found that the
district court's holding for summary judgment was error because the rec-
ord contained factual disputes requiring credibility determinations. The
court refused to conclude that the arresting officer had probable cause as
a matter of law to arrest Cottrell. 61
The court next addressed the illegal search claim.62 The court
started by quoting the language of Chapman v. Nichol. 3 that "[t] here can
be no doubt that a strip search is an invasion of personal rights of the first
49. Id. at 731.
50. Id. at 731-32.





56. "The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings ... show that
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law." FED. R. Cirv. P. 56(c).
57. Cottrel4 994 F.2d at 733.
58. Id. (citing Cottrell v. Kaysville City, 801 F. Supp 572, 574 (D. Utah 1992)).
59. The plaintiff raised numerous claims under § 1983 including wrongful arrest,
wrongful search and seizure, and deliberate indifference to her constitutional fights because
of the city's failure to train the officers. Additional separate claims included false imprison-
ment, assault and battery, malicious prosecution, abuse of process, intentional infliction of
emotional distress, defamation, and invasion of privacy. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 734.
62. Id.
63. 989 F.2d 393 (10th Cir. 1993).
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magnitude."64 The court acknowledged that consistent with Bel465 some
searches incident to lawful arrest may violate Fourth Amendment rights.
The court further supported this view by citing Hill 66 a case factually simi-
lar to Cottrell
The court noted that the officer did not have any reasonable suspi-
cion that Cottrell had drugs, did not conduct a 'pat down search' because
there was no indication that she was carrying any weapons, and did not
believe that Cottrell was a danger to him.67 The court found that these
admissions raised serious doubts about the justification for the strip
search. 68 Additional factors which supported the conclusion that the
search was unconstitutional were that Cottrell was not placed with the gen-
eral jail population 69 and that she wore light summer clothes when ar-
rested. 70 The court concluded that the district court's granting summary
judgment and its assumption that the search actually took place were both
in error.
7 1
C. Analysis of Chapman and Cottrell
Chapman and Cottrell represent an extension, rather than a change, in
existing policy in the Tenth Circuit. The cases stand for the proposition
that the nature, character and circumstances of a strip search are irrele-
vant if the threshold requirement of reasonable suspicion is not found for
a particular detainee prior to the search. An across the board policy of
strip searching all misdemeanants evades the necessity of finding reason-
able suspicion that a particular individual is concealing contraband or
weapons. The necessity of finding reasonable suspicion before the police
can conduct a strip search protects both the arrested misdemeanant and
the jail. The arrested misdemeanant, for whom no reasonable suspicion
exists, is protected from the unnecessary degradation that a blanket strip
search policy entails. However, if the jail personnel have articulable rea-
sons why a particular misdemeanant might be concealing contraband or
weapons, the reasonable suspicion standard is not unduly burdensome to
meet. The abrogation of blanket policies simply means that reasonable
suspicion must be developed on a case-by-case basis. This requirement
means additional work for the police but that additional burden is reason-
able when balanced with the rights of the individual that are protected.
64. Id. at 395.
65. Cottrell 994 F.2d at 734 (citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 558-59 (1979)).
66. Cottrel4 989 F.2d at 734 (citing Hill v. Bogans, 735 F.2d 391, 394 (10th Cir. 1984)).
See also supra notes 24-27 and accompanying text.
67. CottreI4 989 F.2d at 734-35 (citing Appellant's Brief at 119, 130).
68. Cottrel4 989 F.2d at 734-35 (citingJustice v. City of Peachtree City, 961 F.2d 188, 193
(1 lth Cir. 1992) (security and concealed contraband are main reasons for conducting strip
searches).
69. "Courts have consistently recognized a distinction between detainees awaiting bail
and those entering the jail population when evaluating the necessity of a strip search under
constitutional standards." Cottrell, 989 F.2d at 734-35 (citing Fuller v. M.G. Jewelry, 950 F.2d
1437, 1448 (9th Cir. 1991); Logan v. Shealy, 660 F.2d 1007, 1013 (4th Cir. 1981)).
70. Cottrell 989 F.2d at 734-35 (citing Hill 735 F.2d at 394 (procedure was unnecessary
because a pat down search would have been sufficient under the circumstances)).
71. Cottrel, 989 F.2d at 735.
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The Tenth Circuit refused to abide the evasion of the reasonable suspi-
cion requirement and through these cases has indicated that such policies
will be unconstitutional.
In Chapman v. Nichols,7 2 the court made clear that blanket policies of
strip searches for traffic offense misdemeanants will be abrogated. In ad-
dition, the court held that it is unreasonable for law enforcement officers
to believe that such policies might be legal. This ruling strips officials of
qualified immunity and subjects them both personally and officially to lia-
bility under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for perpetuating blanket strip search poli-
cies. The court's decision focused on the undisputed fact that the police
searched the plaintiffs without individualized reasonable suspicion. The
only articulable reason for strip searching these particular people was the
jail's blanket policy based on security grounds. The court held that the
security rationale was unpersuasive when balanced against the minor of-
fense detainee's privacy rights under the Fourth Amendment. The court
reasoned that minimum security concerns could be met by a less intrusive
pat-down search. The court also held that it was not objectively reasonable
for the sheriff to believe that the blanket policy was lawful because the
strip searches were conducted in private. Indeed, the court noted that the
lack of published cases on this issue is probably due to the fact that other
authorities have sensibly abandoned or declined to establish such
polices.
73
In Cottrell v. Kaysville City,7 4 the Tenth Circuit clearly stated that civil
rights suits by strip searched traffic misdemeanants 75 will not be subjected
to summary judgments favoring the malfeasant officials. These strip
searches, absent particularized reasonable suspicion, will be deemed per
se unconstitutional. In Cottrell, the court focused on factors similar to
those that were relevant in Chapman. The court noted that in a deposition
the officer who directed the strip search said he did not suspect that Cot-
trell had concealed drugs on her person and that he did not conduct a
pat-down search because there was no indication that she had weapons or
was a danger to him.76 Additionally, the court found that considerations
of overall jail security were not applicable because Cottrell was never
placed with the general jail population-she was only waiting for bail.
77
The court also held that less intrusive alternatives to a strip search were
available (namely the pat-down search) and that because Cottrell was wear-
ing light summer clothes, the pat-down search would have been sufficient
to discover any contraband.
With the decisions in Chapman and Cottrell the Tenth Circuit has effec-
tively ended any dispute on the issue of blanket strip searches of all traffic
offense misdemeanants. These two cases are in accord with the other cir-
72. Chapman, 989 F.2d at 393.
73. Id. at 399 (citing Weber v. Dell, 804 F.2d 796, 804 (2d Cir. 1986)).
74. Cottrel, 994 F.2d at 730.
75. Cottrell occurred in Utah where driving under the influence of alcohol is either a
class A or B misdemeanor. See UTAH CODE ANN § 41-6-44(3)(a)(i),(ii) (1993).
76. Cottrel., 994 F.2d at 734-35.
77. Id. at 735.
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cuits' decisions on the same issue. They effectively end a demeaning prac-
tice that was once widespread and possibly even constitutional under
Robinson's vague directives.
78
II. ANALYSIS OF SENTENCING UNDER THE PRISONER TRANSFER TR.ATY,
A. Background
On November 25, 1976, the United States and Mexico entered into a
bilateral treaty which provided for the transfer of penal sentences.
79
Under this agreement, Mexicans convicted in the United States can be
transferred to prisons in their home states.80 Reciprocally, United States
citizens convicted in Mexico can be transferred to federal prisons in the
United States.8 1 The explicit goal of this treaty is to "render mutual assist-
ance in combating crime... and to provide better administration of jus-
tice by adopting methods furthering the offender's social
rehabilitation .... "82 However, it is generally agreed that another unmen-
tioned reason was congressional concern over the condition of American
prisoners in the Mexican Penal System. 83 Many American prisoners have
alleged that Mexican prison officials tortured them and engaged in
extortion.
84
Although the treaty has improved prisoner treatment abroad, some
officials and scholars have questioned whether such transfers are constitu-
tional.85 The primary reason for concern over prisoner transfer treaties is
that they allow the transferring state to retain jurisdiction over any collat-
eral attacks on the foreign sentence.8 6 The United States effectively defers
to the foreign judgment on its citizen. Implicit to the transfer is the belief
that the foreign system has due process similar to American requirements,
a premise that some reject.87 The state receiving the prisoner is bound to
honor the judgment and sentence of the transferring state. Therefore, a
United States citizen convicted in Mexico and transferred to the United
States can challenge imprisonment, but is estopped by the treaty provi-
sions from challenging the conviction.
88
78. See supra notes 1-8 and accompanying text.
79. Treaty on the Execution of Penal Sentences, Nov. 25, 1976, U.S.-Mex, 28 U.S.T.
7399, T.I.A.S. No. 8718 (entered into force on Nov. 30, 1977) [hereinafter Transfer Treaty].
80. See Abraham Abramovsky, Transfer of Penal Sanctions Treaties: An Endangered Species,
24 VAN. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 449, 456 (1991).
81. Id.
82. Transfer Treaty, supra note 79, at 7401.
83. See Abramovsky, supra note 80. See also Ronald M. Emanuel, Note, Intervention of
Constitutional Powers: The Prisoner Transfer Treaties, 2 FLA. J. INT'L L. 203 (1986); Robert D.
Steele, The Impact ofRosada v. Civiletti on U.S. Prisoner Transfer Treaties, 21 VA. J. INT'L L. 131-
32 (1980).
84. Abramovsky, supra note 80 at 454-55. See also U.S. Citizens Imprisoned in Mexico: Hear-
ings before the Subcomm. on International Political and Military Affairs of the House Comm. on Inter-
national Relations, 94th Cong., 1st and 2d Sess. at 11-34 and 47-88 (describing the abuse of
U.S. citizens imprisoned in Mexico).
85. Emanuel, supra note 83 at 205.
86. Transfer Treaty, supra note 79, Art. VI, at 7406.
87. Emanuel, supra note 83, at 207-08.
88. Transfer Treaty, supra note 79, Art. VI, at 7406.
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B. Trevino-Casares v. U.S. Parole Commission89
1. Facts
Mr. Trevino-Casares, a United States citizen, was arrested on drug
charges in Mexico on January 13, 1989.90 He was convicted in Mexico and
sentenced to nine years.9 1 Pursuant to the Prisoner Transfer Treaty,92 he
was transferred to the United States on January 31, 1991. 9 3 The United
States Parole Commission determined that Mr. Trevino-Casares would
serve seventy-one months imprisonment and thirty-seven months of super-
vised release. 94 Because of the manner in which the United States Parole
Commission characterized their determination, Trevino-Casares asserted
that he was denied a substantial amount of earned and anticipated service
credits due under 18 U.S.C. § 4105.9 5
Mr. Trevino-Casares appealed the Commission's determination di-
rectly to the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit. He
asserted that the Commission erred in two ways: (1) by imposing a sen-
tence longer than the term of imprisonment imposed by Mexico in viola-
tion of 18 U.S.C. § 4106A(b) (1) (C); 96 and (2) by denying credit
accumulated against his sentence in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 4105(c) (1).
9 7
2. The Tenth Circuit's Opinion
The crux of the court's decision is that the Commission, by translat-
ing a foreign sentence into one for domestic enforcement, is in effect act-
ing as a district court.98 The court noted that translating the sentence is
the Commission's duty under 18 U.S.C. § 4106A(b) (1) (A) which states:
The United States Parole Commission shall, without unnecessary
delay, determine a release date and a period and conditions of
supervised release for an offender transferred to the United
States to serve a sentence of imprisonment, as though the of-
fender were convicted in a United States district court of a simi-
lar offense. 99
89. 992 F.2d 1068 (10th Cir. 1993).
90. Id. at 1069.
91. Id.
92. Transfer Treaty, supra note 79.
93. Trevino-Casares, 992 F.2d at 1069.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. "The combined periods of imprisonment and supervised release that result from
such determination [referring to the determination of a release date by the U.S. Parole Com-
mission] shall not exceed the term of imprisonment imposed by the foreign court on the
offender." 18 U.S.C. § 4106A(b)(1)(C)(1990).
97. "The transferred offender shall be entitled to all credits for good time, for labor, or
any other credit toward the service of the sentence which had been given by the transferring
country for time served as of the time of the transfer." Id. § 4105(c)(1) (1990).
98. The Court noted that its jurisdiction was limited as to the plaintiff's claims, but
because the two claims had analytical overlap, jurisdiction exited. It rejected the Commis-
sions contention that the appeal was procedurally inappropriate. Trevino-Casares, 992 F.2d at
1069.
99. 18 U.S.C. § 4106A(b) (1) (A) (1988).
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The court held that the Commission's translation was, in procedure,
substance, and effect, equivalent to the imposition of a federal sentence by
a district court, and therefore should be treated as such. 10 0 In support of
its holding, the court noted that 18 U.S.C. § 4106A(b) (2) (A)10 1 expressly
makes the Commission's determination directly appealable to the circuit
level.' 02 The court exercised its appellate jurisdiction through holding
that the Commission's determination was equivalent to a sentence by a
district court. This crucial holding allowed the court to hear Mr. Trevino-
Casares's first claim-that his sentence was in violation of the law.' 03 Ad-
ditionally, the court's review of the sentencing process was de novo.
0 4
Mr. Trevino-Casares' second claim involved the administration of ser-
vice credits, which was not part of the Commission's duty. Instead, credit
is calculated by the Bureau of Prisons. 105 Because the calculation of credit
involved the execution, rather than the imposition of a sentence, habeas
corpus review was the appropriate remedy for the second claim. 10 6 This
issue created a problem for the court because circuit courts of appeal do
not have original jurisdiction to consider habeas corpus petitions.' 0 7 The
court stated that although it did not have jurisdiction to decide the dis-
pute over the award of credit, the issue did overlap with the sentencing
which was properly within the court's jurisdiction.1
0 8
The next matter the court discussed was how to arrive at a proper
sentence for the petitioner. The proper length of the sentence was deter-
mined by the Commission to be one hundred eight months, commensu-
rate with the Mexican sentence of nine years. 109 The Commission did
reduce the petitioner's imprisonment to seventy-one months, followed by
thirty-seven months of supervised release, because he suffered permanent
physical damage due to abuse while in Mexican custody.
1 10
After determining that one hundred eight months was the appropri-
ate sentence, the court examined how the Commission characterized its
sentence and what effect that characterization had on the Bureau of Pris-
ons calculation of credit. The court found that the "Commission, evi-
dently with the full agreement of the Bureau of Prisons, denies its § 4106A
100. Trevino-Casares, 992 F.2d at 1069.
101. This section states, "The court of appeals shall decide and dispose of the appeal in
accordance with section 3742 of this title [referring to 18 U.S.C. § 3742] as though the deter-
mination appealed had been a sentence imposed by a United States district court." 18 U.S.C.
§ 4106A(b) (2) (B) (1990).
102. Trevino-Casares, 992 F.2d at 1070.
103. The Court's jurisdiction is derived from 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a)(1) (1988) which autho-
rizes appeal of sentences imposed in violation of the law.
104. United States v. Banashefski, 928 F.2d 349, 351 (10th Cir. 1991)(legal conclusions in
sentencing reviewed de novo, with due deference accorded application of law to underlying
facts).
105. 18 U.S.C. § 3624 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
106. Trevino-Casares, 992 F.2d at 1070.
107. Noriega-Sandoval v. U.S. I.N.S., 911 F.2d 258, 261 (9th Cir. 1990).
108. Trevino-Casares, 992 F.2d at 1070.
109. The sentencing guidelines, as applied by the Commission, would yield a result of
121-151 months for this offense, but pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 5Gl.1 the maximum 108 month
Mexican sentence was adopted. Trevino-Casares, 992 F.2d at 1070.
110. Id. at 1071.
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determination the status of a sentence for purposes of § 4105, leaving the
Bureau of Prisons nothing but the effectively superseded foreign sentence
to subtract the offender's service credits from."
1 1
The court determined that the Commission's interpretation was erro-
neous and held, instead, that the service credits should be subtracted from
the Commission's determination of time that the prisoner must remain
imprisoned in the United States.1 12 In support of this view, the court
noted that two express congressional commands were incorporated into
the statute.' 13 The first command was that the domestic sentence, includ-
ing both confinement and supervised release, may not exceed the length
of imprisonment imposed by the foreign state. 114 The second was that
transferred prisoners must receive the same treatment as other inmates
with respect to their domestic confinement.
1 5
The court concluded its opinion with an explanation of why its inter-
pretation was proper even in light of the deferential standard accorded to
administrative review. First, the statutes leave almost no ambiguity on the
issue of treatment of transferred prisoners. Second, even if ambiguity ex-
ists, the court has a duty to decide whether the Commission had advanced
a permissible construction of the statutes. In regard to the second issue,
the court stated that "the Commission's construction is both internally in-
consistent and impermissibly at odds with the evident intent of the statu-
tory scheme."
1 16
The court affirmed the Commission's determination of the length
and composition of petitioner's sentence and modified the legal status of
the Commission's determination of the sentence. This modification ne-
cessitated the application of service credits by the Bureau of Prisons; cred-
its which had previously been barred. The case was then ordered
transferred to the district court for a determination of the proper applica-
tion of credit pursuant to a habeas corpus review.
11 7
3. Analysis
In Trevino-Casares v. U.S. Parole Commission," 8 the Tenth Circuit was
primarily involved in statutory construction and interpretation of congres-
sional intent. The court's interpretation of the Prisoner Transfer Treaty
between the U.S. and Mexico also played a large role in the decision-mak-
ing process.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 1071-72.
113. Id.
114. 18 U.S.C. § 4106A(b) (1) (C) (1988). See also Transfer Treaty, supra note 79, Art.
V(3) at 7406.
115. "[A] [transferred] offender.., shall remain in the custody of the Attorney General
under the same conditions and for the same period of time as an offender who had been
committed to the custody of the Attorney General by a court of the United States ... . 18
U.S.C. § 4105(a) (1988).
116. Trevino-Casares, 992 F.2d at 1073.
117. The circuit court did not have original jurisdiction to determine the application of




The first difficult issue was whether jurisdiction existed for the court
to hear the claim. The court wisely decided, after considering the statu-
tory context, to treat the Commission's sentencing conversion as the legal
equivalent of a domestic sentence imposed by a district court. This inter-
pretation of the Commission's role was augmented by 18 U.S.C.
§ 4106A(b) (2) (A), which makes the Commission's determination directly
appealable to the circuit level. Therefore, the court's treatment of the
foreign sentence conversion as a domestic sentence issued by a district
court is logical and consistent with the express statutory language.
Some critics may argue that the court overstepped its authority in not
reviewing the administrative agency's decision under the normally defer-
ential arbitrary and capricious standard. However, in apparent anticipa-
tion of this point, the court noted that the statutory framework left almost
no ambiguity on the treatment of transferred prisoners. In essence, the
Commission had very little to interpret on its own initiative-Congress ex-
pressly set out its mandate. The court also noted that, even when ambigu-
ity does exist, courts have the authority to decide whether the
administrative agency has advanced a permissible construction of the stat-
utes. In answering the later question, the court characterized the Com-
mission's construction as inconsistent and contrary to Congress's express
intent.
Through this case, the court struck down the U.S. Parole Commis-
sion's convoluted interpretation of their statutory mandate to translate
foreign sentences into domestic sentences. Prior to Trevino, transferred
prisoners in the Tenth Circuit were denied earned service credits when
their foreign sentence was converted into a domestic sentence by the
Commission. Because the Commission refused to acknowledge that their
translation was a "sentence," the Bureau of Prisons had nothing to sub-
tract the prisoners acquired service credits from. The court replaced the
Commission's practice with a cogent interpretation of the relevant statutes
and treaty that accords well with the congressional intent, as revealed
through the statutory language.
The court's interpretation reconciles the treaty and statutes.1 19 More
importantly, the interpretation formulated by the Tenth Circuit treats
both prisoners sentenced domestically and by Mexican authorities the
same in regard to the application of service credits. Because of Trevino,
the Commission's translations will now be considered a sentence to which
the Bureau of Prisons must apply earned service credits. This decision is
more equitable than what existed under the Commission's prior interpre-
tation, where foreign sentenced prisoners were denied earned service
119. An alternate construction of the statutes and treaty was propounded recently by the
Fifth Circuit. See Cannon v. United States Dep't. ofJustice Parole Comm'n, 961 F.2d 82 (5th
Cir. 1992) (imposition of shorter sentences is also precluded because only the transferring
state has jurisdiction to modify sentences of its courts). See also Thorpe v. United States Pa-
role Comm'n, 902 F.2d 291 (5th Cir. 1990) (Commission does not impose a sentence, it
merely sets a release date).
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credits and effectively had to serve more time than their domestic
counterparts.
III. EXLINE v GuNT"R.32 0 IN CAMERA REVIEW OF SOCIAL SERVICE
RECORDS REQUIRED IN ACCORD WITH PENNSYLVANIA V.
RI7cHzE. 12 1
A. Background
In prosecutions for sexual assaults on children, one of the most criti-
cal issues is the reliability of the victim-the child witness. Information on
the child's reliability is extremely important to the defendant's case; how-
ever, access to crucial social service agency records may be hampered by
state confidentiality laws.
1 22
Pennsylvania v. Ritchie,123 decided by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1987,
is the seminal case on defendants' rights of access to records protected by
state confidentiality laws. In Ritchie, a state agency, the Pennsylvania Chil-
dren and Youth Services ("CYS"), had investigated children on an anony-
mous report of abuse. The files on this investigation were kept
confidential pursuant to Pennsylvania's statutory scheme.1 2 4 After the in-
vestigation, George Ritchie, the father of the children, was prosecuted for
rape, incest, and other sexual offenses against his twelve year old
daughter. 125
Ritchie attempted to subpoena the CYS file to help his defense. He
believed that the file might contain medical records, inconsistent state-
ments by his daughter or other exculpatory information. 126 CYS refused
to allow him access to the file, citing the Pennsylvania confidentiality stat-
ute. 12 7 The trial court refused to grant Ritchie access to the records in
dispute and Ritchie was subsequently convicted. 12 8 On appeal, however,
120. 985 F.2d 487 (10th Cir. 1993).
121. 480 U.S. 39 (1987).
122. For information on the reliability and credibility of child witnesses see Jean Mon-
toya, Something Not So Funny Happened on the Way to Conviction: The Pretrial Interrogation of Child
Witnesses, 35 ARiz. L. REv. 927 (1993); Steven Penrod et al., Special Issue on Child Sexual Abuse:
Children as Observers and Witnesses: The Empirical Data, 23 FAM. L.Q. 411 (1989); Therese L.
Fitzpatrick, Note, Innocent Until Proven Guilty: Shallow Words for the Falsely Accused in a Criminal
Prosecution for Child Sexual Abuse, 12 U. BRIDGEPORT L. REv. 175 (1991); Robin W. Morey,
Comment, The Competency Requirement for the Child Victim of Sexual Abuse: Must We Abandon It?
40 U. MtAMI L. REV. 245 (1985).
123. 480 U.S. at 39. For a general discussion of the impact of the Supreme Court's deci-
sion see Chris Hutton, Confrontation, Cross-examination and Discovery: A Bright Line Appears after
Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 33 S.D. L. REV. 437 (1988); Note, The Supreme Court, 1986 Term Lead-
ing Cases, 101 HARv. L. REv. 119 (1987). For a discussion of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
opinion see PennyJ. Rezet, Note, Criminal Procedure-Balancing Sixth Amendment Rights with the
Victim's Right to Confidentiality-Commonwealth v. Ritchie, 59 TEMP. L.Q. 715 (1986).
124. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. II § 2215(a) (5) (Purdon Supp. 1987), providing that CYS files
are confidential and access is permissible only to courts "of competent jurisdiction pursuant
to a court order" (recodified at PA. STAT. ANN. tit. XXIII § 6340 (a)(5) (Purdon 1991)).
125. The prosecution stemmed from events unconnected with the initial CYS investiga-
tion. See Commonwealth v. Ritchie, 502 A.2d 148, 159 (Pa. 1985).
126. Ritchie, 480 U.S. at 44.
127. Id. at 43.
128. Id. at 44.
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the Pennsylvania Superior Court overturned the conviction 129 and the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court later affirmed.1 30 The Pennsylvania
Supreme Court held that the confrontation clause of the Sixth Amend-
ment required allowing Ritchie's attorney access to the confidential child
abuse records compiled by CYS.1
3 1
The U.S. Supreme Court reversed the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's
order requiring full disclosure to Ritchie's attorney. In a plurality opin-
ion, the Court held that the right of confrontation secured by the Sixth
Amendment was only a trial right.1 3 2 The right of confrontation did not
allow pretrial discovery of confidential documents because discovery was
not part of the "trial."1 33 The plurality held that the Sixth Amendment's
confrontation clause merely guaranteed "an opportunity for effective
cross-examination, not cross-examination that is effective in whatever way
and to whatever extent, the defense might wish."
13 4
The Court used a due process analysis under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment instead of relying on the Sixth Amendment. It held that evidence
which was important to the defense could not be suppressed without viola-
tion of the Fourteenth Amendment. 13 5 The plurality decision further
held that an appropriate remedy would be for the trial court to review the
files in camera.13 6 If, after review, the trial court concluded there was a
reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the de-
fendant, the result of the proceeding would have been different, then a
new trial should be granted with all material evidence released to the
defendant.137
In Ritchie, the Court balanced the state of Pennsylvania's interest in
maintaining the confidentiality of CYS files with defendants' rights to have
access to evidence material to their defense.' 3 8 Had the Court rested its
decision on the Sixth Amendment's confrontation clause, a broad discov-
ery right would have been created. The right to access under the Sixth
Amendment would have been unfettered and would have subsumed the
state's confidentiality interest.13 9 Through its reliance on the Fourteenth
Amendment's Due Process Clause, the Court crafted a more narrowly tai-
lored remedy. The trial judge would conduct the in camera review and
determine what information was to be released. The Court decided this
129. Commonwealth v. Ritchie, 472 A.2d 220 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984).
130. Commonwealth v. Ritchie, 502 A.2d 148, 149 (Pa. 1985).
131. Id. at 153 (citing U.S. CONST. amend. VI.).
132. Ritchie, 480 U.S. at 52.
133. Id. at 53.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 56.
136. Id. at 60.
137. Id. at 57 (citing U.S. v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985)).
138. Ritchie, 480 U.S. at 60-61.
139. "To allow full disclosure to defense counsel . . . would sacrifice unnecessarily the
Commonwealth's compelling interest in protecting its child abuse information.... Neither
precedent nor common sense require such a result." Id. at 60-61.
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mechanism would properly balance the confidentiality interests with the
right to access.
140
B. Exline v. Gunter'
4 1
1. Facts
Larry Exline was convicted in October 1986 in the El Paso County
District Court of one count of sexual assault on a child. 142 On appeal,
Exline argued that the trial court erred in refusing to allow discovery of
the victim's social service child abuse records. 143 The Colorado Court of
Appeals ruled that Exline had failed to make the required offer of proof
for the records and that the denial did not violate his constitutional right
of confrontation.144 The court of appeals affirmed the conviction 145 and
the Colorado Supreme Court denied certiorari.
14 6
After the denial of certiorari by the Colorado Supreme Court, Exline
filed a habeas corpus petition in federal district court. 147 Exline claimed
that the trial court should have reviewed the social service records in cam-
era, and that its refusal to do so violated his rights under the due process
and confrontation clauses. 1 48 .
The federal district court agreed with Exline and held that Exline's
right to due process was violated. The court then ordered the El Paso
County District Court to conduct an in camera review of the social service
records to determine whether they contained information that may have
been necessary to Exline's defense.
1 49
On October 10, 1991 the state court issued its certificate of compli-
ance, as required by the federal district court.' 50 In the certificate, the
state court asserted that it had provided Exline with access to a juvenile
dependency and neglect file. The state court found that Exline had failed
to examine this file and make the required showing of "particularized
need" for the social service records at issue. 151 The court also found, after
conducting the in camera review, that four documents in the social service
records may have been necessary to the defense. 152 However, the state
court further held that Exline's failure to show particularized need obvi-
ated the need for any remedial action in his favor by the court.153
The federal district court, after reviewing the certificate of compli-
ance, ordered the state court to conduct an in camera review of the
140. Id. at 60.
141. 985 F.2d 487 (10th Cir. 1993).
142. Id. at 488.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 488 (citing People v. Exline, 775 P.2d 48 (Colo. Ct. App. 1988)).










records and determine whether any documents "probably would have
changed the outcome of Exline's trial," and, if so, he was to be granted a
new trial.154 However, if the nondisclosure of the information was harm-
less beyond a reasonable doubt then the state court was not required to
take any further action.' 55 The federal district court relied on the holding
in Pennsylvania v. Ritchie156 to fashion its remedy for the due process viola-
tion. The State of Colorado appealed the federal district court's ruling to
the Tenth Circuit.
2. The Tenth Circuit's Opinion
The Tenth Circuit's decision adhered closely to the U.S. Supreme
Court's holding in Pennsylvania v. Ritchie.15 7 The court upheld both the
federal district court's ruling that Exline's due process rights had been
violated and the federal district court's Ritchie-derived remedy. In arriving
at its decision, the court made a variety of comparisons between Ritchie
and Exline. First, the court explained that the facts of Ritchie were similar
to the instant case because both defendants were charged with similar of-
fenses. In both Ritchie and Exline, the defendants made offers of proof that
the social service child abuse records were relevant and necessary to their
defense. 158 In Ritchie, the defendant argued that he should have access to
the records because they might contain the names of favorable witnesses
or other exculpatory evidence.1 59
The court agreed with the federal district court's finding that Exline's
offer of proof was equally as strong as the one in Ritchie, if not more spe-
cific. 16° Exline's offer of proof stated: "[A]nything in those ... reports
relating to credibility ... would be crucial to the defense ... they should
be produced to the Court and then let the court decide.., which ones we
would be entitled to."1 61
The Tenth Circuit also reviewed the applicable Colorado law that al-
lows access by a court to otherwise confidential child abuse records. After
reviewing Colorado Revised Statutes § 19-10-115(1) (a), (2)(a), (2)(f),1
6 2
154. Id. at 488-89.
155. Ritchie, 480 U.S. at 58.
156. Extine, 985 F.2d at 488.
157. Ritchie, 480 U.S. at 39.
158. Extine, 985 F.2d at 489.
159. Id. (citing Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 44 (1987)).
160. Extine, 985 F.2d at 490.
161. Id.
162. CoLo. REv. STAT. § 19-10-115(1)(a)(1986) states that records of child abuse in Colo-
rado, "[e]xcept as provided in this section ... shall be confidential and shall not be public
information."
CoLO. REv. STAT. § 19-10-115(2)(1986) details the agencies which can gain access to
confidential child abuse records. Subsection (a) provides that law enforcement agencies and
prosecutors investigating abuse reports may have access. Most important to the Tenth Cir-
cuit were the provisions of subsection (2) (f) allowing access:
A court, upon its finding that access to such records [referring to confidential child
abuse records, as defined in section (1) (a)] may be necessary for determination of
an issue before such court, but such access shall be limited to in camera inspections
unless the court determines that public disclosure of the information contained
therein is necessary for the resolution of an issue then pending before it....
19941
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the court concluded that the statutes explicitly provided that the state dis-
trict court could conduct in camera reviews of such records if necessary.
In furtherance of the view that the Ritchie and Exline cases were not distin-
guishable on statutory grounds, the court commented that the Colorado
statute which governed Exline's request was similar to the Pennsylvania
statute involved in Ritchie.
163
As additional support the court cited Hophinson v. Shillinger,164 in
which the Tenth Circuit had previously held that "although a defendant
could not point to specific exculpatory information in records he had
never seen, he was entitled to an in camera inspection of those records
under Ritchie."
165
In concluding its opinion, the Tenth Circuit used language that dis-
paraged the state district court's recalcitrant behavior towards the federal
district court's orders.1 66 The court sternly stated that after the case was
returned to the state court for the in camera review, "the state court was
not asked to determine whether it should or should not review the social
service record, and it was not asked to re-interpret what had occurred at
the time of the original hearing .... [T] he state court has yet to make the
findings required by Pennsylvania v. Ritchie."
167
3. Analysis
The court closely compared the facts of Exline to Ritchie. The court
compared the offenses, the statutory schemes and the offers of proof
made in both cases and concluded that the cases were not distinguishable
on any of these substantive grounds.
The State of Colorado, however, argued that Exline's habeas corpus
petition should have been dismissed because he failed to show particular-
ized need for the social service records. The Tenth Circuit could have
used this narrow interpretation of "need" to deny Exline's habeas relief.
Instead, the court found that Exline's offer of proof was more particular-
ized than that offered in Ritchie. The court took an expansive view of the
fights propounded in Ritchie and granted Exline relief, refusing to reverse
this case on irrelevant nuances and cosmetic differences.
The federal district court had held that Exline's due process rights
under the Fourteenth Amendment were violated by the state trial court's
refusal to conduct the in camera review required by Ritchie. Specifically,
Exline was denied the right of access to documents under the control of
the state's social service agency. Exline had a right to social service docu-
ments that could have had a material impact on his defense, even those
protected by a confidentiality statute. Under the remedy created by
Ritchie, it was the trial court's duty to conduct an in camera review and
COLO. REv. STAT. § 19-10-115(2)(f) (1986).
163. Extine, 985 F.2d at 490.
164. 866 F.2d 1185 (10th Cir. 1989).
165. Exiine, 985 F.2d at 490-91.




determine whether any of the documents in question were material. The
state trial court's refusal to review the documents, and later its obstinate
refusal to rule whether its nondisclosure was harmless beyond a reason-
able doubt, initially denied Exline this crucial access and later denied him
a new trial with access to the material documents.
The U.S. Supreme Court crafted the proper remedy in Ritchie. The
Tenth Circuit correctly applied that remedy in Exline. The Tenth Circuit
directed the state district court to determine whether the records con-
tained information that likely would have changed the outcome of Ex-
line's trial. If the state trial court had found that the outcome would have
been the same, or that the nondisclosure was harmless beyond a reason-
able doubt, then no further remedial action on Exline's behalf was neces-
sary. If the state trial court held otherwise, Exline deserved a new trial.
For the Tenth Circuit to have ordered the trial court to do otherwise,
would have amounted to a subversion of Ritchie-a temptation which the
court wisely resisted.
CONCLUSION
During 1993, the Tenth Circuit brought its law on blanket strip search
policies into conformity with the majority of the other circuits. Chapman
and Cottrell removed any ambiguity about the unconstitutionality of these
blanket policies. Trevino-Casares was used by the Tenth Circuit as a vehicle
for reforming the calculations made by the United States Parole Commis-
sion and the Bureau of Prisons in translating foreign sentences into do-
mestic sentences. The Tenth Circuit construed ambiguous statutory and
treaty provisions and created a feasible framework for sentencing transla-
tion. This framework, drawn from discordant statutory and treaty lan-
guage, is cogent and seems to fit the discernible legislative goals. In Exline,
the circuit closely followed the U.S. Supreme Court case of Ritchie and
relied on a due process analysis as the basis for access to confidential social
service child abuse records.
One commonality among these cases was the Tenth Circuit's guarded
view of governmental power. First, the circuit curtailed the ability of po-
lice to conduct strip searches of misdemeanants. Second, the circuit inter-
preted the Prisoner Transfer Treaty and benefitted transferred prisoners
who had previously been denied credit against their domestic sentences.
Finally, the circuit limited the ability of state governments to maintain the




CRIMINAL PROCEDURE SURVEY: SEARCH AND SEIZURE
INTRODUCTION
In criminal procedure jurisprudence during the 1993 term, the Tenth
Circuit brought its search and seizure law in line with precedent from
other circuits and went beyond its own precedent. In United States v.
Brown1 the court formally adopted the warrant severability doctrine.
Under this doctrine, already the law in eight other circuits, reviewing
courts can sever search warrants which have both constitutional and un-
constitutional provisions. The Tenth Circuit, however, provided no appar-
ent standards to govern lower courts' application of the doctrine. In
United States v. Butler2 the Tenth Circuit court substantially confused set-
tled precedent and trivialized the exigent circumstances exception to the
warrant requirement. In Butler, the court upheld a plain view seizure
where the officer was not legally present under any prior theory. This
broadening of arresting officers' ability to immediately enter the home,
and presumably other areas, owned by an arrested individual cannot be
squared with any existing law under the Fourth Amendment.
This Survey discusses the warrant severability doctrine and the Tenth
Circuit's adoption of the doctrine in United States v. Brown, concluding that
this case provides no meaningful direction to the trial courts in applying
the doctrine. Part II analyzes United States v. Butler in the context of the
exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement, finding that
the case substantially broadens and trivializes the exception.
I. ADOPTION OF THE WARRANT SEVERABILITy DOCTRINE
A. Background
The Fourth Amendment requires that search warrants describe with
particularity both the place to be searched and the items to be seized.
3
This requirement leaves little discretion in the hands of the officer execut-
ing the warrant.4 The Tenth Circuit elaborated on this specificity require-
ment by stating that the search must be "confined in scope to particularly
described evidence relating to a specific crime for which there is demon-
strated probable cause." 5 Prior to the adoption of the warrant severability
doctrine, if any part of a warrant did not conform to the Fourth Amend-
1. 984 F.2d 1074 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 204 (1993).
2. 980 F.2d 619 (10th Cir. 1992).
3. The Fourth Amendment provides "no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause
... and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized." U.S. CONsT. amend. IV. See also Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 467
(1971) (particularity requirement prevents a "general, exploratory rummaging in a person's
belongings").
4. See Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 196 (1927).
5. Voss v. Bergsgaard, 774 F.2d 402, 404 (10th Cir. 1985).
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ment mandate, the entire warrant was invalid. Any evidence seized under
the warrant's authority was inadmissible at trial. 6
The warrant severability doctrine avoids the exclusion of evidence ob-
tained under a valid warrant provision. The doctrine allows the court to
sever the unconstitutional portion of the warrant from the constitutional
portion and suppress only that evidence which officers seize under the
unconstitutional provisions. 7 The doctrine is consistent with the purpose
of the exclusionary rule.8 The rule deters officers from illegally obtaining
evidence by excluding that evidence from trial, thereby ensuring that of-
ficers do not profit from constitutional violations.9 The doctrine, however,
still allows consideration of evidence which officers constitutionally
obtain.
1 0
When a court is considering severing a warrant, the foremost question
is whether the court may sever the warrant at all. Because the Fourth
Amendment prohibits general warrants, a court must decide either that it
can sever the constitutional portions of the warrant or that the unconstitu-
tional portions so dominate the warrant that the court must consider the
warrant as general and therefore unseverable. 1 The Supreme Court ad-
dressed such a situation in Lo-Ji Sales, Inc. v. New York 12 In Lo-Ji Sales, a
warrant authorized the police to search an adult bookstore and to seize
two adult films and "'[t]he following items that the Court independently
[on examination] has determined to be possessed in violation of Article
235 of the Penal Law . . . . ' " There were no items listed. The Town
Justice accompanied the police to the bookstore in order to determine
which items violated the code. At the bookstore, an investigator wrote into
6. Rosemarie A. Lynskey, Note, A Middle Ground Approach to the Exclusionary Remedy:
Reconciling the Redaction Doctrine with United States v. Leon, 41 VAND. L. Rav. 811, 813 (1988).
Some commentators criticized the severity of invalidating the entire warrant for minor er-
rors. See 2 WAYNE R. LAFAvE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TRATssE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
§ 4.6(f), at 258 (2d ed. 1987).
7. Prior to the 1993 Tenth Circuit term, eight circuits had adopted some version of the
severability doctrine. See United States v. George, 975 F.2d 72, 79 (2d Cir. 1992); United
States v. Blakeney, 942 F.2d 1001, 1027 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 646 (1991), and cert.
denied, 112 S. Ct. 881 (1992); United States v. Gomez-Soto, 723 F.2d 649, 654 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 466 U.S. 977 (1984); United States v. Fitzgerald, 724 F.2d 633, 636-37 (8th Cir. 1983)
(en banc), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 950 (1984); United States v. Riggs, 690 F.2d 298, 300 (1st Cir.
1982); United States v. Christine, 687 F.2d 749, 754 (3d Cir. 1982); In re Search Warrant
Dated July 4, 1977, 667 F.2d 117, 130 (D.C. Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 926 (1982);
United States v. Cook, 657 F.2d 730, 735 (5th Cir. 1981). The Seventh Circuit, while not
specifically addressing the warrant severability issue, construes warrants more narrowly than
the warrants' language requires in order to avoid finding the warrants overbroad. Donovan
v. Fall River Foundry Co., 712 F.2d 1103, 1111 (7th Cir. 1983). The Fourth Circuit has not
addressed the issue of warrant severability. For an example of the Tenth Circuit's approach
to this problem prior to Brown, see infra notes 31-32 and accompanying text.
8. John W. Kastelic, Project, The Exclusionary Rule, Fourteenth Annual Review of Criminal




11. Charles L. Cantrell, Search Warrants: A View of the Process, 14 OKLA. CITY. U. L. Rav. 1,
67-68 (1989). See also Kastelic, supra note 8, at 397 n.832.
12. 442 U.S. 319 (1979).
13. Id. at 321-23.
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the warrant the titles of the films, magazines and coin-operated film pro-
jectors which the Town Justice found obscene after viewing.
14
The Court held that the warrant was similar to the general warrants
the Fourth Amendment sought to prohibit.1 5 Beyond the two films listed,
the warrant allowed the officials conducting the search total discretionary
power in determining what they should seize. Of key importance to the
Court's invalidation of the entire warrant was the fact that "the search be-
gan and progressed pursuant to the sweeping open-ended authorization
in the warrant."1 6 The search was not initially limited to a search for the
specific items listed; rather, the discovery of additional "illegal" items in-
creased the scope of the search.
17
In reaching its decision in Brown, the Tenth Circuit majority relied
heavily on United States v. George 8 and United States v. LeBron.' 9 In George,
the Second Circuit held severance possible for a warrant which provided
for the search and seizure of a number of specific items 20 and "any other
evidence relating to the commission of a crime." 21 The officers seized,
under the plain view doctrine, 22 a loaded firearm which the defendant, a
convicted felon, could not legally possess.
2 3
The court held that the warrant's "any other evidence" provision was
overbroad. 24 On remand, the court directed the trial court to consider
whether severance of the warrant was appropriate.2 5 If severance was
available, the evidence seized under the plain view doctrine was admissi-
ble.2 6 The court cautioned, however, that the doctrine was inapplicable if
(1) the warrant was devoid of sufficiently particular language; (2) the war-
rant was not meaningfully severable; or (3) the constitutional portions
made up an "insignificant or tangential" portion of the warrant.
27
In United States v. LeBron, the Eighth Circuit majority held severable a
warrant which described three stolen items with particularity but in addi-
tion authorized the search and seizure of "any other property, description
14. Id. at 323.
15. Id. at 325.
16. Id. at 326.
17. Id.
18. 975 F.2d 72 (2d Cir. 1992).
19. 729 F.2d 533 (8th Cir. 1984).
20. The list included "1 [blurgundy purse, I burgundy shoulder bag, credit cards, per-
sonal papers, and ID of Dawn Wood. Misc. photos, keys to Honda motorcycle, dark attache
case containing McDonalds management material, McDonalds uniform Handgun, workboot
of similar design to plaster cast . " George, 975 F.2d at 74.
21. Id.
22. In order for evidence to be admissible under the plain view doctrine, there are two
requirements: first, that the officer was lawfully present when he observed the evidence; and
second, that the officer immediately upon viewing the evidence had probable cause to be-
lieve that it was incriminating. For a more complete description of the plain view doctrine,
see infta notes 90-93 and accompanying text.
23. Geoge, 975 F.2d at 75.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 80.
26. Id. at 79.
27. Id. at 79-80.
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unknown, for which there exists probable cause to believe it stolen."2 8
The court found this clause unconstitutional.2 9 The police seized all three
items described in the valid portion of the warrant. Weapons the officials
later seized were not admissible under the plain view doctrine because the
officers were no longer legally present under the warrant.
3 0
Prior to Brown, the Tenth Circuit indicated a general approval of the
warrant severability doctrine, even though the court never explicitly
adopted it. In United States v. Leafy,31 for example, the Tenth Circuit
noted in dictum that the severability doctrine was a possible remedy to
retain valid portions of a warrant.
32
B. Tenth Circuit Opinion: United States v. Brown
33
On January 29, 1991, a detective obtained a search warrant (Warrant
I) based on his affidavit which stated two primary grounds for probable
cause.3 4 First, two people at the defendant's house had told an informant
they stole and sold vehicles and they had offered to sell the informant
other goods well below their fair value.3 5 Second, the detective himself
observed an individual at the defendant's house working on a dismantled
truck with a cutting torch.3 6 The detective also observed a second truck
which the informant had stated was stolen.
3 7
Warrant I, a state warrant, authorized a search for a large number of
specific vehicle parts and other items,3 8 but included a final sentence au-
thorizing the seizure of "[a] ny other item which the Officers determine or
have reasonable belief is stolen while executing this search warrant."
3 9
The warrant authorized a maximum time of sixteen hours but the search
actually lasted fifty-one hours. On February 7, 1991, after the detective
and other officers had executed Warrant I, the detective applied for a sec-
28. 729 F.2d at 535-36.
29. Id. at 537.
30. Id. at 538-39.
31. 846 F.2d 592 (10th Cir. 1988).
32. Id. at 606, n.25.
33. 984 F.2d 1074 (10th Cir. 1993).
34. Id. at 1075.
35. Id. at 1075-76.
36. Id. at 1076.
37. Id.
38. The enumerated items included:
Vehicle parts to include the following, but not limited to: Bumpers, grills, fenders,
hoods, cabs, dashes, truck beds, engines, transmissions, drive shafts, frames, rear
ends, springs, steering parts, seats and other interior parts, VIN plates, titles, vehicle
registrations, blank registration forms, bills of sale, blank titles, drive-out stickers,
broadcast sheets, EPA stickers, windows, doors, tires, rims and truck bed toolboxes.
Tools or toolboxes which are stolen or contain tools that can be used to disassemble
or reassemble any vehicle, welders and cutting torches, air compressors, computers,
computer components, photocopy machines, firearms, protective devices, carpeting
which also may be stolen.
Id.
39. Id. For an explanation of why this language is not merely an authorization of plain




ond state search warrant (Warrant II).40 The detective listed items officers
observed while executing Warrant I which were not specifically described
in the warrant.4 1 Warrant II authorized the seizure of specific property,
4 2
but also included a catch-all authorization to seize "any other item which
the Officers have determined or have reason to believe is stolen, while
executing this warrant."
43
While executing Warrant II, the officers smelled methamphetamine
in the house and, in fact, found a laboratory in the garage. 44 Based on
that information, the officers obtained a federal search warrant (Warrant
III) and executed it on the same day.45 The evidence secured under War-
rant III led to the defendant's conviction for conspiracy to manufacture
methamphetamine.
4 6
The defendant appealed, challenging the district court's denial of his
motion to suppress all evidence the officers seized under the warrants.
4 7
The defendant claimed that Warrants I and II were overbroad. Since the
officers' observations while executing Warrants I and II formed the sole
probable cause basis for Warrant III, the evidence seized under Warrant
III was also inadmissible as the "fruit" of the unconstitutionally broad first
two warrants. 48 The Tenth Circuit affirmed the conviction, holding that
the unconstitutionally broad final sentences of Warrants I and II were sev-
erable from the sufficiently particular list of items. Therefore, the evi-
dence seized under Warrant III was not the fruit of illegal warrants.
49
1. Majority Opinion
Judge Paul J. Kelly, writing for the majority, began by addressing
whether the warrants in question were sufficiently particular to satisfy the
Fourth Amendment. The majority noted that both Warrants I and II spe-
cifically described a number of objects to be seized, 50 but assumed argu-
endo that the final sentences under those warrants were not descriptive,
did not adequately limit the officers' discretion, and were therefore
unconstitutional.
5 1
The majority held that the final sentences of Warrants I and II were
severable from the constitutionally adequate portions of those warrants.
52
40. Id. at 1076.
41. Id.
42. Warrant II provided for the seizure of, "a Quasar Microwave . . . A brown Cedar
chest that is faded on the top lid and has a tray on the inside, approximately 3' wide and 4' in






48. Id. In Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963), the Supreme Court held that
evidence obtained by exploitation of a constitutional violation was tainted "fruit of the poi-
sonous tree" and was inadmissible. Id. at 488.
49. Brown, 984 F.2d at 1078.
50. See supra notes 38 and 42.
51. Brown, 984 F.2d at 1077 n.1.
52. Id. at 1078.
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The majority further held that the severed warrants provided a lawful basis
for the officers' presence in the defendant's home; therefore, the officers'
observations while on the premises provided the probable cause for the
additional warrants. 53 Under the severed Warrant I, the state officers were
legally present in the defendant's home when they observed the stolen
items described in Warrant II. Similarly, they were legally in the defend-
ant's home under the severed Warrant II when they smelled the
methamphetamine. Warrant III, which was based on the smell of
methamphetamine, was therefore valid.
5 4
2. Dissenting Opinion
Judge Seth's dissent acknowledged that warrant severance is a proper
remedy, but argued that in this case the overbroad language "so tainted
the entire warrant that severance is notjustified."55 Because Warrant I was
"so tainted," the officers were not lawfully on the defendant's property
while executing that warrant. Warrants II and III were therefore illegal as
the fruit of the invalid Warrant 1.56
Much of the dissent focused on the overbroad language of Warrant I.
The dissent asserted that the court could not construe the overbroad lan-
guage as authorizing plain view seizures, 57 nor could the court argue that
the officers were lawfully on the premises under the "good faith" excep-
tion 58 in order to validate any of the warrants. 59 The dissent pointed out
that while Warrant I authorized a search on January 29, 1991, between
6:00 a.m. and 10:00 p.m., the actual search lasted at least fifty-one hours
and did not end until January 31, 1991.60 In addition, officers invited
many townspeople, whose property had been stolen, onto the defendant's
property in order to identify and claim their property.
6 1
As a result of the overbroad scope and extraordinary duration of the
search, the dissent argued that Warrant I more closely resembled a gen-
eral warrant than a warrant with both constitutional and overbroad por-
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Broum, 984 F.2d at 1078 (Seth, J., dissenting).
56. See id.
57. Id. at 1079. The plain view doctrine requires that the officer have probable cause to
believe the item is stolen in order to seize it, whereas the warrant authorized seizure where
the officer had only a "reason to believe" the item was stolen. Id. See also Horton v. Califor-
nia, 496 U.S. 128 (1990) (discussing the requirements necessary to apply the plain view
doctrine).
58. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (holding that, under the "good faith excep-
tion," evidence obtained by officers acting in reasonable reliance on a search warrant ulti-
mately found invalid is admissible).
59. Broun, 984 F.2d at 1080-81. The dissent noted that Warrant I was so "facially and
grossly overbroad" that no officer could have understood it to give guidelines as to what that
officer could seize. Since there could be no reasonable reliance on such a facially defective
warrant, the good faith exception from United States v. Leon could not apply in this case. Id. at
1080.
60. Id. In addition to the large number of tools and auto parts seized, the officers also
took a fishing reel, turquoise stones, Christmas wreaths, Christmas lights and a bug sprayer.
Id.
61. Id. at 1079.
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tions.62 The dissent stated that Warrant I was indistinguishable from the
general warrant in Lo-Ji Sales63 which the Supreme Court held unconstitu-
tional. Warrants II and III were therefore tainted6 by the unconstitution-
ality of Warrant I, and were not valid under any other grounds.6 5
C. Analysis
The court's adoption of the warrant severability doctrine was a pru-
dent decision which brought Tenth Circuit jurisprudence in line with all
circuits that have specifically considered this point of law. 66 The doctrine
is a useful tool which, when correctly applied, avoids suppression of le-
gally-obtained evidence when the warrant is defective due to technical
oversight or overbroad, unjustified authorizations to search. When con-
sidering whether a warrant should be severed, however, it is important to
remember the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against general warrants.
While the language of Warrant I in Brown resembled t he language of war-
rants which other courts of appeals have severed and held valid,6 7 the re-
markable duration of the search in Brown makes it a troublesome case for
the adoption of the severability doctrine. Trial courts will have little gui-
dance in determining how excessive a search's duration must be before
that execution renders a warrant unseverable.
As the majority correctly noted, the language of Warrant I was similar
to many other warrants which courts have severed. In fact, the list of spe-
cific items in Warrant I was more extensive than the lists in many of the
warrants which led to the adoption of the severability doctrine in other
circuits. 6 8 While Warrant I certainly contained overbroad language, it was
not so facially deficient as to appear general in nature when compared
with other warrants which courts have held severable.
The execution of the warrant, however, makes its severance more
problematic. As the dissent noted, the search under Warrant I was to last
for no more than sixteen hours.69 That figure represented the magis-
trate's determination of a reasonable time allotment to search not only for
the enumerated items, but also for the additional "stolen" items the major-
ity in Brown found the officers could not constitutionally seize. 70 Because
the actual search lasted more than three times the stated time limit, the
officers involved were operating largely under the authority of the over-
broad portion of the warrant.
62. Id. at 1082.
63. Lo-Ji Sales, Inc. v. New York, 442 U.S. 319 (1979).
64. Brown, 984 F.2d at 1082. See supra note 48 and accompanying text for a discussion of
the exclusion of tainted evidence.
65. See id. at 1081.
66. See cases cited supra note 7.
67. See supra text accompanying notes 18-27.
68. See supra notes 20 and 28 and accompanying text.
69. Brown, 984 F.2d at 1080.
70. Id.
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The search in Brown somewhat parallels the search in Lo-Ji Sales, Inc. v.
New York, 71 where' the sufficiently particular portion of the warrant com-
prised a negligible portion of the scope of the total warrant.72 That is, the
sufficiently particular portion of Warrant I in Brown authorized a relatively
small portion of the duration of the search. 73 The search in Brown dif-
fered from that of Lo-Ji Sales which was merely an effort directed at seizing
whatever material the Town Justice deemed as violative of the penal
code. 74 The Lo-Ji warrant, as the search demonstrated, never had any le-
gitimate, particularized aspect.75 Under Warrant I in Brown, however, the
officers devoted substantial time to the discovery of the particular enumer-
ated items. They did not search exclusively under the overbroad lan-
guage. 76 Thus, at least a portion of Warrant I, both on its face and in its
execution, fell within constitutional requirements, and Lo-Ji Sales is
inapposite.
United States v. George7 7 is more useful in this context. The warrant in
George was more facially vague than the Warrant I in Brown. While the
court in George did not decide whether to sever the warrant at issue, it
noted that severance might not be appropriate in a case where the suffi-
ciently particular portions of a warrant composed only an "insignificant or
tangential" portion of the warrant.78 Warrant I in Brown appears to be a
warrant where, in light of the search's duration, the enumerated items
bordered on being insignificant.
In addition, United States v. LeBron79 specifically held that while
searching under an overbroad portion of a severable warrant, the police
are not legally present for the purpose of the plain view or other doc-
trines. 80 The correct question in evaluating Brown is, at what point did the
officers complete the search for sufficiently particularized items under
Warrant I? The majority did not ask that question, nor did it explain why
the excessive duration of the search did not render the warrant
unseverable.
The problem with the result in Brown is not that it adopted the war-
rant severability doctrine; the doctrine itself is useful when correctly ap-
plied. The main problem is that the Brown majority did not examine the
execution of Warrant I. Rather, the majority based its holding purely on
the language of the warrant.8 1 The majority therefore did not address the
proper limits of the warrant severability doctrine. As a result, trial courts
will lack sufficient guidance in determining whether they may properly
71. 442 U.S. at 325.
72. Id.
73. Brown, 984 F.2d at 1082 (Seth, J., dissenting).
74. See supra text accompanying notes 12-17.
75. Lo-Ji Sales, 442 U.S. at 326 (the search began and progressed pursuant to the sweep-
ing, open-ended authorization in the warrant).
76. See Brown, 984 F.2d at 1076.
77. 975 F.2d 72 (2d Cir. 1992).
78. Id. at 79-80.
79. 729 F.2d 533 (8th Cir. 1984).
80. Id. at 537-38. See also infra notes 90-93 and accompanying text.
81. Brown, 984 F.2d at 1077-78.
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sever a warrant.82 With Brown as a guide, trial courts will rarely look be-
yond the language of a warrant to determine whether the warrant was
properly executed.
II. THE TRIVIALIZATION OF THE EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES EXCEPTION TO
THE WARRANT REQUIREMENT
A. Background
Under the Fourth Amendment, warrantless searches and seizures in-
side a home are presumptively unreasonable. 83 Absent consent8 4 or exi-
gent circumstances, a state officer may not enter a person's house unless
the officer possesses a warrant.85 In the absence of a warrant or exigent
circumstances, any evidence seized as a result of the illegal entry is inad-
missible at trial.
86
The Supreme Court has grouped exigent circumstances into several
categories: officers responding to in emergency,8 7 officers in hot pursuit
of a fleeing felon, 88 or officers acting to prevent destruction or removal of
evidence.8 9 These exigent circumstances represent exceptions to the war-
rant requirement and should be as narrowly construed as possible.90
An officer who is in a person's home without a warrant, but whose
presence is supported by an exception to the warrant requirement, for
example, an exigent circumstance, may seize some evidence. Such evi-
dence must be in plain view from the officer's lawful position and the
officer must immediately have probable cause to believe the evidence is
incriminating.9 1 Thus, the officer must be lawfully present, by warrant or
82. This lack of guidance for lower courts concerning which warrants are severable is a
prevalent problem among jurisdictions which have adopted the severability doctrine. See
Mark S. Halpern, Comment, Redaction-the Alternative to the Total Suppression of Evidence Seized
Pursuant to a Partially Invalid Search Warrant, 57 TEMP. L.Q. 77, 79, 91-92 (1984).
83. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586 (1980). The Court further stated "[t]he
Fourth Amendment protects the individual's privacy in a variety of settings. In none is the
zone of privacy more clearly defined than when bounded by the unambiguous physical
dimensions of an individual's home-a zone that finds its roots in clear and specific constitu-
tional terms . . . ." Id. at 589.
84. See, e.g., Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973). Consent must be volun-
tary, but the consenting party does not have to know that he can refuse to consent. Id. at
248-49.
85. Payton, 445 U.S. at 590.
86. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 393, 398 (1914). The Supreme Court held that
the exclusionary rule applies to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. Mapp v.
Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 657 (1961).
87. See Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 326 (1987).
88. Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298-299 (1967).
89. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770-71 (1966).
90. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967). The burden of demonstrating
that exigent circumstances exist is on the prosecution. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752,
762 (1969); see generally Steven D. Allison, Project, Exigent Circumstances, Twenty-Sond Annual
Review of Criminal Procedure: United States Supreme Court and Courts of Appeals 1991-199Z 81
GEo. L.J. 853, 902-10 (1993) (discussing the limits of exigent circumstances).
91. Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 136-37 (1990).
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otherwise, 92 in order to invoke the plain view doctrine to legitimize a
seizure.
93
The Supreme Court ostensibly created a new exception to the warrant
requirement in Washington v. Chrisman.94 In Chrisman a campus police of-
ficer stopped the defendant's roommate and asked to see the roommate's
identification. 95 The roommate was drinking and the officer suspected
that he was underage. The roommate had no identification and asked
that the officer allow him to return to his room to obtain it.96 The officer
accompanied the roommate to the room and, while waiting in the thresh-
old of the room, observed marijuana seeds in the room.97 He entered the
room and seized the marijuana.
98
The Court held that an officer has the right to monitor the move-
ments of an arrested person in order "to ensure his own [the officer's]
safety."99 Under those circumstances, there was no requirement of exi-
gent circumstances for the officer to enter the room without a warrant.
Thus, the officer's presence in the room, and therefore the plain view
seizure of the marijuana, were legal.' 0 0
Courts generally have interpreted Chrisman to stand for the proposi-
tion that after a lawful arrest, an arrestee who invites the arresting officer
to accompany him to his home or requests to enter his home grants the
officer a lawful presence in the home.' 0 ' Without the arrestee's invitation
or request that he be allowed to enter his home, the officer must demon-
strate either exigent circumstances or a valid warrant in order to be law-
fully in the home.
10 2
Prior to Chrisman, the Tenth Circuit had addressed the limits of exi-
gent circumstances in United States v. Anthon.10 3 In Anthon the defendant
was arrested outside his hotel room when he was wearing only swimming
92. In Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325 (1990), the Court held that officers may conduct a
protective sweep incident to an in-home arrest provided they have a "reasonable belief based
on specific and articulable facts that the area to be swept harbors an individual posing a
danger to those on the arrest scene." Id. at 337. The protective sweep is not a full search. Id.
at 335.
93. See Steven G. Davison, Warrantless Investigative Seizures of Real and Tangible Personal
Property by Law Enforcement Officers, 25 Am. CRIM. L. REv. 577, 604-605 (1988).
94. 455 U.S. 1 (1982).
95. Id. at 3.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 3-4.
98. Id. at 4.
99. Id. at 7 (emphasis added). The Court also noted that an officer may monitor the
arrestee's movements in order to prevent the arrestee's escape. Id.
100. Id. at 8.
101. See, e.g., United States v. Morgan, 743 F.2d 1158, 1164 (6th Cir. 1984) (The two
significant elements of the holding in Chrisman were that the arrestee requested to return to
his room and that there was a lawful arrest prior to the officer entering the room.), cert.
denied, 471 U.S. 1061 (1985).
102. Chrisman itself represented a departure from prior Supreme Court decisions in its
apparent abandonment of the exigent circumstances requirement for warrantless entry. See
Ira D. Wincott, Comment, Constitutional Law-Fourth Amendment-Plain View Exception to the
Warrant Requirement-Exigent Circumstances-Washington V. Chrisman, 29 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv.
125, 147-48 (1984).
103. 648 F.2d 669 (10th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1164 (1982).
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trunks. The arresting officers returned the defendant to his room, with-
out his consent or request, in order to procure clothing for him.' 0 4 While
the officers were in the defendant's hotel room, they discovered cocaine
and marijuana. The court held that the defendant did not consent to the
police presence, and that no exigent circumstances existed which could
justify the officers' entry without a warrant.' 0 5
B. Tenth Circuit Opinion: United States v. Butler'0 6
On April 30, 1991, two Deputy United States Marshals and two county
sheriff's officers arrived at Butler's trailer in rural Oklahoma in order to
serve Butler with an arrest warrant. 10 7 The ground surrounding the trailer
was covered with broken glass, hundreds of beer cans, and parts from sev-
eral dismantled cars.10 8 Butler's trailer-mate Willis Bruce met the officers,
and one marshal told Bruce that he had a warrant to arrest Butler. Butler,
who was not wearing shoes, then came out of the trailer and was
arrested.' 0 9
There was no way to avoid the debris surrounding the trailer in con-
veying Butler to the officers' cars. 1 0 A marshal asked Butler if he had any
shoes to protect his feet. Butler stated that he had shoes, but that they
were in the trailer."' Bruce asked his girlfriend to retrieve the shoes, but
the marshal stated " 'Well, let's go on in and get them.' "112 While retriev-
ing the shoes, the marshal observed a loaded shotgun in Butler's room
which, as a convicted felon, Butler could not legally possess.' 1 3 The mar-
shal seized the firearm.
114
At trial, Butler moved to suppress the shotgun. The trial court relied
heavily on Chrisman in denying Butler's motion, and Butler was ultimately
convicted. 1 5 Butler appealed the trial court's denial of his motion to sup-
press the shotgun. 116 The Tenth Circuit affirmed the trial court's ruling,
holding that Chrisman supported the characterization of the marshal's
presence as lawful, and the shotgun seizure as valid under the plain view
doctrine. 117
104. Id. at 674-75.
105. Id. at 675. In addition, the court held that the arrest outside of the room would not
permit the characterization of the search inside the room as a search incident to a lawful
arrest, because that search is allowed only for the purposes of discovering and removing
weapons or preventing the destruction of evidence. Its scope is limited to areas within the
arrestee's immediate control. Id. (citing Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762-63 (1969)).
106. 980 F.2d 619 (10th Cir. 1992).






113. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (1988).
114. Butler, 980 F.2d at 621.
115. Id. at 620-21.
116. Id. at 620.
117. Id. at 621-22.
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1. Majority Opinion1 18
The court initially discussed Chrisman, acknowledging that the de-
fendant in Chrisman had invited the officer into his dorm room. In Butler,
the marshal instigated the intrusion and Butler protested the marshal's
entry.119 Ignoring that distinction, the court proceeded to argue that the
marshal's intrusion was based on a genuine concern for Butler's welfare
and was not pretextual; that is, the marshal's intrusion was not made in
"bad faith." 120 Further, the court argued that even without an invitation,
as in Chrisman, police may "conduct a limited entry into an area for the
purpose of protecting the health or safety of an arrestee." 1' 1 The court
relied primarily on two cases from the Second Circuit, United States v.
Titus1 22 and United States v. Di Stefano123 , for its holding that police can
legally accompany an arrestee into his home in order to obtain
clothing.
1 24
Finally, the court distinguished Anthon by arguing that in that case
there existed no "legitimate and significant" threat to Anthon's health
which required that the police enter his hotel room. 125 In the instant
case, however, the marshal had a good faith belief that a significant threat
to Butler's safety existed. The threat to Butler's safety was an exigent cir-
cumstance which allowed the marshal to enter Butler's trailer.' 26
2. Dissenting Opinion
In her dissent, Judge Seymour stressed that the invasion of the privacy
of a person's home is the primary evil against which the Fourth Amend-
ment is directed. 127 The dissent disagreed with the majority's characteri-
zation that Butler's lack of footwear constituted an exigent circumstance
because he was in danger of being injured.' 28 The dissent noted that the
majority ignored the fact that Butler and his companions had just walked
back and forth across the debris in order to bathe in the river. In addi-
tion, Butler neither evinced apprehension that he would injure his feet on
the walk to the officers' cars, nor requested that he be provided with
shoes.
12 9
118. The majority opinion was authored by Patrick F. Kelly, District Judge, sitting by
designation.
119. Butler, 980 F.2d at 621.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. 445 F.2d 577 (2d Cir.) (holding that officers lawfully in defendant's house for arrest
purposes could seize items in plain view), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 957 (1971).
123. 555 F.2d 1094 (2d Cir. 1977) (holding that an officer could lawfully accompany the
defendant into her room so that she could change her clothes after she was arrested).
124. Butler, 980 F.2d at 621.
125. Id. at 622. See also text accompanying notes 103-05.
126. Id.
127. Butler, 980 F.2d at 622 (Seymour, J., dissenting).




The dissent also argued that the instant case was significantly different
from Chrisman. °30 The dissent stated that Chrisman stood for the proposi-
tion that a police officer could accompany an arrested defendant into his
home at the defendant's request. Chrisman did not represent that an of-
ficer could take an arrestee into the arrestee's house without his consent;
the arrestee's request was the linchpin to the Chrisman holding.1 3 ' Since
Butler did not request permission to enter his house or consent to the
marshal's entry, the seizure effected in the instant case did not fall under
Chrisman. The marshal was not legally in Butler's house when he observed
the shotgun. 132 Therefore, the plain view doctrine would not validate the
shotgun seizure.
133
The dissent further argued that Anthon was indistinguishable from the
case at bar. 134 The holding in Anthon was derived from facts in which
there were no exigent circumstances, the defendant did not request to
return to his room, and the defendant did not offer consent for the of-
ficers to enter his room.135 Butler, like Anthon, was not in danger, did
not request to enter his house, and did not consent to the marshal's
entry.
136
Finally, the dissent argued that the holding in Titus was based on an
exigent circumstance, namely, the prevention of the defendant's es-
cape.13 7 The instant case was distinguishable from Titus in that there was
no exigent circumstance to legalize the warrantless entry into Butler's
home. 138 The majority's view that an exigency existed therefore eroded
the protection of the Fourth Amendment by trivializing the exigency
requirement.
C. Analysis
The majority in this case allowed an officer to intrude into the de-
fendant's trailer without any of the justifications which the Supreme Court
and the Tenth Circuit specifically require for such an action. The marshal
did not have a warrant authorizing his entry into the defendant's trailer.
The arrest took place outside the trailer; therefore, a protective sweep,
which likely would not justify the marshal's actions in any case, does not
apply. The only possible justifications, as the majority recognized, were
130. Id. at 622.
131. Id. at 623.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id. See also text accompanying notes 125-26.
135. Id. (citing United States v. Anthon, 648 F.2d 669, 675 (10th Cir. 1981), cert. denied,
454 U.S. 1164 (1982)).
136. Butler, 980 F.2d at 623 (Seymour, J., dissenting).
137. Id. at 624.
138. Id. In distinguishing Titus the dissent stated "[tihe warrantless entry of a home to
prevent the escape of a defendant the police have probable cause to arrest is not analogous
to an entry to obtain shoes for a barefoot arrestee who does not request them." Id. The
dissent also noted that the holding in Di Stefano offered no additional support for the major-
ity's position since that case was from the same circuit as Titus and merely followed Titus as
precedent. Id.
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either that exigent circumstances existed, authorizing the marshal's entry,
or that the Chrisman rationale allowed the marshal to take Butler into his
own trailer, even absent a request from Butler.
Under the former rationale, there were no exigent circumstances
which could have justified the marshal's entering the trailer. As tradition-
ally defined,13 9 none of the exigent circumstance categories applied to the
situation in Butler. The only category which possibly could have applied is
the emergency situation, which the Supreme Court has narrowly con-
strued. 140 In order to argue that the emergency situation legalized the
marshal's entry to obtain Butler's shoes, the majority would have to argue
that the emergency situation made the marshal's entry imperative.
14 1
In this case, the danger was that of the defendant cutting his feet.
Not only is this type of danger relatively minor when compared with what
the Supreme Court has defined as an emergency situation, 142 but in fact
there existed no danger at all to the marshal or to Butler. 143 Butler did
not request the entry into his trailer to obtain shoes, and he evinced no
concern that he would injure his feet. 144 The majority based its holding
partially on the marshal's good faith attempt to protect Butler's feet.
14 5
The majority, however, cited no authority for the proposition that a good
faith attempt to protect a minor safety interest allows an officer to enter an
arrestee's home. Considering the low safety interest the marshal believed
he was protecting and its unlikely classification under any exigent circum-
stance category, the marshal's presence in Butler's trailer cannot be justi-
fied under an exigent circumstance exception to the warrant requirement.
The majority's reliance on Chrisman also is misplaced. The Chrisman
holding does not represent that an officer may return an arrestee to his
room and accompany the arrestee into his room for any reason. Rather,
the arrestee must somehow indicate that he desires to return to his room.
In that situation, the officer may accompany the arrestee for security pur-
poses. Other United States Courts of Appeals have interpreted Chrisman
in such a manner.
146
Moreover, the Court in Chrisman specifically authorized the officer's
presence in the dorm room to monitor the arrestee and to protect the
officer himself.14 7 Nowhere did the Chrisman Court imply that the protec-
tion of an arrestee would authorize an officer to force the arrestee to enter
his own home and allow the officer to enter as well. In Butler, there was no
indication that Butler requested or desired to enter his home to obtain
139. See supra notes 87-90 and accompanying text.
140. See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
141. McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 456 (1948).
142. E.g., Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298-99 (1967) (holding that officers were
acting under exigent circumstances when they entered a dwelling to search for an armed
robbery suspect and weapons and where a delay in action would have endangered lives of
officers and citizens).
143. Butler, 980 F.2d at 623 (Seymour, J., dissenting).
144. Id.
145. Id. at 621.
146. See supra notes 101-02.
147. Washington v. Chrisman, 455 U.S. 1, 7 (1982).
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shoes. The majority's misinterpretation of Chrisman led to a holding
which is both unprecedented and unjustified based on Supreme Court
and Tenth Circuit cases.
Finally, the court in Butler failed to distinguish Anthon in any meaning-
ful way. The majority's attempt to separate Anthon hinged on its statement
that there was in Butler "a legitimate and significant threat" to Butler's
safety whereas in Anthon there was no such threat.148 However, as the dis-
sent correctly noted, there was no legitimate threat because the defendant
had just safely crossed the very area with which the marshal was con-
cerned. 149 In addition, walking across glass and beer cans is hardly a "sig-
nificant threat."15 0 The holding that the danger of minor cuts qualifies as
a significant threat allows the exigent circumstances exception to swallow
up the warrant requirement. The holding in Butler disregards Tenth Cir-
cuit precedent and the precedent of other courts.
CONCLUSION
During the survey period, the Tenth Circuit brought its precedent in
line with other circuits in the area of warrant severability in the Brown case,
but unfortunately did not provide any meaningful direction to the trial
courts in determining when the doctrine should be applied. The Tenth
Circuit departed significantly from established precedent in the area of
warrantless entry in the Butler case, but offered no support for its trivializa-
tion of the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement.
Hopefully, the Supreme Court will address the difficult issues these cases
raise in order to avoid the confusion which the Tenth Circuit's decisions
will create in this area.
Paul Faraci
148. Butler, 980 F.2d at 622.
149. The dissent stated that "[taking an arrestee in bare feet across a littered yard he has
just traversed safely presents no greater exigency than taking an arrestee to the police station
in his bathing suit." Id. at 624 (Seymour, J., dissenting) (referring to Anthon).





Many of the Tenth Circuit's employment decisions in the survey year'
specifically addressed the method by which a plaintiff may prove discrimi-
nation with indirect evidence under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
19642 or the Age Discrimination in Employment Act.3 Initially, this Survey
outlines the allocation and burden of proof in an indirect evidence inten-
tional discrimination case. An analysis of the Tenth Circuit's decisions
demonstrates that although the court continued to lighten the plaintiff's
burden in making out a prima facie case, 4 the court departed from prece-
dent and significantly increased the plaintiff's burden at the pretext
stage.
5
In interpreting the prima facie requirement, the Tenth Circuit ad-
hered to the Supreme Court's warning that the prima facie case was
"never intended to be rigid, mechanized, or ritualistic."6 Accordingly, the
court continued to treat the plaintiff's burden as flexible and minimally
demanding. Most importantly, in Hooks v. Diamond Crystal Specialty Foods,
Inc.,7 the court concluded that a plaintiff need not prove equal or better
qualifications than the person selected to satisfy the prima facie case. 8 Ad-
ditionally, in Whalen v. Unit Rig, Inc.,9 the court decided that the plaintiff's
failure to apply formally for the position at issue did not defeat the prima
facie case. 10 After Whalen, a showing that the employer had notice of the
plaintiff's status as one who might reasonably be interested in the job, or
of the fact that the plaintiff sought employment, will serve to satisfy the
prima facie case. 1
These court decisions addressing the requirements of the prima facie
case must be contrasted with the court's decisions that imposed a more
stringent pretext burden on the plaintiff. The court confronted the pre-
1. The survey year covers decisions handed down between September 1, 1992 and De-
cember 31, 1993.
2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
3. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992). The methodologies for proving inten-
tional discrimination discussed in this survey are also used in proving intentional discrimina-
tion under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1988) and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988). See Drake v. City of Fort
Collins, 927 F.2d 1156, 1163 (10th Cir. 1991).
4. See infra parts I.A., II.A.
5. See infra parts I., II.B. Once the employer has rebutted plaintiff's prima facie case, a
finding of intentional discrimination depends on plaintiff's success in showing pretext. A
finding of pretext indicates that the reasons offered by the employer were not the real rea-
sons for the employment decision, but an attempt to mask the consideration of impermissi-
ble factors.
6. Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978).
7. 997 F.2d 793 (10th Cir. 1993).
8. Id. at 797.
9. 974 F.2d 1248 (10th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1417 (1993).
10. Id. at 1251.
11. See id.
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text issue in an indirect intentional discrimination case in EEOC v. Flasher
Co., 12 and held that a mere finding of disparate treatment,1 3 without a
showing that it was the result of intentional discrimination based on pro-
tected class characteristics, does not prove a violation of Title VII. 14 The
Tenth Circuit's ruling in Sanchez v. Philip Morris Inc.,15 reinforced the
heavy pretext burden articulated in F/asher and detailed the nature of the
more stringent "pretext-plus" requirement for plaintiffs.
16
By tracing the evolution and clarification of the McDonnell Douglas
framework, 17 this Survey criticizes both the court's inconsistent interpreta-
tion of the framework and the court's movement towards increased bur-
dens on plaintiffs at the pretext stage. The Tenth Circuit's pretext
decisions will be discussed in light of the Supreme Court's recent clarifica-
tion of the indirect evidence framework in St. Mary's Honor Center v.
Hicks.18 The Survey concludes that the heightened burdens imposed by
the Tenth Circuit render the McDonnell Douglas framework useless, since
indirect evidence alone, without the anticipation and defeat of all other
possible reasons for the employer's decision, will not support an inference
of intentional discrimination.
I. THE INDIRECT EVIDENCE INTENTIONAL DISCRIMINATION CASE:
BACKGROUND
The purpose of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 196419 is "to assure
equality of employment opportunities and to eliminate those discrimina-
tory practices and devices which have fostered racially stratified job, envi-
ronments to the disadvantage of minority citizens." 20 Although Title VII
does not guarantee ajob to each person, it requires "the removal of artifi-
cial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers to employment when the barriers
operate invidiously to discriminate on the basis of racial or other imper-
missible classification." 2' Congress emphasized that other civil rights
guaranteed in the Act mean little without the right "to gain the economic
wherewithal to enjoy or properly utilize them."2 2 Specifically, Title VII
12. 986 F.2d 1312 (10th Cir. 1992).
13. See infra note 24.
14. F/asher, 986 F.2d at 1314.
15. 992 F.2d 244 (10th Cir. 1993).
16. See infra note 44.
17. The Supreme Court established the indirect evidence framework for Title VII claims
in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
18. 113 S. Ct. 2742 (1993).
19. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
20. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 800.
21. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430-31 (1971).
22. H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, 29 (1964), reprinted in 1964
U.S.C.CA.N. 2355, 2516. The House Report went on to state that "[a]side from the political
and economic considerations, however, we believe in the creation ofjob equality because it is
the right thing to do. We believe in the inherent dignity of man. He is born with certain
inalienable fights. His uniqueness is such that we refuse to treat him as if his rights and well-
being are bargainable." Id. at 30.
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prohibits discrimination on the basis of an individual's race, color, reli-
gion, sex, or national origin.
2 3
To prove intentional discrimination under Title VII, the plaintiff
must show disparate treatment.2 4 A plaintiff may prove disparate treat-
ment by offering express, 25 direct,26 or indirect 27 evidence of intentional
discrimination.
A. The McDonnell Douglas Framework
In McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,2 8 the Court, in an effort to clarify
the appropriate inquiry in an indirect evidence intentional employment
discrimination case, allocated the burden of production and established
an order for the presentation of proof. Under the McDonnell Douglas
framework, the plaintiff in a Title VII case carries the initial burden of
establishing a prima facie case of discrimination. 29 To establish a prima
facie case, the plaintiff must show that: (1) she is a member of a racial
minority, (2) she was qualified and applied for an available position, (3)
23. Section 703(a) (1) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides in pertinent
part: "It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer ... to fail or refuse to
hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise discriminate against any individual with
respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such
individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1)
(1988).
Congress delegated the primary responsibility of preventing and eliminating unlawful
employment practices to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"). Id.
§§ 2000e-4(a), 5(a).
24. Disparate treatment is one of two methods recognized by the Supreme Court for
proving individual discrimination under Title VII. Disparate treatment exists where the "em-
ployer simply treats some people less favorably than others because of their race, color, reli-
gion, sex, or national origin." International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324,
335 n.15 (1977). "[D]isparate treatment was the most obvious evil Congress had in mind
when it enacted Title VII." Id.
The other method of proof, disparate impact, "involve[s] employment practices that are
facially neutral in their treatment of different groups but ... fall more harshly on one group
than another and cannot be justified by business necessity." Id.
25. Express evidence of employment discrimination would be an explicit statement by
an employer indicating discriminatory intent (i.e. "I will not hire you because you are a wo-
man"). See Roberto L. Corrada, St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks: Much Ado About Nothing? I
(1993) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the University of Denver Law Review).
26. Consistent statements made by an employer to his employees that he dislikes African
Americans, coupled with the fact that an African American has never received a promotion
in the respective workplace, is an example of direct evidence of discrimination. The phrase
"smoking gun" is also used to characterize direct evidence. See Gilbert M. Roman, Proving
Intentional Discrimination in Employment Cases Through Indirect Evidence: The Supreme Court Clari-
fies the Rules, 42 TRIAL TALK 6 (1993).
The mixed-motive case, in which a plaintiff shows that an employer considered both an
impermissible factor and a legitimate factor in making the employment decision, is a direct
evidence case properly analyzed under the framework established in Price Waterhouse v.
Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
27. Indirect evidence is best understood as circumstantial evidence. See 2 ARTHUR LAR-
SON & LEx K. LARSON, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION § 50.19, at 10-6 (1993).
28. 411 U.S. 792 (1973). "[T ] he Court deliberately used this case as the occasion and the
vehicle for the promulgation of a general rule designed to bring order out of a chaotic situa-
tion that had developed within the lower courts." LARSON & [ARSON, supra note 27, § 50.10,
at 10-4.
29. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802.
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she was rejected for the position, and (4) the position remained open.
3 0
If the plaintiff succeeds in proving the prima facie case, "[t] he burden then
must shift to the employer to articulate some legitimate, nondiscrimina-
tory reason for the employee's rejection."
3 1
If the employer carries its burden, the plaintiff then has an opportu-
nity to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the legitimate rea-
sons offered by the employer were only a pretext for discrimination.
3 2
Relevant to showing pretext is evidence regarding the employer's treat-
ment of the individual employee during the term of employment, the em-
ployer's reaction to lawful civil rights activities, the employer's general
policy regarding minority employment, and a statistical showing of a pat-
tern of discrimination by the employer.
3 3
B. Refining the Framework
In Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine,3 4 the Court clari-
fied the McDonnell Douglas framework by detailing the relevant burdens.
3 5
In confronting the plaintiff's initial burden, the Court stressed the impor-
tance of a prima facie showing, which creates an inference of discrimina-
tion "only because we presume these acts, if otherwise unexplained, are
more likely than not based on the consideration of impermissible fac-
tors."3 6 The prima facie case establishes a mandatory, rebuttable pre-
sumption3 7 that shifts the burden of production, not persuasion, to the
defendant.38 The nature of the defendant's burden must be "understood
30. Id. Although the Court stated the requirements for a prima facie case in a refusal to
hire context, the Court explicitly stated that "[t] he facts necessarily will vary in Title VII...
and the specification above ... is not necessarily applicable in every respect to differing
factual situations." Id. at 802 n.13.
Accordingly, the federal courts have since adapted the prima facie case to accommodate
a number of employment contexts. See, e.g., Purrington v. University of Utah, 996 F.2d 1025
(10th Cir. 1993) (retaliation); Branson v. Price River Coal Co., 853 F.2d 768 (10th Cir. 1988)
(discharge and age discrimination claim); McAlester v. United Air Lines, Inc., 851 F.2d 1249
(10th Cir. 1988) (discharge); Foster v. MCI Telecommunications Corp., 773 F.2d 1116, (10th
Cir. 1985) (layoff); Mohammed v. Callaway, 698 F.2d 395 (10th Cir. 1983) (failure to pro-
mote); Worthy v. United States Steel Corp., 616 F.2d 698 (3d Cir. 1980) (discipline); Long v.
Ford Motor Co., 496 F.2d 500 (6th Cir. 1974) (denial of training); Lanegan-Grimm v. Library
Ass'n, 560 F. Supp. 486 (D. Or. 1983) (compensation); Chapman v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co.,
456 F. Supp. 65 (N.D. Cal. 1978) (transfer).
31. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802.
32. Id. at 804.
33. Id. at 804-05.
34. 450 U.S. 248 (1981).
35. For a more detailed discussion of the individual burdens in a disparate treatment
case, see Mack A. Player, The Evidentiay Nature of Defendant's Burden in Title VII Disparate Treat-
ment Cases, 49 Mo. L. lEv. 17 (1984).
36. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254 (quoting Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577
(1978)). The prima facie case also serves to eliminate the two most common nondiscrimina-
tory reasons for the plaintiff's rejection: (1) no available positions, and (2) plaintiff is un-
qualified for an available position. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S.
324, 358 n.44 (1977).
37. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254 n.7.
38. Id. at 254-55. Prior to Burdine, the nature of the defendant's burden remained un-
defined by the Court. LARSON & LARSON, supra note 27, § 50.32(a), at 10-38 to 10-44.
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in light of the plaintiff's ultimate and intermediate burdens."3 9 To rebut
the prima facie case, the defendant need not persuade the court of its
nondiscriminatory reasons, but must produce enough evidence to raise a
genuine issue of fact as to the plaintiff's claim of discrimination. 40 If the
defendant remains silent in the face of the presumption, however, the
court must enter judgment for the plaintiff.
4 '
In discussing the burden shift back to the plaintiff, the Court noted
that if the defendant meets the burden of production, "the prima facie
case is rebutted, and the factual inquiry proceeds to a new level of specific-
ity."42 To meet the final burden of persuasion, the plaintiff must prove
that the proffered reason was not the true reason for the defendant's ac-
tion. The plaintiff may succeed in proving intentional discrimination
"either directly by persuading the court that a discriminatory reason more
than likely motivated the employer or indirectly by showing that the em-
ployer's proffered explanation is unworthy of credence."4 3 The proposi-
tion that a plaintiff may prove pretext solely by discrediting the
defendant's proffered reasons proved to be the most controversial aspect
of the Burdine decision.
4 4
39. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253. "The ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that
the defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff remains at all times with the
plaintiff." Id.
40. Id. at 254-55. The purpose of the defendant's burden of production is both to pres-
ent a "legitimate reason for the action and to frame the factual issue with sufficient clarity so
that the plaintiff will have a full and fair opportunity to demonstrate pretext." Id. at 255-56.
41. Id. at 254. It is particularly important that the Court addressed the weight of articu-
lations not admitted into evidence and concluded that such an articulation will not meet the
defendant's burden. Id. at 255 n.9.
42. Id. at 255.
43. Id. at 256. Although Burdine's two-prong test uses the terms "indirectly" or "directly,"
the plaintiff still uses indirect, circumstantial evidence to prove intentional discrimination.
When employing the "more likely motivated" prong, the plaintiff directly (affirmatively)
proves discrimination through the use of circumstantial evidence. When employing the "un-
worthy of credence" prong, the plaintiff proves discrimination without an affirmative show-
ing that the defendant more likely was motivated by impermissible factors. Marina C.
Szteinbok, Note, Indirect Proof of Discriminatory Motive in Title VI Disparate Treatment Claims
After Aikens, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 1114, 1118 n.34 (1988).
44. Following Burdine, the circuit courts adopted one of two interpretations: (1) the
pretext only" rule which embraced the "unworthy of credence" prong, and (2) the "pretext-
plus" rule which prohibited a plaintiff from establishing pretext with a mere showing that the
employer is lying. The "pretext-plus" courts require a showing of pretext, plus proof that no
other legitimate factor was responsible for the employment decision. For a detailed discus-
sion of the differences between the two approaches, see Catherine J. Lanctot, The Defendant
Lies and the Plaintiff Loses: The Fallacy of the "Pretext-Plus" Rule in Employment Discrimination
Cases, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 57 (1991).
Although several circuit courts were slow in interpreting Burdine's "unworthy of
credence" prong, the "pretext only" rule eventually emerged in eight different circuits. See
Dister v. Continental Group, Inc., 859 F.2d 1108, 1113 (2d Cir. 1988); MacDissi v. Valmont
Indus., 856 F.2d 1054, 1059 (8th Cir. 1988); Furr v. AT & T Technologies, Inc., 824 F.2d
1537, 1549 (10th Cir. 1987); Chipollini v. Spencer Gifts, Inc., 814 F.2d 893, 899 (3d Cir.), cert.
dismissed, 483 U.S. 1052 (1987); Tye v. Board of Educ., 811 F.2d 315, 319-20 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 484 U.S. 924 (1987); Bishopp v. District of Columbia, 788 F.2d 781, 789 (D.C. Cir.
1986); Lowe v. City of Monrovia, 775 F.2d 998, 1005 (9th Cir. 1985), modified, 784 F.2d 1407
(9th Cir. 1986); Thornbrough v. Columbus & Greenville R.R., 760 F.2d 633, 647 (5th Cir.
1985).
The "pretext-plus" rule was articulated by four circuit courts. See Spencer v. General
Elec. Co., 894 F.2d 651, 659 (4th Cir. 1990); Benzies v. Illinois Dep't of Mental Health &
1994]
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C. St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks: Clarifying Burdine
In light of the controversy in the circuit courts regarding the "unwor-
thy of credence" prong of Burdine, the Supreme Court granted certiorari
to hear St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks.45 Justice Scalia, writing for the
majority, held that the trier of fact's rejection of the defendant's proffered
reasons does not compel a judgment for the plaintiff as a matter of law.
46
Reversing the Eighth Circuit's decision,4 7 the majority noted that while
discrediting the employer's proffered reasons may prove pretext, it does
not, by itself, prove that the employer's actions were a "pretext for discrimi-
nation."48 Justice Scalia admitted that the decision directly contradicted
the "unworthy of credence" language in Burdine, but concluded that the
Burdine Court's suggestion that a mere showing of unworthiness could suf-
fice to prove pretext was an "inadvertence" on the part of the Court.
49
The Court's rejection of Burdine's "unworthy of credence" prong indi-
cates that plaintiffs must not only prove their own case, but must also con-
vince the trier of fact that no other possible reasons for the employment
action exist.50 In his dissent, Justice Souter warned that the imposition of
such a severe burden would cause a "scouring the record" problem as the
trier of fact may look beyond the presented evidence in search of unarticu-
lated, although completely legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for the
employment action.
5 1
Arguably, St. Mary's essentially gutted both the rationale and the ef-
fect of Burdine.5 2 By eliminating Burdine's "unworthy of credence" prong,
the McDonnell Douglas framework no longer "permits the plaintiff meriting
Developmental Disabilities, 810 F.2d 146, 148 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1006 (1987);
White v. Vathally, 732 F.2d 1037, 1042-43 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 933 (1984); Clark v.
Huntsville City Bd. of Educ., 717 F.2d 525, 529 (11th Cir. 1983).
Although the Sixth Circuit originally adhered to the "pretext only" rule, the court re-
cently shifted to a "pretext-plus" notion. See Galbraith v. Northern Telecom, Inc., 944 F.2d
275, 283 (6th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1497 (1992).
45. 113 S. Ct. 954 (1993).
46. St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. 2742, 2749 (1993).
47. Hicks v. St. Mary's Honor Ctr., 970 F.2d 487 (8th Cir. 1992), rev'd, 113 S. Ct. 2742
(1993). The Eighth Circuit had concluded that once the plaintiff discredited each of the
employer's proffered reasons, a judgment for the plaintiff was compelled as a matter of law.
Id. at 492.
48. St. May's, 113 S. Ct. at 2752. The Court stressed that while discrediting the em-
ployer's reasons does not compel a finding of discrimination, such a showing, accompanied
by a strong prima facie case, may allow an inference of intentional discrimination. Id. at
2749.
49. Id. at 2752-53.
50. The Court stated that Title VII only awards damages against those employers who
are proven to have taken the adverse action based on impermissible factors. Id. at 2756.
Furthermore, "[t]hat the employer's proffered reason is unpersuasive, or even obviously con-
trived, does not necessarily establish that the plaintiff's proffered reason ... is correct." Id.
51. Id. at 2761-63 (Souter, J., dissenting). Although the majority downplayed this possi-
bility by noting the Burdine requirement that the defendant's articulation must be admitted
into evidence, the Court failed to address adequately the issue of the unarticulated reason.
Id. at 2755.
52. See supra notes 34-44 and accompanying text.
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relief to demonstrate intentional discrimination" through indirect
evidence.
53
II. TENTH CIRCUIT CASE LAW
A. The Prima Facie Case
Following the McDonnell Douglas decision, the Tenth Circuit consist-
ently has adhered to the notion that the plaintiff's "burden of establishing
a prima facie case of disparate treatment is not onerous."54 As articulated
in McDonnell Douglas, to establish a prima facie case the plaintiff must show
that: (1) she is a member of a protected class, (2) she applied and was
qualified for an available position, (3) she was rejected, and (4) the posi-
tion remained open following her rejection. 55 During the survey year, the
court confronted the most challenging aspect of the prima facie case, the
application/qualification requirement,56 and continued to lighten the
burden on plaintiffs at that stage.
57
1. Hooks v. Diamond Crystal Specialty Foods, Inc.
5 8
In Hooks, the plaintiff, an African American, brought suit against his
employer alleging discriminatory failure to promote. 59 In accordance
with a company-wide reduction in force, Diamond eliminated the con-
verting coordinator position, a position occupied by the plaintiff.60 Hooks
expressed interest in the position of production supervisor, but was reas-
signed to assistant production supervisor. The production supervisor posi-
tion went to a white male, and several months later Hooks' position was
eliminated. 6 ' The district court, relying on Allen v. Denver Public School
Board,62 concluded that Hooks failed to prove a prima facie case of dis-
crimination and granted summary judgment for the defendant.63 Con-
cluding that the trial court applied the wrong standard for a prima facie
case, the Tenth Circuit stated that "the best approach is to remain consis-
tent with the prima facie elements laid out in McDonnell Douglas and Bur-
53. Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 258 (1981).
54. Id. at 253.
55. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
56. "The question whether a particular plaintiff.., fulfills the qualification requirement
or not is often the central issue in cases involving the McDonnell Douglas prima facie formula."
LARSON & LARSON, supra note 27, § 50.31(c), at 10-25 to 10-26.
57. While the cases offered expected clarification of the prima facie case, the court's
treatment of the prima facie case offers an interesting comparison with the court's treatment
of the plaintiff's burden at the pretext stage. See infra part II.B.
58. 997 F.2d 793 (10th Cir. 1993).
59. Although not relevant to this discussion, the plaintiff also alleged constructive dis-
charge and failure to contract on a nondiscriminatory basis in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981
(1988). Hooks, 997 F.2d at 796. The court also briefly addressed the plaintiff's claim of
discriminatory demotion. Id. at 799-800.
60. Id. at 795.
61. Id. Hooks subsequently accepted Diamond's offer of early retirement. Id. at 795-96.
62. 928 F.2d 978 (10th Cir. 1991).
63. Hooks, 997 F.2d at 796-97.
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dine."6 4 Thus, in establishing a prima facie case, the plaintiff "need not
show that he or she is equally or better qualified than the person selected
for the position."65 On the contrary, in order to shift the burden of pro-
duction to the defendant, the plaintiff need only show that he or she is
qualified for the position.
66
The court, in addressing the importance of the plaintiff's qualifica-
tions, stressed that the investigation properly occurs at the pretext stage,
where the relative qualifications of the applicants serve to illuminate the
employer's reasons for the decision. 6 7 Since the trial court inappropri-
ately considered Hooks' relative qualifications at the prima facie stage, the
court reversed the trial court's conclusion that Hooks failed to make out a
prima facie case. 68 Because Hooks failed to prove pretext,69 however, the
court affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment.
7 0
2. Whalen v. Unit Rig, Inc.
In Whalen v. Unit Rig, Inc.,7 1 the court confirmed that the prima facie
application requirement merely requires a constructive showing of appli-
cation. In that case, the plaintiff, a sixty-three year old man, brought suit
alleging age discrimination. 72 Following a restructuring of the defendant
corporation, John Whalen, an employee of eleven years, was fired. Subse-
quently, the corporation hired a twenty-nine year old man to replace
Whalen. On the basis of indirect evidence, 73 the jury found for the
plaintiff.
64. Id. at 797. In Allen, the court held that a plaintiff must show that she was "equally or
better qualified than those employees actually promoted" to establish a prima facie case.
Allen, 928 F.2d at 984 (quoting Clark v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry., 731 F.2d 698 (10th
Cir. 1984)). Although not explicitly overturning Allen, the court cautioned that the case
must "not be read to increase the prima facie burden established in McDonnell Douglas."
Hooks, 997 F.2d at 797.
65. Hooks, 997 F.2d at 797.
66. Id. If the plaintiff, however, shows that the person actually hired was significantly
less qualified, this will be of great assistance both in showing that the plaintiff's own qualifica-
tions met the minimum requirements for the job and in offering evidence of pretext. LAR-
SON & LARSON, supra note 27, § 50.31 (c), at 10-28.
67. See Hooks, 997 F.2d at 797. The term "qualification" consists of two distinct notions:
(1) absolute qualification suggests that the plaintiff possesses the minimum requirements for
the job and is facially qualified; and (2) relative qualification refers to the individual's qualifi-
cations compared with those of the other applicants for the position. See generally Alisa D.
Shudofsky, Note, Relative Qualifications and the Prima Facie Case in Title VII Litigation, 82
COLUM. L. REv. 553 (1982).
68. See Hooks, 997 F.2d at 797.
69. Id. at 798. The record failed to indicate that Hooks was the better candidate for the
position. The promoted individual possessed a similar amount of supervisory experience. Id.
70. Id. at 799-800.
71. 974 F.2d 1248 (10th Cir. 1992).
72. Age discrimination claims are brought under the Age Discrimination in Employ-
ment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992). Although not a Title VII claim, the
McDonnell Douglas framework has been adapted to this context. See EEOC v. Sperry Corp.,
852 F.2d 503, 507 (10th Cir. 1988).
73. See Whalen, 974 F.2d at 1250. Evidence produced at trial indicated that, prior to the
acquisition, a list of employees was generated in declining order of age and delivered to the
vice president of the company. One witness testified that the president had expressed his
intent to hire a young controller. Id.
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Affirming the trial court's denial of the defendant's motion for sum-
mary judgment and judgment notwithstanding the verdict, the court
found the jury's conclusion that Whalen established a prima facie case to
be plausible. 74 "Employment discrimination law does not require that a
plaintiff formally apply for the job in question." 75 Instead, the plaintiff
can meet that requirement one of two ways: if formal hiring procedures
are used, the plaintiff must show that the employer received specific no-
tice that the plaintiff was seeking employment; or if informal hiring proce-
dures are used, the plaintiff need only show that he or she was in the
group of people who might be reasonably interested in the position at
issue.
76
3. Prima Facie Analysis
The Hooks decision suggests that while the relative qualifications 77 of
the plaintiff are important in a Tide VII case, they are best addressed at
the pretext stage. Accordingly, the plaintiff's absolute qualifications 78 are
the only factors at issue in the qualification prong of a prima facie case of
intentional discrimination.
79
The Whalen court's "constructive notice" articulation of the applica-
tion requirement offers plaintiffs two new methods of meeting that prong
of the prima facie case. The effect of such a broad standard may be to
encourage individuals who otherwise would not meet the application re-
quirement to pursue employment discrimination claims. Specifically, the
Whalen "constructive notice" standard addresses instances in which an ap-
plicant expresses an interest in the position, is met by an unfavorable em-
ployer reaction, and as a result, ultimately does not submit a formal
application. Application of the Whalen reasoning in such circumstances
will prevent employers from engaging in the subtle discouragement and
suppression of interested potential applicants.
8 0
The Tenth Circuit's commitment to offering plaintiffs a fair opportu-
nity to prove a prima facie case is strong, although not particularly surpris-
74. Id. at 1252.
75. Id, at 1251.
76. Id.
77. See supra note 67.
78. See supra note 67.
79. The court's decision in Kenworthy v. Conoco, Inc., 979 F.2d 1462 (10th Cir. 1992),
supports the above analysis. In Kenworthy, the court ruled that a plaintiff, in making out a
prima facie case, could show that she was qualified even when the employer disputed such
qualifications. Id. at 1470. The court properly noted that the employer's reasons for the
employment decision cannot be used to defeat the plaintiff's prima facie case. Id. (citing
MacDonald v. Eastern Wyo. Mental Health Ctr., 941 F.2d 1115, 1120 (10th Cir. 1991)).
80. Such a case would arise in the following hypothetical situation. An Asian American
woman seeks employment in a traditionally white male workplace. Before formally applying
for a position, she travels to the workplace to get a general sense of the environment. Upon
arrival, she is ignored, perhaps ridiculed, and discovers a noticeable absence of women em-
ployees. She speaks with the employer, expresses an interest in the available position, but is
told that she probably would not enjoy working for this company because of the stress and
time commitment involved.
Provided she was qualified for the position, the constructive notice standard approach
arguably would allow her to make out a prima facie case of sex and/or race discrimination.
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ing. The prima facie case still serves its function of screening out
unsupported claims while providing easy access into the heart of the inten-
tional discrimination claim.
B. Proving Pretext
The court's initial response to Burdines "unworthy of credence"
prong is best characterized as one of indifference. With one notable ex-
ception, 81 the court did not employ the "unworthy of credence" prong
until 1987, in Furr v. AT & T Technologies, Inc.82 Between 1987 and 1992,
the court consistently followed Furr and ruled that the plaintiff could
prove pretext merely by discrediting the employer's proffered reasons.
83
The court's decision in EEOC v. Flasher Co.84 marked a clear departure
from Furr and parallels the Court's abandonment of Burdine in St. Mary's.
1. EEOC v. Flasher Co.
In flasher, Edward Perez, a Hispanic male, was fired by the defendant
after an altercation with another employee. The EEOC brought suit on
behalf of Perez, alleging that Perez was fired in violation of Title VII be-
cause he was Hispanic. 85 The employer rebutted the plaintiff's prima fa-
cie case8 6 by claiming that Perez was fired for violating company rules.
Although Perez demonstrated significant disparities in the company's dis-
ciplinary treatment of Perez and non-minorities, 87 the trial court con-
cluded that the plaintiff had not sustained his burden in showing pretext.
In a somewhat tortured approach, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the trial
court.8 8 Perhaps the most startling aspects of the case come from the in-
ternal inconsistencies in Judge Ebel's reasoning. Initially, Judge Ebel
81. See Beck v. Quiktrip Corp., 708 F.2d 532 (10th Cir. 1983). After citing the "unworthy
of credence" language of Burdine, the court concluded that the duty of the trial court is to
"decide which party's explanation of the employer's motivation it believes." Id. at 535 (quot-
ing United States Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 716 (1983)).
82. 824 F.2d 1537 (10th Cir. 1987). The court narrowed the pretext inquiry by stating
that "[t] he critical question for the jury is whether it believes the defendant's proffered rea-
sons for the employment decision, rather than the plaintiff's assertion of impermissible dis-
crimination." Id. at 1549.
83. See Bell v. AT & T, 946 F.2d 1507, 1512 (10th Cir. 1991) (suggesting that the plaintiff
must focus on the defendant's proffered reasons when proving pretext); Denison v. Swaco
Geolograph Co., 941 F.2d 1416, 1421-22 (10th Cir. 1991) (stating that one of the ways a
plaintiff may prove intentional age discrimination is by discrediting the employer's reason for
the employment decision); Krause v. Dresser Indus., 910 F.2d 674, 677 (10th Cir. 1990) (con-
cluding that the plaintiff need only show that the employer's reason is unworthy of credence
to prove pretext).
84. 986 F.2d 1312 (10th Cir. 1992).
85. Id. at 1315.
86. The appropriate prima facie showing in a claim relating to termination for violation
of a work rule is established if the plaintiff shows that: (1) the plaintiff is a member of a
protected class, (2) he was terminated for violation of a company rule, and (3) non-minority
employees who are similarly situated were treated differently. Id. at 1316 (citing McAlester v.
United Air Lines, 851 F.2d 1249, 1260 (10th Cir. 1988)).
87. See id. at 1316. Perez presented five separate instances where non-minorities re-
ceived only verbal reprimands, suspensions, or demotions following company rule violations.
Id. at 1315.
88. See id. at 1316.
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seemed to follow Tenth Circuit precedent when he stated that the defend-
ant's burden of production
defines the parameters of the trial, as the plaintiff then knows the
precise reason that he or she may try to show is only a pretext for
an illegal discriminatory motive. By articulating the reasons for
the plaintiff's termination, the defendant eliminates a myriad of
possible reasons that would otherwise have to be addressed.8 9
Indeed, this language reinforces the notion that the defendant must artic-
ulate the reasons for the decision and that the plaintiff must respond to
those reasons in order to prove pretext.90
An important distinction for Judge Ebel was the difference between
the reason for the decision and the reason for the disparity in treatment.9 1
This distinction allowed Judge Ebel to conclude that the employer need
not explain the differential treatment of minorities and non-minorities in
terms of rational business policies. Even irrational or accidental differ-
ences of treatment may not compel a finding of intentional discrimina-
tion.92 Such a rationale accounted for the holding of the case: "a mere
finding of disparate treatment, without a finding that the disparate treat-
ment was the result of intentional discrimination based upon protected
class characteristics, does not prove a claim under Title VII.
' '9 3
Judge Ebel's unprecedented dissection and reformation of the dispa-
rate treatment claim was enhanced by his dilution of the "unworthy of
credence" prong. After failing to cite any of the Tenth Circuit precedent
that followed Burdine literally,9 4 the court concluded that a finding that
the defendant's reasons are pretextual does not compel a finding of dis-
crimination unless shown to be a "pretext for discrimination against a pro-
tected class."95 To support such a conclusion, the court relied on the
rationale that "[p]roffered reasons may be a pretext for a host of motives,
both proper and improper, that do not give rise to liability under Title
VII. '" 9 6 In light of the above, the Tenth Circuit concluded that the trial
89. Id. at 1318. Judge Ebel stressed that "there is no limit to the potential number of
reasons that could be raised at trial." Id. The defendant is required to enunciate the reasons
for the employment decision to prevent "needlessly confused and delayed" litigation of dis-
crimination claims. Id.
90. See Bell v. AT & T, 946 F.2d 1507 (10th Cir. 1991). It is interesting to note thatJudge
Ebel served on the panel that decided Bell
91. Judge Ebel clarified that the defendant must only address the reason for the deci-
sion against the plaintiff in step two of the McDonnell Douglas framework, while the reason for
the disparity between the plaintiff's treatment and that of other employees is appropriately
addressed by the plaintiff in stage three. See Flasher, 986 F.2d at 1319 & n.7.
92. Id. at 1320.
93. Id. at 1314.
94. See supra notes 81-83 and accompanying text. Instead of relying on Tenth Circuit
precedent, Judge Ebel cited cases from the "pretext-plus" courts of the Fourth, Sixth, and
Seventh Circuits. Rasher, 986 F.2d at 1321.
95. Flasher, 986 F.2d at 1321. This is essentially the same holding reached by the
Supreme Court in St. Maty's. See supra part I.C.
96. Flasher, 986 F.2d at 1321. To justify such a conclusion, Judge Ebel initially com-
mented on the inherent complexities of human relationships. See id. at 1319. He noted the
error in assuming "that differential treatment between a minority and a non-minority em-
ployee that is not explained by the employer in terms of a rational, predetermined business
policy must be based on illegal discrimination" in violation of Title VII. Id. at 1319-20. On
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court was not compelled to enter judgment for the plaintiff upon a show-
ing of unexplained differential treatment.
97
The opinion suggests that the trier of fact may need to scour the rec-
ord to locate some of these acceptable reasons in case the employer fails to
articulate the "real" reason for the decision due to the sensitivity of the
issue.98 Such sensitive non-articulations may include personal animus, fa-
voritism, grudges, random conduct, or procedural errors.
9 9
a. Comparison: Flasher and St. Mary's
As the decision in Flasher preceded the Supreme Court's decision in
St. Mary's, Judge Ebel's opinion may have influenced Justice Scalia's opin-
ion. Judge Ebel struggled with the "pretext" verses "pretext for discrimina-
tion" distinction made in Burdine and concluded that the latter constituted
the proper showing.' 0 0 Justice Scalia reached the same result after an ex-
tended discussion of what the Court really "intended" to convey in Bur-
dine.10 1 The scouring the record problem clearly presented itself in
Flasher'0 2 and was a key issue in Justice Souter's dissenting opinion in St.
Mary's.10 3 Judge Ebel's articulation of improper verses proper motives,
10 4
the contrary, apparently irrational differential treatment that cannot be explained on the
basis of clearly articulated company policies may be explained by a number of factors: (1) the
discipline was administered by different supervisors; (2) the events occurred at different
times when the company's attitudes were different; (3) the individualized circumstances of-
fered mitigation for the infractions less severely punished; (4) the less severely sanctioned
employee was more valuable to the company for legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons; or
(5) "the inevitability that human relationships cannot be structured with mathematical preci-
sion." Id. at 1320.
97. See id. at 1322.
98. See id. at 1321 (citing Benzies v. Illinois Dep't of Mental Health & Developmental
Disabilities, 810 F.2d 146, 148 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1006 (1987)).
This conclusion must be compared to contrary statements in Bell v. AT & T, 946 F.2d
1507, 1514 (10th Cir. 1991). In reversing the trial court, the Bell court faulted the lower
court's reliance on an unarticulated reason to support a finding for the defendant. "[W]hen
the trial court relies on what it considers to be a legitimate reason not articulated by the
employer to rebut the plaintiff's prima facie case. .. a plaintiff does not have a full and fair
opportunity to demonstrate pretext .... " Id. The Bell court's conclusion clearly forbids the
fact finder from straying out of the McDonnell Douglas/Burdine framework. By relying on
unarticulated reasons, the trial court in Bell effectively denied the plaintiff the right to mount
a formidable challenge at the pretext stage. See supra note 41 for similar reasoning by the
Burdine Court.
99. See Rasher, 986 F.2d at 1321 (citing Benzies, 810 F.2d at 148).
100. See id.
101. See St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. 2742, 2752 (1993). Justice Scalia con-
cluded that "a reason cannot be proved to be 'a pretext for discrimination' unless it is shown
both that the reason was false, and that discrimination was the real reason." Id. In light of
that two-part necessity, Justice Scalia noted that where the Burdine Court merely stated the
word "pretext," one must reasonably understand such language to refer to "pretext for dis-
crimination." See id.
102. See supra notes 95-99 and accompanying text.
103. See St. Mary's, 113 S. Ct. at 2762 (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Souter stated that:
under the majority's scheme, a victim of discrimination ... will now be saddled with
the tremendous disadvantage of having to confront, not the defined task of proving
the employer's stated reasons to be false, but the amorphous requirement of dis-
proving all possible nondiscriminatory reasons that a factfinder might find lurking
in the record.
Id.
104. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
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although not confronted by Justice Scalia in detail, was also reflected in
the St. Mary's decision.10 5
That is not to suggest that the two opinions do not differ in important
aspects. Judge Ebel failed to acknowledge that his opinion disturbed prior
Tenth Circuit acceptance of Burdine's "unworthy of credence" prong. The
first half of Judge Ebel's opinion seemed to suggest a continued accept-
ance of Burdine.'0 6 His ultimate betrayal of the "unworthy of credence"
prong seemed misplaced, as he directly contradicted earlier statements.
Indeed, one wonders if Judge Ebel even realized the true importance of
the opinion or understood the inherent contradictions in his rationale.
Justice Scalia, on the other hand, realized the need to confront Bur-
dine head on and devoted much of his opinion to showing that the "un-
worthy of credence" prong was merely inadvertence on the part of the
Burdine Court.10 7 Yet, instead of overturning Burdine, the St. Mary's Court
merely discredited the opinion. Such a backhanded approach may lead to
an abandonment of Burdine's overwhelming acceptance in the circuit
courts. 108
2. Sanchez v. Philip Morris Inc.
Although in retrospect, the language in Flasher proved to be a signifi-
cant blow to the ability of claimants to prove pretext, the effect of the
opinion was accentuated by the court's ruling in Sanchez v. Philip Morris,
Inc.10 9 In Sanchez, the court reversed the district court's finding of reverse
and national origin discrimination. The plaintiff, a Hispanic male,
brought suit under Title VII after he was refused employment in the de-
fendant's company on three different occasions. 110 After noting that Raul
Sanchez made out a prima facie case, 1 1 and that the defendant success-
fully rebutted the presumption, 112 the court concluded that the district
court erred in finding that the plaintiff proved pretext.
113
105. See St. Mary's, 113 S. Ct. at 2751 n.5. The Court stated that it would be "a mockery of
justice to say that if the jury believes the reason [the employer] set forth is probably not the
'true' one, all the other utterly compelling evidence that discrimination was not the reason
will then be excluded from the jury's consideration." Id.
For a critical analysis of Justice Scalia's reasoning, see Corrada, supra note 25.
106. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
107. See St. Mary's, 113 S. Ct. at 2751-55.
108. See Corrada, supra note 25, at 18-19 (criticizing Justice Scalia's treatment of Burdine
and predicting future credibility problems for the Court's decisions).
109. 992 F.2d 244 (10th Cir. 1993).
110. Sanchez applied for an entry level sales position three times with Philip Morris. It
was undisputed that he met the minimum requirements for the position-that the applicant
be twenty-one years old and possess a valid driver's license. Id. at 245. In each of the three
instances, Caucasians were hired for the positions. Id.
111. Sanchez established a prima facie case in the failure to hire context by showing that
he was a member of a protected class, was qualified for an available position, and was rejected
for a position that was ultimately filled. Id.
112. The employer merely articulated that Sanchez was not the "best qualified for any of
the three positions." Id. at 246.
113. The trial court erroneously concluded that the individual hired for the third posi-
tion was less qualified than Sanchez. The circuit court criticized that conclusion because the
difference in the two applicants' qualifications was due to different individual work exper-
iences. See id. at 247.
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The court initially emphasized that "the plaintiff in a Title VII case
must prove that intent to discriminate based upon plaintiff's protected
class characteristics was the determining factor for the allegedly illegal em-
ployment decision." 114 The court then concluded that after a plaintiff
successfully proves that the defendant's reasons are unworthy of belief,
"the plaintiff must still prove that the true motive for the employment de-
cision violates Title VII." 115 After finding that the plaintiff failed to prove
that the employer's decision was not motivated merely by a mistake, favor-




As both Hasher and Sanchez demonstrate, the Tenth Circuit has ele-
vated the burden on the plaintiff during the pretext stage from a "pretext
only" burden to a "pretext-plus" burden.1 17 It is no longer enough to dis-
prove and/or discredit the defendant's articulated reasons for the employ-
ment decision. Instead, the plaintiff must prove that perhaps the only,
and certainly the determining, factor leading to the decision was the em-
ployer's reliance on an impermissible discriminatory reason. Such a stan-
dard exceeds even Justice Scalia's articulation in St. Mary's,118 and in fact,
encourages factfinders to search the record to make sure no other reasons
exist that would justify the defendant's decision. Essentially, such a stan-
dard eliminates the need for the defendant to meet the burden of produc-
tion in good faith." 9 Arguably, it makes no difference what sort of
114. Id. at 246-47 (emphasis added) (citing EEOC v. Flasher Co., 986 F.2d 1312 (10th
Cir. 1992)).
115. Id. at 247. "Because the prima facie case only creates an inference of unlawful dis-
crimination, some evidence that the articulated legitimate business reason for the decision
was pretextual does not compel the conclusion that the employer intentionally discrimi-
nated." Id. (citing Rasher, 986 F.2d at 1321).
The Tenth Circuit reached the same conclusion in Kendall v. Watkins, 998 F.2d 848
(10th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1075 (1994). In Kendall, the court affirmed the dis-
trict court's entry of summary judgment against the plaintiff's Title VII claim. Id. at 849.
The court used the pretext requirement articulated in Sanchez to conclude that the plaintiff
failed to show that sex discrimination was the true motive for the defendant's employment
decision. See id.
116. Sanchez, 992 F.2d at 248. The court rested its conclusion on the basis of the trial
court's failure to equate the differences in qualifications with discrimination. Instead, the
trial court considered the differences in qualifications, standing alone, to be sufficient to
support a judgment for the plaintiff. See id. at 247-48.
117. See supra note 44.
118. As St. Mary's offers a less harsh pretext standard than Rasher, plaintiffs' attorneys will
attempt to use the limited holding of St. Mary's to argue that an "unworthy of credence"
demonstration still allows an inference of intentional discrimination. Such an approach,
although reasonable, may be met with mixed success in the Tenth Circuit. Most likely, the
Court will remain extremely hesitant to infer, or uphold an inference of, discrimination
based only on the establishment of the prima facie case and disproof of the employer's ar-
ticulated reasons.
119. Justice Souter, in his St. Mary's dissent, addressed the new incentive employers would
have to lie in meeting the burden of production. See St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 113 S.
Ct. 2742, 2764 (1993) (Souter, J., dissenting). If a defendant remains silent at the produc-
tion stage, judgment for the plaintiff is compelled as a matter of law. Texas Dep't of Commu-
nity Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254 (1981). Thus, employers who fail to articulate a
nondiscriminatory reason for the employment decision "not only will benefit from lying, but
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evidence the defendant offers if the factfinder1 20 is allowed, even in-
structed, to scan the record.
C. Assessment of Plaintiff's Overall Burden
The Tenth Circuit's conclusion that the plaintiff's initial burden is
minimal seems somewhat obvious and expected. The court's stringent
pretext requirement, however, serves to minimize any advantage gained by
the plaintiff at the prima facie stage. Initially, by recognizing the
factfinder's prerogative to search for any nondiscriminatory reason for the
employment decision, whether articulated by the defendant or not, the
court has effectively erased the defendant's burden. The burden of pro-
duction fails to define the scope of the inquiry, and arguably, no longer
serves a useful purpose. Moreover, the plaintiff must now anticipate all
reasons that may be articulated by the employer and the unarticulated rea-
sons that the factfinder may rely upon after scouring the record.
The elimination of Burdine's "unworthy of credence" prong com-
pounds the severe burden. Proof that the employer lied in its justifica-
tions for the employment action fails to establish that those reasons were
merely a pretext for discrimination. Instead, the plaintiff must prove that
the employer's consideration of an impermissible factor was the only rea-
son for the decision. Such a severe standard of proof will discourage fu-
ture employment discrimination claims for a number of reasons. The
need to disprove both the employer's articulated and unarticulated de-
fenses will result in a significant increase in discovery expense. Addition-
ally, plaintiffs will not succeed unless exceptionally strong circumstantial
evidence substantiates their claims. As a result, attorneys may hesitate in
representing the plaintiff with a legitimate complaint but only minimal
proof.
Arguably, this "pretext-plus" burden shatters the McDonnell Douglas
framework and seems to beg the indirect evidence question. Plaintiffs,
after progressing through the McDonnell Douglas framework designed to
help them prove intentional discrimination indirectly, must still essentially
prove direct intentional discrimination. Indeed, for practical purposes,
the McDonnell Douglas framework as clarified by Burdine has lost all mean-
ing in the Tenth Circuit.
must lie to defend successfully against a disparate treatment action." St. Mary's, 113 S. Ct. at
2764 (Souter, J., dissenting). By offering false evidence, the employer meets the prima facie
case and can hope that the factfinder will search the record for an unarticulated reason that
may offer a nondiscriminatory explanation for the decision. Id.
120. In future cases, the "factfinder" will likely be a jury. The Civil Rights Act of 1991
allows either party in an intentional discrimination case under Title VII to demand a jury
trial. See Civil Rights Act of 1991, § 102(c)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 1981A(c)(1) (Supp. III 1991).
The Supreme Court recently concluded, however, that the Act does not apply retroactively.
Rivers v. Roadway Express, Inc., 114 S. Ct. 1510, 1513 (1994).
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CONCLUSION
The Tenth Circuit has witnessed dramatic changes in the application
of the McDonnell Douglas framework since the Burdine clarification.
Although the plaintiff's prima facie burden continued to lighten during
the survey year, the court developed a more stringent pretext standard in
Flasher. The court also embraced that standard in Sanchez, thus ensuring
the Tenth Circuit's commitment to the Rasher rationale. Plaintiffs in the
Tenth Circuit now face one of the harshest pretext burdens in the nation.
Subsequent Tenth Circuit opinions are unlikely to deviate from Flasher,
particularly since the Supreme Court decided St. Mary's soon thereafter.
As a result, in order to support an inference of intentional discrimination,
attorneys must maneuver through the "new improved" McDonnell Douglas
framework to prove, directly, through the use of indirect evidence, that im-




Since its enactment, the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act ("CERCLA")I has accounted for a major
portion of United States environmental law litigation. One of the coun-
try's most important environmental policies, CERCLA was designed to
provide funding and enforcement authority for cleaning up thousands of
existing hazardous waste sites and responding to hazardous substance
spills.2 While the tenets and substance of both environmental law and
CERCLA litigation shift and settle into place, the Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals continues to help shape and direct the law in these developing
areas. In 1993, the Tenth Circuit remained one of the leading appellate
courts in the country to interpret CERCLA, and this Survey discusses three
cases decided by that court.
In United States v. Colorado,3 the court determined the effect of CER-
CLA on the ability of a state to enforce its own environmental regulation
at a federal facility. In New Mexico Environment Department v. Foulston,4 the
court examined an attempt by a bankruptcy trustee to avoid CERCLA lia-
bility by abandoning property that had been contaminated by hazardous
waste. In United States v. Hardage,5 the court considered the effect of in-
demnification agreements between a generator and a transporter of haz-
ardous waste on their CERCLA liability.
I. CERCLA v. RCRA - THE ROLE OF THE STATES IN ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW: UNITED STA TES V. COL ORADO6
A. Background
Congress established CERCLA in 1980 to deal with thousands of inac-
tive and abandoned hazardous waste sites in the United States. 7 In enact-
ing CERCLA, Congress created a mechanism to guarantee available
funding for the cleanup of seriously contaminated sites.8 CERCLA directs
the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") to identify sites at which
hazardous substances that threaten the public health and safety may have
been released, identify the parties potentially responsible for the site or
1. Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767, amended by the Superfund Amendments and
Reauthorization Act of 1986 ("SARA"), Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988 & Supp. III 1991)).
2. See Major William D. Turkula, Determining Cleanup Standards for Hazardous Waste Sites,
135 MIL. L. REv. 167, 173 (1992).
3. 990 F.2d 1565 (10th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 922 (1994).
4. 4 F.3d 887 (10th Cir. 1993), petition for cert. filed, (U.S. Feb. 1, 1994) (No. 93-1268).
5. 985 F.2d 1427 (10th Cir. 1993).
6. 990 F.2d 1565 (10th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 922 (1994).
7. See H.R. REP. No. 96-1016, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.CA.N.
6119, 6119.
8. See id.
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the releases, and ensure that these responsible parties pay for the cleanup
of the sites.9 When responsible parties cannot be identified or pay the
amount of cleanup costs, CERCLA's "Superfund" provision is triggered,
and established government and industry funds are tapped in order to
achieve cleanup.10
The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 ("RCRA")"
was created as a cradle-to-grave regulatory program for hazardous
wastes. 12 Like CERCLA, RCRA specifies methods of hazardous waste
cleanup and provides for corrective or remedial action once a hazardous
release has occurred due to improper waste management.' 3 RCRA em-
ploys a nationwide permit program to enforce government standards for
acceptable levels of specific contaminants.
14
Congress saw the need for states to have primary regulatory authority
over hazardous waste activities so they could protect their own territo-
ries.15 RCRA allows any state to administer an independent, EPA-ap-
proved hazardous waste program within state boundaries, provided that
the program is at least as stringent as RCRA.16 More than 40 states pres-
ently participate in such programs. 17 At issue in United States v. Colorado
was whether a state which had been authorized to carry out such a hazard-
ous waste program under RCRA could be precluded from doing so at a
hazardous waste facility owned and operated by the federal government
where a CERCLA response action was already underway.' 8
B. Facts
Since 1942, the United States Department of the Army has owned and
operated a chemical munitions facility outside Denver, Colorado known as
the Rocky Mountain Arsenal ("Arsenal").1 9 In 1947, the Army began leas-
ing portions of this 27 square-mile site to private corporations, primarily
Shell Oil Company, that used the facility to develop, test, manufacture,
9. CERCLA § 104, 42 U.S.C. § 9604 (1988).
10. See Comment, Superfund at Square One: Promising Statutory Framework Requires Forceful
EPA Implementation, 11 ENVrL. L. RPTr. 10101, 10102 (1981).
11. Pub. L. No. 94-580,90 Stat. 2795, amended &y the Hazardous and Solid Waste Amend-
ments of 1984 ("HSWA"), Pub. L. No. 98-616, 98 Stat. 3221 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992 (1988 & Supp. III 1991)).
12. H.R. RP. No. 1016, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 17 (1980), reprinted in 1980
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6119, 6120.
13. See Donald A. Brown, EPA's Resolution on the Conflict Between Cleanup Costs and the Law
in Setting Cleanup Standards Under Superfund 15 COLUM. J. ENVrrL. L. 241, 273 (1990).
14. RCRA § 3005, 42 U.S.C. § 6925 (1988) (authorizing the EPA to promulgate regula-
tions requiring permits for treatment, storage or disposal of hazardous waste).
15. SeeJ.B. Wolverton, Note, Sovereign Immunity and National Priorities: Enforcing Federal
Facilities' Compliance with Environmental Statutes, 15 HARv. ENVT.. L. REV. 565, 598 (1991).
16. RCRA § 3006(b), 42 U.S.C. § 6926(b) (1988).
17. David W. Steuber et al., Toxic and Environmental Coverage Litigation, in 455 PLI Lrr.
& ADMIN. PRACTICE COURSE HANDBOOK 223, available in WESTLAW, Environmental Database
(ENV-TP), *2-3.
18. United States v. Colorado, 990 F.2d at 1572-74. Also at issue was whether the state
was precluded from initiating its own hazardous waste program at a site that the EPA had
placed on the National Priorities List (NPL). Id.
19. United States v. Shell Oil Co., 605 F. Supp. 1064, 1067 (D. Colo. 1985).
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and package pesticides, herbicides, and other chemicals. 20 The Army built
a common sanitary sewer system and waste disposal system to handle the
daily wastes produced by its own production of chemical agents as well as
those of the corporate lessees.
2 '
The Army and Shell proceeded to discharge millions of gallons of
liquid waste into unlined natural ground depressions.2 2 In addition, they
buried solid waste and munitions in unlined pits, ultimately causing severe
damage to neighboring farmland and livestock via Arsenal-contaminated
well water.2 3 To ameliorate this problem, the Army, in 1956, commenced
construction and operation of Basin F, an asphalt-lined surface impound-
ment, to store and dispose of chemical manufacturing by-products. 2 4 The
ultimate failure of Basin F, along with the Arsenal's entire waste disposal
system, created what may be one of the worst hazardous and toxic waste
sites in America.
25
In 1975, the Colorado Department of Health ("CDH") issued three
cease and desist orders mandating that the Army and Shell clean up all
sources of designated chemicals, undertake a ground water monitoring
program, and cease certain chemical discharges. 26 In 1982, CDH, the
Army, Shell, and the EPA reached an agreement regarding removal,
remediation, and other response actions to meet requirements under
both CERCLA and RCRA.
27
In 1984, the EPA authorized Colorado to implement the Colorado
Hazardous Waste Management Act ("CHWMA") in lieu of the federal
RCRA program. 28 In 1986, the CDH issued its own Basin F closure plan,
after rejecting an Army closure plan as inadequate. 29 The state then sued
the Army as operator of Basin F under the CHWMA, citing violations of
ground water protection regulations.
3 0
In 1986, the Army stopped complying with RCRA, claiming that CER-
CLA's comprehensive scheme precluded additional application of state
RCRA programs at federal facilities. 3 1 Declaring that the site would be cle-
aned up pursuant to CERCLA requirements, the Army subsequently ig-
nored the CHWMA's Basin F closure plan. 32 Colorado then amended its




22. See Vicky L. Peters et al., Can States Enforce RCRA at Superfund Sites? The Rocky Moun-
tain Arsenal Decision, 23 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10419, 10419 (Aug., 1993).
23. Id.
24. Colorado v. United States Dep't of the Army, 707 F. Supp. 1562, 1563 (D. Colo.
1989).
25. See Daigle v. Shell Oil Co., 972 F.2d 1527, 1531 (10th Cir. 1992).
26. Shell Oil Co., 605 F. Supp. at 1067.
27. Id. at 1068.
28. 49 Fed. Reg. 41,036 (1984).
29. Army, 707 F. Supp. at 1564.
30. Id
31. Id. at 1565.
32. Id. at 1564-65.
33. Id. at 1564.
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In Colorado v. United States Dep't of the Army,3 4 the federal district court
denied the Army's motion to dismiss Colorado's enforcement suit, claim-
ing that CERCLA and RCRA were meant to operate individually, and rea-
soned that neither one should be granted more weight than the other in
enforcement actions.3 5 In its decision, the court relied primarily on CER-
CIA § 120(a) (4), which permits application of state laws concerning re-
moval and remedial action at federal facilities that are not listed on
CERCLA's National Priorities List ("NPL").
3 6
Shortly after this decision, Basin F was added to the NPL by the
EPA.37 The Army continued to ignore Colorado's authority, presumably
based on the assumption that the NPL listing precluded compliance with
the court's order. This resulted in the state issuing a compliance order
citing the Army for a variety of additional violations at Basin F and de-
manding submission of a closure plan for state approval.
38
The United States, in an ensuing district court case, sought an order
declaring that Colorado's requests be suspended on the grounds that the
state had no authority to enforce the CHWMA at a CERCLA site.3 9 The
United States argued that CERCLA § 113(h) banned pre-enforcement re-
view.40 The court agreed that any attempt by Colorado to enforce
CHWMA at the Arsenal would require the court to review the Army's CER-
CIA action prior to its completion and that § 113(h) indeed barred such
review.41 The court subsequently granted summary judgment in favor of
the United States and enjoined Colorado from enforcing the CHWMA at
Basin F.
4 2
C. Tenth Circuit Decision
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court's order
granting summary judgment for the United States43 and found that
§ 113(h) only bars federal courts from reviewing "challenges" to CERCLA
response actions.44 Relying on a plain interpretation of statutory construc-
tion, the court held that Colorado's RCRA-authorized enforcement action
did not constitute a "challenge" to the Army's CERCLA response action.
45
The Tenth Circuit stated that courts must construe seemingly conflicting
statutes harmoniously to give meaning to every provision, and that to do
otherwise in this particular instance would contravene Congress' express
34. 707 F. Supp. 1562 (D. Colo. 1989).
35. Id. at 1569-70.
36. CERCLA § 120(a) (4), 42 U.S.C. § 9620(a)(4) (1988).
37. 54 Fed. Reg. 10,512 (1989).
38. CDH Compliance Order No. 89-05-2301.
39. United States v. Colorado, No. CIV.A.89-C-1646, 1991 WL 193519 (D. Colo. Aug. 14,
1991).
40. Id. at *3.
41. Id. at *4.
42. Id. at *5.
43. United States v. Colorado, 990 F.2d at 1584.




intentions of having CERCLA and RCRA work simultaneously and
independently.
46
CERCLA's "savings provision" in § 302(d) provides that "[n]othing in
[CERCLA] shall affect or modify in any way the obligations or liabilities of
any person under other Federal or State law, including common law, with
respect to releases of hazardous substances or other pollutants or
contaminants."
47
Similarly, CERCLA § 114(a) provides that "[n]othing in [CERCLA]
shall be construed or interpreted as preempting any State from imposing
any additional liability or requirements with respect to the release of haz-
ardous substances within such State."
48
Relying heavily on these CERCLA provisions, the Tenth Circuit held
that the district court's interpretation of CERCLA § 113(h) was contrary to
the plain meaning of §§ 114(a) and 302(d) because it decreased the
Army's required compliance and liability under CHWMA as well as pre-
empted the state's right to impose additional requirements on the Army.
49
The court accordingly disposed of the United States' reliance on § 113(h)
as a preclusive tool and held that Congress clearly expressed its intent that
CERCLA should interact with other federal and state hazardous waste
laws.50 The court then found that the Arsenal, as a federal facility, was
subject to regulation under RCRA. 51 Moreover, the EPA delegation of
RCRA authority to Colorado subjected the Arsenal to regulation under
CHWMA. 52
The court also held that the district court's interpretation of § 113(h)
was inconsistent with RCRA's citizen suit provision.53 That section pro-
vides citizens, defined to include states, with the power to enforce RCRA
provisions. 54 The court found that because RCRA does not prohibit citi-
zen enforcement suits with respect to hazardous waste sites, Congress
clearly intended that such suits could be allowed even at a site where a
CERCLA response action was underway.
55
The court also dismissed the United States' claim that CERCLA
§ 120(a) (4) precludes any state enforcement action due to the EPA's
placement of Basin F on the NPL.5 6 The court held that placement on
46. Id.
47. CERCLA § 302(d), 42 U.S.C. § 9652(d) (1988).
48. CERCIA § 114(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9614(a) (1988).
49. United States v. Colorado, 990 F.2d at 1575-76.
50. Id. at 1575.
51. Id. at 1576.
52. Id. (citing Parola v. Weinberger, 848 F.2d 956, 960 (9th Cir. 1988)) (holding that 42
U.S.C. § 6961 "unambiguously subjects federal instrumentalities to state and local
regulation").
53. United States v. Colorado, 990 F.2d at 1577.
54. RCRA § 7002, 42 U.S.C. § 6972 (1988).
55. United States v. Colorado, 990 F.2d at 1578.
56. Id. at 1580. CERCLA § 120(a) (4) states that "[s] tate laws concerning removal and
remedial action, including State laws regarding enforcement, shall apply to removal and re-
medial action at facilities owned or operated by a department, agency, or instrumentality of
the United States when such facilities are not included on the National Priorities List." 42
U.S.C. § 9620(a)(4) (1988).
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the NPL has no bearing on a federal facility's obligation to comply with
state hazardous waste laws established through an EPA delegation of
RCRA authority. 57 The court relied, in part, on CERCLA § 120(i) 58 which
states that nothing in § 120 "shall affect or impair the obligation of any
department, agency, or instrumentality of the United States to comply
with any requirement" of any RCRA requirements, including those consist-
ing of corrective action. 59
D. Analysis
The Tenth Circuit's unanimous decision in United States v. Colorado
serves as strong precedent for the rest of the country. In undertaking the
task of interpreting two of Congress' main environmental statutes, the
Tenth Circuit has unleashed a crucial and viable solution to hazardous
waste cleanup and regulation.
By recognizing that a state may invoke its EPA-authorized RCRA en-
forcement power to compel hazardous waste cleanups, regardless of the
extent or type of federal involvement, the Tenth Circuit established that
the states are authoritatively equivalent to the federal government in over-
seeing and regulating hazardous waste sites. Such a result is a great relief
considering the overall poor track record of the federal government in
cleaning up hazardous waste sites, especially its own.
Despite Congressional directives, EPA implementation of federal haz-
ardous waste statutes has been extremely inept. The Superfund program,
in particular, has been heavily criticized for not achieving more rapid and
efficient cleanups. ° Considering the overall number of contaminated
sites in the United States, Superfund has accomplished very few cleanups
in its regulatory lifetime. For example, of the approximately 1,200 sites on
or proposed for the NPL in 1989, cleanups have been initiated at only 204
of those sites and completed at only 41 sites. 61
A study by Clean Sites concluded that the slow progress of the
Superfund cleanup program is related to the EPA's failure to aggressively
use its potent enforcement authority. 62 Also, nearsighted EPA implemen-
tation of the Superfund program has resulted in utilizing Superfund assets
exclusively to clean up hazardous waste sites rather than attempting to
reach broader CERCLA goals, such as garnering cleanup commitments
from responsible parties.
6 3
57. United States v. Colorado, 990 F.2d at 1580.
58. Id.
59. CERCLA § 120(i), 42 U.S.C. § 9620(i) (1988).
60. See, e.g., CLEAN SrrEs, MAKING THE SUPERFUND WORK: RECOMMENDATIONS TO IMPROVE
PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION 1 (1989). Clean Sites is an organization developed to help re-
sponsible parties in Superfund cases reach settlements.
61. Oversight of the Environmental Protection Agency's Management Review of the Superfund
Program: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Supeyfund, Ocean, and Water Protection of the Senate
Comm. on Env't and Public Works, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1989) [hereinafter Hearings] (state-
ment of Richard L. Hembra, Director of Environmental Protection Issues, Resources, Com-
munity, and Economic Development Division, GAO).
62. CLAN SrrEs, supra note 60, at 7.
63. Id. at 7-8.
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Part of this failure by the EPA to aggressively enforce hazardous waste
cleanup is merely a result of bureaucratic red tape.64 In order for the EPA
to issue administrative orders to another federal agency, it must first get
acceptance from the Department of Justice. 65 This requirement leads to
prolonged negotiations, which in turn result in enormously slow responses
to CERCLA by polluters, including federal facilities.
66
CERCLA's past failures to delegate enforcement responsibilities di-
rectly to states, the inability of states to settle cleanup cases with responsi-
ble parties, the EPA's myopic application of Superfund assets, and the
limited enforcement resources available to the EPA all result in a weak
cleanup enforcement system riddled with deficiencies.
67
The Tenth Circuit's decision helps to address these problems as it
provides the EPA with a vehicle to more effectively and immediately com-
bat hazardous waste contamination: individual states. By delegating more
cleanup authority to states, hazardous waste management becomes a more
conspicuous, local responsibility and is ultimately addressed with a greater
degree of concern and diligence.
The Tenth Circuit's lead and Colorado's perseverance in this case
should serve as a model for the development of cooperative and effective
environmental cleanup programs nationwide. The fact that twenty-one
states filed an amicus brief supporting Colorado's position 68 illustrates the
widespread concern, and hopefully the willingness, states have in directly
overseeing hazardous waste cleanup. Allowing states to assume a greater
enforcement role may be the only way to effectively enforce cleanup of the
thousands of hazardous waste sites that presently exist throughout the
United States.
II. IMMUNITY TO ABANDON CONTAMINATED PROPERTIES UNDER THE
BANKRUPTCY CODE: NEW ExICO ENviRONMENT DPAR7TMET
v. FOULSTOA 6 9
A. Background
The Bankruptcy Code of 197870 allows a trustee in bankruptcy, after
notice and a hearing, to abandon property that is "burdensome" or of
"inconsequential value" to the estate. 7 1 This ability to free an estate of
property permits trustees to efficiently convert debtors' property to money
64. See Alana Bissonnette, Comment, Clean Up Your Federal Mess in My State: Colorado Has
a State RCRA-Voice at the Rocky Mountain Arsenal, 71 DENV. U. L. REv. 257, 264-65 (1994).
65. Id. at 265 n.83.
66. Id. at 265.
67. See, e.g., Hearings, supra note 61 passim
68. The states that filed the amicus curiae brief included Alaska, Arkansas, Connecticut,
Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada, New
Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Utah and Wyoming.
Amicus Curiae Brief, United States v. Colorado, 990 F.2d 1565 (10th Cir. 1993) (No. 91-
1360).
69. 4 F.3d 887 (10th Cir. 1993), petition for cert. filed, (U.S. Feb. 1, 1994) (No. 93-1268).
70. Bankruptcy Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978) (codified as
amended at 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (1988)).
71. 11 U.S.C. § 554(a) (1988).
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in order to pay off creditors and satisfies Congressional intent to provide
debtors with a "fresh start."7 2 A conflict arises, however, when debtors at-
tempt to abandon, as "burdensome," polluted property to avoid liability
for the cleanup of the property.
One purpose of CERCLA is to clean up existing environmental con-
tamination by imposing joint and several liability upon any or all parties
responsible for the cleanup.73 Cost recovery from responsible parties is
one of CERCLA's major features, and it attempts to accomplish Congress'
explicit goal of making private polluters bear the full costs of their pollu-
tion. 74 Yet, the critical cost recovery structure of CERCLA is compromised
when polluters use the Bankruptcy Code to avoid responsibility for such
cleanup.
The complexity of CERCLA regulation, the severe liability for non-
compliance with such regulation, and the staggering expenses related to
compliance make attempts to abandon contaminated properties by trust-
ees and debtors in bankruptcy common.75 If abandonment is allowed, a
debtor is then only required to pay for environmental compliance to the
extent the debtor owns assets separate from the bankruptcy estate.
7 6 If
the debtor does not have assets separate from the estate to pay the cost of
cleanup, the contaminated property sits idle until the taxpayers are forced
to pay for the necessary remediation.
77
Therefore, a major conflict arises when a trustee legitimately invokes
the power to abandon an asset when that asset is contaminated property
that poses a risk to public health and safety. In such a situation, should
federal or state environmental statutes restrict a trustee's abandonment
power? Further, if abandonment of contaminated properties should be
restricted, what thresholds of contamination must be met? The Tenth Cir-
cuit addressed these questions in New Mexico Environment Department v.
Foulston.
78
Under the Bankruptcy Code, a trustee's ability to abandon property
where state environmental violations exist was eliminated in most circum-
stances by the Supreme Court's holding in Midlantic National Bank v. New
Jersey Department of Environmental Protection.79 In a 5-4 decision, the Court
determined that under § 554(a) of the Bankruptcy Code, the trustee
could not abandon a hazardous waste facility that is burdensome to the
72. See 11 U.S.C. § 727 (1988).
73. See CERCLA § 107(a), 42 U.S.C § 9607(a) (1988).
74. See id.
75. See In re FCX, Inc., 96 B.R. 49, 54 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1989).
76. See Thomas G. Gruenert, Environmental Claims in Bankruptcy: Policy Conflicts, Proce-
dural Pitfalls and Problematic Preceden 32 S. TEx. L. Rzv. 399, 439 (1991).
77. See, e.g., City of NewYork v. Quanta Resources Corp. (In re Quanta Resources Corp.),
739 F.2d 912, 921 (3d Cir. 1984), (holding that "[ilf trustees in bankruptcy are to be permit-
ted to dispose of hazardous wastes under the cloak of the abandonment power, compliance
with environmental protection laws will be transformed into governmental cleanup by de-
fault"), aff'd, 474 U.S. 494 (1986).
78. 4 F.3d 887 (10th Cir. 1993), petition for cert. filed, (U.S. Feb. 1, 1994) (No. 93-1268).
79. 474 U.S. 494 (1986).
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estate "in contravention of a state statute or regulation that is reasonably
designed to protect the public health or safety from identified hazards."
80
The Court's decision in Midlantic demanded that a trustee use estate
funds to clean up environmentally hazardous property as the property
cannot be removed from the estate. 81 The decision limits a trustee's aban-
donment power by forcing the trustee to complete all the debtor's
cleanup responsibilities before the estate can be liquidated.8 2 Through
the Midlantic denial of abandonment, estate funds became the economic
source for cleaning up contaminated estate property or paying the EPA or
a state entity to do so, with the same result as if CERCLA or state liability
had been levied against the estate.
Ironically, the seemingly strong pro-environmental decision in
Midlantic also created a loophole for abandonment actions. The Court left
a small window open to interpretation by holding that unless the environ-
mental laws or regulations in question were designed to "protect the pub-
lic health or safety from imminent and identifiable harm," the power to
abandon would be allowed. 83 Interpreting this phrase in Midlantic, courts




Three gas stations, formerly belonging to L.F. Jennings Oil Company,
were contaminated with hazardous substances.8 5 These sites were known
as the Carrizozo Mart ("Carrizozo"), the Midtown Mart 1 ("Midtown"),
and the Capitan Mart ("Capitan"). Jennings filed for bankruptcy protec-
tion under Chapter 7, at which time the trustee of the estate, Foulston,
attempted to sell the three contaminated sites. 86 Foulston, who con-
ducted tests at the sites, found contamination in excess of 100 parts per
million ("ppm") on each site and reported the findings pursuant to state
law to the New Mexico Environment Department ("NMED") prior to the
attempted sales.
8 7
80. Id. at 507.
81. See Kristy Kutz, Note, Who Is Going to Pay: CERCLA v. Bankruptcy, 31 WASHBURN L.J.
573, 600 (1992).
82. See id, The Court stressed the importance of Bankruptcy Code § 959(b), which es-
tablishes that a trustee in bankruptcy must "manage and operate the property in his posses-
sion . . . according to the requirements of the valid laws of the State." Id. at 505.
83. Id. at 507 n.9.
84. A number of courts have permitted abandonment of contaminated properties not
meeting the "imminent and identifiable harm" threshold. See Borden, Inc. v. Wells-Fargo
Business Credit (In reSmith-Douglass, Inc.), 856 F.2d 12 (4th Cir. 1988); In re Oklahoma Ref.
Co., 63 B.R. 562 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1986). Other courts have strictly refused to permit
abandonment and have made the estate fund the entire expense of remediation based on
possible public harm. See In re Peerless Plating Co., 70 B.R 943 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1987); In
re Stevens, 68 B.R. 774 (Bankr. D. Me. 1987).
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Foulston later determined that the properties should be abandoned
pursuant to § 554(a) of the Bankruptcy Code.8 8 The NMED, although
having notice of the contaminated sites, failed to enter an appearance in
the bankruptcy proceedings and failed to make a timely objection to the
abandonment motions.8 9 The bankruptcy court allowed the trustee to ex-
ercise his abandonment power after concluding that the properties posed
no immediate threat to public health or safety.90 The court denied the
NMED's later motion for reconsideration. 91
The NMED then appealed the decision to the district court which
affirmed the -bankruptcy court's decision denying reconsideration of the
abandonment order. 92 The district court also denied the trustee's motion
to dismiss the appeal as moot for two of the properties that had been
deeded to third-parties by the time the appeal was finally heard.
93
C. Tenth Circuit Decision
On appeal, the NMED claimed that the abandonment power granted
to Foulston violated both the state's environmental laws and the Supreme
Court's ruling in Midlantic.9 4 The Tenth Circuit first ruled that the state's
appeal was indeed moot as to two of the three properties, Carrizozo and
Midtown, because they had already been conveyed to other parties.
95
While the Tenth Circuit acknowledged that Midlantic precluded a bank-
ruptcy trustee from abandoning property in contravention of laws that
protect public health and safety, the court ultimately based its decision on
the narrow "imminent and identifiable harm" exception created in
Midlantic.9 6 The Tenth Circuit held that the Capitan site did not meet this
threshold and therefore the bankruptcy court's order allowing abandon-
ment was correct.
9 7
The court claimed that it was "abundantly clear" from the record that
at the time of abandonment, the Capitan site was not an immediate threat
to public health or safety.98 The court stated that the record showed that:
1) the Capitan site was not listed on the state's list of contaminated sites
indicating the NMED was not considering further testing or investigation
of the site; 2) there was insufficient data for the NMED's expert to say the
property presented an immediate threat; and 3) the bankruptcy trustee's









95. Id. at 888-89. Since the parties continued to raise issues applicable to all three
properties at the appellate level, the court agreed to discuss all three. Id. at 888 n.2.






The NMED failed to adequately address the problems existing at the
Jennings properties. The NMED did not enter an appearance in Jen-
nings' bankruptcy proceeding even though it had notice of the sites' con-
tamination and of Jennings' bankruptcy. 10 0 Although the NMED filed a
motion for reconsideration, the bankruptcy court ruled that the objection
was not made in a timely manner and concluded that abandonment was
allowable. 10 1 The NMED subsequendy appealed the decision but failed to
seek a stay, 10 2 a questionable error and an action that the Tenth Circuit




Congress should amend the Bankruptcy Code and specifically grant
priority to environmental cleanup over abandonment. In the interim, the
courts should take a more active and responsible role in enforcing envi-
ronmental policies in this area. The impairment of environmental
cleanup by abandonment actions compromises the entire national
cleanup effort by diminishing the Superfund and essentially putting envi-
ronmental law policies on the same level as regular debt policies. The
cleanup goals of environmental regulation should not take a back seat to
the abandonment provisions of the Bankruptcy Code or be jeopardized by
varied interpretations of the Midlantic exception.
Further, the Tenth Circuit's presumption that state agency inaction
implied the existence of no substantial public health or safety threat is
frivolous. In Borden, Inc. v. Wells-Fargo Business Credit (In re Smith-Douglass,
Inc.) ,104 a bankrupt Illinois company owned a fertilizer plant in violation
of a variety of state water pollution and hazardous waste laws. As the bank-
ruptcy proceedings began, the state agency monitoring the plant had not
yet pursued any enforcement action against the owner. 10 5 As a result of
this state inaction, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that the site
posed no serious health risk as the hazards therein were "speculative."
1 0 6
The dangerous presumption that state agency inaction sufficiently
gauges the public health threat posed by a contaminated site emerged in
Borden. The Tenth Circuit's decision in Foulston also established this link,
perpetuating a disturbing trend. State agency inactivity regarding existing
environmental law violations should be only one of many factors consid-
ered when determining the immediate threat to public health or safety.
The Foulston court held that the Capitan site posed no "immediate"
threat to public health and safety, and as a result did not meet the "no
abandonment" threshold established by the Supreme Court in Midlan-
100. Md at 888.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. See id. at 890.
104. 856 F.2d 12 (4th Cir. 1988).
105. Id. at 14-15.
106. Id. at 16.
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tic.
1 0 7 Yet, the Midlantic holding calls for a finding of "imminent and iden-
tifiable" harm, not "immediate" harm. 108 Imminent and immediate are
not synonymous, and the outcome of a case may well turn on how a court
characterizes the threat. 10 9 The Court in Midlantic explicitly held that
Congress' intent behind CERCLA was to prevent imminent endanger-
ment. 110 Courts have warned that any attempt to limit "imminent danger"
to "immediate danger" amounts to "gambling with human lives." 111
While the Capitan site might not have presented an apparent "imme-
diate" threat to public health or safety, the site did pose an "imminent"
threat. 1 2 While the contaminated soil of the site might not "instantly"113
affect anyone's health or safety, future harm due to the untreated contam-
ination certainly remains "impending" and "likely to occur."1 14 Such a dis-
tinction should be instilled in a court ruling on abandonment cases as
property abandoned through such actions in most cases winds up in the
hands of unsuspecting, good-faith purchasers.
Although the "contamination" in excess of 100 ppm at each of the
three Foulston sites was not described specifically, it is commonly known
that gasoline contains many hazardous elements. The EPA has recognized
that gasoline lead, through its presence in air, dirt, and dust, is the leading
cause of lead poisoning.1 15 Besides lead, gasoline also contains benzene, a
known carcinogen. 1 16 Epidemiological and animal studies indicate that
exposure to benzene results in high rates of leukemia, kidney cancer, and
liver cancer. 1 7 Exposure to concentrations of benzene as low as 250-500
ppm result in nausea, breathlessness, and vertigo while constant exposure
to low concentrations results in non-functioning bone marrow and defi-
107. Foulston, 4 F.3d at 890.
108. Midlantic, 474 U.S. at 507 n.9.
109. See Rick M. Reznicsek, Note, International Environmental Bankruptcy: An Overview of
Environmental Bankruptcy Law, Including a State's Claims Against the Multinational Polluter, 23
VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 345, 362 (1990).
110. Id. at 506 (citing CERCLA § 106, 42 U.S.C. § 9606).
111. See, e.g., Freeman Coal Mining Co. v. Interior Bd. of Mine Operations Appeals, 504
F.2d 741, 744 (7th Cir. 1974).
112. See, e.g., Dague v. City of Burlington, 935 F.2d 1343, 1356 (2nd Cir. 1991) (conclud-
ing that an activity that presents imminent endangerment does not require a finding of im-
mediate or even threatened actual harm), rev'd in part, 112 S. Ct. 2638 (1992); United States
v. Ottati & Goss, Inc., 630 F. Supp. 1361, 1394 (D. N.H. 1985) (holding that "imminency"
does not require a finding that actual harm will occur immediately so long as risk of
threatened harm exists); Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 13 (D.C. Cir.) (en banc) (holding
that "[c]ase law and dictionary definition agree that endanger means something less than
actual harm"), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 941 (1976); Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. EPA,
465 F.2d 528, 535 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (approving of the EPA's conclusion that the final antici-
pated injury need not occur prior to a determination that an 'imminent hazard' exists).
113. Immediate following without the lapse of appreciable time; done or occurring at
once; instant. FUNK & WAGNALLS NEW "STANDARD" DIcIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE
1230 (1961).
114. Imminent. threatening to happen at once, as some calamity; dangerous and close at
hand; impending. Id.
115. See Small Refiner Lead Phase-Down Task Force v. United States EPA, 705 F.2d 506,
528-29 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
116. Natural Resources Defense Council v. Reilly, 983 F.2d 259, 261 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1993)




ciencies in the elements of the blood.' 18 Therefore, if these abandoned
properties are eventually used for any type of high-traffic use, such as resi-
dential or commercial development, public health and welfare may be-
come unnecessarily and irresponsibly imperiled.
In allowing abandonment of the Capitan site based on a finding that
the site posed no "immediate" threat to public health and safety, the bank-
ruptcy court, the district court, and the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals all
misapplied the Midlantic "imminent and identifiable" exception. Consid-
ering the precedential value of the Tenth Circuit decision, such an error
in interpretation could lead to unremediated environmental contamina-
tion. Had the proper test been applied, the court would have had no
choice but to conclude that the accumulated contamination exceeded safe
exposure levels and at least constituted "imminently" dangerous condi-
tions. The Tenth Circuit should have been able to reach this conclusion
without first requiring such a finding by a state agency.
While the Tenth Circuit's view of the Supreme Court's "imminent
and identifiable" exception efficiently promotes the Bankruptcy Code's
"fresh start" policy, the interpretation also undermines CERCLA's policy
of placing the responsibility for environmental cleanup costs on those who
caused the contamination. While Midlantic dealt with state statutes and
regulations and not CERCLA, CERCLA clearly is "reasonably calculated to
protect the public health or safety" from harm and should be allowed to
limit the power of abandonment and trump weaker and insufficient state
laws when they fail to ensure environmental protection. Until Congress
specifically prioritizes a specific objective, courts will follow the lead of
Foulston and continue to uphold abandonment at the expense of crucial
environmental policies.
III. INDEMNIFICATION AGREEMENTS BETWEEN CERCLA RESPONSIBLE
PARTIES FOR CLEANuP LIABILITY- UNITED STATES V. HARDAGE) 19
A. Background
When the EPA incurs response costs in cleaning up hazardous waste,
it may bring actions to recover the costs against any or all potentially re-
sponsible parties ("PRPs"). 120 CERCLA § 107(a) defines four classes of
PRPs: present owners or operators of facilities contaminated by or con-
taining hazardous substances, past owners or operators of such facilities,
persons who arrange for disposal or treatment of hazardous substances,
and persons who accept for transportation hazardous substances and se-
lect the disposal facility.
12 1
PRPs often enter into indemnification or hold harmless agreements
in order to transfer liability for any cleanup responsibility they may incur
118. American Petroleum Inst. v. OSHA, 581 F.2d 493, 498 (5th Cir. 1978), aff'd, 448
U.S. 607 (1980).
119. 985 F.2d 1427 (10th Cir. 1993).
120. CERCLA §§ 104(a), 107(a), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9604(a), 9607(a) (1988).
121. CERCLA § 107(a)(1)-(4), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1)-(4) (1988).
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under CERCLA.122 PRPs attach great importance to these agreements as
the financial consequences arising out of CERCLA's strict liability for
cleanup are usually very burdensome. Very few PRPs today enter into con-
tracts without considering or bargaining for the inclusion of some kind of
indemnification clause.1 23  ,
Notwithstanding these facts, it remains uncertain whether CERCLA
allows allocation of liability between PRPs. CERCLA § 107(e) (1) states:
No indemnification, hold harmless, or similar agreement or con-
veyance shall be effective to transfer from the owner or operator
of any vessel or facility or from any person who may be liable for
a release or threat of release under this section, to any other per-
son the liability imposed under this section. Nothing in this sub-
section shall bar any agreement to insure, hold harmless, or
indemnify a party to such agreement for any liability under this
section.
124
The seemingly contradictory language of these two sentences has di-
vided courts considering whether CERCLA allows the contractual alloca-
tion of financial responsibility for hazardous waste cleanup.1 25 The Tenth
Circuit addressed the issue in United States v. Hardage.
B. Facts
From 1973 to 1979, United States Pollution Control, Inc. ("USPCI")
transported waste products produced by various parties to the Royal N.
Hardage Industrial Waste Site (Hardage Site) near Criner, Oklahoma. 126
One of the hazardous waste producers was the McDonnell-Douglas Corpo-
ration ("MDC") with whom USPCI had contracted to transport 250,000
gallons of waste to the Hardage site.1 27 The contracts specified that
USPCI would hold McDonnell-Douglas harmless from any claim of loss
resulting from the transport of the waste as well as any liability, obligations,
or costs possibly created by USPCI.
128
Environmental officials eventually identified hazardous wastes at the
Hardage site and named both USPCI and MDC as PRPs, whereupon each
sought indemnification from the other.' 29 USPCI claimed that it had pro-
tected itself by. including indemnification clauses on its standard-form
122. See, e.g., Commander Oil Corp. v. Advance Food Serv. Equip., 991 F.2d 49, 50-51
(2nd Cir. 1993); Jones-Hamilton Co. v. Kop-Coat, Inc., 750 F. Supp. 1022, 1023 (N.D. Cal.
1990), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 973 F.2d 688 (9th Cir. 1992).
123. Lisl E. Miller, Comment, Indemnification Agreements Under CERCLA, 23 ENwTL. L. 333,
348 (1993).
124. CERCLA § 107(e)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(e)(1) (1988).
125. The majority of courts have interpreted § 10
7
(e) to allow indemnification agree-
ments. See, e.g., Niecko v. Emro Mktg. Co., 973 F.2d 1296, 1300-01 (6th Cir. 1992); Jones-
Hamilton Co. v. Beazer Materials & Servs., 959 F.2d 126, 129 (9th Cir. 1992), superseded by,
973 F.2d 688 (9th Cir. 1992). Yet a minority of courts have found that § 107(e) precludes
independent indemnification contracts. See, e.g., AM Int'l, Inc. v. International Forging
Equip., 743 F. Supp. 525, 528-30 (N.D. Ohio 1990).
126. Hardage, 985 F.2d at 1431-32.
127. Id. at 1433.
128. Id. at 1434.
129. Id. at 1432.
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shipping tickets. The tickets stated that MDC and the government agreed
to indemnify USPCI against all liability which MDC or the government
might cause or create.
1 30
The district court granted summary judgment for MDC against
USPCI on the indemnification provisions contained in the contracts, hold-
ing that USPCI's shipping ticket indemnification language was inapplica-
ble.13 1 On appeal, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision,
concluding that liability had been legitimately transferred to USPCI as a
result of broad language favoring MDC found in the parties' various in-
demnification clauses.'
3 2
C. Tenth Circuit Decision
In affirming the district court's decision, the Tenth Circuit found the
plain meaning of § 107(e) (1) prevented PRPs from altogether transfer-
ring their liability, but gave them the right to obtain indemnification for
that liability. 133 In other words, there can be no transfer of liability to the
government or to anyone else, but financial responsibility can be trans-
ferred. As the Tenth Circuit did not delve into a detailed analysis of
§ 107(e) (1), it is important to note the cases the court relied upon to vali-
date indemnification agreements.
The court cited Mardan Corp. v. C.G.C. Music, Ltd.,i5 4 a Ninth Circuit
case holding that section 107(e) (1) "expressly preserves agreements ... to
indemnify a party held liable under 107(a)." 1 35 The Mardan court ex-
plained that "[b]y preserving such agreements, Congress seems to have ex-
pressed an intent to preserve the associated body of state law under which
agreements between private parties would normally be interpreted."S
6
The court also cited Purolator Products Corp. v. Allied-Signal, Inc.,137 in
which a federal district court held that liable parties under CERCLA can
contractually shift responsibility for their response costs among each
other, but can in no way escape their liability to the government or a third
party.13 8 The Purolator court held that allowing indemnification agree-
ments did not hamper CERCLA's goal of recovering moneys for cleanup
because the government could still recover from a responsible party.13 9
Relying on Oklahoma law, the Hardage court found that while an in-
demnification agreement must "clearly and unequivocally express an in-
tent to exculpate," it need not refer to specific acts that will invoke the
clause. 140 The court explained that "such an intent may be found where
130. Id. at 1434.
131. Id. at 1432.
132. Id. at 1436.
133. Id. at 1433.
134. 804 F.2d 1454 (9th Cir. 1986).
135. Id. at 1458.
136. Id.
137. 772 F. Supp. 124 (W.D.N.Y. 1991).
138. Id. at 129.
139. 1d. at 129-30.
140. Hardage, 985 F.2d at 1434.
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the language of the indemnification is so broad and all-inclusive that it
necessarily sweeps all events-including those occurring because of the
indemnitee's actions-into its coverage."
14 1
The court found that MDC was entitled to indemnification from
USPCI based on an indemnification clause found in two transport and
disposal contracts that indemnified all losses "resulting from" the transpor-
tation or disposal of MDC's hazardous waste. 142 The court held that the
term "resulting from" was the type of "all-inclusive and unambiguous lan-
guage" sufficient to relieve MDC from its CERCLA-imposed strict liabil-
ity.143 In contrast, the court concluded that the "caused or created"
language used in USPCI's shipping tickets failed to create any indemnifi-
cation because such language lacked the required breadth found in
MDC's language.
1 44
After contracting to use the Hardage Site for hazardous waste dispo-
sal, USPCI then approached various "customers" including MDC, and pro-
posed the Hardage Site as a feasible hazardous waste dump site. 145
Upholding the district court's ruling, the Tenth Circuit stated that CER-
CLA § 107(a) (4) establishes transporter liability if site selection is chosen




Although courts have differed over the ambiguous language of CER-
CLA § 107(e), it is clear that allowing for indemnification contracts be-
tween PRPs is the correct course for courts to take if hazardous waste
problems are to be aggressively and potently remediated. By allowing for
indemnification agreements between the PRPs in Hardage, the Tenth Cir-
cuit effectively supported the aims of CERCLA by assuring that polluters
pay for their mess regardless of how payment is accomplished.
While a PRP remains fully liable to the government regardless of any
indemnification contracts entered into, 147 such agreements allow a PRP
the opportunity to contractually transfer financial responsibility arising
out of such liability. Therefore, a party indemnified by another liable
party is vested with the incentive to voluntarily clean up hazardous sub-
stances or wastes on its site as it can recover response costs directly from
the other liable party.
141. Id. at 1434-35.
142. Id. at 1434.
143. Id. at 1435.
144. Id. at 1435-36.
145. Id. at 1435 n.6.
146. Id. While USPCI averred that MDC "cause or created" USPCI's liability, it was
USPCI's actions as a transporter and selector of the disposal facility that in essence "caused or
created" their liability.
147. See, e.g., Olin Corp. v. Consolidated Aluminum Corp., 807 F. Supp. 1133, 1140
(S.D.N.Y. 1992) (stating that indemnity agreements have "no impact on the central goal of
CERCLA-to hold PRPs, rather than taxpayers, liable for the cost of environmental clean-
up" because the parties remain jointly and severally liable to the government), aff'd in part,
vacated in part, 5 F.3d 10 (2d Cir. 1993).
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The minority of courts that have prohibited indemnification agree-
ments between PRPs have done so in contravention of the primary CER-
CLA goals of promoting voluntary cleanup of hazardous waste sites148 and
placing the costs of cleanup on the parties responsible for the contamina-
tion. 14 9 Without indemnification agreements, PRPs who pollute have less
incentive to clean up the contamination since any cleanup costs incurred
would be unreimbursed. In such circumstances, the parties might be con-
tent to sit on their pollution, hoping to escape CERCLA scrutiny and
never pay a penny in remediation costs. Prohibiting indemnification
agreements also causes polluters to seek out indemnity or insurance agree-
ments with parties not liable under CERCLA, thus leaving response costs
to be paid by non-polluting, non-culpable parties.
While the Tenth Circuit's decision in Hardage upheld crucial CER-
CIA objectives, it also helped bolster the critical public policies pro-
pounded in Mardan and Purolator. The freedom to contract was implicitly
referred to in Mardan and stands as a personal right fundamental to the
efficiency of the American legal system.150 The Purolator court found that
Congress left parties free to allocate liability contractually among them-
selves, and noted that such a public policy helped in the ultimate equita-
ble application of CERCLA liability.1
5 '
While the majority of courts remain in favor of the transfer of CER-
CLA financial responsibility through indemnification agreements, a mi-
nority currently exists which is striking down such agreements. Such
action is impinging upon the fundamental right of freedom to contract, a
right which CERCLA expressly reserves.' 52 Any major shift towards the
minority view would harm environmental regulation because diminish-
ment in the freedom to contract would undermine the Congressional in-
tent of equitably allocating hazardous waste cleanup costs to the greatest
number of parties.
While the legislative history behind CERCLA § 107(e) is enigmatic, it
tends to support indemnification agreements. The primary purpose of
§ 107(e) initially was to prevent adhesion contracts and to protect parties
from nondisclosure, purposes that have become unnecessary due to adap-
tation and amendment of the law in those fields. 153 Since preclusion of
indemnification agreements is no longer necessary for the reasons Con-
148. See HOUSE COMM. ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, HAZARDOUS WASTE CON-
TAINMENT ACr OF 1980, H.R. REP. No. 1016, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 17 (1980), reprinted
in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6119, 6120.
149. See SENATE COMM. ON ENVIRONMENT AND PUBLIC WORKS, ENVIRONMENTAL EMERGENCY
RESPONSE ACT, S. REP. No. 848, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 12-13 (1980).
150. Article I, § 10 of the United States Constitution provides that "[n]o state.. shall pass
any law impairing the obligation of contracts...." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
151. Purolator, 772 F. Supp. at 134.
152. See, e.g., Hatco Corp. v. W.R Grace & Co-Conn., 801 F. Supp. 1309, 1317 (D.N.J.
1992) (stating that "CERCLA allows parties to privately allocate by contract the risk of loss for
liabilities under [CERCLA]"); Rodenbeck v. Marathon Petroleum Co., 742 F. Supp. 1448,
1456 (N.D. Ind. 1990) (stating that "CERCLA expressly preserves the right of private parties
to contractually transfer to or release another from the financial responsibility arising out of
CERCLA liability").
153. See Miller, supra note 123, at 351.
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gress originally intended, legislative history can not act to invalidate such
agreements. 15 4 Yet, as long as debate over § 107(e)'s legislative history
remains alive, courts will continue to use it as leverage for striking down
indemnification agreements. Congress should take steps to amend CER-
CIA and specifically allow for indemnification agreements between PRPs.
In its delegation of indemnification liability in Hardage, the Tenth Cir-
cuit relied on a very literal interpretation of the language used by the par-
ties in their indemnification attachments. This emphasis on plain
meaning in Hardage should compel individual parties crafting indemnifi-
cation agreements to tailor the language carefully. Using ambiguous, boil-
erplate language for contractual allocation of risk may create unintended
consequences, with neither party receiving bargained-for benefits. 155 Fur-
thermore, parties should expressly incorporate specific state law into their
agreements to ensure that the language of the agreements will actually
protect them.
CONCLUSION
Relying on a plain meaning interpretation of CERCLA, the Tenth Cir-
cuit in United States v. Colorado vested states with the potent ability to regu-
late federal facilities under state RCRA authority. The decision breathes
life back into the EPA's fettered delegation system and adds a much
needed review and enforcement weapon to the nation's environmental
regulation arsenal. The court's decision in United States v. Hardage, recog-
nizing the validity of indemnification agreements between CERCLA re-
sponsible parties, also relied on a plain meaning interpretation of
CERCLA. Hardage follows the majority trend across the country and up-
holds the fundamental freedom to contract as well as crucial CERCIA pol-
icies, including promoting voluntary cleanup of hazardous waste sites and
placing the cost of remediation on those responsible for the pollution.
While the Tenth Circuit's decisions in United States v. Colorado and
Hardage succeeded in upholding Congressional goals of protecting public
health and safety through strict environmental regulation, the court did
not follow that trend in New Mexico Environment Department v. Foulston,
where environmental regulation took a back seat to Bankruptcy Code
policies.
154. For a related view, compare Schalk v. Reilly, 900 F.2d 109.1, 1096 n.4 (7th Cir.) (not-
ing that the disagreement among members of Congress regarding the meaning of certain
CERCLA provisions indicates that courts should be reluctant to rely on legislative history),
cert. denied, 498 U.S. 981 (1990). For examples of cases where indemnification agreements
have been granted without reliance on legislative history, see Armotek Indus., Inc. v. Freed-
man, 790 F. Supp. 383, 386-87 (D. Conn. 1992); Hemingway Transp., Inc. v. Kahn (In re
Hemingway Transp., Inc.), 126 B.R. 650, 653 (D. Mass. 1991), aff'd, 954 F.2d 1 (1st Cir.
1992). But see AM Int'l v. International Forging Equip., 743 F. Supp. 525, 528 (N.D. Ohio
1990) (prohibiting indemnification agreements under § 107(e), finding that the Senate, in
final debates before the passing of CERCLA, "disfavored releases [from liability] except under
strict conditions").
155. Penny L. Parker & John Slavich, Contractual Efforts to Allocate the Risk of Environmental
Liability: Is There a Way to Make Indemnities Worth More Than the Paper They Are Written On?, 44
Sw. L.J. 1349, 1381 (1992).
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Congress should specifically grant environmental policies supremacy
over bankruptcy policies. However, in the face of Congressional inaction,
the courts must act as efficient guardians of the environment themselves
and liberally interpret environmental regulations. The Foulston court's de-
cision rests on a flawed application of Supreme Court precedent and effec-





The nation's health care system has recently undergone unprece-
dented scrutiny. Politicians from the White House to Capitol Hill, health
care professionals and experts, policymakers, and the general public agree
that at some level the present health care system needs to change. Of
course, determining the extent of such a change prompts a highly polit-
ical, ideological, and even emotional debate. Court decisions that inter-
pret and apply health laws expose important health care issues and
problems. Consequently, these decisions facilitate reform by guiding law
and policymakers to problem areas within the health care system. There-
fore, current health law cases warrant investigation.
Over the past year, the Tenth Circuit ruled on numerous health-re-
lated issues. Several of these rulings undoubtedly will impact the health
care system. This Survey discusses three notable Tenth Circuit cases con-
cerning issues in health law arising under the Emergency Medical Treat-
ment and Active Labor Act (EMTAIA),1 the Medicare Act,2 and § 510 of
the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA).3 Part I considers
the issues of patient stabilization and physician liability under EMTALA.
4
Part II analyzes the issue of "Sole Community Hospital" status under the
Medicare Act.5 Finally, part III discusses the issue of health benefit dis-
crimination under ERISA.
6
I. EMERGENCY MEDICAL TREATMENT AND AcrvE LABOR ACT:
DE AEY v. C.DE
7
A. Background
1. Stabilization of an Emergency Medical Condition
EMTALA primarily functions to prevent private hospital emergency
rooms from transferring and denying available medical care to patients
who cannot afford to pay for treatment, a phenomenon known as "patient
dumping."8 Participating Medicare hospitals with emergency rooms must
sufficiently examine the patient to determine whether an "emergency
1. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 1395 (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
3. 29 U.S.C. § 1140 (1988).
4. See infra part I discussing Delaney v. Cade, 986 F.2d 387 (10th Cir. 1993).
5. See infra part II discussing Community Hosp. v. Sullivan, 986 F.2d 357 (10th Cir.
1993).
6. See infra part III discussing Phelps v. Field Real Estate Co., 991 F.2d 645 (10th Cir.
1993).
7. Delaney, 986 F.2d at 387.
8. Diana K. Falstrom, Comment, Decisions Under the Emergency Medical Treatment and Ac-
tive Labor Act: A Judicial Cure for Patient Dumping, 19 N. Ky. L. REv. 365, 365 (1992); John P.
Halfpenny, Comment, Taking Aim at Hospital "Dumping" of Emergency Department Patients: The
COBRA Strikes Back, 31 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 693, 693-94 (1991).
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medical condition" 9 exists. 10 If such an emergency situation does exist,
then the hospital is obligated under the act to either provide treatment or
to transfer the patient."1 Transfer is permitted only if the patient has re-
quested transfer after being fully informed of the risks, the physician has
certified in writing (either directly or by countersignature) that the bene-
fits of transfer outweigh the risks, or the patient has stabilized. 12 One is-
sue addressed in Delaney v. Cade concerned whether the plaintiffs
condition was indeed stabilized prior to her transfer.
13
Several courts have addressed the issue of a patient's stabilization
under EMTALA. The Tenth Circuit found the following cases relevant to
Delaney: Deberry v. Sherman Hospital Ass'n,14 Burditt v. United States Department
of Health & Human Services,15 and Cleland v. Bronson Health Care Group.
16
In Deberry, the plaintiff claimed that her daughter had not been properly
stabilized before being discharged from the defendant hospital. 17 Deny-
ing the defendant's motion to dismiss, 18 the district court noted that hos-
pital violations of EMTALA occur in one of two ways. 19 First, if an
emergency medical condition does exist, the hospital can violate the act by
failing to determine "the nature of the [patient's] emergency condition."
20
Second, if the nature of the emergency condition is discovered, the hospital
can violate the act by transferring or releasing the patient without stabiliz-
ing the patient's condition.2 1 The court concluded that an inquiry into
the occurrence of either violation requires a factual determination,
thereby rendering dismissal inappropriate.
22
9. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(e) (1) (Supp. III 1991).
"Emergency medical condition" is defined as:
(A) a medical condition manifesting itself by acute symptoms of sufficient severity
(including severe pain) such that the absence of immediate medical attention could
reasonably be expected to result in-
(i) placing the health of the individual (or, with respect to a pregnant wo-
man, the health of the woman or her unborn child) in serious jeopardy,
(ii) serious impairment to bodily functions, or
(iii) serious dysfunction of any bodily organ or part; or
(B) with respect to a pregnant women [sic] who is having contractions-
(i) that there is inadequate time to effect a safe transfer to another hospital
before delivery, or
(ii) that transfer may pose a threat to the health or safety of the woman of the
unborn child.
Id.
10. Falstrom, supra note 8, at 369-70.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 370-72. "The term 'stabilized' means, with respect to an emergency medical
condition . . . that no material deterioration of the condition is likely, within reasonable
medical probability, to result from or occur during the transfer of the individual from a
facility, or . .. that the woman has delivered ... ." Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(e) (3) (B)
(Supp. III 1989-1992)).
13. See Delaney, 986 F.2d at 391-93.
14. 741 F. Supp. 1302 (N.D. Ill. 1990).
15. 934 F.2d 1362 (5th Cir. 1991).
16. 917 F.2d 266 (6th Cir. 1990).
17. Deberry, 741 F. Supp. at 1303.
18. Id. at 1307.
19. Id. at 1305.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 1305.
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In Burditt, the defendant doctor appealed the imposition of civil mon-
etary penalties against him for failing, among other things, to properly
stabilize a patient before her transfer. 23 The Fifth Circuit held that Dr.
Burditt failed to properly stabilize the patient because he did not provide
the treatment that medical experts would normally provide to prevent the
potentially adverse consequences to the patient.24 As in Debery, the Burditt
court determined the question of patient stabilization by considering facts,
In Cleland, the plaintiffs appealed the dismissal of their claim that the
defendants failed to stabilize the patient's condition. 25 Upholding the dis-
missal, the Sixth Circuit found that the patient could be considered stabi-
lized within the meaning of EMTALA because the patient was not acutely
distressed and neither the doctors, the patient's parents, nor the patient
himself indicated a deteriorating condition.2 6 In other words, the doctors
had no occasion to detect the patient's state of emergency. 27 Hence, the
court reconciled its decision with Deberry by stating, "[ilf the emergency
nature of the condition is not detected, the hospital cannot be charged
with failure to stabilize a known emergency condition."
28
2. Enforcement Against Hospitals and Physicians
EMTALA also provides three enforcement mechanisms:
29 (1) civil
monetary penalties against hospitals or doctors who negligently violate the
act;3 0 (2) private civil suits against hospitals whose violations directly cause
personal injury;3 ' and, (3) suspension or revocation of a hospital's Medi-
care provider agreement.3 2 Contrary to the language of § 1395dd(d) (1)
imposing civil monetary penalties, § 1395dd(d) (2) (A) allowing for private
civil suits only specifies the participating hospital as the object of the
suit.3 3 Nevertheless, the issue of a doctor's civil suit liability under the act
23. Burditt, 934 F.2d at 1366, 1368-69.
24. Id. at 1369.
25. Cleland 917 F.2d at 269.
26. Id. at 271.
27. See id.
28. Id.
29. See Halfpenny, supra note 8, at 704-05.
30. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(d)(1) (Supp. III 1991) provides:
(A) A participating hospital that negligently violates a requirement of this section is
subject to a civil monetary penalty of not more than $50,000 . . . for each such
violation.
(B) Subject to subparagraph (C), any physician who is responsible for the examina-
tion, treatment, or transfer of an individual in a participating hospital, including a
physician on-call for the care of such an individual, and who negligently violates...
this section .... is subject to a civil monetary penalty of not more than $50,000 for
each such violation ....
31. Id. § 1395dd(d) (2) (A) (emphasis added) provides:
Any individual who suffers personal harm as a direct result of a participating hospi-
tal's violation of a requirement of this section may, in a civil action against the partic-
ipating hospita obtain those damages available for personal injury under the law of
the State in which the hospital is located, and such equitable relief as is appropriate.
32. Id. § 1395dd(d) (2) (A) (violating physicians may be excluded from Medicare and
state health care programs).
33. Falstrom, supra note 8, at 378; see also Case Comment, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 355,
356 (1993) (EMTALA creates a private cause of action against hospitals but not against doc-
tors). Compare 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(d)(1) (Supp. III 1991) with § 1395dd(d) (2) (A).
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has been the source of litigation.3 4 The Tenth Circuit considered this is-
sue in Delaney.
3 5
The leading case on this issue is Baber v. Hospital Corp. of America.3 6 In
Baber, the plaintiff sued the physicians for allegedly violating EMTALA by
inadequately addressing his sister's emergency medical condition.3 7 The
district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant physi-
cians.3 8 The Fourth Circuit affirmed, holding that EMTALA does not pro-
vide for private civil suits against physicians.3 9 The Fourth Circuit further
explained that only the Department of Health and Human Services can
bring an action against a physician to impose administrative civil monetary
penalties and/or to prohibit the physician's involvement in Medicare pro-
grams. 40 The court based its decision on its failure to find contrary con-
gressional intent in EMTALA's legislative history.
4 1
The plaintiff argued against summary judgment based on Burditt
42
and Sorrells v. Babcock.43 Yet, the Fourth Circuit found neither case per-
suasive. 44 Burditt involved a doctor's appeal from the assessment of ad-
ministrative civil monetary penalties by the Department of Health and
Human Services, not a private civil suit against a physician. 45 The court in
Sorrells merely held that the federal courts have jurisdiction over EMTALA
actions against emergency room physicians. 46 While the Sorrells court
questioned Congress' intent behind allowing the Secretary to recover
monetary penalties in cases where a patient brought the suit,4 7 the Fourth
Circuit considered the Sorrells analysis to be mere dictum, and illustrative
of the court's confusion of the issues.
48
34. See Falstrom, supra note 8, at 384; see also Robert A. Bitterman, Note, A Critical Analy-
sis of the Federal COBRA Hospital "Antidumping Law": Ramifications for Hospitals, Physicians, and
Effects on Access to Healthcare, 70 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 125, 172-73 (1992) (discussing cases
that have addressed the civil liability of physicians under EMTALA).
35. See Delaney, 986 F.2d at 393-94.
36. 977 F.2d 872 (4th Cir. 1992).
37. Id. at 874.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 876-77. Several federal district courts agree on this issue. See Jones v. Wake
County Hosp. Sys., Inc., 786 F. Supp. 538, 545 (E.D.N.C. 1991) (COBRA does not provide a
private cause of action against a physician); Lavignette v. West Jefferson Medical Ctr., No.
CIV.A.89-5495, 1990 WL 178708, at *2 (E.D. La. Nov. 7, 1990) (holding the express language
and legislative history of EMTALA indicate it was not intended to provide a private cause of
action against physicians); Verhagen v. Olarte, No. 89CIV.0300(CSH), 1989 WL 146265, at *6
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 21, 1989) (construing EMTALA as excluding a federal private claim against a
physician).
40. Baber, 977 F.2d at 877.
41. See id.; H.R. REP. No. 241, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 3, at 6-7 (1986), reprinted in 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N. 726, 728.
42. 934 F.2d 1362 (5th Cir. 1991).
43. 733 F. Supp. 1189 (N.D. Ill. 1990).
44. See Baber, 977 F.2d at 877; see also Case Comment, supra note 33, at 358 (explaining
the Baber court's distinction of Burditt and Sorrelts).
45. Id. at 877-78; see Burditt, 934 F.2d at 1366.
46. Baber, at 878; see Sorrells, 733 F.Supp at 1195.
47. Baber, 977 F.2d at 878; see Sorrells, 733 F. Supp. at 1194.
48. See Baber, 977 F.2d at 878. But see Bitterman, supra note 35, at 172 (citing Sorrells as
authority for holding physicians liable in private civil suits); Falstrom, supra note 8, at 384.
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B. Tenth Circuit Decision: Delaney v. Cade 49
1. Facts
The plaintiff, Ms. Delaney, sustained serious injuries in an automobile
accident. 50 Her injuries included a transected aorta, face and knee lacera-
tions, arm and neck fractures, and a broken nose.51 The emergency room
at St. Joseph Memorial Hospital (St. Joseph) received Ms. Delaney imme-
diately following the accident.5 2 While at St. Joseph, the defendant, Dr.
Cade, treated only her knee injuries; he neither ordered x-rays nor per-
formed a physical examination. 53 At that time, Ms. Delaney still had feel-
ing in her legs and she complained of chest pains.54 Two hours after her
arrival at St. Joseph, Dr. Cade transferred her to Central Kansas Medical
Center (Central). 55 By the time she arrived at Central, the feeling in her
legs had disappeared. 5 6 Ms. Delaney received further medical treatment
at Central before being transferred again to the University of Kansas Medi-
cal Center (K.U.). 57 At K.U., doctors discovered Ms. Delaney's clotted
transected aorta. 58 They performed surgery, but Ms. Delaney remained
permanently paralyzed.
5 9
Ms. Delaney sued Dr. Cade, St. Joseph, and Central under § 1395dd
of EMTALA for failing to stabilize her condition prior to her transfer.60
The district court concluded that the facts alleged did not support a claim
against either hospital and thus granted those defendants full summary
judgment. 61 The district court also found that EMTALA does not allow
private civil suits against physicians; therefore, the court granted Dr. Cade
partial summary judgment on that issue.62 Ms. Delaney appealed these
judgments. 63 The Tenth Circuit reversed in part, holding that the evi-
dence may support a claim against the hospitals under § 1395dd, but af-




The Tenth Circuit first addressed whether Ms. Delaney's condition
had been stabilized before she was moved to Central. The court cited
49. 986 F.2d 387 (10th Cir. 1993).
50. Id. at 388.
51. Id. at 388 n.1.
52. Id. at 388.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 388-89.
55. Id. at 388-89.
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Debery v. Sherman Hospital Ass'n 65 for the rule that hospitals can violate
§ 1395dd of EMTALA by failing to stabilize a patient's emergency medical
condition before the patient is released or transferred.66 The court held,
based on Deberry, that all expert testimony introduced on the summary
judgment issue must be considered to determine whether a material dete-
rioration of the plaintiffs condition was likely during the transfer (that is,
whether the defendant hospitals properly stabilized Ms. Delaney).67 Ms.
Delaney disputed the district court's finding that she had conceded the
stabilization issue. 68 Furthermore, Ms. Delaney alleged that the feeling
she had in her legs before transfer had dissipated by the time she arrived
at Central-a material deterioration of her condition during the trans-
fer.69 Considering these allegations, the court found that the evidence
offered by Ms. Delaney presented a genuine issue of material fact concern-
ing the stabilization of her condition. 70 The court then reversed the sum-
mary judgment for the hospitals on that issue.
7 1
The Tenth Circuit next considered the issue of a physician's civil lia-
bility under § 1395dd of EMTALA. 72 The court followed Baber and the
statute's language in holding that § 1395dd does not allow individuals to
bring civil suits against physicians who allegedly violate the act, but that
individuals can bring civil suits against an offending hospital.73 Thus, the




The Tenth Circuit properly followed other decisions that applied a
fact-based analysis to the issue of patient stabilization. 75 The definition of
"stabilized" is sufficiently vague to require significant fact-finding and
weighing of evidence. 76 Congress may have intended to be unspecific in
its definition. However, more specificity and clarity in the definition of
"stabilized" would provide a useful guide for the fact-finding process.
Given the present definition and the circumstances of Ms. Delaney's case,
the Tenth Circuit correctly left the question open for an adversarial con-
sideration of the alleged facts. Ruling one way or the other as a matter of
65. 741 F. Supp. 1302 (N.D. Ill. 1990).
66. Delaney, 986 F.2d at 391-92.
67. Id. at 392. For definition of "stabilized" see supra note 12.
68. Delaney, 986 F.2d at 392-93.




73. Delaney, 986 F.2d at 393-94.
74. Id. at 394.
75. See, e.g., Burditt v. United States Dep't of Health and Human Serv.'s, 934 F.2d 1362,
1369 (5th Cir. 1991) (stabilization question depended upon testimony by medical experts);
Cleland v. Bronson Health Care Group, 917 F.2d 266, 271 (6th Cir. 1990) (held to be stabi-
lized because no facts indicating otherwise); Deberry v. Sherman Hosp. Ass'n, 741 F. Supp.
1302, 1305 (N.D. Il. 1990) (definition of"to stabilize" is obviously factual question). See supra
notes 13-27 and accompanying text (discussing these cases more fully).
76. See definition of "stabilized" supra note 12.
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law on this issue when an actual factual dispute exists would accomplish
nothing. The Tenth Circuit's decision may influence other courts to resist
ruling on similar issues before trial.
On the issue of a physician's civil liability under EMTALA, the court
properly held that no such liability exists based on the actual language of
the statute and on other court decisions. 77 It does seem anomalous, how-
ever, that both negligent hospitals and negligent doctors may incur ad-
ministrative monetary penalties, but only negligent participating hospitals
may be sued by private individuals.78 Even though a hospital may be ap-
propriately considered vicariously liable for the negligent acts of its physi-
cians, it is usually an individual physician who makes the medical
decisions, examines or fails to examine the patient, and provides or fails to
provide the treatment.
The legislative history fails to directly address the reason for immuniz-
ing physicians from private civil liability, but the Judiciary Committee ex-
pressed its concern that overly severe penalties might defeat the goal of
the act to increase availability of emergency care, thereby leading some
hospitals to close their emergency rooms to avoid penalty risks.79 In addi-
tion, the committee expressed concern that more severe penalties might
exacerbate the medical malpractice crisis.80 The Judiciary Committee be-
lieved the present penalties constituted a sufficient deterrent against
emergency room abuses.8 1 Perhaps the committee also felt that creating a
private cause of action against physicians under the act would be superflu-
ous in light of common law malpractice suits.
To make the act's penalty provisions more consistent, Congress could
allow for limited physician civil liability. For example, Congress could cap
the amount of available damages. Congress could also require the ag-
grieved patient to choose between suing the physician under the act, or
suing the physician under a common law action. While congressional con-
cerns about the potentially adverse effects of imposing overly harsh penal-
ties are certainly understandable, allowing an injured patient some level of
personal redress through the act, even if limited, should accomplish the
goals of the act, yet dodge adverse repercussions.
77. See, e.g., Jones v. Wake County Hosp. Sys., Inc., 786 F. Supp. 538, 545 (E.D.N.C.
1991) (COBRA does not provide a private cause of action against a physician); Lavignette v.
West Jefferson Medical Ctr., No. CIV.A.89-5495, 1990 WL 178708, at *2 (E.D. La. Nov. 7,
1990) (holding the express language and legislative history of EMTALA indicate it was not
intended to provide a private cause of action against physicians); Verhagen v. Olarte, No.
89CIV.0300(CSH), 1989 WL 146265, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 21, 1989) (construing EMTALA as
excluding a federal private claim against a physician).
78. See supra part I.A.2.
79. See H.R. REP. No. 241, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 3, at 6 (1986), reprinted in 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N. 726, 728.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 7, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 726, 729.
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II. "SOLE COMMUNITY HospIAL" UNDER THE MEDICARE AcT:
COMMUNI-Y HOSPITAL V. SULLIVAN
8 2
A. Background
Originally, the Medicare Act provided reimbursement to participating
hospitals for the "reasonable cost" of care given to Medicare recipients.
83
In 1983, Congress changed the system by replacing the "reasonable cost"
system with the "prospective payment system" (PPS). 84 The PPS paid set
amounts to hospitals based on the diagnoses of patients. 8 5 Congress
hoped this new system would encourage hospital efficiency by rewarding
cost-efficient services.86 However, because smaller rural hospitals are
often less efficient than larger urban medical centers, these rural hospitals
received disproportionately fewer Medicare reimbursements than their ur-
ban counterparts. 87 In response to this adverse effect, Congress allowed
certain rural hospitals, those defined as "sole community hospitals"
(SCHs), to receive more Medicare funds.
88
Congress originally defined SCH in fairly general terms. 89 In 1989
Congress narrowed the definition by requiring, among other things, that
SCHs be more than 35 miles from other hospitals or that SCHs be the only
source of hospital services due to a lack of "other like hospitals."90 The
phrase "like hospitals" did not exist in the former definition.
9 1
Pursuant to the authority granted in the statute, the Secretary of
Health and Human Services promulgated corresponding administrative
regulations concerning SCH status.92 The regulations define "like hospi-
tal" as one providing "short-term acute care."93 In addition, the regula-
tions state that hospitals with SCH status under the original system would
82. 986 F.2d 357 (10th Cir. 1993).
83. 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww (1982) (amended 1983); see id. at 358;.
84. 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(d) (1988) (amended 1989); see Community Hosp., 986 F.2d at 358;
85. 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(d) (1988); see Community Hosp., 986 F.2d at 358.
86. H.R. REP. No. 25, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 132 (1983), reprinted in 1983 U.S.C.C.A.N.
219, 351; see Community Hosp., 986 F.2d at 358.
87. Robin E. Margolis, Healthtrends, HFALTHSPAN, May 1992, at 21.
88. 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(d) (5) (c)(ii) (1988); see id.
89. 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(d) (5) (C) (ii) (1988) (amended 1989) provided:
[T] he term "sole community hospital" means a hospital that, by reason of factors
such as isolated location, weather conditions, travel conditions, or absence of other
hospitals (as determined by the Secretary), is the sole source of inpatient hospital
services reasonably available to individuals in a geographical area who are entitled
to benefits under part A of this subchapter.
90. 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(d) (5) (D) (iii) (Supp. III 1991) (emphasis added) provides:
[An SCH is] any hospital(l) that the Secretary determines is located more than 35
road miles from another hospital, (II) that, by reason of factors such as the time
required for an individual to travel to the nearest alternative source of appropriate
inpatient care ... , location, weather conditions, travel conditions, or absence of
other like hospitals (as determined by the Secretary), is the sole source of inpatient
hospital services reasonably available to individuals in a geographic area who are
entitled to benefits under part A of this subchapter, or (III) that is designated by the
Secretary as an essential access community hospital ....
91. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(d) (5) (C) (ii) (1988) (amended 1989).
92. 42 C.F.R. § 412.92 (1990).
93. Id. § 412.92(c) (2).
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not be required to meet the new standards,9 4 and SCH status would not be
revoked unless the conditions surrounding the conferral of the status
changed.
95
In St. Mary's Hospital & Medical Center v. Heckler (St. Mary's),96 the dis-
trict court found that St. Mary's Hospital qualified as a SCH because
nearby Community Hospital, unlike St. Mary's Hospital, provided limited
osteopathic97 care; St. Mary's Hospital provided more extensive allopathic98
care. 99 This difference in treatment methodologies distinguished the two
hospitals sufficiently enough to permit SCH status for St. Mary's Hospi-
tal. 100 Based on the reasoning of the St. Mary's case, Community Hospital
also applied for SCH status, resulting in the recent Tenth Circuit
decision.101
B. Tenth Circuit Decision: Community Hospital v. Sullivan
1. Facts
Community Hospital v. Sullivan involved the same two hospitals as in St.
Mary's Hospital & Medical Center v. Heckler.10 2 Community Hospital (Com-
munity) provides short-term, acute osteopathic10 3 care in Grand Junction,
Colorado. 10 4 The nearest osteopathic hospital is located 500 miles away in
Albuquerque, New Mexico. 10 5 However, St. Mary's Health Center (St.
Mary's), a short-term, acute allopathic 10 6 care hospital, is located only a
few blocks away from Community. 10 7 In addition, St. Mary's has SCH sta-
tus under an obsolete statutory and regulatory procedure. 108 The basis
94. Id. § 412.92(b) (5) provides:
A hospital that has been granted an exemption from the hospital cost limits under
§ 413.30(e)(1) of this chapter before October 1, 1983, or whose request for the
exemption was received by the appropriate intermediary before October 1, 1983,
and was subsequently approved, will be automatically classified as a [SCH] unless
that classification has been canceled under paragraph (b)(3) of this section, or
there is a change in the circumstances under which the classification was approved.
95. Id. § 412.92(b)(3) provides, "An approved classification as a [SCH] will remain in
effect without need for reapproval unless there is a change in the circumstances under which
the classification was approved."
96. No. CIV.84-Z-1474, 1985 WL 56559 (D. Colo. Feb. 7, 1985).
97. Osteopathy is "[a] school of medicine based upon the idea that the normal body
when in 'correct adjustment' is a vital machine capable of making its own remedies against
infections and other toxic conditions. Practitioners use the diagnostic and therapeutic meas-
ures of ordinary medicine in addition to manipulative measures." STrEDMN'S MEDICAL DIC-
TIONARY 1004 (5th unabr. lawyer's ed. 1982). Practitioners are doctors of medicine.
Community Hosp. v. Sullivan, 986 F.2d 357, 362 n.2 (10th Cir. 1993).
98. Allopathy is "substitutive therapy; a therapeutic system in which a disease is treated
by producing a second condition that is incompatible with or antagonistic to the first." Id. at
44.
99. St. Mary's, 1985 WL 56559 at *1; see Community Hosp., 986 F.2d at 359.
100. St Mary's, 1985 WL 56559 at *1-2.
101. See Community Hosp., 986 F.2d at 359.
102. Id.
103. See supra note 97 (definition of osteopathic).
104. Community Hosp., 986 F.2d at 359.
105. Id.
106. See supra note 98 (definition of allopathic).
107. Community Hosp., 986 F.2d at 359.
108. See id.; St. Mary's Hosp. & Medical Ctr. v. Heckler, No. CIV.84-Z-1474, 1985 WL
56559 at *1. The St. May's case was decided before the current statutes and regulations went
1994]
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for St. Mary's SCH status arose from the fact that Community provided
only osteopathic care with limited services, (that is, no intensive care, ther-
apeutic radiology, or emergency department), while St. Mary's provided
allopathic care.' 0 9
Relying on the St. Mary's decision and the 500-mile distance between
Community and the nearest osteopathic hospital, Community applied for
SCH status in 1990.110 The Secretary of Health and Human Services re-
fused to grant SCH status to Community on the grounds that Community
and St. Mary's fit the definition of "like hospitals.""1 On appeal, the dis-
trict court relied on the St. Mary's decision, reversed the Secretary's ruling,
and ordered the Secretary to grant Community SCH status. 1 2 The Secre-
tary appealed to the Tenth Circuit." 
3
2. Opinion
The Tenth Circuit reversed the district court's decision. 1 4 The court
applied a standard of review deferential to the Secretary's findings and
quickly dispensed with Community's first two arguments: collateral estop-
pel and inappropriate deference to the Secretary's interpretation.' 1 5 The
court held that the Secretary was not collaterally estopped from raising the
"like hospitals" issue because the facts and law had significantly changed
from those existing at the time of the St. Mary's decision."16 Specifically,
Community's services had changed, as had the statutory and regulatory
procedure. 1 17 On the issue of inappropriate deference to the Secretary's
interpretation, the court ruled that deference to the Secretary was appro-
priate for two reasons: (1) Congress explicitly granted the Secretary the
authority to administer the statute, and (2) the Secretary reasonably inter-
preted it.118
The third and primary substantive issue in the case involved the
proper interpretation of the regulatory definition of "like hospitals.""19
Community first argued that the Secretary's interpretation of the phrase
conflicted with congressional intent by creating an unfair economic imbal-
ance between the two fundamentally different hospitals.' 20 Community
further argued that the administrative regulations permitting the Secre-
tary to revoke the SCH status of grandfathered hospitals due to changed
circumstances 121 conflicted with the "like hospitals" regulation. 12 2 Specifi-
into effect. See Community Hosp., 986 F.2d at 360. See also supra notes 88-94 and accompany-
ing text.
109. Community Hosp., 986 F.2d at 359; see St. Mary's, 1985 WL 56559 at *1.
110. Community Hosp., 986 F.2d at 359.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 358.
114. Id. at 360.
115. Id. at 360.
116. Id. See supra notes 95-100 and accompanying text (discussing the St. Mary's decision).
117. Community Hosp., 986 F.2d at 360.
118. Id.
119. See id. at 361; 42 C.F.R § 412.92(c) (2) (1990).
120. See Community Hosp., 986 F.2d at 361.
121. See42 C.F.R. § 412.92(b) (3), (5) (1990); supra notes 93-94 and accompanying text.
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cally, Community asked how the Secretary could deny Community SCH
status on the basis of changed circumstances while simultaneously al-
lowing St. Mary's' SCH status to continue despite the changed circum-
stances. 123 Finally, Community argued that the allopathic and osteopathic
distinction made the two hospitals different by nature.
1 24
The court first held that because the statute clearly seeks to reimburse
rural hospitals that are the only available means of standard medical care,
and not those hospitals in the same rural area that provide specialty care,
the need to analyze the statute's legislative history was eliminated.1 25 Sec-
ond, the court held that the grandfather regulation 126 requiring SCH ap-
plicants such as Community to meet the present statutory and regulatory
scheme, while exempting those with prior SCH status such as St. Mary's,
did not invalidate the "like hospitals" regulation merely because a differ-
ent regulatory mechanism applied to the grandfathered hospitals.' 2 7 Fi-
nally, the court held that the district court incorrectly applied the St.
Mary's decision to Community's case.1 28 The court found the osteo-
pathic/allopathic distinction irrelevant under the present regulations.
129
"Like hospitals," as used in the statute and defined in the regulation, in-
clude those hospitals located within 35 miles of each other that provide
short-term, acute care regardless of the type of care otherwise provided.
130
The court applied this definition and found that both hospitals provided
short-term, acute care within 35 miles of each other, and thus concluded
that Community did not qualify for SCH status.
13 1
C. Analysis
The Tenth Circuit's decision turns on the definition of "like hospi-
tals" as defined in title 42 § 412.92 of the 1990 Code of Federal Regula-
tions.13 2 Because a like hospital, St. Mary's, was within 35 miles of
Community, Community did not meet the requirements of the statute and
could not receive SCH status. t33 This decision seems logical and appro-
priate. It requires a strict application of a relatively clear statute and regu-
lation to the facts. The court's decision does not sidestep the issue,
convolute the meaning of the statute, or boldly override the controlling
legislation. The court found the statute and definitions to be clear and
122. Community Hosp., 986 F.2d at 361.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 362.
125. Id. at 361 (citing Public Hosp. Dist. No. 1 v. Sullivan, 806 F. Supp. 1478, 1485 (E.D.
Wash. 1992)). "There is no indication in the language of the statute that Congress intended
that the government subsidize specialty hospitals located in the same rural community." Id.
126. See 42 C.F.R. § 412.92(b) (5) (1990); supra note 89 and accompanying text.
127. Community Hosp., 986 F.2d at 361-62.
128. Id. at 362.
129. See id.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 363.
132. 42 C.F.R. § 412.92 (1990). See supra text accompanying note 93.
133. Community Hosp., 986 F.2d at 363.
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applied the law to Community's case. When the requirements for SCH
status were not met, the court properly denied Community that status.
Nevertheless, the result is troublesome. Because Community is an os-
teopathic hospital and St. Mary's is an allopathic hospital, the two hospi-
tals provide fundamentally different approaches to acute medical care, not
different specialties.'5 4 Therefore, patients who prefer one approach over
the other are limited to one such hospital within a 35-mile radius. The
Tenth Circuit's decision sets a precedent that two hospitals are "like hospi-
tals" regardless of the fact that they provide two completely different types
of acute care. Because the court's decision turned primarily on the defini-
tion of "like hospitals," that definition should be narrowed to prevent "un-
like" hospitals from being considered "like." This would permit patients
to chose the type of short term acute care they desire. A narrower defini-
tion is also consistent with Congress' goal in granting SHC status to pre-
vent additional charges from being passed on to the patients who have no
opportunity to use a less expensive hospital if only one hospital is in the
community and if Medicare reimbursement is limited.' 3 5 Patients in
Grand Junction, Colorado who wish to undergo osteopathic care are de-
nied this opportunity to shop around.
Furthermore, this decision leaves Community economically disadvan-
taged compared to St. Mary's. With the SCH reimbursements, St. Mary's
may be more cost competitive than Community and ultimately cause Com-
munity's closure. Such a result conforms neither to Congress' apparent
intent (to reimburse less efficient rural hospitals so they can remain open)
nor to the needs of rural communities (availabilty of medical care).
Even though the court's decision seems unfair, the court may have
had little choice. Given the clear statutory and regulatory definitions, the
decision for Community may have set a snowballing precedent. Most rural
hospitals, if not all, would be able to ride on the coattails of grandfathered
hospitals and gain SCH status,1 3 6 effectively rendering the new regulations
useless. Moreover, as Community implicitly argued, the changes in Com-
munity's medical services and the changes in the law itself strongly suggest
that St. Mary's' SCH status should be revoked.1 3 7 Therefore, to avoid simi-
lar inequitable results in the future, either the statute and regulations
need to be further amended or the agency responsible for determining
SCH status should do its job and revoke unnecessary grants.
134. For definitions of osteopathy and allopathy, see supra notes 97-98; see also Community
Hosp., 986 F.2d at 362 n.2 (distinguishing the practices of osteopathic and allopathic
medicine).
135. Community Hosp., 986 F.2d at 361.
136. See Community Hosp., 986 F.2d at 361.
137. See id. at 361.
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III. SEcriON 510 OF ERISA AND INTERFERENCE WITH EMPLOYEE HEALTH
BENEFITS: PHELPS V. FIELD R&4L ErTA TE CO.
1 3 8
A. Background
Congress enacted ERISA13 9 as a means of uniformly regulating pri-
vate. employee benefit programs. 140 ERISA applies to both pension and
welfare or health benefit plans. 14 1 This statute serves as a guide for pri-
vate, self-insured employers to determine their employees' benefits.
14 2
Section 510 of ERISA forbids both employer discrimination against, or dis-
charge of, employees who rightfully file benefit claims, and further forbids
employer interference with employees' rights to receive benefits under a
benefit plan.143 In other words, the statute prohibits discrimination or
discharge not only for actually filing a benefit claim, but also for the
probability or possibility of filing a claim.
144
As suggested above, ERISA cases usually follow one of two scenarios:
(1) the employer discharges the employee, supposedly for a legitimate rea-
son, but the employee alleges that the employee's effect, or expected ef-
fect, on benefit costs actually motivated the discharge; or (2) the employee
claims that the employer changed or stopped the employee's benefit plan
to conserve costs. 14 5 Phelps involved the first of these scenarios.
146
In discharge cases, the employee must generally show three elements:
(1) the employer engaged in prohibited conduct; (2) to interfere, (3) with
the employee's right to receive benefits. 147 If the employer masks the mo-
tive with a legitimate reason for the discharge, however, the employee's
burden of proof becomes extremely difficult.148 In Gavalik v. Continental
Can Co., the Third Circuit Court of Appeals held that ERISA cases require
proof of a specific intent to discriminate or interfere with a benefit
right. 14 9 The court added that circumstantial evidence may be used to
138. 991 F.2d 645 (10th Cir. 1993).
139. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
140. Carl A. Greci, Note, Use It and Lose It: The Employer's Absolute Right Under ERISA Section
510 to Engage in Post-Claim Modifications of Employee Welfare Benefit Plans, 68 IND. L.J. 177, 179
(1992). ERISA applies to benefit plans financed through the employer's own assets (self-
insured benefits), not to commercial insurance benefits. See id. at 177-78.
141. Id. at 179, 181; see 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1)-(2) (1988).
142. Arthur S. Leonard, Ethical Challenges of H1VInfection in the Workplace, 5 NOTRE DAME J.
L. ETics & PUB. POL'y 53, 63 (1990).
143. Joan Vogel, Containing Medical and Disability Costs by Cutting Unhealthy Employees: Does
Section 510 of ERISA Provide a Remedy?, 62 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1024, 1041-42 (1987). ERISA
§ 510 provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person to discharge, fine, suspend, expel, discipline, or
discriminate against a participant or beneficiary for exercising any right to which he
is entitled under the provisions of an employee benefit plan ... or for the purpose
of interfering with the attainment of any right to which such participant may be-
come entitled under the plan ....
29 U.S.C. § 1140 (1988).
144. See Vogel, supra note 143, at 1042.
145. Greci, supra note 140, at 184-85.
146. See Phelps v. Field Real Estate Co., 991 F.2d 645, 645 (10th Cir. 1993).
147. Gavalik v. Continental Can Co., 812 F.2d 834, 852 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 979
(1987); Greci, supra note 140, at 185.
148. Vogel, supra note 143, at 1042.
149. Gravalik, 812 F.2d at 851-52.
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show specific intent.150 In Conkwright v. Westinghouse Electric Corp.,15 1 the
court ruled that an employee claiming discriminatory discharge on the
basis of his age must prove that his age more probably than not motivated
the employer's decision to discharge.
15 2
Phelps involved allegations of such unlawful discharge based on the
employee's development of Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
(AIDS). 15 3 AIDS costs both money and lives. The enormous health care
costs associated with AIDS invite employers to target and discriminate
against employees or potential employees who either have AIDS, have
tested positive for human immunodeficiency virus (HIV)15 4 infection, or
present a high risk of contracting the virus. 155 Before Phelps, no case law
existed directly addressing ERISA's protection against discriminatory dis-
charge of an employee with AIDS.1 56 Courts have granted relief under
ERISA, however, to employees discharged for other illnesses.
157
B. Tenth Circuit Opinion: Phelps v. Field Real Estate Co.
1. Facts
Field Real Estate Company (Field) hired John Phelps as vice-presi-
dent of commercial real estate in 1985.158 Almost two years later, Phelps
tested positive for HIV; however, he exhibited no symptoms or illness. 159
Because his HIV status did not affect his ability to work, Phelps decided
not to disclose his condition.1' °
The chief executive officer of Field, Douglas Poole, evaluated Phelps'
performance annually. 161 On a scale of one to five, Phelps received pri-
marily threes on his 1986 evaluation. 162 In 1987, Phelps was promoted to
senior vice-president, and in his 1987 performance evaluation, he received
primarily fours.
163
In 1988, Poole received an anonymous note stating that Phelps had a
fatal blood disease, and asking that he be transferred. 164 When con-
150. Id.; see also Dister v. Continental Group, Inc.,'859 F.2d 1108, 1112 (2d Cir. 1988)
(stating that specific intent in ERISA claims can rarely be shown by direct evidence).
151. 933 F.2d 231 (4th Cir. 1991).
152. Id. at 235.
153. Phelps, 991 F.2d 645.
154. HIV is the virus that causes AIDS. THE SLOANE-DoRTAND ANNOTATED MEDIc.&L-LEGAL
DIcrIoNARY 497 (1992 Supp.).
155. See Vogel, supra note 143, at 1031, 1061.
156. See Leonard, supra note 142, at 65. Cf McGann v. H & H Music Co., 946 F.2d 401
(5th Cir. 1991) (affirming an employer's absolute right to significantly reduce the maximum
lifetime benefit for AIDS-related claims).
157. See Arthur S. Leonard, AIDS, Employment and Unemployment 49 OHIo ST. LJ. 929, 950-
52 (1989); see, e.g., Folz v. Marriott Corp., 594 F. Supp. 1007 (W.D. Mo. 1984) (awarding
equitable relief under ERISA to an employee fired after revealing that he had multiple
sclerosis).
158. Phelps v. Field Real Estate Co., 991 F.2d 645, 646-47 (10th Cir. 1993).








fronted, Phelps admitted that his condition was fatal and that he kept it
confidential for fear of losing his job and health insurance. 165 Poole reas-
sured Phelps; however, Poole expressed concern about the effects of
Phelps' condition on corporate liability and the acquisition of "key man"
insurance for Phelps if Field were sold. 16 6 At Poole's request, Phelps pro-
duced a letter signed by a physician stating that Phelps' condition could
adversely affect his insurability but that his condition did not presently
affect his job performance. 167 Phelps still did not reveal the true nature of
his condition. 168 Phelps gave the letter to Poole, who expressed confi-
dence in Phelps' working capabilities.
1 69
Later in 1988, Poole advertised for a commercial real estate division
manager, describing a position similar to Phelps' job. 170 In early 1989,
Phelps received all fours on his evaluation, but a performance comment
stated that commercial sales growth had been poor.17 1 Phelps responded
that outside factors including a poor economy stunted the division's
growth.
172
In August 1989, a memo leaked regarding changes in the commercial
division and the hiring of a new general manager of sales and leasing.
1 73
Two days later, Field discharged Phelps; the reasons given were the divi-
sion's poor performance and the company's reorganization.1 74 At that
time, Phelps revealed that he had AIDS and that discharging him would
terminate his health insurance benefits.1 75 Poole stated that he was not
aware Phelps had AIDS and offered him a position as a real estate agent
with the option of continuing his health insurance at his own expense.
176
Phelps rejected the offer and filed suit against Field, claiming violations
under § 510 of ERISA.
177
The district court found that Poole did know the true nature of
Phelps' illness but that Phelps failed to prove a discriminatory motive.
178




167. Id. at 647-48.
168. Id. at 648 n.4.




173. Phelps, 991 F.2d at 648.
174. Id. at 649.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 646. This survey does not discuss Phelps' second claim alleging discrimination
against employees with handicaps under COLO. REv. STAT. § 24-34-402(1)(a) (1988). See
Phelps, 991 F.2d at 650.
178. Phelps, 991 F.2d at 649-50.
179. Id. at 646 n.I. John Phelps died in 1992 before his case was heard on appeal. Id.
180. Id. at 651.
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2. Opinion
Phelps' ERISA claim required the Tenth Circuit to determine
whether the evidence suggested that Field based any part of its decision to
discharge Phelps on saving expected benefit costs.1 8 ' The court applied
the rule from Conkwright v. Westinghouse Electric Corp.,' 8 2 requiring Phelps
to show that his medical condition, more probably than not, motivated his
employer to fire him. 18 3 The court also applied the rules from Gavalik v.
Continental Can Co.,184 and Dister v. Continental Group, Inc.,18 5 stating that
Phelps could prove his claim by using circumstantial evidence because di-
rect evidence of an improper motive is rare. 18 6 After briefly analyzing the
district court's findings of fact; the court found that Phelps failed to show
any prohibited intent on the part of his employer. 187 The court based its
decision on the following facts: (1) Field discharged Phelps fourteen
months after he revealed his illness; (2) the commercial sales division
under Phelps did not meet growth expectations; (3) Field completely reor-
ganized its commercial sales and leasing division; (4) at the time of
Phelps' discharge, Field warned another employee who headed the com-
mercial leasing division that his job was limited; and (5) the other em-
ployee left the company soon after the reorganization.' 188
C. Analysis
Phelps exposes a variety of troubling contemporary ethical and legal
issues. The court's decision itself is disturbing. The Tenth Circuit applied
the conventional rules concerning discriminatory discharge under § 510
of ERISA but engaged in a rather dubious factual analysis. The court
seemed to slide by some very important facts in reaching its decision that
strongly suggested improper motive. First, the court agreed that evidence
existed to show the possible adverse effect an employee with AIDS might
have on health benefits.' 8 9 The district court found and the Tenth Circuit
accepted the fact that Poole, Phelps' supervisor, knew or at least suspected
that Phelps had AIDS, even though the facts also showed that Poole ex-
pressed surprise when Phelps revealed his true illness. 190 The facts show
that Poole expressed concern about the effects of Phelps' illness on corpo-
rate liability and securing "key man" insurance. 9 1 Phelps' performance
evaluations continually improved; in fact, his last evaluation contained all
fours, yet Field discharged Phelps for his past performance.' 92 Field fired
181. See id. at 649.
182. 933 F.2d 231 (4th Cir. 1991).
183. See id. at 235.
184. 812 F.2d 834 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 979 (1987).
185. 859 F.2d 1108 (2d Cir. 1988).
186. See Phelps, 991 F.2d at 645; Dister, 859 F.2d at 1112; Gavalik, 812 F.2d at 852.
187. See Phelps, 991 F.2d at 650.
188. See id.
189. See id.
190. Id. at 649; see Phelps v. Field Real Estate Co., 793 F. Supp. 1535, 1540-41 (D. Colo.
1991).
191. Phelps, 991 F.2d at 647.
192. See id. at 647-49.
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Phelps without warning and without instituting a probationary employ-
ment period. 19 3 In light of the fact that Phelps' coworker received a warn-
ing,194 the preceding fact becomes even more relevant. Finally, when
Phelps revealed his illness, his employer offered him a demotion so that
he could continue his health insurance at his own expense.195 The last fact
strongly suggests that Phelps' employer had considered the potential ef-
fects that Phelps' illness would have on the benefit program. Hence, cir-
cumstantial evidence of the employer's improper motive abounds.
The court should have weighted the above facts more heavily, espe-
cially given that an employer can rebut the accusation by merely present-
ing a legitimate reason for the discharge. 196 Apparently the division
under Phelps really did experience sluggish growth. However, evidence of
contributing economic factors also existed. Because AIDS not only gener-
ates costly medical expenses but also carries one of the worst stigmas of
modern times, it seems highly possible, if not probable, that Phelps would
not have lost his job if his employer had not known Phelps had AIDS.
Unfortunately, the AIDS epidemic continues with no certain cure or
treatment in sight. Because of early detection tests and medications that
delay symptoms, people known to have HIV infection live and function
longer with the disease. 19 7 Therefore, infected persons without symptoms
or illness will continue to appear in the workplace. The high costs of med-
ical care, the availability of early detection, and perhaps lingering
prejudices provide incentives to the employer to identify infected employ-
ees or potential employees. This invites discrimination.
198
193. See id. at 649.
194. See id.
195. See id.
196. See id. at 650. Motive may be masked by a legitimate discharge reason. See Vogel,
supra note 143, at 1031, 1061.
197. See Leonard, supra note 142, at 53-54.
198. Although Colorado's amendment to its constitution (popularly known as Amend-
ment 2), COLO. CONST. art. II, § 30(b) (Supp. 1993), is beyond the scope of this article, it
does merit some attention. Amendment 2 prevents the State of Colorado and any of its cities
or towns from passing laws that prohibit discrimination based on sexual orientation. Amend-
ment 2 provides:
No Protected Status Based on Homosexual, Lesbian, or Bisexual Orientation.
Neither the State of Colorado, through any of its branches or departments, nor any
of its agencies, political subdivisions, municipalities or school districts, shall enact,
adopt or enforce any statute, regulation, ordinance, or policy whereby homosexual,
lesbian or bisexual orientation, conduct, practices or relationships shall constitute
or otherwise be the basis of or entitle any person or class of persons to have or claim
any minority status quota preferences, protected status or claim of discrimination.
This Section of the Constitution shall be in all respects self-executing.
Id. This type of constitutional provision simply exacerbates the problem. If such laws and
ordinances are prohibited, then employers may skip the step of trying to determine whether
a person has AIDS and eliminate homosexuals as a class because they (specifically homosex-
ual males) represent a high-risk group. See Leonard, supra note 157, at 956-57.
In December 1993, the Denver District Court ruled that Amendment 2 is unconstitu-
tional. Evans v. Romer, CIV.A. No. 92 CV 7223, 1993 WL 518586, at *9 (Colo. Dist. Ct. Dec.
14, 1993). However, this decision will probably be appealed, perhaps as high as the United
States Supreme Court. Thaddeus Herrick, Both Sides in Gay Bights Fight Claim Victory, RocKY
MTN. NEws, Dec. 15, 1993, at 8A. Until a final ruling of unconstitutionality is made by a
higher court, the specter of other similar laws and constitutional provisions looms ominously.
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High health care costs constitute the primary cause of health benefit-
based discrimination. If expensive medical care costs are merely an una-
voidable fact of life, however, then employers who provide health benefits
should expect, prepare, and provide for employees who get sick. Further-
more, the law should strictly enforce antidiscrimination laws to diminish
the incentive to discriminate against ill or potentially ill employees.
Otherwise, the newly proposed national health insurance program will be
the only other solution. 199 If soaring health care costs are contained, and
if everyone is guaranteed some level of health care by widely distributing
costs, then employers will have no reason to treat unhealthy employees
differently.
CONCLUSION
The three cases discussed in this Survey involve two larger issues: (1)
the right to quality health care and (2) the problem of high health care
costs. Delaney v. Cad 00 and EMTALA 20 1 concern a patient's right to re-
ceive the best available emergency medical treatment and the liability of
those who violate that right.20 2 Community Hospital v. Sullivan20 3 and the
Medicare Act 20 4 involve the financial protection of smaller, more rural
hospitals that may be the sole providers of medical care to their surround-
ing communities. Insuring quality health care to rural residents is the ulti-
mate concern behind the protection of rural hospitals. In addition, the
situation in Community Hospital arises out of high hospital costs and the
inability of many patients to pay.20 5 Finally, Phelps v. Field Real Estate Co.
20 6
and § 510 of ERISA20 7 concern employees' rights to obtain quality health
care through employer-provided health benefits. Phelps also exhibits the
problems associated with high health care costs, and employees who re-
quire or potentially require extensive medical care.
20 8
The Tenth Circuit's decisions further shape and define citizens' legal
rights and obligations under the nation's health care system. The extent
to which these decisions will impact health law remains to be seen, espe-
cially considering the proposed national health insurance system. Even if
Congress eventually implements a new and radically different health care
system, court decisions such as those surveyed here expose current health
law issues and serve as guides to questions that will have to be addressed in
any reformation process.
A. Mark Isley
199. See Greci, supra note 140, at 201-02; Leonard, supra note 157, at 963.
200. 986 F.2d 387 (10th Cir. 1993).
201. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
202. See supra part I.
203. 986 F.2d 357 (10th Cir. 1993).
204. 42 U.S.C. § 1395 (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
205. See supra part II.
206. 991 F.2d 645 (10th Cir. 1993).
207. 29 U.S.C. § 1140 (1988).




During 1993, the Tenth Circuit's attention in the intellectual property
arena focused on copyright protection of computer software programs. In
Autoskill v. National Educational Support Systems,1 the court affirmed the
New Mexico District Court's preliminary injunction against Autoskill,
whose computer software program designed to teach reading skills copied
the protectable elements of National Educational Support System's com-
peting copyrighted program. 2 Most notably, the court held that a three-
step analysis combining abstraction, filtration, and comparison was a per-
missible method for determining "substantial similarity" in computer
software programs.3 Although the court found it unnecessary to indicate
what method of analysis it would employ upon review of a final copyright
infringement judgment, the opportunity to clarify its position came in
Gates Rubber Co. v. Bando Chemical Industries, Ltd.,4 whereby the court ex-
pressly adopted the three-step approach articulated in AutoskilL5 Addi-
tionally, the Gates court provided further guidance concerning the role of
the abstractions step in substantial similarity analysis as well as suggesting
district courts engage in a preliminary "holistic" comparison of the pro-
grams at issue prior to undertaking separation of the protectable expres-
sion from non-protectable elements of the allegedly infringed program.
6
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals vacated the Colorado District
Court's order in Gates that found copyright infringement of a computer
program designed to determine the size of industrial machine belts. 7 The
court concluded the district court failed to identify certain protectable ele-
ments of the program, and also extended copyright protection to certain
unprotected elements.8
Although the Tenth Circuit's decision to adopt this three-step
method of substantial similarity analysis will likely lead to narrower copy-
right protection for computer software programs, it does provide a long
overdue framework for Tenth Circuit district courts struggling to deter-
mine copyright protection for computer software programs.
This Survey examines the Autoskill and Gates decisions in light of the
adoption of yet another "substantial similarity" test, together with its likely
impact in future copyright infringement actions.
1. 994 F.2d 1476 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 307 (1993).
2. Id. at 1481.
3. Id. at 1490-91.
4. 9 F.3d 823 (10th Cir. 1993).
5. Id. at 834.
6. It. at 841.
7. Id. at 849.
8. Id. at 830.
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I. BACKGROUND
A. Scope of Copyright Protection for Computer Programs
Copyright law protects original, creative expression against copying,
but does not protect ideas, processes, or methods of operation. 9 This is
because the constitutional purpose of copyright law is to "promote the
Progress of Science and the useful Arts" by granting protection to works of
authorship, but not to any underlying idea.10 Therefore, copyright en-
courages people to build freely on the ideas of others, while secondarily
protecting the rights of authors in the original expression of their ideas. 1
Congress, in passing the Copyright Act of 197612 ("Act"), suggested
the applicability of copyright law to computer programs.1 3 In 1980, Con-
gress further amended the Act to more clearly cover computer programs
in the general definition section.1 4 Thus, while computer programs are
generally the subject of copyright protection, 15 the ideas embodied in a
computer program are no more protectable than the ideas embodied in
any other copyrighted work.16
Recent cases addressing the scope of copyright protection for com-
puter programs conclude that copyright protects not only the literal text
of the program code (both human readable and machine readable), but,
as in the case of any other "literary work," extends to its non-literal ele-
ments. 17 Non-literal elements of a program encompass its "look and feel"
and include so much of its structure, sequence or organization, and visual
9. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1988) ("[I]n no case does copyright protection for an original
work of authorship extend to any idea .... ."); H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. at 57
(1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5670 (17 U.S.C. § 102(b) intended actual
processes or methods embodied in the computer program not to be within the scope of
copyright law); 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992) ("[Clopyright protection subsists
... in original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression .... from
which they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated . . . ."); Computer
Assocs. Int'l v. Altai, 982 F.2d 693, 703 (2nd Cir. 1992). See Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 102
(1879) (system of accounting described in book is not protected by copyright-only written
expression used to describe the system is protected).
10. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
11. Feist Publications v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349-50 (1991).
12. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-1010 (1988 & Supp. IV 1993).
13. See, e.g., Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback Software Int'l, 740 F. Supp. 37, 49 (D. Mass.
1990) (computer programs are copyrightable); H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. at
51 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5664 (17 U.S.C. § 102(b) applies to computer
programs).
14. Act of Dec. 12, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-517 § 10, 94 Stat. 3015, 3028.
15. Johnson Controls v. Phoenix Control Sys., 886 F.2d 1173, 1175 (9th Cir. 1989); Wil-
liams Elecs. v. Artic Int'l, 685 F.2d 870, 875 (3d Cir. 1982).
16. Apple Computer v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1252-53 (3d Cir.
1983), cert. dismissed, 464 U.S. 1033 (1984).
17. Brown Bag Software v. Symantec Corp., 960 F.2d 1465 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S.
Ct. 198 (1992) (copyright protection applies to the user interface, or overall structure and
organization of a computer program, including its audiovisual displays, or screen "look and
feel"); see also Johnson Controls; 886 F.2d at 1175 ("non-literal components of a program, in-
cluding the structure, sequence, and organization and user interface" are copyrightable); see
generally, Apple Computer v. Formula Int'l, 725 F.2d 521 (9th Cir. 1984) (computer programs




display as to effectively constitute expression.18 Courts will not, however,
protect non-literal elements that contain ideas or expression merged with
ideas. 19
Because of these limitations, "[t]he breadth of copyright protection a
court extends to a computer program is directly related to where that
court draws the line between idea and expression." 20 This distinction
frustrates courts' efforts to compare or reconcile claims of substantial simi-




As a practical matter, copyright infringement turns on whether the
accused work is "substantially similar" to protected elements of the copy-
righted work. 22 Although an infringement plaintiff must prove ownership
of a valid copyright,23 and establish access by the defendant to the copy-
righted and allegedly infringed program,2 4 validity may be presumptively
shown by a certificate of copyright registration, 25 and access is often either
conceded or easily proven.26 Thus, substantial similarity is often disposi-
18. See, e.g., Whelan Assocs. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., 797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1986), cert.
denied, 479 U.S. 1031 (1987). Using a novel as an analogy, the written words would be the
code and the organization of the chapters, characters, and story would be the non-literal
elements. Id. at 1234.
19. See also Broum Bag Software, 960 F.2d at 1475-77 (recognizing unprotectable expres-
sion); Data East USA v. Epyx, Inc., 862 F.2d 204, 208 (9th Cir. 1988); Lotus, 740 F. Supp. at
58 (stating that expression is not copyrightable if it merely embodies elements of the idea).
20. Dennis M. McCarthy, Copyright Infringement-Redefining the Scope of Protection Copyright
Affords the Non-Literal Elements of a Computer Program-Computer Associates International, Inc.
v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1992), 66 TEMP. L. REV. 273 (1993).
21. See, e.g., Soft Computer Consultants v. Lalehzarzadeh, 1989 Copyright L. Dec. (CCH)
22,403 at 22,538 (E.D.N.Y. 1988) (stating that the "general standard for establishing copy-
ing is the substantial similarity test"); see also 3 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER
ON COPYRIGHT: A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF LrERARY, MUSICAL, AND ARTISTIC PROPERTY, AND
THE PROTECTION OF IDEAS § 13.03[B] [2] [a] (1993) [hereinafterNiMMER] (discussing the idea-
expression dichotomy as it relates to substantial similarity analysis); see infra text accompany-
ing note 35.
22. See Brown Bag Software v. Symantec Corp., 960 F.2d 1465, 1472 (1992) (absent evi-
dence of direct copying, unauthorized copying is proven by demonstrating substantial
similarity).
23. Feist Publications v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 361 (1991) (copyright in-
fringement is proven by: (1) ownership of a valid copyright, and (2) copying of constituent
elements of the original work).
24. Access may be established by showing that the defendant had a "reasonable opportu-
nity to view" or "opportunity to copy" the allegedly infringed work. NIMMER, supra note 21,
§ 13.02[A] at 13-17.
25. 17 U.S.C. § 410(c) (1988) (certificate of registration of a copyright shall constitute
prima facie evidence of a valid copyright.) See Frybarger v. Int'l Business Machs., 812 F.2d
525, 529 (9th Cir. 1987).
26. See Whelan Assocs. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., 797 F.2d 1222, 1232 (3d Cir. 1986), cert.
denied, 479 U.S. 1031 (1987) (noting defendant's access was uncontested because the pro-
gram was used in his laboratory, and he acted as a sales representative for plaintiff);
Broderbund Software, Inc. v. Unison World, Inc., 648 F. Supp. 1127, 1136 (N.D. Cal. 1986)
(noting that plaintiff gave defendant "several commercially-available copies" of the pro-
gram); NIMMER, supra note 21, § 13.02.
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tive. 27 However, even if substantial similarities are found, courts must de-
termine whether the similarities relate to protected elements of
expression or instead to unprotected expression or ideas for which no lia-
bility attaches.
Several approaches for determining what constitutes protected non-
literal elements of computer' programs for copyright infringement pur-
poses have been explored by many courts. These multiple and fractured
approaches have created the present chaotic status of substantial similarity
analysis. With the Autoskill and Gates decisions, the Tenth Circuit begins
participating in the difficult task of refining the analysis.
1. Whelan Associates - The Functional Approach
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals articulated the most expansive
protection for non-literal elements of computer programs in Whelan Associ-
ates v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory,28 whereby the court held the purpose or
function of a utilitarian work would be the work's idea, and everything
that is not necessary to that purpose or function would be part of the ex-
pression of the idea.29 Some courts have adopted this reasoning,30 while
others have rejected it.3 1 The primary criticism of this approach is of its
assumption that a computer program has only one idea.
3 2
2. The "Total Concept and Feel" Approach
Another broad approach was recently taken in Lotus Development Corp.
v. Paperback Software InternationaL33 The court rejected dissection of every
element of the allegedly infringed work, opting instead for first determin-
ing whether its elements are copyrightable and then identifying whether
those elements, considered as a whole, were impermissibly copied. 34 This
test has also been criticized for its sweeping protection and lack of detailed
analysis.
35
27. John W.L. Ogilvie, Note, Defining Computer Program Parts Under Learned Hand's Ab-
stractions Test in Software Copyright Infringement Cases, 91 MIcH. L. REv. 526, 527 (1992).
28. 797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1031 (1987).
29. Id. at 1238; Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback Software Int'l, 740 F. Supp. 37, 65 (D.
Mass. 1990).
30. See, e.g., Broderbund Software, 648 F. Supp. at 1133.
31. See Plains Cotton Co-op Ass'n v. Goodpasture Computer Serv., 807 F.2d 1256, 1262
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 821 (1987); Gates Rubber Co. v. Bando Am., Inc., 798 F.
Supp. 1499, 1513 (D. Colo. 1992) (adopting two-prong analysis), aff'd in part and vacated in
part, 9 F.3d 823 (1993); cf. Synercom Technology v. University Computing Co., 462 F. Supp.
1003, 1014 (N.D. Tex. 1978).
32. Richard A. Golihofer, Copyright Protection of Computer Software: What Is It and How Did
We Get It?, 5 SovrwaaE L.J. 695 (1992).
33. 740 F. Supp. 37 (D. Mass. 1990).
34. Id. at 67; see Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prod. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157,
1167 (9th Cir. 1977); Roth Greeting Cards v. United Card Co., 429 F.2d 1106, 1109-10 (9th
Cir. 1970). See generally NIMMER, supra note 21, § 13.03[A][1][cl (discussingthehistoryofthe
total concept and feel test).
35. "[T]he addition of 'feel' to the judicial inquiry, being a wholly amorphous referent,
merely invites an abdication of analysis." NIMMER, supra note 21, § 13.03[A] at 13-37.
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3. Levels of Abstractions Approach
Judge Learned Hand's famous "patterns of abstractions" analysis ar-
ticulated in Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp.3 6 was first applied to plays and
screenplays. Under this analysis, a court must determine the patterns or
components of the protected work on a continuum from the most general
to the most specific and then identify which of these are no more than a
formulation of the idea.3 7 Although this method of analysis is both unpre-
dictable and ad hoc,3 8 courts appear to be prepared to adapt these princi-
ples3 9 with some modifications for cases involving computer software.
40
4. The Three-Step Approach
In response to the broad protection afforded to non-literal elements
of computer programs under Whelan41 and Lotus,4 2 the Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit crafted a narrower three-part approach for estab-
lishing "substantial similarity" of computer software. In Computer Associates
International v. Altai,43 the court begins its analysis by borrowing from
Learned Hand's abstractions formula, dissecting the allegedly infringed
program's structure and isolating it into its various levels of abstraction.
44
Once the program has been dissected into its various levels of
abstraction, the court undertakes the second step, filtration. 45 In the
filtration process, the court eliminates unprotectable elements consist-
ing of ideas, elements subject to external factors, 46 and material in
36. 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930), cert. denied, 282 U.S. 902 (1931).
37. "Upon any work, and especially upon a play, a great number of patterns of increas-
ing generality will fit equally well, as more and more of the incident is left out." Id. at 121.
38. Judge Learned Hand wrote of the line between expression and idea that "[n]obody
has ever been able to fix that boundary, and nobody ever can." Id. He echoed this view in a
later opinion, stating that "[o]bviously, no principle can be stated as to when an imitator has
gone beyond copying the 'idea,' and has borrowed its 'expression.' Decisions must therefore
inevitably be ad hoc." Peter Pan Fabrics v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487, 489 (2d Cir.
1960).
39. Ogilvie, supra note 27, at 528-29 (arguing that although Judge Hand's test is not a
panacea for all the current ills of software copyright law, it provides courts with a framework
that should increase the consistency of decisions).
40. See supra text accompanying note 31.
41. 797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1031 (1987).
42. 740 F. Supp. 37 (D. Mass. 1990).
43. 982 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1992).
44. Id. at 707.
45. Id.
46. External factors include:
(1) the mechanical specifications of the computer on which a program is intended
to run; (2) compatibility requirements of other programs with which a program is
designed to operate in conjunction; (3) computer manufacturer's design standards;
(4) demands of the industry being serviced; and (5) widely accepted programming
practices within the computer industry.
Id. at 709-10 (citations omitted); see also Feist Publications v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S.
340, 361-64 (1991) (if the only unauthorized copying is of those elements that are not pro-
tectable, then the resulting copy will not constitute an infringement); NIMMER, supra note 21,
§ 13.03 [8] [2].
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the public domain or subject to the doctrines of merger and scones d
faire.
47
The final step involves an actual comparison of the remaining non-
literal program elements. 48 Once all non-protectable elements are
filtered out, courts will apply an "extrinsic" test to determine whether sub-
stantial similarity exists between the two programs. 49 This is accomplished
primarily through the use of experts. 50 If similarity is found, some courts
may also employ an "intrinsic" test that measures substantial similarity ac-
cording to the response of the ordinary lay observer. 51 While some courts
endorse the lay observer test 52 in computer program cases, others reject it
due to the inherent technical expertise required.
5 3
In Autoskill the Tenth Circuit found this narrower three-step ap-
proach a permissible method for determining substantial similarity of
computer software programs54 and then formally adopted it in the Gates
decision.
55
II. THE Au-Tos=zL DECISION
A. Facts and Procedural History
Autoskill, Inc. ("Autoskill"), a Canadian corporation, developed a
computer software program for use in teaching reading skills to students
with reading disabilities entitled "Autoskill: Component Reading and Sub-
skills Testing and Training Program."56 Autoskill obtained a United States
Certificate of Registration of the copyright on the software program
("Autoskill Program").
57
National Educational Support Systems, Inc. ("NESS"), is a New Mex-
ico corporation. One of the principals in NESS, Ron Neil, was familiar
with the Autoskill Program, and unsuccessfully attempted to obtain a li-
cense to market it.58 Neil then entered into an agreement with a com-
puter programming firm, Automation Consultants, Inc. (ACI), to develop
47. Computer Assocs., 982 F.2d at 710 (courts must filter out all unoriginal elements of a
program, including those elements that are found in the public domain or subject to the
doctrines of merger and scines d faire); see infra notes 86-87.
48. Computer Assocs., 982 F.2d at 710.
49. See, e.g., Shaw v. Lindheim, 919 F.2d 1353, 1356 (9th Cir. 1990); see also Whelan
Assocs. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., 797 F.2d 1222, 1232 (1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1031 (1987).
50. Sid & Marty Kroffl Television Prod. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1159, 1164 (1977).
51. See, e.g., Brown Bag Software v. Symantec Corp., 960 F.2d 1465, 1475, cert. denied, 113
S. Ct. 198 (1992); Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 468-69 (2d Cir. 1946).
52. Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1233; see also Autoskill v. Nat'l Educ. Support Sys., 793 F. Supp.
1557, 1569 (1992), aff'd, 994 F.2d 1476 (10th Cir.), and cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 307 (1993)
(noting the appropriateness of examining lay evidence and exhibits presented by the parties
to determine substantial similarities).
53. Dawson v. Hinshaw Music, 905 F.2d 731, 732-37 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 981
(1990) (holding that lay observer test not practical in the context of computer programs).
54. Autoskill, 994 F.2d at 1490-91.
55. Gates, 9 F.3d at 834.
56. Autoskill, 994 F.2d at 1481.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 1481-82 (Neil's familiarity and use of the Autoskill Program was sufficient to
meet the access requirement). Id. at 1559.
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software "to be like" the Autoskill Program.5 9 ACI's program for NESS was
called "Nessi: Reading and Language Development Program" (Nessi).
6 °
NESS's distributor received a letter from Autoskill's attorney shortly after
it began marketing Nessi indicating it could be named in a copyright in-
fringement action.
6 1
NESS filed suit in the District of New Mexico seeking a declaratory
judgment that it did not infringe the Autoskill copyright.62 Autoskill re-
sponded by suing NESS for copyright infringement, and sought a prelimi-
nary inunction to prevent continued infringement.63 Autoskill claimed
NESS's program infringed upon the non-literal elements of Autoskill's
Program. 64 The cases were consolidated.
B. District Court Holding
The district court granted Autoskill a preliminary injunction prohibit-
ing NESS from impinging upon the "protectable elements" of the Autos-
kill Program. 65 It employed a three-step method of analysis, combining
abstraction, filtration, and comparison to determine the "substantial simi-
larity" of the programs. 66 The court rejected the functional approach es-
poused in Whelan6 7 as a "temptingly simplistic bright line test"68 that could
not account for the reality that many ideas may exist in a given work, and
also rejected the "total concept and feel" test, as being more appropriate
when evaluating "simplistic works."69 Rather, the court opted for an analy-
sis similar to the one recently employed by the Second Circuit in Computer
Associates.
70
The court concluded that the identification and use of three subtypes
of students with reading difficulties were not protectable, because these
subtypes were identified and discussed in literature available to the pub-
lic. 71 The "idea" of teaching reading, based on these subtypes, was also
not protectable; however, Autoskill's "manner" of teaching and the way it
communicates those ideas to students and teachers amounts to protect-
able "expression."72 Thus, the court emphasized pedagogical similarity,
59. Id. at 1481.






66. Autoskill, 793 F. Supp. at 1565.
67. See supra notes 28-32 and accompanying text discussing Whelan Assocs. v. Jaslow
Dental Lab., 797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1031 (1987).
68. Autoski, 793 F. Supp. at 1566.
69. Id. at 1515-70.
70. See supra notes 43-47 discussing Computer Assocs. Int'l. v. Altai, 982 F.2d 693, 710
(2d Cir. 1992).
71. Autoskill 793 F. Supp. at 1566. The program is designed to test or diagnose and
train three distinct subtypes. Type 0 is the oral reading subtype, Type A is the intermodal-
associative deficit subtype, and Type S is the sequential deficit subtype. Id. at 1559.
72. Id. at 1566.
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rather than the logical flow of the program. NESS appealed, raising a
number of procedural 7
3 and substantive issues.7
4
C. The Tenth Circuit Opinion
In Autoskil4 the Tenth Circuit began its substantial similarity analysis
by first examining the district court's factual findings concerning the over-
all similarities between the Autoskill and Nessi Programs. 75 In general,
the Autoskill Program is designed to improve a student's rapid automatic
response to training stimuli.7 6 It tests students for oral reading, audio-
visual matching, visual matching, and visual scanning according to thir-
teen categories of word-form types that are based on different combina-
tions of vowels and consonants. 7 7 The tests use words and non-words
while recording the student's accuracy and response speed.78 Based on
the testing results, the students are assigned a training program that corre-
sponds to their subtypes.
79
The district court determined that NESS's program had merely
changed the names and sequence of the tests with minor format
changes. 80 The three main sections of each program consisting of testing
or diagnosis, profile analysis, and training utilized similar criteria and per-
formed substantially similar functions.
8 1
Satisfied with the district court's findings that both programs were
substantially similar, the court undertook a review of the three-step ap-
proach used for identifying which non-literal elements of Autoskill's Pro-
gram were protected from infringement.
8 2
73. The Tenth Circuit rejected Autoskill's arguments that NESS's notice of appeal was
untimely pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362, which prevented NESS from appealing the preliminary
injunction due to an automatic bankruptcy stay and, further, that NESS filed its notice of
appeal outside the 30 days allowed by Rule (4) (a) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Proce-
dure. Autoskil4 994 F.2d at 1483. The court held that the filing of a bankruptcy petition by
NESS extended the time for filing a notice of appeal. Id. Additionally, the bankruptcy rules
authorized NESS to prosecute its appeal from a grant of a preliminary injunction in a copy-
right infringement action without authorization from the bankruptcy court. See id. at 1486.
74. The Tenth Circuit rejected the trial court's reasoning concerning its refusal to retro-
actively apply the U.S. Supreme Court's 1989 holding in Community for Creative Non-Vio-
lence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730 (1989), distinguishing "employees" from "independent
contractors" for purposes of copyright ownership of "works made for hire." Id. at 1488.





80. Id. See supra part II.B.2. discussing the district court's findings.
81. Autoskil, 994 F.2d at 1490.
82. "Infringement is shown by a substantial similarity of protectable expression, not just




1. The Levels of Abstraction Step
The court concluded that although the district court did not precisely
use the abstractions analysis outlined in Computer Associates,8 3 its ruling
should not be reversed simply because of a lack of any particular detail.
8 4
Further, the court found an ample factual basis for the district judge's
analysis on the levels of abstraction and his conclusions as to which were
idea levels not entitled to protection, and those possibly eligible for pro-
tection after the filtration analysis which were in the expression area.
85
2. The Filtration Step
The court again agreed with the district court's application of the fil-
tration step whereby it filtered out portions of the Autoskill Program's ex-
pression not entitled to copyright protection, employing the copyright
doctrines of merger86 and scines dfaire.87 Specifically, the thirteen catego-
ries of vowel and consonant combinations as well as the silent sentence
and silent paragraph components were excluded from copyright protec-
tion.88 However, the court upheld copyright protection of the "keying
procedure," finding the procedure reflected at least a minimal degree of
creativity and did not constitute a "method of operation" or "process" pre-
cluded from copyright protection.89 The court reasoned that NESS failed
to produce any evidence that the procedure was common practice and
should therefore, be filtered out of the analysis.90
3. The Comparison Step
Substantial similarity analysis concludes with a comparison of portions
of the alleged infringer's works with the portions of the complaining
83. See supra notes 43-48 and accompanying text discussing Computer Assocs. Int'l v.
Altai, 982 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1992).
84. NESS claimed the trial court erred when it examined the similarities in the functions
performed as the highest level of abstraction, rather than from the code level up to the
program's function. Autoskill 994 F.2d at 1492.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 1494. See Feist Publications v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349 (1991).
Where a particular expression is common to the treatment of a specific idea, process, or
discovery, it lacks the originality for copyright protection. See, e.g., Toro Co. v. R & R Prods.
Co., 787 F.2d 1208, 1211 (8th Cir. 1986) (under copyright merger doctrine, copyright protec-
tion will be denied even to some expressions of ideas if idea behind expression is such that it
can be expressed only in very limited number of ways). The merger doctrine excludes ex-
pression from copyright protection if it is "merged" inseparably with an idea. NIMMER, supra
note 21, § 13.03[B][3] at 13-74.
87. The "scdns dfaire" doctrine generally excludes from copyright protection, material
that is "standard," "stock," or "common" to a particular topic or that "necessarily follow from
a common theme or setting." NIMMER, supra note 21, § 13.03[B] [4] at 13-70.
88. Autoskill, 994 F.2d at 1494.
89. Id. at 1495 n.23. See, e.g., Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 214 (1954) (originality de-
notes only enough definite expression so that one may distinguish authorship); compare Toro
Co., 787 F.2d at 1208 (lawn care matching part numbering system not original) with Hutchin-
son Tel. Co. v. Frontier Directory Co., 770 F.2d 128 (8th Cir. 1985) (telephone white pages
directory original work).
90. Autoskull 994 F.2d at 1495.
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party's work determined to be legally protectable under the Act.9" The
court again agreed with the district court's assessment of substantial simi-
larity based upon a comparison of the two programs' structure, sequence,
and organization and rejected NESS's argument that no protectable ele-
ments of the Autoskill Program remained upon completion of the filtra-
tion step.92 Additionally, the district court's use of expert testimony
throughout its analysis was not erroneous.
93
III. THE GATES DECISION
A. Facts and Procedural History
Gates Rubber Co. ("Gates") is a Colorado corporation manufacturing
rubber belts for use in industrial machinery. 94 Gates developed a com-
puter software program entitled Design Flex 4.0 ("Gates Program"), which
calculates the proper Gates belt for a specified machine.9 5 The program
utilizes published formulas in conjunction with certain mathematical con-
stants developed by Gates for determining belt size.96 Gates obtained a
Certificate of copyright registration on the Gates Program.
97
Bando American (Bando) is a division of a Japanese corporation that
competes with Gates in the manufacture and sale of industrial belts. 98 Nu-
merous Bando employees were former Gates employees, including Steven
Piderit, who had access to the components and the design of the Gates
Program. 99 In 1990, Bando made available its "Chauffeur" Program, a
program similar to the Gates Program.
100
In 1992, Gates filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the District of
Colorado alleging copyright infringement, unfair competition, misappro-
priation of trade secrets, as well as breach of contract.10 '
B. District Court Holding
The district court held that the Chauffeur Program infringed the
Gates's copyright' 0 2 and that Bando had misappropriated Gates's trade
secrets.10 3 Specifically, it found that Bando had misappropriated ten pro-
91. Id. at 1496. See Computer Assocs., 982 F.2d at 710 ("The analysis at this point poses
essentially a value judgment, involving an assessment of the importance of the material that
was copied."). See NIMMER, supra note 21, § 13.03[F] at 13-146.
92. Autoski, 994 F.2d at 1496.
93. Id. at 1497-98 ("We are satisfied the judge's crediting of the Autoskill witness testi-
mony over that of NESS's, was not clearly erroneous or an abuse of discretion.").





99. Id. (there was evidence Piderit pirated a copy of the Gates Program and brought it
with him to Bando).
100. Id. at 831.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id. The District court concluded that Bando had misappropriated trade secrets be-
longing to Gates, ordered their return, and enjoined Bando from any further use. Id. The
Tenth Circuit affirmed. Id. at 830. It rejected Bando's argument that Gates's claims were
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tected elements of the Gates Program, including its menus, constants, sort-
ing criteria, control flow, data flow, the engineering calculation module,
the design module, common errors, fundamental tasks, and install files.
10 4
Bando appealed, claiming the district court erred when it extended
copyright protection for what it characterized as facts and ideas in the
Gates Program. 10 5 Bando further appealed the district court's granting of
trade secret protection to Gates's program constants.
10 6
C. Tenth Circuit's Opinion
The Tenth Circuit began by acknowledging that the proper test for
determining substantial similarity had not been previously addressed in
this circuit and, consequently, that its opinion was intended to bring clar-
ity to district courts struggling with copyright protection of computer
software programs. 10 7 The court adopted in substantial part the abstrac-
tion, filtration, and comparison test set forth in Autoskill and by the Sec-
ond Circuit in Computer Associates, finding it an effective test formed from
constitutional and statutory constraints and guided by existing case law. 10 8
Specifically, the courts should first dissect the program according to
its varying levels of generality as provided in the abstractions test. 109 Next,
courts should examine each level of abstraction in order to filter out those
elements of the programs that are unprotectable, eliminating from com-
parison the unprotectable elements of ideas, processes, facts, public do-
main information, merger material, scines d faire material, and other
unprotectable elements suggested by the particular facts of the program
under examination. 1 10 Finally, courts should then compare the remain-
ing protectable elements with the allegedly infringing program to deter-
mine whether there has been a misappropriation of substantial elements
of the protected program.
11 1
preempted by federal law and specifically found that because Gates's trade secret misappro-
priation claim under the Colorado Uniform Trade Secrets Act requires proof of a breach of
trust or confidence, an element not required under the Copyright Act, Gates' state claims
were not preempted by federal law. Id. at 846-48. Further, the constants constituted trade
secrets and although they were disclosed during the permanent injunction hearing, Gates'
post-hearing measures to protect the confidentiality of the constants maintained their status
as trade secrets, i at 848-49.
104. Id at 842-46.
105. Id. at 830.
106. Id.
107. Id The court was aided in its analysis of the copyright law concerning computer
programs by briefs submitted by amicus curiae: the American Committee for Interoperable
Systems; Computer and Business Equipment Manufacturers Association; the International
Anticounterfeiting Coalition, Inc.; Adobe Systems, Inc.; Apple Computer, Inc.; Computer
Associates International, Inc.; Digital Equipment Corporation, Inc.; International Business
Machines Corporation; Lotus Development Corporation; Wordperfect Corporation; and
Xerox Corporation. Id. at 831 n.3.
108. Id. at 834; see also Computer Assocs., 982 F.2d at 701-14; Lotus, 740 F. Supp. at 37.
109. Gates, 9 F.3d at 834. See supra notes 41-44, 83-85, and accompanying text discussing
the abstractions step.
110. Gates, 9 F.3d at 834. See supra notes 45-47, 86-90, and accompanying text discussing
the filtering step.
111. Gates, 9 F.3d at 834. See supra notes 48-52, 91-93, and accompanying text discussing
the comparison step.
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The court suggested, however, that prior to undertaking these steps,
it would be helpful for courts to make an initial determination of whether
the defendant copied portions of the allegedly infringed program before
determining whether the copying involved protectable elements. 112 Here,
the court concluded that both programs were substantially similar, as a
whole,' 13 prior to proceeding with its analysis under the three-step
approach.
1. Levels of Abstraction
The court was careful to note that application of the abstractions test
will necessarily vary from case-to-case and program-to-program, due to the
"complex and ever-changing nature" of computer technology.1 14 Thus, it
declined to establish any strict methodology for the abstraction of com-
puter programs.
115
In this instance, the court utilized a method whereby computer pro-
grams are parsed into six levels of generally declining levels of abstrac-
tion. 116 These levels of abstraction include: the main purpose of the
program,11 7 the program structure or architecture, 1 8 modules, 119 algo-
rithms and data structures, 120 source code,
121 and object code.1 22
Under this analysis, the main purpose or function of a program will
always be an unprotected idea.123 Similarly, basic functions of a module
will likely be unprotectable. 124 However, the program's literal elements,
112. Gates, 9 F.3d at 833.
113. The district court found that Bando had access to the Gates Program and that the
Bando Program was copied from the Gates Program. Gates, 798 F. Supp. at 1516. On appeal,
Bando did not dispute those findings. Gates, 9 F.3d at 833 n.10.
114. Gates, 9 F.3d at 834.
115. Id. The court stated that it foresees, in most cases, the use of experts to provide
substantial guidance to courts in applying an abstractions test. Id. at 834-35.
116. Id. at 835. Ogilvie, supra note 27, at 528.
117. Gates, 9 F.3d at 835. The main purpose of a program is a description of the pro-
gram's function or what it is intended to do. Ogilvie, supra note 27, at 534.
118. Gates, 9 F.3d at 835. Program architecture or structure "is a description of how the
program operates in terms of its various functions, which are performed by discrete modules,
and how each of these modules interact with each other." Id.
119. Id. "A module typically consists of two components: operations and data types. An
operation identifies a particular result or set of actions that may be performed.... A data
type defines the type of item that an operator acts upon such as a student record or a daily
balance." Id.; see Ogilvie, supra note 27, at 536.
120. Gates, 9 F.3d at 835.
An algorithm is a specific series of steps that accomplish a particular operation.
Data structure is a precise representation or specification of a data type that consists
of: (i) basic data type groupings such as integers or characters, (ii) values, (iii)
variables, (iv) arrays or groupings of the same data type, (v) records or groupings of
different data types, and (vi) pointers or connections between records that set aside
space to hold the record's values.
Ogilvie, supra note 27, at 536-40; see Welas, 797 F.2d at 1230.
121. Gates, 9 F.3d at 835. Source code is the literal text of a computer program. Whelan,
797 F.2d at 1230.
122. Gates, 9 F.3d at 835. Object code is the literal text of a computer program written in
binary language through which the computer directly receives its instructions. Computer
Assocs. v. Altai, 982 F.2d 693, 698 (2nd Cir. 1992).




structure or architecture, and perhaps its algorithms and data structures
may contain protectable expression.1 25 The court did not dispute the dis-
trict court's abstractions analysis, and conceded that these generalized
levels of abstraction are not necessarily applicable to all computer codes,
but may facilitate the critical second step of filtering out unprotectable
elements of the program.
1 26
2. Filtration
The filtration step requires that courts filter out those elements of the
program that are not protected by copyright, requiring review of the idea-
expression dichotomy,' 27 process-expression dichotomy,1 28 as well as ap-
plication of the doctrines of merger 129 and scnes dfaire.
130
The court concluded that the district court failed to undertake a
proper filtration analysis.1 31 Specifically, the Gates Program constants
(program results) constituted facts not subject to copyright protection.
132
Further, the district court failed to adequately analyze the Gates Program
menus and sorting criteria,133 control and data flow,' 3 4 modules, 35 com-
mon errors, 136 fundamental tasks, 13 7 and install files. 138 Accordingly, the
court remanded these issues for further determination of copyright
protection.
3. Comparison
Due to the district court's inadequate analysis at the filtration stage,
the court did not undertake a comparison of the protectable portions of
the Gates Program with the Bando Program.
IV. ANALYSIS
After Autoskill and Gates, parties claiming copyright infringement of
their computer software programs will likely be subject to a narrower
three-step approach to substantial similarity, rather than a Whelan or Lotus
type of approach. Although the Autoskill court failed to endorse any one
125. See id.
126. Id. at 835-36 (the organization of a program into abstraction levels is a tool).
127. See supra text accompanying note 9.
128. Gates, 9 F.3d at 836.
129. Id.; see supra text accompanying note 86.
130. Gates, 9 F.3d at 836; see supra text accompanying note 87.
131. Gates, 9 F.3d at 830.
132. Id. at 842-43.
133. Id. at 843-44. "The district court failed to clarify whether it was referring to the
visual screen displays or some other aspect of the program when it discussed the menus and
sorting criteria ... ." Id.
134. Id. at 844. "The district court failed to define exactly what it meant by control flow
and data flow...." Id.
135. Id. at 845 (district court erroneously suggested that algorithms constitute processes,
protected only by patent law).
136. Id. (district court erroneously analyzed protection of program errors).
137. Id. at 846 (district court was unclear on what it meant by "fundamental tasks").
138. Id. (district court failed to make adequate findings concerning the install files).
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approach over another,18 9 the Gates court did so, and clarified the Tenth
Circuit's position on substantial similarity by adopting a substantial part of
the "Abstraction-Filtration-Comparison" method of analysis.
140
Additionally, the Gates court suggested a preliminary indirect method
of proving copying by examining the similarities as a whole, regardless of
the fact that even if the programs are copied verbatim, this is not a basis
for liability.1 4 ' As the court correctly noted, district courts may otherwise
be deprived of the "use of probative, and potentially essential, information
on the factual issue of copying" if it only extracts all protectable elements
prior to its comparison.' 42 The court acknowledges factual similarity may
create an unfair inference of misappropriation; however, evidence of in-
dependent creation may rebut this inference.
143
Finally, the court attempted to add guidance to the levels of abstrac-
tion test. Commentators have criticized the Autoskill district court for the
manner in which the abstractions step was employed.1 44 In an obvious
attempt to respond to these criticisms, the Gates court identified six gener-
ally declining abstraction levels for guidance.' 45 However, the court was
quick to qualify application of the abstraction test to a case-by-case and
program-by-program basis generally requiring the aid of expert testi-
mony. 146 Thus, the court left the door open for future discordant
applications.
147
Expert testimony may also create problems for courts as evident in
the Autoskill decision. NESS challenged the district court's reliance on
Autoskill's substantial similarity expert.148 The court rejected these argu-
ments after little inquiry. t 49 Autoskill's expert, Dr. Olson, was admittedly
not a computer programmer. 150 His qualifications included a Ph.D. in
psychology151 and a strong background in reading education and the use
139. Autoskill, 994 F.2d at 1492. ("[W]e feel that the judge used a permissible method of
analysis and reached reasonable conclusions, although we are not deciding which precise
method of analysis should be followed in a final copyright decision.").
140. Gates, 9 F.3d at 834.
141. Id. at 832 n.7 ("[Clopying of even unprotected elements can have a probative value
in determining whether the defendant copied the plaintiff's work" because "it may be more
likely that protected elements were copied if there is evidence of copying among the unpro-
tected elements of the program.").
142. Id.
143. Id. at 833 n.8.
144. William T. Rintala, Copyright Update-Cases, Practicing Law Institute, PLI/Corp 725,
Jan. 1993 (unclear the Autoskill court applied these doctrines in any disciplined way). Ogil-
vie, supra note 27, at 530 (court apparently recognizes "skill levels" in educational software as
a "level of abstraction").
145. See supra notes 116-22 and accompanying text.
146. Gates, 9 F.3d at 834-35.
147. Id. at 834 n.12 ("[W]e note that the appropriate test to be applied and the order in
which its various components are to be applied in any particular case may vary depending on
the claims involved, the procedural posture of the suit, and the nature of the computer
programs at issue.").
148. Autoskill 994 F.2d at 1493 n.19.
149. Id. at 1492-93.




of software in reading education. 15 2 He had also reviewed cases and the
Nimmer treatise on copyright infringement prior to trial.15 3 On the one
hand, the district court found this computer program "complex,"154 yet a
Ph.D. in psychology qualified Olson to dissect the program's constituent
parts for purposes of a copyright infringement action.' 55 Both the district
and the Tenth Circuit courts' reliance on Dr. Olson's testimony appears
misplaced in light of his apparent lack of training and background neces-
sary in an area requiring very specialized expertise.
Finally, although not directly an issue in Gates, the court addressed
concerns surrounding copyright protection extending "to the methodol-
ogy or processes adopted by the computer programmer, rather than
merely to the 'writing' expressing his ideas." 156 Processes or methods of
operation themselves are not copyrightable; however, "an author's de-
scription of that process, so long as it incorporates some originality, may
be protectable."1
57
The Autoskill court addressed this issue directly, but with little clarity.
Specifically, the district court rejected NESS's argument that the keying
procedure employed by the Autoskill Program's audio visual matching test
was a "method" and therefore, not subject to copyright protection.
5 8
Autoskill's witnesses testified that the Autoskill Program did not simply
involve touching key 1, 2, or 3, but required the student to look at the
word on the screen and respond with his or her hands on the keyboard. 159
Further, this system took considerable investigation, research, statistician,
and programming efforts. 160
The Tenth Circuit concluded that this testimony reflected that the
Autoskill Program was unique16 ' and demonstrated at least a minimal de-
gree of creativity for purposes of a preliminary injunction. 16 2 Moreover,
NESS failed to produce evidence that this procedure was common prac-
tice 163 or that it was dictated by efficiency considerations requiring exclu-
sion at the filtration stage.164 Although the Tenth Circuit found that
NESS failed to show the keying procedure was common practice, Autos-
kill's own witness, Dr. Olson, testified that though not a standard proce-
dure, it is present in other programs.'
65
152. Id.
153. Id. at 1561.
154. I& at 1570.
155. Id. at 1561. Dr. Olson considered the programs as a whole to reach his conclusions
regarding substantial similarity. Id.
156. Gates, 9 F.3d at 836.
157. i at 837.
158. Autoskill, 994 F.2d at 1495 n.23. Copyright protection does not extend to any "pro-
cess" or "method of operation." 17 U.S.C. § 102(b).
159. Autoskill, 994 F.2d at 1495.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. 1i at 1495 n.23.
163. 1i (Autoskill Program was not drawn from prior Doehring research).
164. AutoskiU, 994 F.2d at 1495 n.23.
165. Autoshili, 793 F. Supp. at 1569.
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The test for determining whether a work contains original copyright-
able subject matter rests on whether it is an "original work of author-
ship."1 6 6 If so, the second requirement is that it "be fixed in any tangible
medium of expression, now known or later developed, from which it can
be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or
with the aid of a machine or device." 167 In this instance, the keying proce-
dure appears to meet the fixation requirement as it employs read-commu-
nication together with keyboard response. However, it is less clear that it
satisfied the originality requirement. The court does not expressly state
the keying procedure is original to Autoskill, but only that it was not cop-
ied from a particular prior public domain study.168 Perhaps this finding is
intended to imply Autoskill's independent creation. However, the court
finds only that it contained the requisite degree of creativity.1 69 Moreover,
the level or amount of an author's labor has no bearing on whether it
constitutes an original work. Although the district court acknowledged
the inapplicability of the "sweat of the brow" doctrine, 170 the Tenth Cir-
cuit appeared to provide weight to Autoskill's labor and effort in develop-
ing the program. 171 Even if the court viewed the keying procedure as a
compilation 172 for purposes of copyright protection, compilations must
meet the not-so-stringent original work of authorship test.1 73 Thus, the
Tenth Circuit failed to make clear whether the Autoskill Program's keying
procedure was an original work of authorship entitled to copyright
protection.
Despite the gaps remaining in the court's analysis in Autoskill the
Gates decision provides a clearer framework upon which to determine sub-
stantial similarity.
166. Original, for purposes of copyright, "means only that the work was independently
created by the author (as opposed to copied from other works) and that it possesses at least
some minimal degree of creativity." Feist Publications v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340,
345 (1991).
167. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
168. Autoskil4 994 F.2d at 1496.
169. Id. at 1495 n.23.
170. Autoskill 793 F. Supp. at 1571 ("An analysis of originality can only be based upon the
protectable elements of the program [s]" and this opinion is not based in any way upon evi-
dence of the time and effort it put into developing the Autoskill Program.).
171. Autoskill 994 F.2d at 1495 & n.23.
Autoskill system did not simply involve touching keys 1, 2, or 3, but involved looking
at the word on the screen and responding with hands on the keyboard, a system
that took considerable investigation and research staff work, and also that of statisti-
cians and programmers. This testimony shows that the Autoskill program was
unique and was not drawn directly from the Doehring research.
Id. at 1495 (citation omitted). This proof also disposes of a related argument regarding
NESS's contention that this is a "method" not protected by copyright. Id. at 1495 n.23.
172. A "compilation" is the selection and arrangement of uncopyrightable facts into a
format that is copyrightable. See Feist, 499 U.S. at 349.
173. Id at 349 (even if the work contains absolutely no protectable expression, only facts,





The need for coherent computer software copyright law is evidenced
by the varied and inharmonious substantial similarity tests currently ap-
plied among the Circuits. 174 Although some of the resulting chaos is un-
doubtedly due to the youth of software copyright law, it is not known
whether the Tenth Circuit's use of yet another method of analysis will
serve to magnify this confusion, or reduce it. Certainly, the Autoskill'75
and Gates176 decisions shed some light on the future direction the Tenth
Circuit will take concerning substantial similarity analysis. District courts
struggling to determine copyright infringement of computer software pro-
grams now have at least a framework for their analysis. Most notably, these
opinions espouse a narrower three-step approach, combining abstraction,
filtration, and comparison, together with a preliminary indirect compari-
son of the programs. This method constitutes the preferable method of
analysis for Tenth Circuit district courts in determining substantial similar-
ity of computer software programs.
Wendy j Pijher
174. "[C]ase law and commentators in the area of copyright protection seem woefully ill-
equipped to provide a systematic means for analyzing copyright issues as they arise in the
context of computer software." Gates, 798 F. Supp. at 1502.
175. 994 F.2d 1476 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 307 (1993).
176. 9 F.3d 823 (10th Cir. 1993).
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INTRODUCTION
This Survey focuses on recent cases affecting oil and gas and public
lands. Part I demonstrates how contractual agreements govern relation-
ships in the oil and gas arena. This section explores how courts may either
take an active role in interpreting such agreements by ignoring the ex-
press language to reach an equitable result, or the courts may allow the
contracting parties to allocate risk and define the nature of the agree-
ment. In Amoco Rocmount Co. v. Anschutz Corp.,' the United States Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit unconvincingly determined that a gas mar-
ket sharing provision in a unit operating agreement was ambiguous,
thereby enabling the court to equitably distribute proceeds from the sale
of production. In Reese Exploration, Inc. v. Williams Natural Gas Co.,2 the
Tenth Circuit relied on the language in the assignment agreements to de-
termine whether a gas owner was negligent for damage caused by escaping
gas. In Reese, the court allowed the oil and gas parties entering a contrac-
tual agreement to define their relationship, while in Amoco the court took
an active role in establishing the parties' relationship.
Part II focuses on public lands. This section discusses public partici-
pation in Bureau of Land Management (BLM) planning pursuant to the
Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976.3 In National Parks &
Conservation Ass'n v. Federal Aviation Administration,4 the Tenth Circuit cor-
rectly held that the Bureau of Land Management failed to meet its statu-
tory obligation of providing adequate public notice prior to conveying
lands that had been previously designated by the BLM as Areas of Critical
Environmental Concern. Although the court sent a powerful message to
the BLM regarding the necessity of public participation, its ruling had lit-
tle effect on the situation at hand because the court had previously ig-
nored a request for an injunction preventing the conveyance.
I. OIL AND GAS
A. Interpreting "Ambiguous" Agreements to Equitably Balance Gas Proceeds:
Amoco Rocmount Co. v. Anschutz Corp.
5
1. Background
In oil and gas production, unitization refers to combining leases and
wells in order to maintain pressure or to aid secondary or tertiary recovery
1. 7 F.3d 909 (10th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. CL 1507 (1994).
2. 983 F.2d 1514 (10th Cir. 1993).
3. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1784 (1988).
4. 998 F.2d 1523 (10th Cir. 1993).
5. 7 F.3d 909 (10th Cir. 1993).
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operations.6 The unitized development of reservoirs has been advocated
since the early 1900's. 7 Prior to unitization, production attempts centered
around maximizing the amount of drilling occurring within a given field.8
However, dissipation of the natural pressure in reservoirs caused by over-
drilling left large amounts of oil in the formation. 9 The concepts of com-
munitization, pooling, and unitization arose, in part, to remedy this prob-
lem. 10 Although the effect of these concepts is similar,1 1 unitization is
"the most satisfactory cooperative plan from the standpoint of maximizing
a yield from an entire producing formation."
12
A plan of unitization is generally effectuated by two separate instru-
ments: the unit agreement and the unit operating agreement.' 3 A unit
agreement is defined as an agreement "of development and operation for
the recovery of oil and gas... as a single consolidated unit without regard
to separate ownerships and for the allocation of costs and benefits on a
basis as defined in the agreement or plan."1 4 More specifically, the unit
agreement defines the areal limits, creates the unit, designates the unit
operator, and determines the participation formula to distribute produc-
6. JOHN S. LOWE, OIL AND GAS LAW, 220-21 (1983). Secondary recovery is a method of
recovery in which extraneous energy sources, such as liquids or gas, are employed to move
the hydrocarbons through the reservoir or to extract the product. HOWARD R. WILLIAMS &
CHARLES J. MEYERS, OIL AND GAS TERMS 798 (6th ed. 1984) [hereinafter TERMS].
Tertiary recovery is an enhanced method of recovery of crude oil or natural gas in which
chemicals or energy are employed to assist in the recovery process. Id. at 900.
7. Bruce M. Kramer, "Unit Agreements - Historical Perspective and Theoretical Under-
pinnings," Federal Onshore Oil and Gas Pooling and Unitization II, Paper No. 4, 4-2 (Rocky Mtn.
Min. L. Fdn. 1990).
8. See Philip G. Dufford, "Summary of Comments Relative to an Introduction to Pool-
ing and Unitization," Institute on Pooling and Unitization of Oil and Gas Interests, Paper No. 1, 1-7
to 1-8 (Rocky Mtn. Min. L. Fdn. 1980). The desire to maximize production and its subse-
quent negative effects were largely caused by the early adoption of the rule of capture. See 1
BRUCE M. KRAMER & PATRICK H. MARTIN, THE LAW OF POOLING AND UNITIZATION § 2.02 (3d
ed. 1992). The rule of capture created substantial problems for efficient development of oil
and gas. Kramer, supra note 7, at 4-3. See also infra part II.
9. Dufford, supra note 8, at 1-8. See also KRAMER & MARTIN, supra note 8, § 2.03 ("the
amount of hydrocarbons that are left underground as the result of primary production tech-
niques may be substantial").
10. Dufford, supra note 8, at 1-9 to 1-10. Communitization, or the communitized lease,
allows owners of small tracts of land to execute a common lease with the understanding that
a well drilled anywhere within the area will benefit all the owners proportionally to the
amount of land contributed. See id. Pooling also refers to the combining of ownerships, but
applies to lessees as well as lessors. Id. at 1-10. Pooling developed to maximize the spacing of
wells to most efficiently drain an area. Id. Cf TERMS, supra note 6, at 140, 652 (indicating
that communitization and pooling are synonyms). The terms unitization and pooling are
used synonymously. LowE, supra note 6, at 220.
11. Compare Kramer, supra note 7, at 4-6 to 4-7 (unitization eliminates the internal prop-
erty lines within the unit area so that the wells can be drilled where they most effectively
drain the reservoir) with Dufford, supra note 8, at 1-10 (pooling maximizes the spacing of wells
to most effectively drain a given area).
12. Dufford, supra note 8, at 1-10. There are two primary types of unitized operations:
developmental and operational. Kramer, supra note 7, at 4-2. The developmental unit is
formed to permit rapid and systematic field development. TERMS, supra note 6, at 218. The
operational unit deals with a mature field or reservoir, typically created in order to imple-
ment secondary or tertiary recovery. Kramer, supra note 7, at 4-2.
13. Kramer, supra note 7, at 4-1.
14. TERMS, supra note 6, at 936.
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tion.15 The unit agreement typically includes all interest owners: mineral,
leasehold, and royalty.
16
Although some of its functions overlap, the unit operating agreement
is generally more limited in its focus than the unit agreement in that it
defines the relationships among the working interest owners. In other
words, a unit operating agreement is concerned with the "parties sharing
the costs of unit development, typically the leasehold and unleased min-
eral owners."1 7 The unit operating agreement also governs the allocations
of funds derived from the sale of the production.' 8
Although standard forms of these agreements are available, t9 every
unitization is unique. Therefore, the parties must exercise "substantial
care . . .in the drafting of provisions appropriate for the particular situa-
tion." 20 Unit agreements and unit operating agreements are exceedingly
complex because of the high possibility of unforeseeable future con-
flicts.2 ' The parties must adequately address various issues in the agree-
ment to avoid future problems, including: 22 the allocation of production
among the premises included in the unit;2 3 the allocation of drilling and
other costs; 24 payment of shut-in royalties to lessors;25 problems arising
from the creation of units applicable only to specified minerals or strata;
2 6
15. Kramer, supra note 7, at 4-1.
16. Id.
17. Id. Although an instrument may be termed an "operating agreement," it may not be
limited to controlling the actual operation of producing wells. The agreement may encom-
pass the exploration and exploitation as well as the production and abandonment phases.
Thomas P. Schroedter & Lewis G. Mosburg, Jr., "An Introduction to the AAPL Model Form
Operating Agreement," The Oil and Gas Joint Operating Agreement, Paper No. 1, 1-1 (Rocky
Mtn. Min. L. Fdn. 1990).
18. Amoco Rocmount Co. v. Anschutz Corp., No. C86-0172-B, at 2 (D. Wyo. July 30,
1990) (findings of fact and conclusions of law).
19. For a sample unit agreement, see 7 HowARD R. WILLIAMS & CHARLESJ. MEYERS, OIL
AND GAS LAw § 920.1-2 (1993). For a sample unit operating agreement, see Federal Onshore
Oil and Gas Pooling and Unitization II, 195-a (Rocky Mtn. Min. L. Fdn. 1990); 3 KRAMER &
MARTIN, supra note 8, § 29.02.
See alsoJoe 0. Young, "Non-Federal Operating Agreements," Institute on Pooling and Uni-
tization of Oil and Gas Interests, Paper No. 9, 9-1 to 9-4 (Rocky Mtn. Min. L. Fdn. 1980)
(describing the intended and preferred uses for various forms of unit operating agreements,
mining joint operating agreements, and offshore operating agreements).
20. 6 WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 19, § 920. See also id. at §§ 921 - 921.19 (discussing
customary provisions of pooling and unitization agreements).
21. The risk of potential conflicts is reduced by the fact that the parties generally engage
in protracted negotiations in creating unitization agreements. See id. § 924 (describing the
various stages occurring in agreement negotiations).
22. It is beyond the scope of this article to discuss all of the issues and problems that
should be addressed in unit and unit operating agreements. Agreement negotiations may
take years. Id. See also Young, supra note 19, at 9-7 to 9-13 (discussing problems either cre-
ated or not resolved by the A.A.P.L. form 610-Model Form Operating Agreement).
23. 6 WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 19, § 970.
24. Id. § 972.
25. See id. § 982. A shut-in royalty clause in an oil and gas lease allows the lessee to make
payments to the lessor to keep the lease alive when a well has been drilled which is capable of
producing "in paying quantities," but the gas is not being marketed. See TERMS, supra note 6,
at 818.
26. 6 Williams & Meyers, supra note 19, §§ 973 - 974.4.
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description problems;2 7 alteration in unit boundaries;2 8 and the fiduciary
duties of the unit operator and other parties.
2 9
In addition, parties to a unit operating agreement may attempt to
predict future gas balancing 30 problems or inequities in gas sales by in-
cluding a gas balancing agreement or other provisions within the unit op-
erating agreement that address possible future gas inequities. 3 1 The
inclusion of such provisions make the unit operating agreement (and the
task of negotiating it) much more complex.3 2 Generally, gas balancing
problems arise when working interest owners fail to take gas in proportion
to their ownership interest, thereby leaving parties either over or under-
produced. 33 Gas balancing problems may also arise when one party enters
a gas sales contract and the other parties do not.
34
The reasons for disproportionate gas production or sales are as nu-
merous as the situations in which they occur.3 5 The methods by which
parties choose to balance also vary greatly.3 6 Therefore, provisions ad-
27. Id. § 980.3.
28. Id. § 980.2.
29. Id. § 991.
30. Gas balancing is "[t]he process by which persons having an interest in production
from a well, unit or reservoir adjust their take therefrom to ensure that each such person
receives his proportionate part of production." TERMS, supra note 6, at 62.
31. See Ernest E. Smith, "Relationships Between Co-Owners in Marketing Natural Gas,"
Institute on Natural Gas Marketing, Paper No. 11, 11-1 (Rocky Mtn. Min. L. Fdn. 1987) ("The
operating agreement may, or may not, contain a gas balancing agreement as an attachment,
and either its presence or its absence may create problems of interpretation relative to the
producer's right to sell the gas.").
See also Bert L. Campbell, "Gas Balancing Agreements," Institute on Oil and Gas Agree-
ments, Paper No. 9, 9-4 (Rocky Mtn. Min. L. Fdn. 1983) (noting that balancing was accom-
plished for years without written agreements). Working interest owners have elected to
proceed without gas balancing agreements due to uncertainty in meaning or result. Id. at 9-
5.
32. "The difficulty experienced in negotiating balancing agreements is evidenced by the
fact that many oil balancing agreements provide that the parties agree to agree on a balanc-
ing agreement for gas if and when commercial production of gas is obtained, thus postpon-
ing to a later day the complex negotiating process." 8 WILAMS & MYasS, OIL AND GAS
TERMS 85 (citing Pogo Producing Co. v. Shell Offshore, Inc., 898 F.2d 1064, 1065 (5th Cir.
1990)).
33. Ezekiel J. Williams, Land and Natural Resources Survey, 70 DENV. U. L. REv. 811, 812
(1993). A party is "underproduced" if it does not sell its share of production. Id. Conversely,
overproduced parties have taken more than their share. Id.
34. See KRAMER & MARTIN, supra note 8, § 19.05. The question then becomes whether
the party with the sales contract must account to the other parties for their proportionate
share of production. Id. This was the question put to the court in Amoco. See infra part I.B.
35. See Campbell, supra note 31, at 9-1 to 9-3 (providing extensive examples of situations
in which gas balancing disputes may arise).
36. Courts recognize three methods for balancing: (1) balancing in kind requires the
underproduced party to take a percentage of the overproduced party's gas until the imbal-
ance has been made up; (2) periodic cash balancing requires that the underproduced party
receive cash from the overproducer, curing the imbalance immediately; (3) cash balancing
upon reservoir depletion occurs when balancing in kind is unavailable because the reservoir has
been depleted; therefore, the overproduced party compensates the underproduced party
with cash. Beren v. Harper Oil Co., 546 P.2d 1356, 1359 (Okla. Ct. App. 1975).
Absent an agreement on the method of balancing, courts generally prefer balancing "in
kind" to remedy gas balancing problems. See, e.g., Pogo Producing Co., 898 F.2d at 1065-66
(explaining that industry usage and custom require balancing in kind to remedy underpro-
duction); Doheny v. Wexpro Co., 974 F.2d 130, 133-34 (10th Cir. 1992) (holding that unless
conditions suggest otherwise, balancing in kind is the preferred remedy to correct gas pro-
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dressing gas production or sales inequities in unit operating agreements
cannot address all of the issues and resolve all of the conflicts that may
arise among co-owners as a result of natural gas production and sales.
2. Amoco Rocmount Co. v. Anschutz Corp.
In Amoco Rocmount Co. v. Anschutz Corp.,3 7 the Tenth Circuit held that
an ambiguous gas market sharing provision in a unit operating agreement
required a party to the agreement to share with the other working interest
owners its proceeds from gas sales and its settlement of a take-or-pay con-
tract dispute with a gas purchaser.
a. Facts
The Anschutz Corporation (Anschutz) appealed the district court's
judgment3 8 ordering it to pay over $29 million to Amoco Rocmount Com-
pany (Amoco) 39 and other working interest owners (collectively WIOs),
40
for breaching a unit operating agreement. 4 1 The controversy underlying
the litigation stemmed from the 1979 discovery of a reservoir known as the
Anschutz Ranch East Unit (AREU).42 The WIOs of the AREU negotiated
a unit operating agreement (UOA) for the field. The UOA contained the
controverted provision regarding future gas sales. Section 5.11 of the
UOA, entitled Inability to Market All Gas, read in part:
If at any time a Party's share of the gas available for sale exceeds
the quantity of gas such Party's gas purchaser will take (excess
gas), then every other Party, if requested to do so by the Party
owning such excess gas, shall be obligated to share its market for
gas with the Party owning such excess.
43
Prior to 1979, Anschutz entered into a long-term, take-or-pay natural
gas sales contract 44 with Natural Gas Pipeline Company of America
(NGPL), which encompassed the area in which AREU was subsequently
duction imbalances in the absence of a formal gas balancing agreement); Williams, supra
note 33, at 816 (discussing the types of balancing available and providing an analysis of the
Doheny ruling).
37. 7 F.3d 909 (10th Cir. 1993).
38. Amoco Rocmount Co. v. Anschutz Corp., No. C86-0172-B (D. Wyo. July 30, 1990).
39. Amoco also appealed the district court's judgment awarding damages to Anschutz
for $4,940,585.03 for indemnifaction of attorney's fees for the Anschutz-NGPL suit and for
breaching its duty as unit operator to notify the working interest owners prior to making
substantial changes in the basic method of operation. Amoco Rocmount, 7 F.3d at 913, 920.
40. A working interest is "[t ] he operating interest under an oil and gas lease. The owner
of the working interest has the exclusive right to exploit the minerals on the land." TERms,
supra note 6, at 979. The WIOs of a unitized area are entitled to pro rata shares in the oil and
gas produced from the field. See Amoco Rocmunt, No. C86-0172-B, at 2 (findings of fact and
conclusions of law).
See also LowE, supra note 6, at 388 (a working interest is "[t]he rights to the mineral
interest granted by an oil and gas lease, so-called because the lessee acquires the right to
work on the leased property to search, develop and produce oil and gas." The right is cou-
pled with an obligation to pay all costs).
41. Amoco Rocmount, 7 F.3d at 913.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. In a take-or-pay contract, the "purchaser agrees to take a minimum quantity of...
gas over a specified term at a fixed price.., or to make minimum periodic payments to the
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discovered. 45 Anschutz assigned one-half of its interest in the AREU to
Mobil Rocky Mountain, Inc. (Mobil), including a share of the contract
with NGPL. In 1985, however, NGPL curtailed its AREU gas purchases
and filed suit against Anschutz and Mobil to relieve itself of its obligations
under the take-or-pay contract because natural gas prices were plummet-
ing.46 These disputes were settled out of court.
4 7
Amoco and the other Wits did not enter into long-term gas sales
contracts during this period; however, all the WiO's had gas sales con-
tracts, and all but one sold some gas. The gas Anschutz sold to NGPL
equaled only its working interest owner's share of gas available for sale.
48
In 1986, Amoco and the other Wits (collectively Amoco) sued An-
schutz, claiming that according to section 5.11 of the UOA, Anschutz was
obligated to share the proceeds of its sales to NGPL. 49 Amoco also
claimed that under section 5.11, it was entitled to a share of the settlement
money Anschutz received from NGPL for breaching the take-or-pay con-
tract.50 In addition, because Mobil had purchased an interest in the
AREU and part of the NGPL contract from Anschutz, Amoco sued Mobil
for the same market sharing benefits from its gas sales to NGPL. 51 Amoco
and Mobil settled the dispute. Although Mobil was uncertain about the
meaning or application of section 5.11, the amount on which the parties
settled was consistent with Amoco's interpretation of the section.
5 2
Anschutz argued that section 5.11 was not applicable because Amoco
did not have the requisite gas purchaser and did not make the required
request. According to Anschutz, section 5.11 provided a method for short-
term cash balancing that would take effect only when one party's pur-
chaser was unable to take all of that party's gas.
5 3
b. District Court
The district court held that section 5.11 required Anschutz to share
the proceeds of its natural gas sales with the other WIOs. 54 In reaching its
conclusion, the court determined that the term "excess gas" was ambigu-
producer even though (the) ... gas is not being delivered to the purchaser." TERMS, supra
note 6, at 883.
45. Amoco Rocmount, 7 F.3d at 914.
46. Id. In 1980, the average wellhead gas price in Wyoming and Utah was $1.78 per one
thousand cubic feet (mcf). In 1981, it was $2.47 per mcf; $3.19 in 1982; and $3.41 in early
1984. Upon deregulation, the prices fell in 1985. By 1986, prices were down to $2.59 per
mcf. Amoco Rocmount, No. C86-0172-B at 6.
See also David W. Wilson, "What is Happening to our Natural Gas Markets?" Natural Gas
Marketing, Paper No. 13 (Rocky Mtn. Min. L. Fdn. 1987) (explaining that the deteriorating
natural gas market was caused, in part, by a drop in demand, competition from an overbuilt
electrical generating capacity, and a non-responsive regulatory structure).
47. Amoco Rocmount, 7 F.3d at 914.
48. Amoco Rocmount, No. C86-0172-B at 8-9.
49. Amoco Rocmount v. Anschutz Corp., No. C86-0172-B (D. Wyo. July 30, 1990).
50. Amoco Rocmoun 7 F.3d at 914.
51. Id. at 919.
52. Id. at 920.
53. Amoco Rocmount, No. C86-0172-B at 4.
54. Id. at 28.
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ous.55 Therefore, the court admitted extrinsic evidence regarding the
parties' intent. The evidence included testimony and memoranda from
representatives of the Wits, the parties' post-agreement conduct, and the
settlement between Amoco and Mobil.
The court agreed with Anschutz that the section provided for cash
balancing, but disagreed when it took effect. The court observed that
although in kind balancing is the preferred remedy, equity or special cir-
cumstances may compel a court to cash balance. 56 A court must also allow
cash balancing if the agreement between the parties provides for cash bal-
ancing. The court concluded that "the agreement here, although ambigu-
ous, clearly provides for cash balancing." 57 The court explained that the
Wits rejected in kind balancing because the gas recovery process re-
quired nitrogen injection which would decrease the quality of the gas and
increase the cost of processing the gas, thus making balancing in kind
inequitable.
58
The court also found that the parties' post-agreement conduct "over-
whelmingly" indicated that all parties intended the section to be a market
sharing provision without a gas purchaser prerequisite. 59 The specific
conduct the court relied on included the following facts: Amoco paid an-
nual royalties and taxes on the revenue it expected from the NGPL sales;
60
a 1985 letter from Anschutz's vice president proposed to make payments
to Amoco for distribution among the WIG as "a resolution to the WiG's
differences";6 1 reports prepared for Anschutz by Scientific Software Cor-
poration prior to 1985 referred to the "gas contract sharing agreement"
and thereafter referred to the "gas contract sharing agreement which has
now been discontinued";62 and a complaint Anschutz filed against NGPL
that stated that it had obtained an interest in and expected in the future to
obtain interests in natural gas not taken from the Unit by the other
Wits. 63 In addition, several of the WIts were marketing for one another
and sharing sales revenues.
64
Finally, the court held that Anschutz's interpretation was unreasona-
ble. The court could find "no reasonable explanation for why the parties
55. "Excess gas," the court reasoned, could mean any gas left after a purchaser had
taken some or any amount of gas unsold. Id. at 10.
56. Id. at 21-24. The cases on which the court based its gas balancing discussion in-
cluded: Pogo Producing Co. v. Shell Offshored, Inc., 898 F.2d 1064 (5th Cir. 1990); Chevron
v. Belco Petroleum Corp., 755 F.2d 1151 (5th Cir. 1985); United Petroleum Exploration v.
Premier Resources, 511 F. Supp. 127 (W.D. Okla. 1980); Shell Offshore, Inc. v. Marr, No. 89-
0846 (E.D. La. Jan. 5, 1990).
57. Amoco Rocmount, No. C86-0172-B at 24.
58. I.
59. Id. at 25.
60. Id. at 26. Amoco's income projections, however, did not mention market sharing
revenues. Id. at 12.
61. Id. at 26. The court assumed that this "proposal could not have been made if An-
schutz had not recognized an obligation to share its market under § 5.11." Id. at 13.
62. Id. at 26. The information used by Scientific Software was provided entirely by An-
schutz. Id. at 14.
63. Id. at 14, 26.
64. See d. at 12-13.
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would have intended to require a gas purchaser before the market sharing
provisions would go into effect."
65
On appeal, Anschutz argued that the district court incorrectly: 1) de-
termined that 5.11 was ambiguous; 2) held that 5.11 did not require a gas
purchaser; and 3) admitted evidence regarding the settlement between
Mobil and Amoco.
66
c. Tenth Circuit Opinion
After assuming jurisdiction, 67 the Tenth Circuit upheld the district
court's interpretation of section 5.11 requiring Anschutz to share its gas
market and settlement proceeds with Amoco and the other WIOs. The
Tenth Circuit explained that the district court had correctly found section
5.11 to be ambiguous 68 and that the district court's extensive findings of
fact regarding the parties' intent were not clearly erroneous. Therefore,
the Tenth Circuit could not overturn the district court's holding regard-
ing the meaning of the section. 69 In addition, the Tenth Circuit held that
the trial court's admission of the settlement agreement between Mobil and




Given the complex nature of gas balancing and unit operating agree-
ments, it is unlikely that parties will foresee and adequately address all
potential problems. The parties' failure in Amoco to clearly define section
5.11 of the unit operating agreement resulted in a difficult, $29 million
65. Id. at 26.
66. Amoco Rocmount, 7 F.3d at 917. Anschutz argued in the alternative that if section 5.11
did require them to share, they were only required to do so for one year. The court found
that the one year limitation was included in the section so that the market sharing would not
result in the unit being taxed as a corporation. Id. at 919. See alsoYoung, supra note 19, at 9-
11 to 9-12 (explaining difficulties with express provisions in operating agreements that at-
tempt to affect state and federal taxation).
67. The court asserted its jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c) (1) (diversity) despite
Anschutz' challenge. Anschutz argued: 1) that its principal place of business as well as
Amoco's was in Colorado, therefore no diversity existed between them; and 2) Amoco vio-
lated the 28 U.S.C. § 1359 prohibition against the collusive manufacture of federal jurisdic-
tion by agreeing with the other WIOs that they would not join the suit against Anschutz so as
not to destroy diversity. Amoco Rocmount, 7 F.3d at 914.
In rejecting the firstjurisdictional challenge, the court explicitly adopted the "total activ-
ity" test to determine that Amoco's principal place of business was not Colorado while An-
schutz' was. Id. at 915-16. The court then determined that a litigation agreement between
Amoco and the other WIOs limiting the involvement of the later in the suit against Anschutz
did not constitute improper collusion under 28 U.S.C. § 1359. Amoco, as the unit operator,
would normally conduct business, including litigation, on behalf of and for the benefit of the
WIO's. Id. at 916.
68. Id. at 918.
69. Id. at 919. Under Colorado law, findings of fact must be accepted by the appellate
court unless they are clearly erroneous. Id. at 918. The Tenth Circuit did admit that ascer-
taining the parties' intent was a difficult task in this case: "we cannot find clearly erroneous
the district court's conclusion that the intent of the parties, to the extent it can be ascertained at
al, was that they were not required to have a gas purchaser before invoking the market
sharing provisions of § 5.11. " Id. at 919 (emphasis added).
70. Id. at 919-20.
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judicial decision. In adopting Amoco's interpretation of section 5.11, the
district court and the Tenth Circuit managed to ensure an equitable distri-
bution of the gas production proceeds. However, to achieve this end, the
district court unconvincingly determined that the section was ambiguous,
thereby allowing the court to examine extrinsic evidence regarding the
parties' intent.
A court may only investigate the parties' intent through extrinsic evi-
dence if the language of the agreement or provision is ambiguous. To
support its conclusion that the section was ambiguous, the Tenth Circuit
asserted well-known axioms of contractual interpretation: "[t] he meaning
of a contract is found by examination of the entire instrument and not by
viewing clauses or phrases in isolation"; "[e]ach word is to be given mean-
ing if at all possible";71 and " [t] o ascertain whether a provision is ambigu-
ous, the court must examine and construe the language in harmony with
the plain, popular, and generally accepted meaning of the words em-
ployed and with reference to all provisions of the document."72 Although
the court asserted these propositions, it did not apply them.
a. The "Ambiguous" Word Defined
First, the lower court held, and the Tenth Circuit agreed, that the
term "excess gas" was ambiguous. The trial court explained that it could
mean either the quantity of gas remaining after a purchaser had taken
some gas or any quantity of unsold gas.73 This is a reasonable explanation
only if the term is analyzed separately from the provision in which it is
found. However, section 5.11 solves the dilemma of the meaning of the
term by explicitly defining "excess gas" as a quantity of gas that exceeds
the quantity such party's purchaser will take.
b. Each Word Given Meaning
The courts' interpretation of section 5.11 rendered the term "gas pur-
chaser" meaningless. The Tenth Circuit pointed out that "[n]owhere else
in the contract is a requirement for a gas purchaser mentioned," thereby
leaving the court without another reference to the term to examine. 74 It
is unlikely that the parties intended to ignore the term. Because "gas pur-
chaser" is mentioned only in section 5.11, the Tenth Circuit should have
given it import.
c. Examination of the Entire Instrument
An examination of the entire instrument shows that the two provi-
sions of the UOA directly preceding section 5.11 are concerned with tak-
71. Id. at 917 (quoting United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Budget Rent-A-Car Sys., Inc.,
842 P.2d 208, 213 (Colo. 1992) (emphasis in original)).
72. Id. (quoting Wota v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 831 P.2d 1307, 1309 (Colo. 1992)).
73. Amoco Rocmoun4 No. C86-0172-B at 10.
74. Amoco Rocmount, 7 F.3d at 919.
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ing in kind.75 Section 5.9, entitled "Taking in Kind," sets forth a general
proposition that "[e] ach party shall currently, as produced, take in kind or
separately dispose of its share of Allocable United Substances .... Except
as otherwise provided in Section 5.10 or 5.11 each Party shall be entitled
to receive directly all proceeds from the sale of its share of United Sub-
stances sold."
76
Apparently, section 5.10 acts as the first exception to section 5.9. Sec-
tion 5.10, entitled "Failure to Take in Kind," contemplates the situation in
which a party may "fail to take in kind or separately dispose of its share" of
production. 77 Under such circumstances, a party may purchase the share
or shares not taken. 78 The second exception to 5.9, the controverted 5.11,
contemplates a situation in which a party's gas purchaser will not take all
of that party's gas. Under this isolated situation, the parties agreed on
balancing in cash.79 The district court, however, found that the "agree-
ment" rejected balancing in kind and intended to balance in cash.80 This
statement, however, is inaccurate if the document is viewed in its entirety
and if any meaning is to be given to the immediately preceding sections.
Section 5.9 clearly provides for balancing in kind as the parties' desired
remedy for imbalances. 8 '
Although the district court used a questionable method in reaching
its holding, the Tenth Circuit was not compelled to overturn the ruling
because the result was equitable. Under the unit and unit operating
agreements, each party contributes to the costs of extracting the produc-
tion, and therefore should reap rewards in proportion to contribution.
The operating agreement embodies the WIOs' commitment to work to-
gether toward a common goal of production profit. A "partnership" is
formed in which, at a minimum, fair dealing is owed one another. "A sort
of team spirit or esprit de corps permeates the operating agreement by the
fashion in which the parties put their trust in one another to carry out the
75. Brief for Appellant, Amoco Rocmount v. Anschutz Corp., No. C86-0172-B (D. Wyo.






80. See text accompanying notes 56-58.
81. Arguably, none of these provisions addressed the situation at hand, in which a party
was without a gas purchaser and wished to share another WIO's market for gas.
An unattractive effect of the court's decision was to reward Amoco's risky business deci-
sion to wait to sell until prices were higher and punish Anschutz for diligently marketing its
share of production. In retrospect, Amoco was able to "hold out" at no risk.
Interpreting § 5.11 as the court did also provides incentive for WIOs without purchasers
to rely on proceeds from parties with purchasers rather than to secure or attempt to secure
purchasers of their own. Parties to the agreement may avoid this result by including a state-
ment requiring all parties to put forth a good faith effort to obtain purchasers, unless such
requirement is implicitly imposed upon the parties.
In some jurisdictions, a lessee has an implied duty to diligently search for a market in
which to sell produced gas. Tucker v. Hugoton Energy Corp., 855 P.2d 929, 936 (Kan. 1993)
(explaining that the payment of shut-in gas royalties does not excuse the lessee from its duty
to search for a market). It may be argued that a similar duty is imposed on a WIO.
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goals of the agreement."8 2 As members of the "joint venture," Wits rea-
sonably expect to share the fruits of the labor as well as the costs.
B. Private Agreements Governing Common Law Negligence: Reese
Exploration, Inc. v. Williams Natural Gas Co.
83
1. Background
Generally, minerals are considered real property and therefore sub-
ject to the rules of real estate law. The law governing oil and gas owner-
ship, however, differs substantially from the law governing solid mineral
ownership because of the peculiar nature of oil and gas.84 In the early
stages of the development of oil and natural gas law, courts understanda-
bly analogized these minerals to wild animals (ferae naturae) because of
their migratory propensities and a limited scientific knowledge regarding
the nature of the minerals. 85 As a result, the law of capture, 86 which gov-
erned ownership of wild animals, was applied to oil and gas.
8 7
82. Milam Randolph Pharo, "Duties and Obligations Revisited - Who Bears What Risk
of Loss?," The Oil and Gas Joint Operating Agreement, Paper No. 4, 4-2 (Rocky Mtn. Min. L. Fdn.
1990).
83. 983 F.2d 1514 (10th Cir. 1993). During the Survey period, the Tenth Circuit
decided several other oil and gas cases: Octagon Gas Sys. v. Rimmer, 995 F.2d 948 (10th Cir.
1993) (holding that the owner of a "perpetual overriding royalty interest" in proceeds from
the sale of natural gas through Chapter 11 had an enforceable interest in debtor's gas sale
proceeds, that the owner's interest constituted an "account" subject to Article 9 of the UCC,
and that the account was an estate property despite prior assignment of the account);
Northwest Pipeline Corp. v. FERC, 986 F.2d 1330 (10th Cir. 1993) (holding that a suit
brought by a gas pipeline owner to review FERC's order requiring the owner to amend
downward a take-or-pay surcharge to customers was not ripe for judicial review); Lone
Mountain Production Co. v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co. of Am., 984 F.2d 1551 (10th Cir. 1992)
(holding that a pipeline company was estopped from demanding strict compliance with the
assignment provision of a gas purchase contract and damages awarded to the well operator
were properly based on estimates of preflow production); Howell Petroleum Corp. v. Leben
Oil Corp., 976 F.2d 614 (10th Cir. 1992) (holding that a working interest owner's action for
accounting was time barred and that the interest holder did not produce the requisite
evidence of a balance due as required to obtain an accounting).
84. 1 EUGENE KuNTz, OIL AND GAS § 2.2 (1987). The law pertaining to oil and gas is
generally the same. The gaseous character of natural gas, however, necessitates methods of
handling different from those used in oil production. Id. § 1.19.
85. Gas, usually present with oil, has the capacity to expand when the pressure within
the formation is reduced. Phillip Wm. Lear, "Conservation Principles and Federal Onshore
Pooling and Unitization: An Overview," Federal Onshore Oil and Gas Pooling and Unitization II,
Paper No. 1, 3 (Rocky Mm. Min. L. Fnd. 1990) (quoting Professor Philip Dufford on the
physical characteristics of petroleum).
The rapidity and facility with which the migration of oil takes place depends upon: the
hydrostatic pressure, character of the formation, dip of the strata, and nature of the oil.
KuN-rz, supra note 84, § 1.21.
86. The "law of capture" is used interchangeably with the "rule of capture." It also has
been referred to as the "law of piracy" or the "law of the jungle." Robert E. Hardwicke, The
Rule of Capture and its Implications as Applied to Oil and Gas, 13 TEX. L. REv. 391, 392 (1935)
(deemed as such because it authorizes the taking of another person's property).
87. See, e.g., Bezzi v. Hocker, 370 F.2d 533 (10th Cir. 1966); Anderson v. Beech Aircraft
Corp., 699 P.2d 1023 (Kan. 1985); Hammonds v. Central Kentucky Natural Gas Co., 75
S.W.2d 204 (Ky. 1934). Cf Ellis v. Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co., 450 F.Supp. 412 (E.D. Okla.
1978), affd, 609 F.2d 436 (10th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 964 (1980); White v. New
York State Natural Gas Corp., 190 F. Supp. 342 (W.D. Pa. 1960); Lone Star Gas Co. v. Murchi-
son, 353 S.W.2d 870 (Tex. Civ. App. 1962).
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The law of capture embodies a simple concept of ownership; whoever
captures it owns it, regardless of where it was located.88 Furthermore, if it
escapes it is no longer owned and therefore obtainable by anyone.89
Although the underlying concept of this rule is simple, many problems
resulted from its application to oil and gas. In oil production, the law of
capture promotes overdrilling which causes dissipation of reservoir energy
and results in substantial waste through nonrecovery. 90 The doctrine was
also unsuccessful when applied to natural gas, particularly when gas stor-
age became a necessity.9 '
The primary problems resulting from the application of the law of
capture to natural gas centered around determining ownership and liabil-
ity for damage. Strict adherence to the law of capture meant gas injectors
would not retain title to the natural gas that they stored in underground
formations, and other parties, such as mineral owners or adjacent land
owners, were able to obtain ownership. 92 Furthermore, if the injectors did
not retain title to natural gas injected into formations for storage, it was
not clear who was liable to the mineral or surface owners for damage
caused by the gas.
93
For an excellent critique on the evolution and application of the rule of capture and the
hardships it created for the oil and gas industry see Hardwicke, supra note 86. In 1935, when
Hardwicke's article was published, all states recognized the rule of capture. Id. at 403.
88. Under traditional oil and gas jurisprudence the Rule of Capture determines the
owner of the oil and gas. In simple terms the Rule assigns ownership to a party who
captures or controls the hydrocarbons by bringing it to the surface, regardless of
where the hydrocarbons may have been located underground.
Kramer, supra note 7, at 4-6.
89. See Mullett v. Bradley, 53 N.Y.S. 781, 782 (N.Y. App. Div. 1898) (noting that the
owner loses the property interest in an animal that returns to the wild).
90. Lear, supra note 85, at 1-7.
91. The nation's demand for natural gas increased during the past twenty years due to a
change in social concerns regarding energy consumption. However, an inefficient gas trans-
port system that provided more gas than needed in the summer months and less than
needed in winter months gave rise to the need for an efficient method for storing gas. Fred
McGaha, Symposium, Underground Gas Storage: Opposing Rights and Interest, 46 LA. L. REv. 871,
871 (1986). The surplus gas is often transported into underground storage reservoirs. Id.
92. Id. at 879. Cf Octagon Gas Systems v. Rimmer, 995 F.2d 948, 954 (10th Cir. 1993)
(once extracted, natural gas becomes personal property in Oklahoma). The inequity of the
rule's result is obvious, considering that the gas owner likely paid for the right to extract the
gas and for its production or purchased the gas from a producer and then purchased the
storage rights.
93. See Hammonds v. Central Kentucky Natural Gas Co., 75 S.W.2d 204 (Ky. App. 1934)
(holding that injected gas becomes ferae naturae and is no longer owned by the injector,
therefore the injector is not required to pay a landowner for use of the subsurface strata
when the gas strays into it). Cf Ellis v. Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co., 450 F. Supp. 412 (E.D.
Okla. 1978), afd, 609 F.2d 436 (10th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 964 (1980) (ownership
of injected gas is not lost upon injection when it does not mix with native gas and the bound-
aries of the reservoir are capable of determination); White v. New York State Natural Gas
Corp., 190 F. Supp. 342 (E.D. Pa. 1960) (gas storage company could recover from those
producing their injected gas from a neighboring well under the theory of conversion upon
proving that it was their gas being produced); Lone Star Gas Co. v. Murchison, 353 S.W.2d
870 (Tex. Civ. App. 1962) (ownership of injected gas is not lost).
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Problems such as these, resulting from the rule of capture, greatly
curtailed the rule's application to oil and gas.94 Several states have explic-
itly precluded application of the rule to stored gas.95 It is now generally
accepted that the ownership of gas is not lost upon injection.96 However,
this does not necessarily mean that the injectors will be held responsible
for damages caused by storing the gas and its subsequent movement or
escape.
9 7
2. Reese Exploration, Inc. v. Williams Natural Gas Co
In Reese Exploration, Inc. v. Williams Natural Gas Co.,9 8 the Tenth Cir-
cuit looked to the language in the assignment of mineral interests to de-
termine whether a gas owner was liable to an oil producer for damages
caused by escaping gas. In doing so, the Court refused to apply Kansas's
vestige of the rule of capture.
a. Facts
The controversy in Reese arose out of a conflict between two oil and
gas lease owners in Colony-Welda Field in Anderson County, Kansas. Wil-
liams Natural Gas Company (WNG) obtained9 9 gas storage rights in the
94. See Lear, supra note 85, at 1-8. Waste in oil production due to non-recovery has also
been curtailed by the evolution of communitization and unitization as well as secondary and
tertiary recovery techniques. See supra part IA.
95. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:22(D) (1985); OaLA. STAT. ANN., tit. 52, § 36.6 (1992 &
Supp. 1994); TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 91.182 (West 1993). See also BRUCE M. KRAMER &
PATRICK H. MARTIN, THE LAW OF POOLING AND UNITIZATION § 2.02 (3d ed. 1989 & Supp.
1992).
96. McGaha, supra note 91, at 883 (excepting when the gas can no longer be identified).
Cf Anderson v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 699 P.2d 1023 (Kan. 1985) (holding that ownership
rights were lost when gas was reinjected, but limiting the holding to situations where natural
gas public utilities are not involved, and the injector did not obtain permission from the
authorized commission or from the adjoining land owner). Also, parties may still argue that
the doctrine, in certain circumstances, applies or should apply to natural gas stored or escap-
ing from the underground reservoirs. See Reese v. Williams Natural Gas, 983 F.2d 1514, 1517
(10th Cir. 1993) (petitioner arguing that escaped natural gas was common property under
Kansas law).
97. The theory that substances with migrating propensities may be injected into a forma-
tion even if the injection results in the displacement of more valuable substances is known as
the "negative" rule of capture. According to this theory, the injector will not be liable for
damages if pursued as part of a reasonable program of development and without injury to
the producing formation. 1 WILLIAMS & MEYERs, OIL AND GAS LAw § 204.5 (1993). Cf Young
v. Ethyl Corp., 521 F.2d 771 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1089 (1979) (allowing
recovery under a theory of nuisance for damages caused by the injection of salt water); Jame-
son v. Ethyl Corp., 609 S.W.2d 346 (Ark. 1980) (holding injector liable when secondary re-
covery processes depletes minerals from or causes special damage to adjoining lands).
Note that the "negative rule of capture" is generally not applied to the injection of gas
for storage purposes. McGaha, supra note 91, at 883-84.
98. Reese, 983 F.2d 1514 (10th Cir. 1993).
99. The leases at issue in this case were assigned to W.S. Fees in 1936 and 1937 and
entitled Fees to oil, gas, and gas storage rights on the land. Fees conveyed all "the gas and
gas rights ... and all gas storage rights" to Cities Service Gas which was WNG's predecessor in
interest. Cities Service Gas began injecting and storing gas in the field in the late 1930's. Id.
at 1517.
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field up to a depth of 1,050 feet.100 WNG was injecting gas into and with-
drawing it from the Bartlesville formation, located at 900 feet in depth.' 0 1
Reese Exploration Incorporated (Reese) owned the right to produce
oil from the same land that WNG was using to store gas. 10 2 Specifically,
Reese was attempting to recover oil from the Squirrel formation located at
800 feet, just above the Bartlesville formation.
Reese alleged that WNG was negligently permitting its injected gas to
escape and enter the Squirrel sand formation, thereby inhibiting Reese's
oil recovery operations. Reese sought compensatory damages and injunc-
tive relief ordering WNG to lower its storage zone pressure. 10 3 Reese also
argued that the escaped gas was common property under Kansas law.'
0 4
Therefore, Reese requested declaratory relief recognizing its ownership of
the migrated gas.
1 0 5
WNG responded that its lease conferred the right to store gas up to
1,050 feet below the surface and that Reese's oil rights were subject to
WNG's gas storage rights; therefore, it did not owe Reese a duty.
10 6
b. District Court
The district court found that WNG's storage rights were limited to the
Bartlesville formation. 10 7 Thus, WNG was liable for the damage caused to
Reese by the escaping gas.' 08 The court reasoned that the parties had "co-
existing rights to produce oil and store gas," neither of which was superior,
so neither party should interfere with the other's exercise of its rights
100. Id. Fees was both the surface and mineral owner at the time he conveyed gas storage
rights to WNG's predecessor. See McGaha, supra note 91, at 872-73. (discussing which inter-
est owner may lease or assign storage rights).
101. Reese, 983 F.2d at 1516.
102. In 1979, Fees' trustee assigned all Fees' remaining rights to Charles Hardesty who
assigned them to We-Kan Resources, Inc., who in turn assigned them to Reese. Id. at 1517.
103. Id. Changing pressures from the storage and escape of gas in and from the Bartles-
ville formation affected activity in the Squirrel formation because the two formations were in
.pressure communication." Id. High pressure created by WNG's gas storage inhibited oil
production and created safety hazards. Phillip E. DeLaTorre, Survey of Kansas Oil and Gas
Law (1988-1992), 41 KAN. L. REv. 691, 719 n.203 (1993). WNG's gas rendered nine out of
ten of Reese's wells non-producing. Reese, 983 F.2d at 1517.
WNG attempted to mitigate the damage loss of gas with a compressor which captured
the gas in the Squirrel formation and returned it to the Bartlesville formation. On one occa-
sion, the compressor failed and caused Reese's lead line to "blow out." As a result, twenty
acres were soaked with oil and salt water. Id.
104. A recent case decided by the Kansas Supreme Court applied the rule of capture to
gas storage. Anderson v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 699 P.2d.1023 (Kan. 1985). The Anderson court
held that an owner of natural gas lost its tide when it injected non-native gas into the under-
ground area and the gas was then produced from the common reservoir (limiting the hold-
ing to situations where the landowner is not a public utility and has stored natural gas under
the property of an adjoining land owner without permission). Id. See also TanyaJ. Treadway,
Note, Oil & Gas Law: The Rule of Capture Applied to the Underground Storage of Natural Gas -
Anderson v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 34 KAN. L. Rav. 801 (1986) (arguing that the Anderson
court should have based its decision on a theory of trespass rather than quiet tide).
105. Reese, 983 F.2d at 1517.
106. Id.
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under its respective lease. 1°g Furthermore, because WNG had elected to
utilize only the Bartlesville formation for storage, it could not now enlarge
its storage rights to other formations. 110 However, the court ruled against
Reese's claim for ownership finding that although gas had escaped, WNG
never lost ownership.'11
c. Tenth Circuit Opinion
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the lower court holding that WNG re-
tained title to the non-native gas produced by Reese from the Squirrel
formation, 112 but it reversed the lower court on the negligence issue,




In finding that the escaped gas was not subject to the law of capture
under Kansas law, the Tenth Circuit distinguished the Kansas' Supreme
Court's holding in Anderson. 1 4 According to the court, the situation in
Reese was easily distinguishable from Anderson because: 1) in the present
case the gas migrated vertically, whereas in Anderson, the gas migrated
horizontally through the same formation to different lands; 115 2) WNG
had a contractual authorization to store gas in the Squirrel formation;" l6
and 3) WNG was a natural gas public utility permitted by FERC.
117
The Tenth Circuit reversed the lower court's holding that WNG was
negligent. The court explained that negligence can be found only if a
corresponding duty is imposed on the allegedly negligent party. The issue
in Reese was whether a duty was imposed on WNG in the assignment of its
storage rights not to interfere with Reese's oil production. 118 The court
resolved this issue by interpreting the express language of the parties' as-
signment contracts. The grant to WNG's predecessor conveyed the right
to store gas in all underground formations above 1,050 feet without any
reservations. Meanwhile, the assignment to Reese's predecessor was ex-
109. Id. at 1423.
110. Id. at 1424. The court analogized WNG's rights to an easement in which a party's
actions define the scope and location of the easement. In other words, because WNG had
only utilized the Bartlesville formation for storage, its rights to store were now limited to that
area. Id.
111. Id. at 1427.
112. Reese Exploration, Inc. v. Williams Natural Gas Co., 983 F.2d 1514, 1523 (10th Cir.
1993).
113. Id. at 1522.
114. Id. at 1523. For a description of the Anderson holding, see supra note 104.
115. The situation in Reese was unusual because the two interest owners' tracts were lo-
cated on top of one another and the gas migrated vertically. Typically, the applicability of
the law of capture arises when the parties' tracts are adjacent and the migration is horizontal.
The district court reasoned, without sufficient explanation, that the direction of the migra-
tion assisted in distinguishing Reese from Anderson. Reese, 768 F. Supp. at 1427. The Tenth
Circuit merely adopted the lower court's distinction. Rees, 983 F.2d at 1523. See DeLaTorre,
supra note 103, at 720 (criticizing the lower court's distinction of horizontal and vertical
movement in determining whether or not to apply the rule because Kansas "recognizes hori-
zontal, as well as vertical, severance of rights").
116. Reese, 983 F.2d at 1523.
117. Id.
118. See id. at 1521.
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plicitly made subject to the gas storage rights assigned to WNG. 119 The
Tenth Circuit concluded that Reese owed a duty not to interfere with
WNG's gas storage activities, but the duty was not reciprocal.
120
3. Analysis
Several different causes of action may give rise to a capture analysis.
Attempts to store gas which migrates to adjoining land owners' property
may result in trespass actions by the land owner. 121 If the court adheres to
the law of capture, the gas owner is not liable for trespass because the gas
owner is deemed to have lost title upon injection or migration.
Rather than sue for damages under trespass, adjoining surface or
mineral owners may seek a declaratory judgment that the injector lost pos-
session of or title to the stored gas.' 22 Applying the law of capture here
would result in a transfer of ownership. Likewise, the gas injector would
lose the rights to the gas and the extractor would become the new owner.
Finally, gas injected may cause damage to a neighboring interest owner,
causing the affected party to sue for negligence.
Reese sued for ownership and negligence. Theoretically, under the
law of capture, ownership is either lost upon injection or upon escape
from the storage formation; therefore, the previous owner cannot be held
liable for damage caused by the gas.123 For example, if the Tenth Circuit
had applied the law of capture in Reese, WNG would have been deemed to
have lost title to the gas and therefore may not have been liable for dam-
ages suffered by Reese. However, Reese would have gained or had the
opportunity to gain possession of the gas. On the other hand, without the
law of capture, WNG retained ownership, thereby subjecting itself to possi-
ble liability for the damage caused by the gas.
A negligence claim against WNG failed because the conveyances of
the respective interests designated Reese's interest as servient or subject to
WNG's. Therefore, the Tenth Circuit rejected Reese's negligence claim.
This demonstrates that contract rights may define duties which control
common law negligence. In other words, private agreements, such as
leases and assignments of mineral interests, can determine whether com-
mon law tort actions apply. Even though Reese suffered damage from the
presence of WNG's gas, Reese could find no remedy in court. 12 4 In creat-
ing and purchasing leases and assignments, parties should be aware of
such agreements impact on the common law, particularly negligence.
119. Id. at 1521-22.
120. Id. at 1522.
121. See, e.g., Hammonds v. Central Kentucky Natural Gas Co., 75 S.W.2d 204 (Ky. 1934).
122. See, e.g., Bezzi v. Hocker, 370 F.2d 533 (10th Cir. 1966).
123. This is not to say that one cannot be negligent in attempting to store or recover the
gas.
124. The court noted that WNG's conduct may have been limited by the doctrine of
implied covenants or by KAN. STAT. ANN. § 55-1203 (1983), which allows the appropriation of
subsurface formations for gas storage, but requires that the appropriation be without preju-
dice to other rights or interests. The Tenth Circuit, however, did not decide these issues
because they were not raised by the parties. Reese, 983. F.2d at 1523, n.8.
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Although Reese's case engenders sympathy, Reese knew gas was being
injected at the location when it took the assignment. Reese's best option
now is to enter into a contractual relationship with WNG to remedy or
mitigate the situation if it is economically prudent to continue
production.125
II. PUBLIC LANDS
A. Public Participation in the Bureau of Land Management's Planning and
Land Transfer Procedures: National Parks and Conservation
Ass'n v. Federal Aviation Administration
2 6
1. Background
In the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976
(FLPMA), 127 Congress directed the Bureau of Land Management
(BLM) 1 2 8 to undertake formal, comprehensive planning for the 448 mil-
lion acres of land within its jurisdiction.1 29 Although many of FLPMA's
directives are vague and ambiguous, 130 the provisions regarding protec-
125. As a result of the court's ruling, WNG now possesses superior negotiating leverage.
Reese would likely have to pay great consideration to convince WNG to alter its conduct.
126. 998 F.2d 1523 (10th Cir. 1993).
127. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1784 (1988). FLPMA covers areas of public land administration
that fall beyond the scope of this article. This section will focus on subchapter I of FLPMA
(General Provisions) and parts of subchapter II (Land Use Planning and Land Acquisition
and Disposition). Subchapter III specifically addresses administration; subchapter IV autho-
rizes the Secretary of Interior to issue permits and leases for domestic livestock grazing; sub-
chapter V provides for the grants of rights-of-way; and subchapter VI discusses reviewing
particular tracts for designation as wilderness areas. See Robert L. Glicksman, Severability and
the Realignment of the Balance of Power Over the Public Lands: The Federal Land Policy and Manage-
ment Act of 1976 After the Legislative Veto Decisions, 36 HASTINGs LJ. 1, 6-7 (1984).
128. The BLM is an agency of the Department of the Interior. For purposes of this arti-
cle, "public land(s)" refer only to the lands governed by the BLM.
In total, the federal government owns about one-third of the country's on-shore surface
land, totaling 730 million out of 2.3 billion acres which comprise the United States. JAN G.
LArros &JOSEPH P. TOMAIN, ENERGY AND NATURAL RESOURCES LAw 64 (1992). See also GEORGE
CAMERON COGGINS ET AL., FEDERAL PUBLIC LAND AND RESOURCES LAw 14 (3d ed. 1993) [here-
inafter COGINS ET. ALI (indicating how much land in each state is owned by the federal
government).
129. Prior to FLPMA, the BLM had commenced formal land planning pursuant to the
1964 Classification and Multiple Use Act (CMUA). 43 U.S.C. §§ 1411-1418 (expired 1970).
130. FLPMA is widely criticized for its vagueness and generalities. See George Cameron
Coggins, The Developing Law of Land Use Planning on the Federal Lands, 61 U. COLO. L. REv. 307,
319 (1990) [hereinafter Coggins] (although § 1712 mandates planning, it otherwise is open-
ended; "it specifies neither schedules, procedures, nor content of land use plans, leaving
most methods and details to secretarial discretion"); id. at 308 ("Congress neglected to spell
out anything except vague generalities to guide the BLM"); Lisa J. Hudson, Judicial Review of
Bureau of Land Management's Land Use Plans Under the Federal Rangeland Statutes, 8 PuB. LAND
L. REv. 185, 189 (1987) ("Congress failed to resolve adequately basic management conflicts
or translate underlying principles into binding commands" and "failed to ensure that the
planning process would be implemented fully and neglected to define precise standards").
In addition to ambiguities within the statute, Coggins attributes BLM's inconsistent plan-
ning to budget constraints and other statutes imposing ad hoc planning requirements on the
BLM. Coggins, supra note 130, at 316-17.
1994] 1033
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
tion for designated areas of critical environmental concern (ACEC)' 3 1
and public participation in the planning process are particularly clear.
Generally, FLPMA embodies the basic philosophies of land use plan-
ning, multiple use, and sustained yield.13 2 FLPMA grants the agency flexi-
bility in allocating resources rather than forcing the BLM to devote any
particular tract of public land to a specific use.
133
Planning under FLPMA begins with an inventory of all public lands,
their resources, and values.13 4 FLPMA § 1712(a)1 3 5 commands the BLM
to create formal land use plans, based in part on the inventories taken.'
3 6
These plans are legally binding on the BLM,13 7 and agency decisions re-
garding the management of public lands must be "in accordance" with
such plans.' 38 Therefore, the BLM is theoretically committed to a ra-
tional, coordinated management scheme.'
39
131. An Area of Critical Environmental Concern (ACEC) is an area within the public
lands where special management attention is required to "protect and prevent irreparable
damage to important historic, cultural, or scenic values, fish and wildlife resources or other
natural systems or processes, or to protect life and safety from natural hazards." 43 U.S.C.
§ 1702(a) (1988). The corresponding regulation uses the same definition of ACEC, except it
adds that the identification of a potential ACEC "shall not, of itself, change or prevent
change of the management or use of public lands." 43 C.F.R. § 1601.0-5(a) (1993).
ACECs are supposed to be unique areas of national significance deserving protection in
their natural state. The ACEC designation is not intended to halt all development. Gail L.
Achterman et al., "NFMA and FLPMA: Fifteen Years of Planning," Public Land Law, Paper No.
5, 5-27 (Rocky Mtn. Min. L. Fdn. 1992) (citing S. Rep. No. 94-583, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. at 43
(1976)).
132. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701(a) (7) & 1712(c) (1) (1988). These philosophies, along with much
of the language in FLPMA, were borrowed from the 1960 Multiple Use, Sustained-Yield Act
(MUSYA). 16 U.S.C. §§ 528-531 (1988). See Hudson, supra note 130, at 188-89 (explaining
that while much of the language in FLPMA was borrowed from the MUSYA applicable to the
Forest Service's management of the national forests, the two statutes are different in that the
management directives in FLPMA are couched in mandatory language). See also COGGINS ET
AL., supra note 128, at 622-23 (providing a summary of MUSYA).
133. See generally Maria E. Mansfield, On the Cusp of Property Rights: Lessons from Public Land
Law, 18 ECOLOGY L.Q. 43 (1991). See also COocINS Er AL., supra note 128, at 14 (noting that
the basic public land legal conflicts are over use of public resources).
134. See 43 U.S.C. § 1711(a) (1988). The section includes identifiable values but does
not limit them to outdoor recreation and scenic values. Additionally, the inventory is to be
kept current to reflect changes in conditions and to identify new and emerging resource and
other values. Id.
135. "The Secretary shall, with public involvement.., develop, maintain, and, when ap-
propriate, revise land use plans which provide by tracts or areas for the use of the public
lands." 42 U.S.C. § 1712(a) (1988).
136. See 43 U.S.C. § 1712 (c)(4) (1988). The command to plan embodied in the section
is unspecific so as to leave room for agency discretion. See Coggins, supra note 130, at 319.
"It is not realistic to expect or require that plans be so specific that they eliminate managerial
discretion." On the other hand, under a broad mandate such as this, the agency may "pro-
mulgate plans so general as to be meaningless as limitations on or guidelines for subsequent
management decisions." Id. at 309.
137. See Coggins, supra note 130, at 309.
138. 43 U.S.C. § 1732(a) (1988).
139. Hudson, supra note 130, at 188. Realistically, BLM planning has been hampered by
a chronic shortage of resources, personnel, and expertise and by changes in policy direction.
Coggins, supra note 130, at 318 & n.104. In addition, BLM maintains a low planning budget.
Id. at 320. As a result, BLM's planning efforts are "criticized as tardy, inconsistent, and gener-
ally inadequate." Id. at 318.
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FLPMA sets forth substantive criteria that the BLM must consider in
the development and revision of land use plans. 140 The BLM shall: ob-
serve the principles of multiple use and sustained yield; give priority in
protection to Areas of Critical Environmental Concern; rely on the inven-
tory of the lands; consider present and potential uses; consider the scarcity
of values and the availability of alternatives; weigh the long-term against
the short-term benefits; provide for compliance with applicable pollution
control laws; and coordinate with other states and other agencies.
141
In addition to ACECs' role as substantive criteria for the adoption of
land use plans, 142 ACECs are mentioned in § 1711 (a) of FLPMA, regard-
ing the BLM's land inventories. 143 Section 1711(a) by itself does not
change management standards for land designated as an ACEC. 144 Sec-
tion 1712, however, specifies that the resource inventory required under
§ 1711(a) including ACEC identification, serves as the foundation for the
land use plan. 145 The two sections read together indicate that Congress
intended more than cursory consideration of ACECs.
146
Although FLPMA contains few procedural requirements, 147 it clearly
reflects congressional sentiment regarding the importance of including
the public in land use decisions. FLPMA was enacted largely in response
to a shift in public sentiment regarding public land use from favoring dis-
position to favoring conservation. 148 Congress recognized the public's
growing discontent and resolved to retain the remaining public domain in
federal ownership 149 and to manage the lands to avoid "unnecessary or
140. 43 U.S.C. § 1712(c) (1988).
141. 43 U.S.C. § 1712(c) (1),(3)-(9) (1988). Coggins notes that"[e]ven though Congress
phrased each mandatorily, the criteria are remarkable for their lack of specificity." Only the
mandates requiring designation and protection of ACECs and compliance with applicable
pollution control laws are definite, applicable standards. Coggins, supra note 130, at 321.
142. Section 1712(c) (3) provides that in the development and revision of land use plans,
"the Secretary shall . . .give priority to the designation and protection of areas of critical
environmental concern."
143. Section 1711 (a) provides that "the Secretary shall prepare and maintain . .. an
inventory of all public lands . .. giving priority to areas of critical environmental concern."
144. Coggins, supra note 130, at 319.
145. See 43 U.S.C. § 1712(c)(4) (1988).
146. See Coggins, supra note 130, at 321-22 (predicting that any challenges to a plan based
on the Secretary's statutory requirements to give priority to ACEC designations would "face
uphill battles").
147. Coggins points out that FLPMA specifies only two mandatory procedural require-
ments: public participation and the use of a "systematic interdisciplinary approach to
achieve integrated consideration of physical, biological, economic, and other sciences." Id.
at 320 (quoting 43 U.S.C. § 1712 (c)(2) (1988)).
148. Achterman et al., supra note 131, at 5-2. FLPMA also sought to remedy wide-spread
over-grazing on public lands, among other problems. LArros & TOMAIN, supra note 128, at
95.
Because FLPMA embodies the multiple use philosophy, the BLM must also consider and
fulfill "demands for recreation, minerals, forage, timber, and other resources and activities"
in addition to considering conservation interests. Maria E. Mansfield, The "Public" in Public
Land Appeals: A Case Study in "Reformed"Administrative Law and Proposalfor Orderly Participation,
12 HARv. ENvrL. L. REv. 465 (1988) (examining BLM procedural rules to discuss public
participation in public land management).
149. 43 U.S.C. § 1701(a)(1) (1988).
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undue degradation." 150 ACEC designation and public participation are
two tools enabling FLPMA to achieve its objectives.
FLPMA and the BLM's FLPMA regulations embrace the public partic-
ipation concept.15 I FLPMA provides for public participation twice within
§ 1712 regarding the development of land use plans. First, "public in-
volvement" is required in developing, maintaining and revising land use
plans. 15 2  Second, FLPMA requires the Secretary to adopt procedures,
including public hearings, to act as a vehicle for public participation.
15
The BLM regulations also contain numerous provisions regarding
public participation. The regulations require public involvement in plan-
ning at the beginning of the process,1 5 4 throughout a plan's development,
and during its adoption, revision, or amendment.' 55 Despite the pervasive
existence of mandatory public participation provisions in both FLPMA
and the regulations, the BLM has attempted to plan without the public.
1 56
2. Tenth Circuit Opinion
In National Parks and Conservation Ass'n v. Federal Aviation Administra-
tion,1 57 the Tenth Circuit recognized the public's right to participate in
actions affecting public lands. The court held that the BLM neglected to
meet its statutorily prescribed duty to provide adequate notice prior to
amending a land plan and transferring land within its jurisdiction.1
5 8
a. Facts
The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) approved and provided
funding for construction of an airport in San Juan County, Utah.' 59 The
150. 43 U.S.C. § 1732(b) (1988); 43 C.F.R. § 1601.0-8 (1993).
151. Public involvement is generally defined as "the opportunity for participation by af-
fected citizens in rulemaking, decisionmaking, and planning with respect to the public lands,
including public meetings or hearings at locations near the affected lands, or advisory mech-
anisms, or other such procedures as may be required in particular instances. 43 U.S.C.
§ 1702(d) (1988).
152. 43 U.S.C. § 1712(a) (1988).
153. 43 U.S.C. § 1712(f) (1988):
The Secretary shall allow an opportunity for public involvement and by regulation
shall establish procedures, including public hearings where appropriate, to give
Federal, State, and local governments and the public, adequate notice and opportu-
nity to comment upon and participate in the formulation of plans and programs
relating to the management of the public lands.
154. 43 C.F.R. §§ 1610.2 (c), (f)(1); 1610.4-1 (1993).
155. See 43 C.F.R. §§ 1610.2 (a), (c), (f)(2-5); 1610.5-5 (1993) (requiring participation in
amending a plan); Id § 1610.4-2 (in reviewing the proposed planning criteria); Id § 1610.5-
1 (b) (in publication of the proposed resource management plan and proposed and final
environmental impact statement (EIS) and in any significant change made to the plan as a
result of action on protest).
156. See Coggins, supra note 130, at 320 & n.l 19 (citing National Wildlife Fed'n v. Bur-
ford, 835 F.2d 305 (D.C.Cir. 1987), rev'd, 878 F.2d 422 (D.C. Cir. 1989), cert. granted sub norm.,
Lujan v. National Wildlife Fed'n, 110 S. Ct. 834 (1990); Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc. v. Hodel, 618 F. Supp. 848 (E.D. Cal. 1985)).
157. 998 F.2d 1523 (10th Cir. 1993).
158. Id at 1531.
159. Id. at 1526.
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site FAA selected encompassed public land administered by the BLM 16 °
pursuant to FLPMA. 16 1 The BLM had designated a portion of the land as
an ACEC by a 1989 Proposed Resource Management Plan (RMP). 162 The
proposed RMP provided ACEC protection for corridors on both sides of
Utah Highway U-276, which subsequently included the airport site.
163
The RMP also contained a ban on the transfer of federal ownership of the
land. 16 4
In order to convey the tract, the BLM had to amend the RMP, which
according to the court, required compliance with the National Environ-
mental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA). 1 65 The FAA issued a draft environ-
mental impact statement (DEIS) on January 17, 1990 in which the final
airport site was identified for the first time. This was also the first form of
notice to the public indicating that the BLM was transferring the land
rather than moving forward with the proposed RMP. 166 Although the
BLM and the FAA had been discussing the transfer for some time prior to
the issuance of the DEIS, the public believed that the BLM intended to
protect the area.1 67  The National Parks & Conservation Association
(NPCA) requested a stay of the construction and sought review of the
BLM's decision to amend the land plan to convey public land to the FAA
for construction of the airport. Specifically, NPCA argued that the BLM
violated FLPMA by failing to give notice of the land plan amendment and
by not providing a rational assessment of the effect of the conveyance on
the existing land plans. Furthermore, NPCA alleged that the BLM's rever-
160. Id. at 1525.
161. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701 to 1784 (1988).
162. See generally 43 C.F.R. §§ 1610.1 - 1610.8 (1993). A Resource Management Plan is a
land use plan as described by FLPMA. 43 C.F.R. § 1601.0-5(k) (1993). It should establish:
land areas for exclusive or limited use (including ACEC designation); allowable resource uses
and levels of production to be maintained; resource condition goals; program constraints
and necessary management practices; areas to be covered by more specific plans; support
action; implementation sequences; and standards for monitoring and evaluating the plan.
See 43 C.F.R. § 1601.0-5 (k)(1)-(8); National Parks, 998 F.2d at 1525 n.7.
The BLM also governed the site according to the 1973 Management Framework Plan
(MFP). Id. at 1525. MFPs differ in both procedure and content from RMPs prepared under
FLPMA. Coggins, supra note 130, at 317. A MFP provides step-by-step instructions as to the
management of a particular public land resource area. Each individual management deci-
sion is listed along with the action required to achieve the decision and the supporting ra-
tionale. National Parks, 998 F.2d at 1525-26 n.8. The MFPs remain in force until superseded
by RMPs, but the BLM has been slow to make the transition and to promulgate RMPs. See
Goggins, supra note 130, at 317 & n.93.
163. National Parks, 998 F.2d at 1525-26.
164. Id. at 1529.
165. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321 to 4370a (1988). NEPA requires an EIS for all "major Federal
actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment." Id. § 4332(C) (1988).
An EIS enables federal administrators to consider the consequences of their actions
before acting. In an EIS, adequate consideration must be given to reasonable alternatives to
the proposed action. The statute, however, does not impose an obligation on the agency to
follow any course of action. ElSs have been controversial due to the additional transaction
costs incurred in developing them and the litigation they have spurred. See COGGINS ET AL.,
supra note 128, at 335.
166. National Parks, 998 F.2d at 1530-31.
167. 998 F.2d at 1530. In fact, in April 1989, the BLM reissued the proposed RMP with
the ACEC designation and ban on transfer still included. Id.
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sal of its position with respect to the Scenic Corridor ACEC was arbitrary
and capricious.
168
The BLM 169 responded that the EIS conducted by the FAA suffi-
ciently met the BLM's requirements under FLPMA and that because the
1989 RMP was only a proposal, the change in designation of land was not
an arbitrary and capricious action.
170
3. Holding
The Tenth Circuit denied NPCA's request for a stay of the construc-
tion of the airport,17 1 but the court held that the BLM violated the specific
requirements of NEPA and FLPMA. The BLM failed to provide the public
with notice of its actions so that public participation could take place.
17 2
Based on the chronology of events leading to the transfer of BLM land, it
was apparent to the court that the notice given was "far from adequate."
173
Specifically, the BLM violated its own regulation that notice be provided at
the "outset of the planning process." 174 The court reversed and re-
manded because it was unclear whether the BLM would have reached the




In National Parks, the Tenth Circuit applied the brakes to the BLM's
fast and loose rulemaking by holding that the BLM's public notice of the
plan amendment and land transfer was inadequate. Given the complexity
of the BLM'sjob in developing plans for vast amounts of land and its tight
budget, thejoint effort between the BLM and the FAA in providing a DEIS
was reasonable. 176 The BLM's reliance on other agencies to provide no-
tice of its own actions, however, was not acceptable.
168. Id at 1526. The NPCA also sought review of the FAA's determination that the noise
impact of the airport would have "no significant impact" on the adjacent Glen Canyon Na-
tional Recreation Area. The NPCA specifically alleged that the FAA ignored relevant studies
on noise impact and failed to consider relevant factors in determining noise impacts. Id
The court agreed, concluding that the FAA's approval of the airport project, based on a
finding of"no significant impact," was arbitrary and capricious. It explained that the decision
to reverse and remand FAA's finding of no significant impact would not be meaningless even
though the airport had already been built. On remand, the FAA may determine that it must
make use of studies not utilized in the EIS. If the agency then finds a "significant impact," it
would be required to mitigate the damage. Id. at 1533-34.
169. Other respondents included the FAA, the Department of Transportation, and the
Department of the Interior. Id. at 1523.
170. Id. at 1526.
171. Id. at 1525 n.3.
172. Id. at 1531.
173. Id.
174. 43 C.F.R. § 1610.4-1 (1993).
175. National Parks, 998 F.2d at 1533. The court remanded to determine whether the
land should be retained under BLM control and management or transferred to the FAA. Id.
176. The court did not address whether the BLM was required to furnish its own EIS for
amending the plan. Agencies may be exempt from NEPA obligations when there is a direct
statutory conflict with the agency's enabling legislation, if the agency action pursuant to an
environmental statute is the functional equivalent of NEPA review, or if the agency's statutory
duties further NEPA's purposes. LArros & TOMAIN, supra note 128, at 242-43.
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Public participation is obviously thwarted by inadequate notice.
FLPMA clearly announces Congress' intent that the public stay abreast of
the BLM's planning activities. Similar sentiment was reflected in the
BLM's own regulations. Due to the pervasiveness of concern for public
,involvement embodied in the statute, it is unlikely the courts will overlook
omissions by the BLM in this area.
Although the Tenth Circuit prevented the BLM from disregarding
FLPMA mandates by supporting an important procedural aspect of the
statute, the court failed to give FLPMA substantive meaning regarding
ACECs.' 77 As noted earlier in this survey, many of FLPMA's substantive
provisions are vague. 178 The provision regarding ACEC designation, how-
ever, is not. Congress intended that ACEC designation attach if the land is
nationally significant and deserving of protection in its natural condition.
It is unlikely that Congress intended ACEC designation to be disregarded
by the BLM upon receiving an offer to purchase. Judicial enforcement of
ACECs and other substantive FLPMA provisions would give the BLM in-
centive to provide coherent and consistent land plans. The Tenth Circuit
had the opportunity in National Parks, but failed to give import to the
BLM's ACEC designation.
Furthermore, the Tenth Circuit unwisely denied NPCA's request for a
stay of the construction of the airport, which was completed prior to the
issuance of this decision. 179 Although the court held that the BLM did
not follow FLPMA's procedural mandates regarding public involvement,
the holding merely provided a post hoc reprimand of the BLM's conduct.
Because public involvement is an essential procedural element of FLPMA,
an injunction would not have been an unreasonable remedy.' 80
In actions alleging NEPA violations, courts may grant plaintiffs pre-
liminary injunctions against projects in their early stages.' 81 Under such
circumstances, the agency generally is required to remedy procedural defi-
ciencies by either preparing an EIS or correcting an inadequate one
before resuming work on the project.' 8 2 Similarly, the court could have
halted construction of the airport to allow the BLM to correct its omission
and comply with the statute.
The court explained that even though the airport had been built, the
remand was not meaningless because mitigation measures could still be
The BLM attempted to eschew NEPA in early planning efforts. See National Resources
Defense Council v. Morton, 388 F. Supp. 829, 841-42 (D. D.C. 1974), affd per curiam, 527 F.2d
1386 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 913 (1976) (rejecting the BLM's argument that a
programmatic environmental impact statement would suffice to assess all BLM grazing pro-
grams and ordering the agency to prepare 145 district-specific EISs by 1988).
177. Courts have historically avoided substantive FLPMA review. See Coggins, supra note
130, at 326.
178. See supra part III.A.
179. National Parks, 998 F.2d at 1525 n.3.
180. The court noted the seriousness of the BLM's failure to notify the public when it
pointed out that the agency may not have made the same decision to convey the land to the
FAA "if active public involvement [were] present from the beginning of the process." Id. at
1533.
181. See Steubing v. Brinegar, 511 F.2d 489, 495-96 (2d Cir. 1975).
182. JAN G. LArros, NATURAL RESOURCES LAw 112 (1985).
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implemented. Regardless of public sentiment regarding the use of the
land, this provides little consolation for the court's disregard of the pub-
lic's statutory right to participate in the BLM's use designation of the "pub-
lic" land.
CONCLUSION
A substantial number of oil and gas cases are resolved by judicial in-
terpretation of the underlying agreements. In Amoco, the Tenth Circuit
interpreted a gas marketing clause in a unit operating agreement to allow
the working interest owners to share the proceeds of gas sales. In Reese,
the Tenth Circuit found that the underlying assignments controlled the
parties respective duties and held the owner of escaping gas was not liable
for damage it caused. Together, Amoco and Reese demonstrate an inconsis-
tency in the court's degree of judicial activism in interpreting private oil
and gas agreements. Finally, in the area of public lands, in National Parks,
the Tenth Circuit ruled in favor of public participation in the BLM's plan-
ning process. Although the court could have prevented the BLM from
conveying public land without public involvement by granting an injunc-
tion, the National Parks decision nonetheless, sent a powerful message to





During 1993, the Tenth Circuit considered few traditional real prop-
erty issues.1 This Survey addresses three divergent cases, Buzzard v.
Oklahoma Tax Commission, Honce v. Vigi4 and Board of County Commissioners
for Garfield County v. WH.L, Inc. In Buzzard v. Oklahoma Tax Commission,
2
the Tenth Circuit addressed the ongoing problem of defining the limits of
state taxing authority of Indian tribes and their activities. Honce v. Vigil
s
defined the proper standards for sexual harassment in the context of a
claim under the Fair Housing Act.4 Board of County Commissioners for Gar-
field County v. WH.L, Inc.,5 a traditional property case, involved determin-
ing when a statute of limitations begins to run in circumstances where the
public claims ownership of a road by adverse possession.
I. LIMITNG THE MEANING OF "INDIAN COUNTRY"6 IN STATE TAX CASES
The limits of a state's power to tax Indian tribes and their activities is
an issue that has faced the courts for some time because there has never
been a set policy controlling state taxation of Indians. 7 The rules vary
depending on who is taxed, what is taxed, and where the taxed property is
located. This section discusses the sovereignty and taxation of Indian
tribes.
A. Background
1. Sovereignty of Indian Tribes
The law applicable to Indians is a specialized area of law with princi-
ples generally irrelevant to the core of property law.8 At the same time,
some principles of Indian law, such as sovereignty, apply to property law.
Sovereignty, in the sense it is used to mean the power to rule one's own
1. Perhaps the most interesting case decided by the Tenth Circuit during the survey
period impacting property was United States v. Colorado, 990 F.2d 1565 (10th Cir. 1993),
cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 922 (1994). The court held that Colorado could enforce its law in-
dependent of the federal government's enforcement of a CERCLA action. For a detailed
commentary on this case see Alana Bissonnette, Comment, Clean Up Your Federal Mess in My
State: Colorado Has a State RCRA-Voice at the Rocky Mountain Arsenal, 71 DENy. U. L. REv. 257
(1994).
2. 992 F.2d 1073 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 555 (1993).
3. 1 F.3d 1085 (10th Cir. 1993).
4. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
5. 992 F.2d 1061 (10th Cir. 1993).
6. The author realizes that the term "Indian country" may be considered insensitive
and, thus, offensive by some. However, since "Indian country" is the term that is, and has
been, used in statutes, case law, and articles on the subject, it will be used throughout this
Survey for consistency.
7. Keith E. Whitson, Note, State Jurisdiction to Tax Indian Reservation Land and Activities,
44 WASH. U. J. UR.. & CoNTMP. L. 99, 122 (1993).
8. SeeJoseph William Singer, Sovereignty and Property, 86 Nw. U. L. REv. 1, 51 (1991).
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property, is one of the biggest of the "sticks in the bundle" that make up
traditional property rights.
The general rule of tribal sovereignty is that tribes remain subject to
the superior sovereignty of the United States government. 9 In practice,
tribes enjoy the right to self-governance, 10 subject to limitations that may
be set by Congress.
1
Tribal sovereignty does not extend outside the boundaries of tribal
lands but is divested to the extent that it involves external relations. 12 Tri-
bal sovereignty may also be divested in relation to lands within the bound-
aries of a reservation owned by an individual in fee simple. A tribe may,
however, have regulatory power over a fee owner if he threatens the polit-
ical integrity, economic security, or health and welfare of the tribe.' 3 The
tribe's regulatory power extends only to circumstances that impinge on
the political integrity, economic security, or health and welfare of the
tribe.14 It must also be shown that the activity regulated has a serious im-
pact on the tribe's interests. 15
Congress muddied the waters of Indian sovereignty with the Indian
General Allotment Act of 1887 ("Dawes Act")' 6 and the Indian Reorgani-
zation Act of 1934.17 The Dawes Act was intended to assimilate the Indi-
ans into society by splitting up the reservations and allotting the land to
individual Indians. 18 The federal government was to hold the land allot-
ted to individual Indians in trust for twenty-five years to ensure that the
Indians were not disadvantaged. 19 The Indian Reorganization Act ended
the process by stating that after June 18, 1934, no land from an Indian
reservation could be allotted to any Indian.20 The allotment process
ended when the government realized that the goal of assimilating tribal
members into society was not being reached. 21 The Indian Reorganiza-
tion Act also extended the duration of the trusts created by the Dawes Act
until such time as Congress directed that the trusts be discontinued.22 By
9. FELIX S. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAw 245 (Rennard Strickland et al.,
eds., 1982).
10. Janice Brandt, Note, Indian Sovereignty-Beyond the "Well Pleaded Complaint Rule," 15
T. MARSHALL L. REv. 169, 178 (1989-90).
11. Stacy L. Cook, Comment, Indian Sovereignty: State Tax Collection on Indian Sales to Non-
tribal Members-States Have a Right Without a Remedy [Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Citizen
Band Potawatome Indian Tribe of Oklahoma, 111 S. Ct. 905 (1991)], 31 WASHBuRN L.J. 130,
132 (1991).
12. Brendale v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S.
408, 425-26 (1989).
13. Id. at 428.
14. Id. at 429.
15. Id. at 431.
16. Dawes Act, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (1887) (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 331-34,
339, 341-42, 348-49, 354, 381 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992)).
17. Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, ch. 576, 48 Stat. 984 (codified as amended at 25
U.S.C. §§ 461-79 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992)).
18. Singer, supra note 8, at 9.
19. 25 U.S.C. § 348.
20. 25 U.S.C. § 461.
21. J. Bart Wright, Note, Tribes v. States: Zoning Indian Reservations, 32 NAT. REsouRcEsJ.
195, 198 (1992).
22. 25 U.S.C. § 462.
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the time the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 was enacted, almost two-
thirds of the reservation land in the United States had been allotted to
individuals.
23
Because of the Dawes Act and the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934,
land that was once part of Indian reservations is now held in a variety of
ways. First, various Indian tribes still own reservation land. Second, indi-
vidual Indians own some land that is held in trust for them by the govern-
ment. Third, individuals-both Indians and non-Indians-own land in
fee simple within the boundaries of reservations. These varied forms of
land ownership within Indian reservations create a checkerboard owner-
ship of land-the crux of many problems in determining Indian sover-
eignty.2 4 The difficulty of determining which sovereign power has
authority over the various types of land occurs in many cases that involve
Indians, and is often the determinative factor in a given case.
2 5
2. Indian Country
The benchmark for allocating authority over Indians and Indian land
is whether the land has been classified as "Indian country. '2 6 Although
the concept of Indian country was originally used to determine jurisdic-
tion in the criminal context,2 7 courts have also used the concept to deter-
mine jurisdiction in civil matters including taxation.
28
Though the definition of Indian country seems fairly clear, courts
have extended the determination of Indian country beyond the words of
the statute. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has given further direc-
tion on what test to use to determine whether a given piece of property is
Indian country. The bottom-line test is whether the land has been validly
set aside by the federal government for the use of Indians under the super-
23. Singer, supra note 8, at 9.
24. Id.
25. See, e.g., Brendale v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation,
492 U.S. 408 (1989). Brendale was a zoning case involving whether the tribe or the county
had the power to zone specific lands. The different rulings depended on where on the reser-
vation the land was located. The case involved two parcels of land. One was within the
"closed" area of the reservation, which is closed to the general public. The Court held that
the tribe, not the county, had the authority to zone this land. The other parcel was within
the "open" area of the reservation. The Court held that this land could be zoned by the
county. Id.
26. Indian Country, U.S.A., Inc. v. Oklahoma, 829 F.2d 967, 973 (10th Cir. 1987), cert.
denied, 487 U.S. 1218 (1988).
27. 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (1988). The statute reads:
Except as otherwise provided in sections 1154 and 1156 of this title, the term
"Indian country", as used in this chapter, means (a) all land within the limits of any
Indian reservation under the jurisdiction of the United States Government, notwith-
standing the issuance of any patent, and, including rights-of-way running through
the reservation, (b) all dependent Indian communities within the borders of the
United States whether within the original or subsequently acquired territory
thereof, and (c) all Indian allotments, the Indian titles to which have not been
extinguished, including rights-of-way running through the same.
Id.
28. Indian Country, U.S.A., 829 F.2d at 973.
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intendence of the government.2 9 The Tenth Circuit held that a formal
designation of land-as a "reservation" is not required for the land to be
Indian country.3 0 Nor is patented fee title ownership an obstacle to find-
ing a given piece of land to be Indian country, regardless of whether the
fee is owned by an Indian, the tribe, or a non-Indian.
3 1
Despite some direction provided by the courts, problems still arise in
determining what land is Indian country. Issues include whether the
property is either a "dependent Indian community," or not Indian country
at all. The Tenth Circuit held that to determine whether a given property
is a dependent Indian community, the court must look at the nature of
the area in question, the relationship of the inhabitants of the area to the
Indian tribe and to the federal government, and the established practice
of government agencies toward the area.32 The Tenth Circuit left some
room to the lower courts by holding that they could look at other relevant
factors to determine whether a given property is a dependent Indian com-
munity but did not elaborate on what those other factors might be.3 3 The
court also held that a group of Indians present in one community does
not, by itself, establish that area as a dependent Indian community.
3 4
3. The Tax Cases
In an effort to develop consistent standards, courts have experi-
mented with varied tests for resolving the inherent tension between shield-
ing Indians from excessive interference and reserving some amount of
regulatory control for the state. The three most common tests include:
(1) the federal instrumentality test; (2) the infringement on sovereignty
test; and (3) preemption analysis.
3 5
The federal instrumentality test is based on a simple premise that be-
cause Indian tribes are instrumentalities of the federal government, they,
like the government, are exempt from state taxation without express au-
thority.36 The infringement on sovereignty test balances the state's au-
thority to tax Indians against infringement on the Indians' right to self-
governance.3 7 Under preemption analysis, Indians are exempt from state
29. Citizen Band Potawatome Indian Tribe of Okla. v. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n, 888 F.2d
1303, 1305-06 (10th Cir. 1989) (citing United States v. Pelican, 232 U.S. 442, 449 (1914)),
aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 498 U.S. 505 (1991).
30. Indian Country, U.S.A., 829 F.2d at 973.
31. Id. at 975. See also Hilderbrand v. Taylor, 327 F.2d 205, 207 (10th Cir. 1964) (hold-
ing that the words "notwithstanding the issue of any patent" in § 1151 refer to any patent,
regardless of to whom it was issued).
32. United States v. Martinez, 442 F.2d 1022, 1023 (10th Cir. 1971) (citing Sandoval and
United States v. Joseph, 94 U.S. 614 (1876)).
33. Id. at 1024.
34. Id.
35. Whitson, supra note 7, at 105-19.
36. Id. at 105.
37. Id. at 106-07. This test provided more authority to the states to govern off-reserva-




taxation only when Congress has clearly stated such an intent.3 8 The gen-
eral rule of construction used by courts is that statutory ambiguities should
be construed in favor of the Indians.3 9 Courts continue to use variations
of these tests.
40
There are two presumptions made about state taxation of tribal activi-
ties. First, state taxation of tribal activities on reservations is invalid.41 The
second presumption is the converse: state taxation of tribal activities off
the reservation is presumably valid.4 2 The analysis of a given tax is not as
simple as determining whether it taxes an on- or off-reservation activity,
because the federal government has plenary authority over Indian affairs
and may authorize state taxation on both tribes and individual Indians.
43
The United States Supreme Court recently held that without express con-
gressional authority, a state cannot tax activities that are in Indian coun-
try.44 This is because the aforementioned presumption applies not only to
formal reservations, but to all Indian country.
There are some clear rules in the context of state taxation of Indian
activities. A state can tax nontribal members with whom the tribe does
business as long as the tax falls on the nonmember rather than on the
tribe. 45 The state can also tax residents of the reservation who are not
members of the tribe.46 Regardless of whether the tribe also imposes a
tax, there is no effect on, or preemption of, valid state taxation on non-
members of the tribe.
47
In the context of cigarette shops on reservations, the Supreme Court
held that states cannot tax sales to tribal members. 4 8 Although the state
can tax sales of cigarettes made by tribal smokeshops to nontribal mem-
bers, states may encounter difficulties with tax revenue collection. The
Court previously held that states may put minimal burdens on tribes to
collect the taxes from nontribal members.49 Despite the fact that individ-
ual tribe members have no specific immunity from lawsuit by the state,
Indian tribes have immunity, and states cannot use their courts to collect
such taxes. 50 The Court instead provided a list of alternative means of
38. Id at 108. Preemption analysis was a creation of the Burger Court, now replaced by
the infringement on sovereignty test.
39. Id.
40. See, e.g., Indian Country, U.S.A., Inc. v. Oklahoma, 829 F.2d 967 (10th Cir. 1987)
(using both preemption analysis and the infringement on sovereignty tests to invalidate a
state tax on Indian activities), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1218 (1988).
41. Tunica-Biloxi Tribe v. Louisiana, 964 F.2d 1536, 1538 (5th Cir. 1992).
42. Id.
43. Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 759, 765 (1985).
44. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Sac and Fox Nation, 113 S. Ct. 1985, 1992 (1993).
45. Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163, 175 (1989).
46. Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134,
161 (1980).
47. Id. at 158.
48. Id. at 160.
49. Moe v. Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes of the Flathead Reservation, 425
U.S. 463, 483 (1976).
50. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Okla., 498 U.S.
505, 514 (1991).
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collection the state may use.5 1 Controversy is the natural by-product of
granting a right without a remedy.
52
B. Buzzard v. Oklahoma Tax Commission
5 3
1. Facts
In Buzzard, the State of Oklahoma taxed the sales of smokeshops
owned and operated by the United Keetoowah Band of Cherokee Indians
("UKB").54 The smokeshops were located on land purchased and owned
in fee simple by the tribe. The land was subject to a restriction on aliena-
tion because the tribal charter prevented the tribe from conveying the
land without the approval of the Secretary of the Interior. 55 The tribe
sought an injunction to prohibit the state from enforcing its state tobacco
taxing statute against the tribe.5 6 Upholding the application of the stat-
ute, the trial court held that the restriction against alienation did not
make the land involved fit within the definition of Indian country.
57
2. Opinion
The court began its opinion by discussing the statute that originally
defined Indian country.58 The court then distinguished United States v.
McGowan,59 which found land to be an Indian colony because it had been
set aside by the government for the use of Indians and because the govern-
ment purchased the land for needy Indians.6 0 This was not the case in
Buzzard. The next step in the Buzzard court's analysis was a discussion of
trust land. The court determined that when the government holds land in
trust it holds title to the land and has thus acted to show its intent to exert
jurisdiction over the land.6 1 Although the government must act in order
for UKB to sell the land in question, that fact does not, by itself, indicate
that the government intended the land to be set aside for the tribe.
The court next considered the effects of holding the land to be In-
dian country.6 2 The court stated that if the land were Indian country, it
51. Id The suggested alternatives include: collection of the tax from cigarette wholesal-
ers, seizing unstamped cigarettes off the reservation, and entering into agreements with the
tribe to adopt a system for collecting the tax. Id.
52. See Cook, supra note 11.
53. 992 F.2d 1073 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 555 (1993).
54. Id. at 1075.
55. Id. The tribe also claimed that 25 U.S.C. § 177 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992) restricted
the sale of their land without prior government approval. 25 U.S.C. § 177 prevents any con-
veyance of land from the Indians from being valid in the absence of a treaty. There is case
law holding that the statute applies to all Indian land regardless of whether it is classified as
Indian country. See Mohegan Tribe v. Connecticut, 638 F.2d 612, 621 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
452 U.S. 968 (1981). The court in Buzzard did not reach this issue because of its disposition
of the other issues in the case. Buzzard, 992 F.2d at 1077.
56. Buzzard, 992 F.2d at 1075.
57. Id.
58. 18 U.S.C. § 1151. For text of statute see supra note 27.
59. 302 U.S. 535 (1938).





would mean that any land UKB purchased would be Indian country, forc-
ing the federal government to assert criminal and civil jurisdiction over
that land. The court further held that nothing in the case law allowed
Indian tribes the unilateral power to create Indian country.63 The court
concluded that the land in question was not Indian country despite the
restraint on alienation. 64 By finding that the land was not Indian country,
the court upheld Oklahoma's power to tax the smokeshops.
C. Analysis
The analysis of whether property is Indian country is fact specific and
should take into account the current climate and situation of Indian
tribes.6 5 Courts should consider the purposes behind reserving jurisdic-
tion over Indian country to the tribes or the federal government. One
purpose beneficial to the tribes is preservation of important tribal attrib-
utes, including domestic relations, economic development, and tribal
customs.
6 6
Important issues arise when states tax the activities of Indian tribes.
State taxation may impinge on the tribe's sovereignty. Additionally, tribal
economies may depend on tax exemptions. Federal impingement on tri-
bal sovereignty may violate the federal policy of fostering Indian develop-
ment. Adding state taxation to an existing federal taxation scheme leads
to double taxation where both the tribe and the state tax the same sale.
6 7
Prohibiting state taxation of Indian tribes may grant an unfair com-
petitive advantage to Indians. 68 Refusing states the right to tax Indians
denies the states valuable revenues, 69 and discriminates in that it treats
one group of United States citizens differently due to their heritage. 7
0
Given that the tax levied in Buzzard did not impinge the integrity of
the tribe, the Tenth Circuit correctly held that the land was not Indian
country and was, therefore, subject to taxation by the state. The land sim-
ply did not fit any of the defined types of property considered Indian
country.
71
The effect of Buzzard is that a tribe cannot expand its tax-exempt
boundaries by purchasing land in fee simple and adding it to Indian coun-
try. The ruling does not affect the tax-exempt status of property within
the definition of Indian country. Any sales made to tribal members on
those lands are not subject to state taxation. Since it is not the policy of
federal Indian law to authorize Indian tribes to market tax exemptions, 72
63. 1d& at 1077.
64. Id.
65. McGowan, 302 U.S. at 537-38.
66. Wright, supra note 21, at 199.
67. Whitson, supra note 7, at 125-26.
68. Id. at 127-28.
69. 1& at 129.
70. Id at 129-30.
71. See supra notes 26-34 and accompanying text.
72. Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134,
155 (1980).
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but to foster development, allowing the tax does not contradict federal
policy.
Additionally, this decision does not directly impact the economic de-
velopment of the tribes. If the land purchased by the tribe is considered
Indian country, the effect would be that all sales except those to tribal
members would be taxable. The only difference is that, due to this deci-
sion, the state may tax sales to members of the tribe.
Because the Tenth Circuit did not recognize the land at issue as In-
dian Country, the tribe may not tax activities on the land. Thus, if the
tribe's economy depends on tax revenues generated on land obtained by
purchase, there will be a negative impact. The Buzzard decision does not
offend Indian development policy because the tribe may locate the store
on land considered Indian country, thereby exempting tribal members
from taxes.
It should also be noted that the state supports the land that the Indi-
ans purchased in fee simple, just as it does any other landowner's land, by
providing services such as road maintenance. It would be unfair to deny
the state the ability to collect revenues to pay for the support of Indian-
owned land. Further, a holding contrary to Buzzard would be discrimina-
tory by allowing the Indians a benefit not given to others when their land
is no different than that of any other landowner.
D. Conclusion
The Tenth Circuit's decision in Buzzard comports with prior case law
on Indian country and does not substantially detriment the Indians.
While the United States should foster economic development by Indian
tribes, it should not do so by discriminating in favor of the tribes at the
expense of the states.
II. USING EMPLOYMENT LAW PRINCIPLES IN HOUSING
In Honce v. Vigi473 the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals applied em-
ployment law principles to find that a landlord did not sexually harass a
tenant. 74 In doing so, the Tenth Circuit joined relatively few courts in
creating specific rules for sexual harassment in the field of housing law.
7 5
This section discusses the law applicable to sexual harassment in the fields
of employment law and housing law, as well as the liability of the harasser's
employer or the owner of the property.
73. 1 F.3d 1085 (10th Cir. 1993).
74. Id. at 1090.





There is no longer any question that sexual harassment is actionable
sexual discrimination. 76 There are two types of sexual harassment cases,
"quid pro quo" and "hostile environment." 77 Problems arise when at-
tempting to define what conduct rises to the level of sexual harassment.
As a threshold matter, to constitute harassment, the conduct must be
that which would not occur but for the sex of the employee. 78 In a hostile
environment claim, the conduct must also be sufficiently severe so as to
alter the conditions of employment and create an abusive work environ-
ment.79 To determine whether an illegal condition has been created,
courts examine the "totality of the circumstances."80 It is not enough to
show casual or isolated manifestations of discrimination.
8'
Whether a hostile environment exists is very fact specific. The United
States Supreme Court recently provided a list of factors to determine
whether an environment is hostile.8 2 The factors include: "the frequency
of the conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliat-
ing, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes
with an employee's work performance."8 3 The alleged harm that the con-
duct has on an employee's psychological state is one relevant factor, but is
not dispositive in determining whether a hostile environment exists.
8 4
Two other general rules are important in sexual harassment claims in
employment cases. First, in hostile environment cases, the concern is with
the general work atmosphere and, therefore, conduct directed at another
person that affects the atmosphere is relevant to the case.8 5 Second, for
either type of sexual harassment claim, it is not necessary to show an eco-
nomic or tangible injury in order to recover.86 The harm that must be
shown is that a reasonable person perceives the environment as hostile.8 7
In Henson v. City of Dundee,88 the Eleventh Circuit found a valid sexual
harassment cause of action based on a hostile work environment when the
plaintiff was subjected to demeaning sexual inquiries and vulgarities dur-
ing her employment, as well as to repeated requests from a supervisor to
engage in sexual activities.8 9 The supervisor also engaged in other activi-
76. See Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64 (1986).
77. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (1993). For further explanation of hostile environment claims
see infra text accompanying notes 78-88. For further explanation of quid pro quo cases see
infra text accompanying notes 92-100.
78. Hicks v. Gates Rubber Co., 833 F.2d 1406, 1415 (10th Cir. 1987).
79. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 67.
80. Hicks, 833 F.2d at 1413.
81. I& at 1414.
82. Harris v. Forklift Sys., 114 S. Ct. 367, 371 (1993).
83. 1d.
84. Id.
85. Hicks v. Gates Rubber Co., 833 F.2d 1406; 1415 (10th Cir. 1987).
86. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 64.
87. Harris, 114 S. Ct. at 370.
88. 682 F.2d 897 (11th Cir. 1982).
89. Id. at 899.
19941 1049
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
ties such as following the employee to the rest room, exposing himself,
fondling the employee in front of other employees, and even sexually as-
saulting the employee. 90 The Supreme Court, in Meritor Savings Bank, FSB
v. Vinson,9 1 found a valid claim of sexual harassment based on a hostile
environment when the employee voluntarily engaged in sexual relations
with a supervisor because she feared losing her job.
In addition to claims of sexual harassment based on the creation of a
hostile environment, there are also claims based on a quid pro quo re-
quest. Quid pro quo involves an employer asking an employee to engage
in sexual activity in exchange for certain benefits of employment, such as
obtaining a job or a promotion, or in exchange for the continuation of
benefits. 92 The test for whether a sexual request to an employee is dis-
criminatory is whether the request was unwelcome to the employee, not
whether the employee voluntarily engaged in sexual activity.
9 3
a. Proof Elements
In a sexual harassment case based on hostile environment, the plain-
tiff must allege and prove three elements.94 The first element requires the
plaintiff to be a member of a protected class. This simply requires a stipu-
lation that the employee is a man or a woman. 95 The second element is
that the employee was subjected to unwelcome conduct constituting sex-
ual harassment. 96 The third element is that the harassment was based
upon sex. 9 7 The harassment cannot be directed at both women and men
because in such a case, the harassment is not based upon gender.98
The elements necessary to prove a quid pro quo sexual harassment
claim are similar to those for hostile environment claims. The difference
is the addition of a fourth element: the acceptance or rejection of the
harassment must be an express or implied condition to the receipt of ajob
benefit, or the cause of a denial of a job benefit. 99
b. Procedure
The procedure in a sexual harassment case is somewhat confusing.
The plaintiff carries the initial burden of establishing a prima facie dis-
crimination case. 10 0 If the plaintiff successfully establishes a prima facie
case, the burden moves to the defendant to articulate some legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for the alleged discriminatory act. 1 1 The plain-
90. Id.
91. 447 U.S. 57, 60 (1986).
92. Cf 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (1993).
93. Meritor, 447 U.S. at 68.




98. Id. at 904.
99. Id. at 909.




tiff may attempt to prove that the defendant's articulated reasons are a
cover up, or pretext, for a discriminatory reason. 10 2 Confusion arises over
the court's role after the defendant has offered explanatory reasons. At
that point, the court must determine whether the action was discrimina-
tory, not whether the defendant's given reason is truthful. 10 3 The
Supreme Court held it is not enough to disbelieve the defendant. The
existence of discrimination is a question of fact like any other. To find
that sexual harassment occurred, the plaintiff's explanation of intentional
discrimination must be more credible than the employer's explanation.
10 4
2. Housing Cases
Attention to sexual harassment in the context of housing is relatively
recent. 10 5 The Fair Housing Act'0 6 prohibits discrimination in housing
based on sex.' 0 7 The text of the Fair Housing Act is similar to the Equal
Employment Opportunity Act of 1972.108
Very few courts have ruled on the issue of sexual harassment in hous-
ing. This is unfortunate in light of the pervasiveness of such conduct. 109
The few cases, however, ruling on this issue offer guidance for defining
sexual harassment in the housing context.
102. Id. at 805.
103. St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. 2742, 2753 (1993) (5-4 decision) (Sou-
ter, J., dissenting). The dissent argued that the majority increased the breadth of the evi-
dence needed by a plaintiff. By requiring the plaintiff to be believed in order to prevail, the
dissent believed that the majority was requiring plaintiffs to disprove reasons for the firing
never articulated by the defendant. Before this decision, a plaintiff could prevail based solely
on a prima facie case coupled with disbelief of the defendant's articulated reasons for fiing
the plaintiff. Id. at 2753.
104. Id. at 2754.
105. Regina Cahan, Comment, Home Is No Haven: An Analysis of Sexual Harassment in Hous-
ing, 1987 Wis. L. Rav. 1061 (providing a survey of the limited case law in the area and a
statistical analysis of the incidence of sexual harassment in housing).
106. Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992). This Act is also
referred to as Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968.
107. Id. § 3604. The Fair Housing Act, in relevant part, reads:
[I] t shall be unlawful
(a) To refuse to sell or rent after the making of a bona fide offer, or to refuse
to negotiate for the sale or rental of, or otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwell-
ing to any person because of ... sex ....
(b) To discriminate against any person in the terms, conditions, or privileges
of sale or rental of a dwelling, or in the provision of services or facilities in connec-
tion therewith, because of ... sex ....
Id. It is further prohibited to:
[C]oerce, intimidate, threaten, or interfere with any person in the exercise or
enjoyments of, or on account of his having exercised or enjoyed . . . any right
granted or protected by section 3603, 3604, 3605, or 3606 of this title.
Id. § 3617.
108. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992). The act makes it unlawful to
discriminate "against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment, because of such individual's.., sex." Id The Equal Employment
Opportunity Act of 1972 is part of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968 as amended.
109. See Cahan, supra note 105, at 1066. Of 87 housing centers that gave complete an-
swers to Cahan's survey, 57 centers (65%) reported that they received complaints of sexual
harassment. Id.
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In New York v. Merlino,"s0 the court implied that sexual harassment is
actionable under the Fair Housing Act.'11 The court relied on Meritor Sav-
ings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 112 but did not explicitly adopt employment sexual
harassment law to govern sexual harassment in the housing context be-
cause there was a question of whether the statute of limitations barred the
claim. 
1 1 3
Shellhammer v. Lewallen was the first case to apply sexual harassment
concepts in the housing context.1 1 4 The United States District Court for
the Western District of Ohio held that the sexual harassment doctrine de-
veloped in employment law applies to housing claims.1 15 Shellhammerrec-
ognized both hostile environment and quid pro quo (conditioned
tenancy) claims. The court held that a hostile environment claim requires
the plaintiff to show "pervasive and persistent" offensive conduct by the
landlord.1 1 6 If the plaintiff establishes persistent conduct, its effect, ac-
cording to the court, should be examined under a subjective standard.
117
The court reasoned that liability should not be defeated solely because a
reasonable person might have reacted differently to the landlord's con-
duct than did the plaintiff.1 18
In Grieger v. Sheets,119 the court recognized both hostile environment
claims and quid pro quo claims as actionable sexual harassment under the
Fair Housing Act. As in employment cases, a sexual harassment claim
under the Fair Housing Act does not have to include a tangible injury.
Additionally, there need not be a loss of housing in order to support such
a claim.
120
To support a sexual harassment claim based on hostile environment,
the plaintiff must show extensive sexual harassment that made his or her
tenancy burdensome and significantly less desirable than it would have
been in the absence of the harassment.12 1 Furthermore, conduct that is
not of a strictly sexual nature can support a sexual harassment claim if the
conduct would not have occurred but for the gender of the harassee.
122
To establish a quid pro quo or conditioned tenancy claim, a plaintiff
must show either: (1) that the landlord conditioned the terms, conditions,
110. 694 F. Supp. 1101 (S.D.N.Y. 1988). The plaintiffs alleged that Merlino had a pattern
of sexual harassment, unwanted touching, and propositions directed toward female custom-
ers for housing.
111. Id. at 1104.
112. 477 U.S. 57, 64 (1986). See also supra text accompanying notes 76-79.
113. Merlino, 694 F. Supp. at 1102.





119. No. 87-C-6567, 1989 WL 38707, at *2 (N.D. Ill. 1989). In Gsieger the landlord
stopped making needed repairs to the property because his sexual advances were rejected.
Id. at *I.
120. Merlino, 694 F. Supp. at 1104.
121. Gfieger, 1989 WL 38707 at *2.
122. Id. at *3.
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or privileges of housing on the plaintiff's submission to sexual requests;
123
or, (2) that the landlord deprived the plaintiff of terms, conditions, or
privileges of tenancy because the plaintiff did not submit to sexual re-
quests. 12 4 The plaintiff need not show that repeated sexual requests oc-
curred. 125 It is explicitly illegal to condition the granting of housing
services based on whether the person submits to sexual requests. 126
Courts have adopted many sexual harassment principles from em-
ployment law and applied them in the housing context. Due to the simi-
larity between Title VI (the Equal Employment Opportunity Act), and
Title VIII (the Fair Housing Act) of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, this is
logical. Not only is the language very similar,1 27 but the two statutes share
the same purpose: ending discrimination.
128
3. Third Party Liability
The liability of third parties in sexual harassment claims in the em-
ployment context is uncertain. It is clear, however, that employers are not
strictly liable for acts of sexual harassment committed by their employ-
ees. 129 Rather, courts apply agency principles to determine the liability of
employers. 130 The problem with applying agency principles is that agency
cases are very fact specific and consequently no clear rule addressing this
issue emerges.
Courts have also applied agency law to determine liability in the hous-
ing context.'3 1 However, in the housing context, the principal is, in most
cases, liable for discriminatory treatment of customers by his agent be-
cause the agent is usually within the scope of his or her employment dur-
ing the time the agent has contact with the harassed person.' 3 2 While
situations may exist in the housing context where the agent acts outside of
the scope of employment, it appears that they tend to occur less frequently
than in the employment context.
123. Id
124. ld
125. Shellhammer v. Lewallen, 1 Fair Hous.-Fair Lending Rep. 115,472 (W.D. Ohio, Nov.
22, 1983).
126. 24 C.F.R. § 100.65(b) (5) (1993). The relevant part of the regulation reads: "Prohib-
ited actions under this section include, but are not limited to: ... (5) Denying or limiting
services or facilities in connection with the sale or rental of a dwelling, because a person
failed or refused to provide sexual favors." Id.
127. See supra notes 106-08.
128. See, e.g., Merlino, 694 F. Supp. at 1104 (recognizing that the two statutes are "part of a
coordinated scheme" to end discrimination).
129. Hicks v. Gates Rubber Co., 833 F.2d 1406, 1417 (10th Cir. 1987) (citing Meritor, 477
U.S. at 72).
130. Meitor, 477 U.S. at 72.
131. Mart v. Rife, 503 F.2d 735, 741 (6th Cir. 1974) (FHA case based on racial
discrimination).
132. Id at 741.
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B. Honce v. Vigil'3 3
1. Facts
In August 1990, Ms. Honce arranged to rent a lot in a mobile home
park owned and operated by Mr. Vigil. Before Ms. Honce took possession
of the lot Mr. Vigil asked her out socially on three occasions.' 3 4 Mr. Vigil
asked her to accompany him to a religious seminar, the state fair, and to
visit some property. Each time Ms. Honce refused. 135 Before Ms. Honce
moved in, Mr. Vigil asked when she would go out with him. Ms. Honce
replied that she did not wish to go out with him at all. Both parties agreed
that Mr. Vigil never used profanity or made sexual advances or
requests.1
3 6
After Ms. Honce moved her trailer to the lot, she and Mr. Vigil had
several disputes. One dispute involved a plumbing problem for which Mr.
Vigil refused to pay because the problem was not in his sewer line.' 3 7 An-
other confrontation involved paving stones that Mr. Vigil supplied to all
the tenants, and which Ms. Honce did not want to use.
138
The principal dispute between Mr. Vigil and Ms. Honce involved a
fence that Ms. Honce was building around a dog run. Mr. Vigil came
upon workmen building the fence and using concrete. Mr. Vigil had a
policy that forbade the use of concrete, and he preferred that his tenants
use fencing materials supplied by him. 139 The fence incident led to a
shouting match between Ms. Honce and Mr. Vigil during which he
threatened to evict her. Immediately thereafter, Ms. Honce went to the
sheriff for advice and left the trailer park the next day.
140
Ms. Honce brought an action against Mr. Vigil, claiming violations of
the Fair Housing Act based on sexual harassment and breach of the cove-
nant of quiet enjoyment. 14 1 At trial, other people from the trailer park
testified that they had similar problems with Mr. Vigil. One couple testi-
fied that they also had problems involving a dog run and an argument
over paving stones. Additionally, they testified that Mr. Vigil yelled at
them because they did not attend a Bible study class with him. These ten-
ants also moved out.
1 4 2
After the presentation of her case, the United States District Court for
the District of New Mexico granted judgment as a matter of law for Mr.
Vigil on all claims. Ms. Honce appealed.
143
133. 1 F.3d 1085 (10th Cir. 1993).








142. Id. at 1088.




The Tenth Circuit began its opinion by expressly adopting the princi-
ples of employment discrimination in order to decide the housing
claim. 144 Citing St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks,145 the court held that Ms.
Honce failed to prove a prima facie case of disparate treatment because
she did not prove that Mr. Vigil treated women differently than men.
146
The court then addressed the issue of quid pro quo sexual harass-
ment. The court found that Ms. Honce did not have a quid pro quo claim
because Mr. Vigil never made any threat based upon sexual favors.
Although Ms. Honce contended that the threat was implicit, she did not
provide any evidence of a connection between Mr. Vigil's actions and her
rejection of his social advances.
1 47
The court next turned to Ms. Honce's claim of sexual harassment
based on a hostile housing environment. The court used the Meritor stan-
dards for hostile environment 48 to determine what constitutes a hostile
environment in the housing context. 14 9 The court determined that Ms.
Honce did not have a sexual harassment claim based on a hostile housing
environment because the offensive behavior did not include sexual re-
marks, requests for sexual favors, physical touching, or threats of violence.
Additionally, the court found that Mr. Vigil treated tenants of both sexes
alike. 150 In affirming the district court's dismissal, the Tenth Circuit con-
cluded that Ms. Honce did not state claims sufficient to allow a reasonable
jury to find for her.
151
3. Dissenting Opinion
Judge Seymour dissented from the majority's findings, disagreeing
with the majority's holding that Ms. Honce did not offer sufficient evi-
dence to raise ajury question on her claims.' 5 2 Although she agreed that
employment discrimination principles should be used to assess a discrimi-
nation claim under the Fair Housing Act, she argued the majority misap-
plied the law.'
5 3
Judge Seymour based her dissent on an underlying characterization
of the facts that differed from the majority's. On the disparate treatment
claim, she found that the evidence on the treatment of Ms. Honce's neigh-
bors, as well as Mr. Vigil's assertion that he was the victim of a conspiracy
by women, justified trying the claim. 154 As to the quid pro quo claim,
144. Id. at 1088.
145. 113 S. Ct. 2742 (1993).
146. Honce, 1 F.3d at 1089.
147. Id.
148. Mentor, 477 U.S. at 67-70.
149. Honce, 1 F.3d at 1090.
150. d.
151. Id. at 1091. The court also addressed Ms. Honce's breach of the covenant of quiet
enjoyment claim, which is not discussed here. See id at 1090-91.
152. Id. at 1092 (Seymour, J., dissenting).
153. Id.
154. Id. at 1092-93.
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Judge Seymour held that the timing of Mr. Vigil's actions in asking for a
date raised a triable claim. Because Ms. Honce testified that Mr. Vigil's
treatment of her changed after she refused his requests for a date, Judge
Seymour argued that there was a valid jury question as to whether Mr.
Vigil's eviction threat was in retaliation for Ms. Honce's refusal to accept
his invitations. 155
Judge Seymour's strongest criticism involved the claim of a hostile
housing environment. Citing Hicks v. Gates Rubber Co., 156 she suggested
that the harassment itself need not be sexual in nature. Rather, the test is
whether it would have occurred regardless of the sex of the harassee.
Judge Seymour reasoned that Mr. Vigil's conspiracy belief and the testi-
mony of the neighbors were evidence that the harassment might not have
occurred if Ms. Honce were male. In Judge Seymour's opinion, this gave
rise to a valid claim to be submitted to the jury.
C. Analysis
Sexual harassment in housing disproportionately affects poor women
who cannot escape the harassment. 15 7 Courts should treat sexual harass-
ment as seriously as other forms of discrimination. In the employment
context there may be an opportunity to escape the harassment, perhaps by
requesting a transfer. In the housing context, however, escape may be
more difficult, especially for the poor, due to the inherent problems of
finding a new place to live.
The use of employment law principles to address sexual harassment
in housing is sound because employment law provides proven standards
and rules. Additionally, employment and housing law share similar statu-
tory schemes. Differences, however, exist between the housing and em-
ployment environments, including the relative ease of escaping an
offensive situation and the ability to use a formal complaint process to stop
the harassment. Courts should consider these characteristics when devel-
oping the law of sexual harassment in housing. Simple application of em-
ployment law doctrines to housing law will not result in the best law.
Courts should apply reasonable doctrines in the housing context, and de-
velop new standards where employment law offers none.
There are two basic difficulties in defining sexual harassment. First, a
behavior might be sexual harassment or socially acceptable behavior de-
pending on the circumstances. Second, there is a divergence between
male and female perceptions (and between different members of the
same gender) as to what constitutes sexual harassment. 158 Since the
United States Supreme Court recently suggested that the reasonable per-
155. Id. at 1094.
156. 833 F.2d 1406 (10th Cir. 1987).
157. Cahan, supra note 105, at 1067. Obstacles include the costs of finding new housing
and the possibility of being blacklisted from housing that they can afford.
158. See Nancy Brown, Note, Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson: Clarifying the Standards of
Hostile Wor*ing Environment Sexual Harassment, 25 Hous. L. REV. 441, 449 (1988).
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son standard is correct to determine whether conduct is harassment,1 5 9
what is reasonable in an employment context may not be reasonable in
the housing context.
Unlike typical employee complaint procedures, no grievance proce-
dure exists in the housing context. A large number of harassers could be
unintentionally and unknowingly harassing people and still be held liable
for that harassment, without a chance to modify their behavior. While this
is not a concern in egregious cases, it does neither the law nor society any
good to have the courts serve as the first source of relief. Legislatures
should develop procedures whereby a victim could deal with the supervi-
sor of an alleged harasser to solve the problem outside of the court system.
If this is not possible, for example, if the harasser owns the property, or
the process fails, then the victim could resort to the courts.
The other major concern with adopting employment principles to
housing involves the use of agency principles to create vicarious liability.
Under the Restatement (Second) of Agency, a renter or seller of real es-
tate is almost always within the definition of scope of employment. 16° The
principal is subject to liability for the agent's behavior. 16 1 The problem
occurs when the renter or seller works for a company and not for the
owner of the property. In that case, liability could pass to the owner when
the rental agent is not within the owner's control, but is controlled by
another party, who is in turn controlled by the owners.
D. Conclusion
The use of the sexual harassment employment law principles in hous-
ing law is valid. Courts and regulatory agencies should further develop the
law in this area. Problems unique in the housing context should be
scrutinized.
III. ADVERSE POSSESSION OF ROADS BY THE GOVERNMENT
In Board of County Commissioners for Garfield County v. WH.I., Inc.,
16 2
the Tenth Circuit held that the statute of limitations for adverse possession
of a road began to run when the road was incorrectly declared public.
The holding allowed the federal government to successfully claim the road
as a public highway. This section examines adverse possession and the
Tenth Circuit's decision, and suggests a separate doctrine of law that
would have allowed the road to be obtained for public use without waiting
twenty years.
A. Background
This section discusses the Colorado law of adverse position at issue in
W.H.I. Colorado statutory law provides that a road over private land may
159. Harris v. Forklift Sys., 114 S. C. 367, 370 (1993).
160. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF AGENCY § 228 (1958).
161. Id. § 219.
162. 992 F.2d 1061 (10th Cir. 1993).
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be adversely possessed by the public.1 63 Colorado case law further refines
the doctrine of adverse possession as it applies to roads.
The general rule is that when a property owner constructs a passage
over his property at his own expense, the use of the passage by people
other than the owner is presumed permissive. 164 A permissive use contin-
ues to be permissive until the use is changed, with the knowledge of the
owner, to an adverse use.1 65 If the use remains permissive, the lapse of
time does not confer title by adverse possession to the user. 16
6
In order to prove adverse possession, the use must be actual, adverse
to the interests of the owner, hostile, and under a claim of right.1 67 The
use also must be open, notorious, and exclusive, and must continue for
the statutory period.168 The statutory period does not begin to run until
the adverse claimant creates an exclusive right in herself by a clear, posi-
tive, and unequivocal act. 169 The adverse possessor may also fatally end
her adverse possession claim by acknowledging the title of the owner dur-
ing the adverse possession period.
170
The case law interpreting Colorado Revised Statute § 43-2-201 (1) (c)
retains the common law requirements of an adverse use, claim of right,
and a use continuing for the statutory period.1 7 1 The case law, however,
adds a requirement that the landowner had actual or implied knowledge
of the public's use of the road during the statutory period, and the owner
could not have objected to that use. 172 A party relying on section 43-2-
201 (1) (c) to prove adverse possession is aided by a presumption that the
use is adverse when the party shows that the use was for the prescribed
period of time. 173 However, the placement of a gate across the road to
obstruct free travel ordinarily makes the public use permissive. 174 The
permissiveness is not conclusive, however, and is fact specific.'
75
Recent case law has added a few variables to the adverse possession
equation. An unexplained use of an owner-constructed easement for the
statutory period is presumed to be under a claim of right and, therefore,
163. COLO. REv. STAT. § 43-2-201(1)(c) (1993). The statute provides:
(1) The following are declared to be public highways:
(c) All roads over private lands that have been used adversely without interrup-
tion or objection on the part of the owners of such lands for twenty consecutive
years;...
Id.
164. Allen v. First Nat'l Bank of Arvada, 208 P.2d 935, 940 (Colo. 1949).
165. Id.
166. Segelke v. Atkins, 357 P.2d 636, 638 (Colo. 1960).
167. Id. at 637.
168. Id. In Colorado the statutory period for road easements is twenty years. CoLo. REv.
STAT. § 43-2-201 (1) (c) (1993).
169. Lovejoy v. School Dist. No. 46 of Sedgwick County, 269 P.2d 1067, 1069 (Colo.
1954).
170. Segelke, 357 P.2d at 638.








adverse. 176 This rule does not apply when the land at issue is vacant, un-
enclosed, and unoccupied.
17 7
B. Board of County Commissioners for Garfield County v. WH.I., Inc.
178
1. Facts
Garfield County claimed that the public held a right of way estab-
lished by adverse possession over the company's land. The road in ques-
tion crossed land owned by private landowners and the United States.
1 7 9
The county originally brought suit in the Garfield County District Court
seeking declaratory and injunctive relief.180 As a landowner, the United
States was originally a defendant in this action. However, the United
States believed that its interests were the same as those of the county and
removed the case to the federal courts, realigning itself as a plaintiff. 8 1
The United States and Garfield County, as co-plaintiffs, sought a declara-
tion that the road was a public highway and requested an injunction to
restrain the private landowners from obstructing the road.' 8 2 The United
States District Court for the District of Colorado dismissed the suit, hold-
ing that the United States and Garfield County failed to show a right to
relief. The United States appealed.
18 3
In 1929, the then owners of the defendant's land tried to have the
county declare the road in question a public road. The landowners at that
time petitioned the county for that purpose but did not correctly fill out
the petition.1 84 Disregarding the deficiency, the county passed a resolu-
tion, without objection by the owners, declaring the road a public highway
with the width extending twenty feet to either side of an unknown center
line.1
85
In 1959, the then owner of the land in question, Buster Brown, re-
quested that the county abandon the road. This request was refused and
Brown erected a gate across the roadway. The owners of the land have
obstructed the road since that time.
186
At trial, the county presented evidence that the road was used by the
public to access potato cellars, hike, hunt and fish, and collect mistletoe.
There was also testimony that the road had historically been a logging
176. Durbin v. Bonanza Corp., 716 P.2d 1124, 1129 (Colo. Ct. App. 1986).
177. Id.
178. 992 F.2d 1061 (10th Cir. 1993).
179. Id. at 1062.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 1063. The United States had the same interest as the county because the road
led to national forest service land. As a result the United States removed the case to federal
court and realigned as a plaintiff, which made standing an issue. The appellate court held
that the United States had standing because the public would suffer injury if the road were
determined to be private. Id. at 1062-64.
182. Id. at 1063.
183. Id.
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road.18 7 One witness, Mr. Jordan, testified that the land was not vacant
because there were homesteaders and a sawmill in the area. Mr. Jordan
also thought that there might have been fences in the area, but could not
be sure because, "they weren't important to me."188
2. Opinion
The court cited section 43-2-201 (1) (c) of the Colorado Revised Stat-
utes, and found there was evidence that the public used the roadway from
the time it was built through the date of the obstruction. 189 The landown-
ers claimed the land was vacant, and thus the use was permissive, not ad-
verse. The court rejected that claim on the basis that the resolution by the
Board of County Commissioners in 1929 put the owners on notice of the
adverse claim; thus, the statutory period started in 1929.190 The court so
held despite the fact that the petition asking for the resolution was incom-
plete and did not show the course of the roadway. 19 1 The court also noted
that there was evidence that the land was not vacant during the twenty-year
period.'
9 2
Next, the court addressed the fact that the exact path of the road is
not definite. The court stated that the road generally followed a wagon
road depicted in a 1893 plat. Further, the court held that the path of a
road may be altered without destroying the right of way. Additionally, the
landowners acquiesced in the use by the public even though the road
changed course. 193 The court concluded by holding that the public use
may have been adverse and remanded the case for a full hearing, directing
the district court to order the United States to undertake a survey to deter-
mine its exact path.
C. Analysis
The court correctly held that the use of the road by the public may
have been adverse, since all of the elements of adverse possession were
met.194 The conclusion is further bolstered by the finding in Board of
County Commissioners of the County of Saguache v. Flickinger.195 In Flickinger,
the Colorado Supreme Court held that the county initially asserted the
public character of a road at the time it incorporated the road into the
county road system and that the statutory period for adverse possession
began to run at that time. 19 6 Further, it was not necessary for the court to
address the issue of the gate since the statutory period had run by the time
the gate was erected.
187. I.
188. Id. at 1066.
189. Id. at 1065.
190. Id. at 1066.
191. Id. at 1065.
192. Id. at 1066.
193. Id. at 1067.
194. See supra notes 162-77 and accompanying text.




The owners of the land that the road crossed were not unfairly hurt
by the decision reached by the court because the statute requires the
owner to prohibit public use in order to maintain private use. 19 7 The state
has the power to condition ownership of land on the owner undertaking
such a minimal responsibility. 198 In addition, the owners had constructive
knowledge of the public use even though the recording document was
defective.
Although the doctrine of adverse possession allowed the county to
prevail in its claim, it only succeeded by virtue of the passage of at least
twenty years. There is another doctrine, the doctrine of dedication, that
could have been applied to keep the roadway public without the passage
of time. 199 Basically, a dedication involves the landowner voluntarily al-
lowing her land to be used by the public. The doctrine of dedication
could have been used successfully in WH., but was not pleaded. The
doctrine of dedication would have permitted the county to prevail without
waiting twenty years. Usually, courts have used the doctrine of dedication
when the dedicated land involved commerce.2 0 0 The reasoning is that
dedication involves land becoming public and commerce is the most pub-
lic activity.20 1 In WH.L, the logging use was commerce, as well as hunting,
fishing, and access to the potato cellar if done commercially.
20 2
Dedication is the correct doctrine to apply to highways, although
courts have historically applied prescription (adverse possession).2°3 The
advantage of dedication, in a context similar to WH.L, is that it does not
depend on the passage of time.2 0 4 Dedication may be applied when it is
satisfactorily proven that the owner of the land intended to set it aside for
public use and the public has accepted the land.2 05 To have a dedication,
a clear manifestation of the landowner's intent to dedicate the land must
be shown.2 0 6 When the dedication is to the public, it does not depend on
the existence of a specific grantee; the public suffices, and actual accept-
ance is not required but may be implied. 20 7 After a dedication, the gran-
tor is precluded from asserting an exclusive right over the land for as long
as it remains in public use.
20 8
In WH.L there was a dedication because the court found that the
landowners intended to set the road aside for the public use in 1929. The
dedication was complete even though the petition making the dedication
197. Id. at 982.
198. Id. at 984.
199. See Carol Rose, The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce, and Inherently Public
/Pberty, 53 U. Cm. L. REv. 711, 724 (1986).
200. Id. at 772.
201. Id. at 774.
202. See, e.g., Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385 (1948) (some forms of commercial fishing
given the protection of the commerce clause).
203. SeeJOSEPH K. ANGELL & THOMAS DURFEE, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF HIGHWAYS § 131
(3d ed.) (1886).
204. Starr v. People, 30 P. 64, 66 (Colo. 1892).
205. Id. at 65.
206. ANGELL & DURFEE, supra note 203, § 142.
207. President of Cincinnati v. Lessee of White, 31 U.S. 431, 436 (1832).
208. Id.
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was flawed. Because it was a dedication to the public it did not matter that
there was not a grantee. If dedication had been used, the issue of when
the statute of limitations began could have been avoided, allowing the
county to avoid a substantial hurdle at trial. Furthermore, because a gran-
tor who dedicated land to the public has no right over that land as long as
it is used by the public, the roadway could have been used in perpetuity.
D. Conclusion
While the doctrine of adverse possession was applied correctly in
W.H.L, there was a better doctrine available that was not used. By using
the doctrine of dedication, the government could have avoided addressing
when the statute of limitations began to run. This would have given the
public the use of the road and prevented any possibility of not having that
use.
CONCLUSION
During the survey period the Tenth Circuit addressed a variety of is-
sues that impact on real property. In Buzzard v. Oklahoma Tax Commis-
sion,20 9 the court added to their long line of cases defining when a state
can tax the activities of Indian tribes. In Honce v. Vigil,2 10 the court took
an important step toward defining discrimination based on sex in the con-
text of housing. Hopefully, future precedent will take into account devel-
oped law from the employment context and considerations unique to
housing. In Board of County Commissioners for Garfield County v. WH.,
Inc.,2 11 the court correctly applied doctrine from state law to find that a
road was obtained by the public using adverse possession. Although the
doctrine of dedication would have provided a quicker, surer way to accom-
plish the same result, the parties failed to plead the doctrine.
David G. Thatcher
209. 992 F.2d 1073 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 555 (1993).
210. 1 F.3d 1085 (10th Cir. 1993).





This Survey begins with a discussion of United States v. McDermott.1 In
McDermott, the Supreme Court reversed the Tenth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals by allowing a federal tax lien priority over ajudgment creditor's pre-
viously recorded lien on after-acquired property.
The Survey continues with detailed examinations of selected 1993
opinions of the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals involving matters of fed-
eral tax law. In Colorado National Bankshares, Inc. v. Commissioner,2 the
court determined that a bank that purchases another bank may take amor-
tization deductions for the cost allocable to the core deposit intangibles of
the acquired bank. In Denbo v. United States3 and Muck v. United States,4 the
court explored the applicability of the 100% penalty rule to employers
who fail to pay over withholding taxes to the Internal Revenue Service. In
Litwin v. United States,5 the court explored the ability of a corporate share-
holder-employee to take bad debt deductions for loans made to the corpo-
ration that subsequently become worthless.
The Survey concludes with a summary of other federal taxation deci-
sions issued by the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals during the survey pe-
riod and a brief look into the annual host of tax protestor cases.
I. THE SUPREME COURT REVERSES THE TENTH CIRCUIT COURT
OF APPEALS-FEDERAL TAx LIEN PRIMES JUDGMENT CREDITOR'S
PREVIOUSLY RECORDED LIEN AS TO AFTER-ACQuIRED
PROPERTY: UNmiTo STATEs v. MDERorIf
6
A. Background
The Internal Revenue Code of 1986 grants a lien in favor of the
United States upon all property and rights to property, whether real or
personal, belonging to any person liable to pay any tax who neglects or
refuses to pay.7 The rule under the Code is that the general federal tax
* B.S.B.A., Accounting, University of Denver, 1977; Masters in Taxation, University of
Denver, 1978; J.D., Stanford University, 1981; Lecturer in Law, University of Denver.
1. 113 S. Ct. 1526 (1993).
2. 984 F.2d 383 (10th Cir. 1993).
3. 988 F.2d 1029 (10th Cir. 1993).
4. 3 F.3d 1378 (10th Cir. 1993).
5. 983 F.2d 997 (10th Cir. 1993).
6. 113 S. Ct. 1526 (1993).
7. I.R.C. § 6321 (1988). The lien secures the amount of the deficiency, plus any inter-
est, additional amount, addition to tax, assessable penalty, and costs. Id.
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lien arises at the time the assessment is made8 and continues until the
liability for the amount is satisfied or becomes unenforceable by reason of
lapse of time.9
The priority afforded competing federal tax liens and state-created
liens is a matter of federal law.10 Secured creditors will generally have
priority over the federal tax lien if their state-created liens were fully per-
fected and choate before the federal tax lien arose.1 1 Judgment lien credi-
tors, however, are afforded special treatment under the Code. The Code
provides that the general federal tax lien is not valid against any judgment
lien creditor until the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") files a notice meet-
ing the requirements of the Code.
12
Judgment lien creditors are therefore among certain creditors who
may have priority over federal tax liens, if their liens are fully perfected
and choate prior to the filing of the federal government's Notice of Tax
Lien. "The doctnne of choateness is intended to protect the standing of
federal liens. 'Otherwise, a State could affect the standing of federal liens,
contrary to the established doctrine, simply by causing an inchoate lien to
attach at some arbitrary time .... 1 13 Whether or not a lien is choate is a
federal question.1 4 For a prior lien on all of a person's real or personal
property to take priority over a federal tax lien, the lien must be "per-
fected in the sense that there is nothing more to be done to have a choate
lien-when the identity of the lienor, the property subject to the lien, and
the amount of the lien are established."1 5 The applicable Treasury Regu-
lation acknowledges the judicially created choateness doctrine in defining
the term 'Judgment lien creditor" for purposes of the Code, and likewise
states the aforementioned three-part test.
16
8. Assessments are little more than bookkeeping notations entered by the IRS on the
taxpayer's account indicating that the amount has been administratively determined to be
due and payable.
9. I.R.C. § 6322 (1988).
10. United States v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y of the United States, 384 U.S. 323,
328 (1966); Allan v. Diamond T Motor Car Co., 291 F.2d 115, 116 (10th Cir. 1961). The
general federal tax lien " 'creates no property rights but merely attaches consequences, feder-
ally defined, to rights created under state law.'" Avco Delta Corp. Canada Ltd. v. United
States, 459 F.2d 436, 440 (7th Cir. 1972) (quoting United States v. Bess, 357 U.S. 51, 55
(1958)).
11. United States v. City of New Britain, 347 U.S. 81, 85-86 (1954).
12. I.RC. § 6323(a) (Supp. IV 1992). In Colorado, such notice is deemed to have been
provided by the IRS with respect to real property upon the filing of a Notice of Tax Lien with
the office of the clerk and recorder for the county in which the real property is located. As to
personal property owned by a corporation whose principal office is in Colorado the filing of
a Notice of Tax Lien must be made with the Colorado Secretary of State. In most other cases
liens against personal property must be filed in the office of the county clerk and recorder of
the county where the lienee resides. COLO. Rav. STAT. § 38-25-102 (Supp. 1993).
13. McAllen State Bank v. Saenz, 561 F. Supp. 636, 639 (S.D. Tex. 1982) (quoting
United States v. City of New Britain, 347 U.S. 81, 86 (1954)).
14. United States v. Security Trust & Say. Bank, 340 U.S. 47, 49 (1950).
15. United States v. City of New Britain, 347 U.S. 81, 84 (1954).
16. The definition states:
The term "judgment lien creditor" means a person who has obtained a valid judg-
ment, in a court of record and of competentjurisdiction, for the recovery of specifi-
cally designated property or for a certain sum of money. In the case of a judgment
for the recovery of a certain sum of money, ajudgment lien creditor is a person who
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McDermott involved an interpleader action centering on the compet-
ing claims of ajudgment lien creditor and the IRS in certain real property
located in Salt Lake County, Utah.
17
B. Facts
On June 22, 1987, Zions First National Bank ("Zions") obtained a
judgment in the amount of $67,977.67 against the McDermotts and prop-
erly docketed the judgment in Salt Lake County on July 6, 1987.18 Under
Utah law, Zions's lien attached to all of the McDermotts' real property
located in the county. 19 The IRS obtained its lien by filing a Notice of Tax
Lien on September 9, 1987. As a result of such filing, the IRS's lien at-
tached to all of the McDermotts' owned and after-acquired real and per-
sonal property.
20
On September 23, 1987, the McDermotts took title to certain real
property in Salt Lake County for which they already had a purchaser.
2 1
To obtain title insurance for the property to complete the sale to this new
purchaser, the McDermotts were required to obtain releases from Zions
and the IRS.22 The parties entered into an escrow agreement by which
Zions and the IRS released their claims to the real property, while reserv-
ing their rights to the cash proceeds of the sale. The escrow agreement
provided that the priority of the competing claims of Zions and the IRS
would remain identical to the priorities they held in the Salt Lake County
has perfected a lien under the judgment on the property involved. A judgment lien is
not perfected until the identity of the lienor, the property subject to the lien, and the amount of
the lien are established Accordingly, ajudgment lien does not include an attachment
or garnishment lien until the lien has ripened into judgment, even though under
local law the lien of the judgment relates back to an earlier date. If recording or
docketing is necessary under local law before ajudgment becomes effective against
third parties acquiring liens on real property, ajudgment lien under such local law
is not perfected with respect to real property until the time of such recordation or
docketing. If under local law levy or seizure is necessary before a judgment lien
becomes effective against third parties acquiring liens on personal property, then a
judgment lien under such local law is not perfected until levy or seizure of the
personal property involved.
Treas. Reg. § 301.6323(h)-i (g) (1976) (emphasis added).
17. McDermott v. Zions First Nat'l Bank, 945 F.2d 1475 (10th Cir. 1991), rev'd sub nom.
United States v. McDermott, 113 S. Ct. 1526 (1993).
18. Id. at 1477.
19. Utah law provides:
From the time the judgment of the district court or circuit court is docketed and
filed in the office of the clerk of the district court of the county it becomes a lien
upon all the real property of the judgment debtor, not exempt from execution, in
the county in which the judgment is entered, owned by him at the time or by him
thereafter acquired during the existence of said lien.
UTAH ConE ANN. § 78-22-1 (1992) (emphasis added).
20. McDermott, 945 F.2d at 1477. The general federal tax lien applies to after-acquired
property, even though not specifically stated in I.R.C. § 6321. Glass City Bank v. United
States, 326 U.S. 265, 268 (1945).
21. McDermott, 945 F.2d at 1477. The McDermotts had sold this property to two individ-
uals in 1981, taking back a note and a deed of trust securing the note. The purchasers,
defaulted and, after some interim struggles and maneuvers, the McDermotts succeeded in
getting the trustee to notice a sale of the property at which the McDermotts repurchased the
property by submitting a credit bid and assuming an underlying mortgage. Id. at 1477-78.
22. Id. at 1477.
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property.23 The escrow agreement also required that the McDermotts in-
stitute an interpleader action so that a court could determine who was
entitled to priority in the proceeds of the sale.
2 4
In the interpleader action, the federal district court found that Zions
had priority according to the common law "first in time, first in right"
doctrine.2 5 Although both liens attached simultaneously on September
23, 1987, Zions had filed first. The district court also found that the IRS
waived its interest in the McDermotts' sales contract as personalty and the
proceeds of that personalty by virtue of the Escrow Agreement.2 6 The IRS
appealed.
C. The Tenth Circuit's Opinion
The issue before the Tenth Circuit 2 7 was whether Zions's non-contin-
gent lien on all of the McDermotts' real property, perfected prior to the
federal tax lien, took priority over the federal lien when the competing
lienors were claiming interests in after-acquired property. Because Zions's
identity as the lienor and the amount of its judgment lien were known, the
only question under the relevant three-part test was whether the "property
subject to the lien" was sufficiently established.
28
The IRS argued that because the choateness doctrine requires the
property subject to the lien to be established, ajudgment lien creditor can
only acquire a perfected or choate lien with respect to property owned by
the debtor at the time the judgment creditor obtains his lien, and not as to
after-acquired property. 29 The theory of the IRS was, therefore, after-ac-
quired property of the debtor would be subject to a superior federal tax
lien if that lien was perfected by filing subsequent to the time that the
judgment lien creditor obtained his lien, but prior to the time that the
debtor obtained ownership of the property to which the competing liens
attach. Under this view, Zions's judgment lien did not become choate
until September 23, 1987, when the McDermotts acquired title to the real
property in question, and therefore the IRS's lien, as perfected by its No-
tice of Tax Lien filed on September 9, 1987, would prime Zions's lien.
23. Id. The escrow agreement provided in relevant part:
The respective priorities of the parties to the cash proceeds shall be identical to the
priorities of the respective liens of the parties as they existed against the real prop-
erty as of September 23, 1987, after Bruce J. McDermott successfully bid and




25. The interpleader action was originally brought by the McDermotts in state court, but
the United States removed to federal court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1) (1988). Mc-
Dermott, 945 F.2d at 1477 n.3.
26. Id at 1478.
27. The three-judge panel consisted of Judge Tacha, Judge Seth, and Howard C. Brat-
ton, Senior District Judge of the United States District Court for the District of New Mexico,
sitting by designation. Id at 1477.
28. See id at 1480.
29. McDermott, 945 F.2d at 1480.
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The Tenth Circuit rejected the position of the IRS, holding that a
judgment lien creditor having a choate lien on all of a person's real prop-
erty will take priority over a later-perfected federal tax lien, even when the
IRS and the judgment creditor are claiming an interest in after-acquired
property.
3 0
In support of its decision, the Tenth Circuit relied primarily on United
States v. Vermont.5 1 In Vermont, the State of Vermont and the United States
held almost identical general tax liens, arising upon assessment, upon all
the taxpayer's real and personal property.3 2 Vermont's lien arose approxi-
mately three and one-half months prior to the federal tax lien, and related
to all of the taxpayer's property rather than specifically identified portions
of it. Subsequently, Vermont attempted to reach certain portions of that
property-a bank account-it had not yet taken steps to attach.3 3 The
United States argued that a state-created lien had to attach to specific prop-
erty in order for it to take priority; that is, the requirement that the prop-
erty subject to the lien is not "established" unless there is specific property
to which the lien attaches. 3 4 The Supreme Court held that, even though
both liens were general in nature, both were equally perfected as to all the
taxpayer's property and were choate at the time the liens arose. 35 There-
fore, when both governments attempted to satisfy their liens with the same
property, Vermont's lien took priority, being the lien that arose first.3 6
The Tenth Circuit concluded that Zions's lien was no less "perfected"
than Vermont's in United States v. Vermont
Zions' lien was not contingent, it was docketed, specific in
amount, and fully enforceable against any real property owned
by the McDermotts in Salt Lake County during the pendency of
the lien. We agree with the cases cited by Zions in interpreting
Vermont to apply to property acquired by the debtor after perfec-
tion of the lien as well as to property owned by the debtor at the
time the lien was perfected.
37
The Tenth Circuit concluded that "Congress has made clear in sec-
tion 6323(a) . . . that judgment lien creditors who perfect their liens
before the filing of a federal tax lien have priority,"3 8 even where the prop-
erty as to which the competing liens are asserted is after-acquired
property.
30. Id. at 1482.
31. 377 U.S. 351 (1964).
32. Id. at 352.
33. Id. at 352-53.
34. Id. at 356-57.
35. Id. at 358-59.
36. Vermont, 377 U.S. at 359.
37. McDermott, 945 F.2d at 1481. See Wisconsin v. Bar Coat Blacktop, Inc., 640 F. Supp.
407 (W.D. Wis. 1986); McAllen State Bank v. Saenz, 561 F. Supp. 636 (S.D. Tex. 1982);
United States v. Fleming, 474 F. Supp. 904 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); see also WILLIAM T. PLUMB, JR.,
FEDERAL TAx LIENS 134-35 (3d ed. 1972) (asserting that "[iun light of [the Vermont] standard,
the typical general judgment lien on 'all' the debtor's real property seems safe from later tax
liens, at least if the lien is perfected against other third parties acquiring liens") (citations
omitted).
38. McDermott, 945 F.2d at 1481.
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D. The Supreme Court's Opinion
In a 6-3 opinion, the Supreme Court reversed the Tenth Circuit
Court of Appeals.3 9 The majority and dissent both recognized that the
matter presented a very close question.
Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia reiterated the New Britain
three-part test by noting that "our cases deem a competing state lien to be
in existence for 'first in time' purposes only when it has been 'perfected'
in the sense that 'the identity of the lienor, the property subject to the lien, and
the amount of the lien are established.' "40 Justice Scalia equated "estab-
lished" with "perfected," asserting the question was "whether the Bank's
judgement lien was perfected in this sense before the United States filed
its tax lien on September 9, 1987. If so, that is the end of the matter; the
Bank's lien prevails."
4 1
Justice Scalia then addressed the court of appeals' application of the
Vermont holding to the case at issue. Distinguishing Vermont on its facts,
Justice Scalia pointed out that Vermont did not involve after-acquired prop-
erty. 42 The bank account in question had in fact been owned by the tax-
payer at the time the competing liens arose. In Vermont, the IRS had
simply argued, unsuccessfully, that a state lien is not perfected for these
purposes if it attaches to al of the taxpayer's property rather than to spe-
cifically identified portions of it. "We did not consider, and the facts as
recited did not implicate, the quite different argument made by the
United States in the present case: that a lien in after-acquired property is not
'perfected' as to property yet to be acquired."4 3
The issue in McDermott thus centered on the meaning of the term
"perfected" in this context; that is, whether Zions's lien had been "per-
fected" for these purposes with respect to the subject property, where the
property had not yet been acquired by the McDermotts at the time the
judgment lien arose but was subsequently acquired after the IRS had filed
its Notice of Lien.
Justice Scalia chose to interpret the term "perfected" by equating it
with "attachment," and concluded that Zions's judgment lien was not per-
fected for priority purposes until it actually attached to the subject prop-
erty.44 This was determined not to occur until September 23, 1987, when
the property was acquired by the McDermotts. "Since that occurred after
filing of the federal tax lien, the state lien was not first in time."
45
Justice Scalia concluded, on the other hand, there is no requirement
in the Internal Revenue Code that the priority of federal tax liens likewise
must be evaluated from the time of actual attachment.46 To the contrary,
39. United States v. McDermott, 113 S. Ct. 1526 (1993).
40. Id. at 1528 (quoting United States v. New Britain, 347 U.S. 81, 84 (1954)).
41. Id.
42. Id. at 1528-29.
43. Id. at 1529 (emphasis added).
44. McDermott, 113 S. Ct. at 1529 (1993).




the statute states simply that the IRS's lien is not valid as against a judg-
ment lien creditor until notice of the federal lien is filed.4 7 Filing of the
notice, and not attachment, is all the statute requires when measuring the
priority of the federal tax lien. Therefore, "while we would hardly pro-
claim the statutory meaning we have discerned in this opinion to be
'clear,' it is evident enough for the purpose at hand. The federal tax lien
must be given priority."
48
Writing in dissent, Justice Thomas (joined by justice Stevens and Jus-
tice O'Connor) acknowledged that the issue was a close one, and that "our
precedents do not provide the clearest answer to the question of after-
acquired property."49 Justice Thomas, however, characterized the factual
distinction drawn by the majority between the present case and Vermont as
"wooden" 50 and the product of a "parsimonious reading"5 1 of Vermont.
The dissent contended that "the Government's 'specificity' claim rejected
in Vermont is analytically indistinguishable from the 'attachment' argument
the Court accepts today."52 Justice Thomas viewed the majority's require-
ment that a judgment lien must attach to property before it can be suffi-
ciently certain for priority purposes as a "rigid criteria"53 not supported by
prior decisions, and would have preferred to apply a "more flexible cho-
ateness principle" 54 so as to protect state-created judgment liens. The dis-
sent would have held, as did the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, that the
bank's lien had already acquired sufficient substance and had become so
perfected with respect to the after-acquired property as to defeat the later-
filed federal tax lien. According to the dissent, the result reached by the
majority subjects a choate judgment lien in after-acquired property to a
"secret lien" in favor of the federal government.55
E. Summary
Seven of the thirteen judges who weighed in on the McDermott case
would have agreed-as the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals had held-
that Zions'sjudgment lien trumped the IRS's later-filed tax lien, even as to
after-acquired property. The decision of the Supreme Court, however, es-
tablishes the priority of filed federal tax liens over state-created judgment
liens in after-acquired property. While the filing of a Notice of Tax Lien
will not operate to prime ajudgment lien otherwise previously established
against property in which the taxpayer already has an interest, such a filing
will prevail over the judgment lien with respect to property in which the
taxpayer subsequently acquires an interest.
47. I.RC. § 6323(a) (Supp. IV 1992).
48. McDermott, 113 S. Ct. at 1531.
49. Id. at 1534 (ScaliaJ., dissenting).
50. Id. at 1532.
51. Id. at 1534.
52. Id. at 1532-33.
53. McDermott, 113 S. Ct. at 1531.
54. Id. at 1534.
55. Id. at 1534.
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1I. BANK ENTITLED TO AMORTIZATION DEDUCTIONS FOR COST OF CORE
DEPOSIT INTANGIBLES OF ACQUIRED BANKs: CoLop.4Do
NATIOA'AL BAARE&!, 1,Nc. V. COMzrSSIO ArEyi
6
A. Background
Section 167 of the Internal Revenue Code authorizes taxpayers to
claim a deduction for depreciation representing "a reasonable allowance
for the exhaustion, wear and tear (including a reasonable allowance for
obsolescence)" of property used in a trade or business or held for the
production of income. 57 Applicable Treasury Regulations extend this de-
duction to the amortization of intangibles, providing that "[i]f an intangi-
ble asset is known from experience or other factors to be of use in the
business ... for only a limited period, the length of which can be esti-
mated with reasonable accuracy, such an intangible asset may be the sub-
ject of a depreciation allowance."5 8 However, "[n]o deduction for
depreciation is allowable with respect to goodwill."59
The issue of whether amortization deductions can be claimed with
respect to a particular intangible asset generally arises in the context of a
purchase by one taxpayer of the going-concern business of another tax-
payer. In determining whether a particular intangible asset arising from
such a purchase may be subject to amortization deductions, the courts
generally apply a two-part test. First, the asset must have an ascertainable
value independent of goodwill. 60 That is, the taxpayer must show that the
asset is not simply a component part of or otherwise inseparable from
goodwill. Second, the asset must have a limited useful life, "the duration
of which can be ascertained with reasonable accuracy." 6 1
Neither the courts nor the Internal Revenue Code have fashioned a
definitive definition of "goodwill." The term has been employed to refer
generally to "the expectancy of continued patronage, for whatever rea-
son,"62 or put differently, the expectation that "the old customers will re-
sort to the old place." 63 As a tax accounting matter, the consideration
given by the acquiring taxpayer in an asset purchase transaction is re-
quired to be allocated among various classes of the acquired assets under
the so-called "residual method," and goodwill is generally the last class of
assets to which consideration is allocable, after allocations are made to
certain tangible and intangible assets.
6 4
56. 984 F.2d 383 (10th Cir. 1993).
57. I.R.C. § 167(a) (1988).
58. Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-3 (as amended in 1960).
59. Id.
60. Newark Morning Ledger Co. v. United States, 945 F.2d 555, 562 (3d Cir. 1991) (quot-
ing Houston Chronicle Publishing Co. v. United States, 481 F.2d 1240, 1250 (5th Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1129 (1974)), reu'd and remanded on other grounds, 113 S. Ct. 1670 (1993).
61. Id. (quoting Houston Chronicle, 481 F.2d at 1250).
62. Boe v. Commissioner, 307 F.2d 339, 343 (9th Cir. 1962).
63. Commissioner v. Killian, 314 F.2d 852, 855 (5th Cir. 1963) (quoting Nelson Weaver
Realty Co. v. Commissioner, 307 F.2d 897, 901 (5th Cir. 1962)).
64. See I.R.C. § 1060 (West Supp. 1993); Treas. Reg. § 1.1060-IT(d) (1988); see also
I.R.C. § 338(b)(5) (1988); Treas. Reg. § 1.338(b)-2T (as amended in 1986).
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The courts have not necessarily been consistent in determining when
intangible assets are to be treated as inseparable from goodwill. In Hous-
ton Chronicle Publishing Co. v. United States,65 the Houston Chronicle Pub-
lishing Company bought the assets of the Houston Press for $4.5 million
when the latter went out of business. Among the assets acquired were
subscription lists the Chronicle intended to use to increase its own circula-
tion.66 Based upon its estimate that forty percent of the Press subscribers
would subscribe to the Chronicle, and that the average cost of obtaining a
new subscriber was $2.00, the Chronicle allocated $71,200 to subscription
lists. 67 The Chronicle then amortized them over a five year period. 68 The
IRS challenged the amortization deductions, asserting that the lists were
inseparable from goodwill and therefore inherently nondepreciable.
Finding the subscription lists to be intangible capital assets that could be
depreciated, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held for the Chronicle.
69
In Newark Morning Ledger Co. v. United States,70 the Third Circuit took a
more expansive view of goodwill and found certain intangible assets insep-
arable from goodwill. In that case, the taxpayer acquired certain newspa-
pers owned by Booth Newspapers, Inc., and allocated $67.8 million of the
purchase price to "paid subscribers" of those newspapers. 7 1 The figure
was an estimate of the future revenues anticipated by the taxpayer to be
derived from existing subscribers to Booth newspapers, who the taxpayer
expected to continue to subscribe after the acquisition. 72 The govern-
ment contended, as it had in Houston Chronicle, that "paid subscribers" rep-
resented an asset indistinguishable from goodwill. 73 The Third Circuit
agreed.7 4 In a 5-4 decision, the United States Supreme Court reversed the
Third Circuit, holding the taxpayer had met its burden of proving that
"paid subscribers" was an intangible asset with an ascertainable value and a
limited useful life.
7 5
The issue in Colorado National Bankshares, Inc. v. Commissioner76 in-
volved a taxpayer's attempt to amortize an allocable portion of the acquisi-
tion costs it incurred in purchasing the assets of various banks.
Specifically, the taxpayer had claimed amortization deductions for the
65. 481 F.2d 1240 (5th Cir. 1973).
66. Id. at 1243.
67. Id. at 1243-44.
68. Id. at 1244.
69. Id. at 1251, 1266.
70. 945 F.2d 555 (3d Cir. 1991), rev'd, 113 S. Ct. 1670 (1993).
71. Id. at 556.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 556-57.
74. Id. at 568. The Third Circuit's basic position was that if goodwill is defined as the
.expectancy that old customers will resort to the old place," then "paid subscribers" is the
essence of goodwill. Id.
75. Newark Morning Ledger Co. v. United States, 113 S.Ct. 1670, 1683 (1993). See David
G. Jaeger, Supreme Court Decides Newark Morning Ledger Co., 1 TAXES 406 (1993); Mark Wer-
tlieb, et al., The Amortization of Purchased Intangible Assets, 24 TAX ADviSER 583 (1993). The
Supreme Court noted that the burden of proof faced by taxpayers attempting to make the
required showing with respect to most intangibles is "substantial" and "often will prove too
great to bear." Id. at 1681.
76. 984 F.2d 383 (10th Cir. 1993).
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portion of the purchase price allocable to so-called "core deposits" held by
the acquired banks. The Tax Court has in the past held that core deposits
are not, as a matter of law, necessarily an inseparable part of goodwill and
may be amortized if the taxpayer can otherwise satisfy the two-part test
described above. 77 The IRS has never accepted the view that core deposits
are separable from goodwill, and in Colorado National Bankshares, again at-
tempted to find a sympathetic judicial ear for its position that any value
attributable to such deposits may not be amortized.
B. Facts
In 1981 and 1982, the taxpayer, Colorado National Bankshares, Inc.,
purchased seven banks located on the front range in Colorado. Among
the assets acquired were the "core deposits" of the banks, defined by the
taxpayer as deposit liabilities on which no or low interest rates are paid.78
These included funds on deposit from the following types of accounts: (1)
interest-free checking accounts; (2) interest-paying checking accounts,
known as "NOW accounts"; and (3) savings accounts. 79 Core deposits are
highly valued by banks, as they are relatively low cost, reasonably stable,
and relatively insensitive to interest rate changes.8 0 The profitability of a
bank is largely dependant upon its ability to attract such deposits. As a
regulatory matter, and in furtherance of generally accepted accounting
principles, such core deposits are required to be recorded as assets sepa-
rate and apart from goodwill.8 '
Prior to acquiring the assets of the seven banks, the taxpayer had con-
ducted detailed and thorough studies estimating the value of the bank's
assets. The value of the core deposits and their expected lives were esti-
mated as part of this process.8 2 The taxpayer intended to reinvest the core
deposit funds, thereby deriving an income stream from the spread be-
tween the low interest rates paid on the core deposits and the higher rates
at which they would be reinvested.8 3 Based upon a report prepared by
certified public accountants,8 4 the taxpayer characterized the present
value of this projected income stream as an asset, and claimed an amorti-
zation deduction on its 1982, 1983, and 1984 tax returns related to this
asset. The taxpayer amortized the core deposits over useful lives ranging
from three to ten years, depending upon the nature of the accounts con-
77. See IT & S of Iowa, Inc., v. Commissioner, 97 T.C. 496 (1991); Citizens & Southern
Corp. v. Commissioner, 91 T.C. 463 (1988), aff'd, 900 F.2d 266 (lth Cir. 1990).
78. Colorado Nat'l Bankshares, 984 F.2d at 384.
79. Id.
80. Colorado Nat'l Bankshares, Inc., v. Commissioner, 60 T.C.M. (CCH) 771, 772
(1990).
81. Colorado Nat'l Bankshares, 984 F.2d at 385.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. 60 T.C.M. (CCH) at 775. The methodology-statistical and otherwise-used by the
taxpayer's accountants and advisors in determining the value and useful lives of the core
deposits is described at length in the opinion of the Tax Court. Id. at 775-87. The Tax
Court's opinion is instructive in enabling the reader to appreciate the scope and detail of the
well-prepared analysis used by the taxpayer to carry its burden of proof.
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stituting the core deposits and the identity of the acquired bank to which
they related.
The IRS disallowed the claimed deductions on the ground that the
core deposit intangibles were an inseparable part of the goodwill of the
acquired banks. The Tax Court held for the taxpayer.
8 5
C. The Tenth Circuit's Opinion
Noting that the "[c]ategorization of core deposit intangibles is admit-
tedly a close question,"8 6 the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals8 7 sided with
the taxpayer and affirmed the Tax Court.88
The court of appeals was greatly influenced by the fact that the tax-
payer "presented the Tax Court with substantial evidence, and the Tax
Court found, that the core deposit intangibles were separate and distinct
from goodwill, and had both an ascertainable value independent of good-
will and a limited useful life."8 9 The Tenth Circuit determined that the
intangibles were separate from goodwill by relying on various factors, in-
cluding the necessity of the taxpayer is expending substantial additional
time, effort, and expense to produce income from the deposits and the
fact that the deposits could have been transferred apart from any goodwill
of the selling banks.90
In addressing the question of whether the deposits had both an ascer-
tainable value independent of goodwill and a limited useful life, the court
of appeals noted that the taxpayer had not claimed the amortization de-
ductions until after consulting with "certified public accountants conver-
sant in the field," who estimated the value and useful life of the core
deposits. 9 1 The court of appeals noted that these estimates need only be
.a reasonable approximation of value for purposes of depreciation-abso-
lute certainty is not required."92 The court found the estimates "to be
neither arbitrary nor unrealistic," 9 3 and concluded that the "taxpayer has
sustained its burden of demonstrating value and a limited useful life for
the core deposit intangibles."
94
D. Summary
The opinion of the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals in Colorado Na-
tional Bankshares is illustrative of the court's willingness to give credence to
a taxpayer's determination that a particular intangible asset may be amor-
tized. As to the specific issue raised in the case, however, the import of the
85. Colorado Nat'l Bankshares, 60 T.C.M. (CCH) at 771.
86. Colorado Nat'l Bankshares, 984 F.2d at 387.
87. The three-judge panel consisted of Chief Judge McKay, Judge McWilliams, and
Judge Kelly. Id. at 384.
88. Id. at 387.
89. Id. at 385.
90. Id. at 387.
91. Colorado Nat'l Bankshares, 984 F.2d at 385.
92. Id. at 386.
93. Id. at 385.
94. Id. at 386.
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decision is mitigated by the enactment of I.R.C. § 197 as part of the Reve-
nue Reconciliation Act of 1993. 95 Under the Act, effective for acquisitions
after August 10, 1993, so-called "section 197 intangibles" are required to
be amortized on a straight-line basis over a period of 15 years.9 6 A "section
197 intangible" is defined to include, inter alia, goodwill, 97 going-concern
value, 98 workforce in place, information base, know-how, customer-based
intangibles, supplier-based intangibles, licenses, permits, or other rights
granted by a governmental unit or agency, covenants not to complete, and
franchises, trademarks, and tradenames.9 9 As relevant to the issue in Colo-
rado National Bankshares, the term "customer-based intangibles" is specifi-
cally defined to include the deposit base and any similar asset of a
financial institution.1 00 According to the House Committee Report, "simi-
lar assets" include items such as checking accounts, savings accounts, and
escrow accounts.10 1 Core deposit intangibles such as those identified by
the taxpayer in Colorado National Bankshares will, under these new rules, be
required to be amortized ratably over 15 years, and not over the much
shorter period used by the taxpayer in that case.
III. THE TENTH CIRCUIT EXPLORES APPLICATION OF 100% PENALTY
OF I.R.C. § 6672: DENBO V. UNIrFD STATS 1 0 2 AND
MUCK V UNITED STA TE
"1 0 3
A. Background
Employers are required under the Internal Revenue Code to pay over
to the IRS a variety of taxes imposed in respect of their employees, gener-
ally referred to as "employment taxes" 10 4 and "withholding taxes." 10 5
Some of these taxes are deducted and withheld from the payroll checks of
95. Title XIII, Chapter 1, of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L.
No. 103-66, 107 Stat. 416 (to be codified in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
96. I.R.C. § 197(a) (West Supp. 1993). Generally speaking, this new rule applies only to
assets acquired by the taxpayer from an unrelated third party, and not to self-created in-
tangibles. Id. § 197(c) (2).
97. Id. § 197(d)(1)(A). The House Committee Report defines goodwill as "the value of
a trade or business that is attributable to the expectancy of continued customer patronage,
whether due to the name of a trade or business, the reputation of a trade or business, or any
other factor." H.R. REP. No. 111, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 762 (1993), reprinted in 1993
U.S.C.C.A.N. 378, 993.
98. I.R.C. § 197(d)(1)(A) (West Supp. 1993). Going concern value is defined by the
House Committee Report as "the additional element of value of a trade or business that
attaches to property by reason of its existence as an integral part of a going concern. Going
concern value includes the value that is attributable to the ability of a trade or business to
continue to function and generate income without interruption notwithstanding a change in
ownership." H.R. REP. No. 111, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 762 (1993), reprinted in 1993
U.S.C.C.A.N. 378, 993.
99. I.R.C. § 197(d)(1)(C)-(F) (West Supp. 1993).
100. I.R.C. § 197(d) (2) (B) (West Supp. 1993).
101. H.R. REP. No. 111, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 763 (1993), reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N.
378, 994.
102. 988 F.2d 1029 (10th Cir. 1993).
103. 3 F.3d 1378 (10th Cir. 1993).
104. See I.R.C. §§ 3101-3128 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
105. See I.R.C. § 3402 (1988 & Supp. V 1992).
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the employees, and others consist of a "matching portion" that is imposed
on the employer.
As part of the Federal Insurance Contributions Act (FICA),' 0 6 a tax is
imposed on employees and employers consisting of two parts: old-age, sur-
vivor, and disability insurance (OASDI) 10 7 and Medicare hospital insur-
ance (HI).' 0 8 For wages paid in 1994 to covered employees, the HI tax
rate is 1.45% of the employee's wages.109 The employer is required to
withhold the HI tax from the wages of each employee as a payroll deduc-
tion and periodically remit the same over to the IRS. 110 In addition, the
employer is required to "match" the employee's HI contribution by paying
over to the IRS an additional 1.45% of the employee's wages.' The
OASDI tax rate is 6.2%,112 and in 1994 is imposed on the first $60,600 of
the employee's wages. The OASDI tax is likewise withheld from the em-
ployee's wages through payroll deductions, and is also matched by the
employer. 113
Moreover, as part of the Federal Unemployment Tax Act (FUTA),114
a tax is imposed, on employers only, equal in 1994 to 6% of the wages of
each employee,' 15 subject to certain credits depending on the level of con-
tributions the employer is required to make into the state unemployment
fund under the state's unemployment compensation law. 16
The foregoing taxes are generally referred to as "employment taxes."
In addition to being responsible for withholding and paying over the em-
ployee's portion of employment taxes, employers are also obligated under
the Internal Revenue Code to withhold federal income taxes from the em-
ployee's wages in each payroll period based upon income tax withholding
tables published by the IRS. 117 The amounts withheld from an employ-
ees' paycheck-including the employee's portion of employment taxes-
are sometimes referred to as "withholding taxes."
Employment taxes generally fall into one of two categories, "trust
fund" taxes and "non-trust fund" taxes. Amounts withheld by an employer
from an employee's wages, such as the employee's withheld income taxes
and the employee's share of social security taxes, are considered to be
held by the employer in trust for the government pending their payment
over to the Internal Revenue Service." 8 Such taxes are generally referred
to as the trust fund portion of employment taxes. 1 9 The employer's
106. I.R.C. §§ 3101-3128 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
107. I.R.C. §§ 3101(a), 3111(a) (1988).
108. I.R.C. §§ 3101(b), 3111(b) (1988).
109. Id.
110. I.R.C. § 3102(a) (1988).
111. I.R.C. § 3111(b) (1988).
112. I.R.C. § 3101(a) (1988).
113. I.R.C. § 3102(a) (1988).
114. I.R.C. §§ 3301-3311 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
115. I.R.C. § 3301 (1988).
116. I.R.C. § 3302 (1988 & Supp, IV 1992).
117. I.R.C. § 3402 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
118. I.R.C. § 7501(a) (1988).
119. Slodov v. United States, 436 U.S. 238, 242-43 (1978).
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matching share of social security taxes, as well as federal unemployment
taxes, constitute the non-trust fund portion.
When a corporation fails to pay its trust fund taxes, the United States
Treasury suffers the loss, because the employees from whose wages the
amounts were withheld nevertheless are credited in full for the withheld
amounts even though they are not paid over to the government. This is
especially true where the employer goes out of business. 120 To remedy
this situation, I.R.C. § 6672121 provides that any person required to col-
lect, truthfully account for, and pay over any tax-such as the trust fund
portion of employment taxes-and who willfully fails to do so, is liable to
the government for the full amount of the taxes not collected, accounted
for, or paid over. The § 6672 penalty, also known as the "100% pen-
alty," 12 2 is frequently asserted by the Service when withheld trust fund
taxes are left unpaid by a corporation.'
23
The persons required to collect, truthfully account for, and pay over
the subject taxes are referred to as "responsible persons."1 24 Generally
speaking, the IRS will look to the officers, directors, and shareholders of
the employer, plus others with check-signing authority, in attempting to
affix "responsible person" status for purposes of imposing the 100% pen-
alty. Due to the conjunctive nature in which the elements of liability are
set out in I.R.C. § 6672, a person is not liable for the 100% penalty unless
(1) he was a "responsible person" with respect to the unpaid taxes, and (2)
he acted willfully in failing to see that the taxes were paid. 125
Liability for the 100% penalty is joint and several. 126 The IRS may
impose the penalty, in full, on as many responsible persons as can be iden-
tified with respect to a particular trust fund tax liability. 12 7
120. If the employer goes out of business, the government suffers the loss of the non-trust
fund taxes as well, which are unlikely ever to be recovered from the employer and cannot be
asserted as part of the 100% penalty. "Once the corporation is out of business, the United
States can kiss goodbye any non-trust fund taxes owed it but not paid." United States v.
Schroeder, 900 F.2d 1144, 1146 n.1 (7th Cir. 1990).
121. I.R.C. § 6672 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
122. Although these exactions are frequently termed a penalty, such description "does
not alter their essential character as taxes." United States v. Sotelo, 436 U.S. 268, 275 (1978).
123. It has been held that the pendency of a corporate bankruptcy does not prevent the
Service from pursuing the principals of the corporate debtor to collect the 100% penalty, as
the latter is a "separate and distinct" obligation. United States v. Huckabee Auto Co., 783
F.2d 1546, 1548 (11th Cir. 1986). However, the courts are in disagreement as to whether the
Bankruptcy Court has jurisdiction to determine the § 6672 liability of the principals of a
corporate debtor when they themselves are not "debtors" in the bankruptcy. Compare In re
Brandt-Airflex Corp., 843 F.2d 90 (2d Cir. 1988) (no) with Quattrone Accountants, Inc., v.
I.R.S., 895 F.2d 921 (3d Cir. 1990) (yes). It is settled, however, that the Bankruptcy Court
does have the authority to order the government to apply tax payments made by a chapter 11
corporate debtor, first, to the corporation's trust fund tax liability, then to the non-trust fund
liability. United States v. Energy Resources Co., 495 U.S. 545 (1990).
124. McCray v. United States, 910 F.2d 1289, 1290 (5th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S.
921 (1991). SeeJoseph S. Merrill, IRS HAS BROAD POWER TO FIND PAYROLL TAX REsPONSIBIL-
flY, 20 TAX'N FOR LAwYEas 76 (1991).
125. Howard v. United States, 711 F.2d 729, 733-36 (5th Cir. 1983).
126. See McCray, 910 F.2d at 1290; Brown v. United States, 591 F.2d 1136, 1142-43 (5th
Cir. 1979).
127. It is the policy of the IRS to collect the 100% penalty in full from each responsible
person it can identify as to a particular withholding tax delinquency. IRM [57(16) (0)] 723 (1-
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Two cases decided in 1993, Denbo v. United States128 and Muck v. United
States,129 presented the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals with the opportu-
nity to explore the -factors employed by the courts in determining liability
for the 100% penalty.
B. Facts
1. Denbo v. United States
John Denbo was the secretary-treasurer of Louisiane Restaurants, Inc.,
an Oklahoma corporation in which he was a fifty percent shareholder.
The other fifty percent of the stock of the corporation was held by Robert
Allred, the president of the company. °3 0 Denbo served as a director of the
corporation and as its secretary-treasurer. Allred conducted the day-to day
affairs of the company, and signed all checks (including payroll checks)
written on the corporation's bank account.1 3 ' While Denbo also had
check signing authority, he did not actually sign any company checks dur-
ing the period in question.
132
The corporation experienced financial difficulties from its inception.
Denbo was substantially involved in efforts to keep the company afloat,
obtaining various loans which he personally guaranteed and which were
secured by pledges of his personal assets.' 33 Beginning in September
1986, Denbo became aware that the company was not paying its payroll
taxes. Subsequently, in November 1987, Denbo attended a meeting with
IRS personnel to discuss a payment plan for bringing the unpaid taxes
current.13 4 However, Denbo never personally saw to it that the company
paid the taxes, relying instead on Allred's assurances that they were being
paid.'3 5 Sometime in 1989, Denbo bought all but ten percent of the re-
maining stock in the company from Allred, and the two parted ways.
13 6
In May 1990, the IRS assessed Denbo over $107,000 in the form of the
100% penalty.' 3 7 After paying a portion of the assessment,' 3 8 Denbo
14-84). This can result in the IRS collecting the unpaid taxes many times over, although the
IRS may suspend collection activities against other responsible persons if it has collected in
full from one or more of them. IRM 5638.3 (6-3-91). The practice of the IRS is to hold the
funds collected from multiple responsible persons until after the statute of limitations for
refund claims has passed as to each of them, and then rebate to the responsible persons any
funds collected from them in excess of the trust fund taxes (plus penalties and interest)
actually owed. Id.
128. 988 F.2d 1029 (10th Cir. 1993).
129. 3 F.3d 1378 (10th Cir. 1993).





135. Denbo, 988 F.2d at 1031.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Withholding taxes are divisible. Flora v. United States, 362 U.S. 145, 171 n.37, 175
n.38 (1960). Therefore, taxpayers may initiate refund proceedings by paying only the unpaid
taxes for one employee for one quarter (usually stipulated by the IRS to equal $100), and
then filing a claim for refund. The government will then counterclaim for the balance of the
assessment. See I.R.C. § 6672(b)(1) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
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filed suit for refund, and the government counterclaimed for the remain-
der of the assessment.13 9 Denbo's case was tried to a jury, which found
Denbo liable as a responsible person who willfully failed to pay over the
subject taxes. 140 Denbo appealed to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals.
2. Muck v. United States
Ronald Muck was the president and sole shareholder of Graystone
Castle, Ltd., a Colorado corporation that owned and operated a hotel in
Thornton, Colorado. 141 The corporation failed to pay over employee
withholding taxes for the last quarter of 1988 and the first two quarters of
1989. In response to a notice of intent to levy from the IRS, Muck paid a
portion of the claimed taxes and sued for refund, seeking to establish that
he was not the "responsible person" liable for the 100% penalty as to these
taxes. 142 The government counterclaimed, asserting the 100% penalty
against Muck for all unpaid withholding taxes for the three quarters in
question. 143 In an unreported decision, the district court granted the gov-
ernment's motion for summary judgment and entered judgment against
Muck in the amount of approximately $95,000.144 Muck appealed to the
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals.
C. The Tenth Circuit's Opinions
1. Denbo v. United States
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals 145 affirmed Denbo's
liability for the 100% penalty.
14 6
The court of appeals first addressed the "responsible person" element
of I.R.C. § 6672. Denbo contended that Allred, not Denbo, had exclusive
authority over the financial affairs of the corporation, including the hiring
and firing of all employees, the signing of all corporate checks, including
payroll checks, and the review and signing of payroll tax returns. Denbo
claimed that this absolved him of any responsibility for the 100% pen-
alty.14 7 The court acknowledged that Allred may in fact have exercised
greater control over the affairs of the corporation than Denbo, but did not
see this possibility as dispositive of whether Denbo also had status as a
responsible person. The court noted that the responsible person "gener-
139. Denbo, 988 F.2d at 1031.
140. Id. at 1032.




145. The three-judge panel consisted ofJudges Anderson, Barrett, and Tacha. Denbo, 988
F.2d at 1030.
146. Id. at 1031. Ajury verdict will not be overturned unless the appellate court finds that
no reasonable jury could have reached such a verdict based on the evidence presented. E.g.,
Acrey v. American Sheep Indus. Ass'n, 981 F.2d 1569, 1575 (10th Cir. 1992).
147. Denbo, 988 F.2d at 1032.
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ally is, but need not be, a managing officer or employee, and there may be
more than one responsible person."
148
The court stated that the indicia of responsible person status may in-
clude "the holding of corporate office, control over financial affairs, the
authority to disburse corporate funds, stock ownership, and the ability to
hire and fire employees,"1 49 and that the person had" 'significant, though
not necessarily exclusive, authority in the general management and fiscal
decisionmaking of the corporation.' "15o The court found ample evidence
in the record to support a determination that Denbo was a responsible
person in the instant case. The "undisputed facts" as summarized above,
"along with Denbo's 50% stock ownership and status as an officer and
director of the corporation, demonstrate that he possessed 'significant au-
thority in the.., fiscal decisionmaking of the corporation.' "1151 In light of
Denbo's position and involvement with the company, the court decided
that Denbo had the power to direct the company to pay the taxes in ques-
tion. Noting that " '[a]uthority to pay [in the context of section 6672]
means effective power to pay,' "152 the court concluded that Denbo's "finan-
cial involvement in the corporation, along with his check-signing author-
ity, gave him the effective power to see to it that the taxes were paid."
1 53
There was therefore sufficient evidence before the jury from which it
could find that Denbo was a responsible person as to the corporation's
unpaid payroll taxes.
The court then turned to the second element of liability under I.R.C.
§ 6672, which requires that the responsible person must have acted will-
fully in failing to collect, account for, and pay over the payroll taxes.
1 54
The court noted that "[w] illfulness, in the context of section 6672, means a
'voluntary, conscious and intentional decision to prefer other creditors
over the Government.' "155 While mere negligence will not satisfy this ele-
ment, reckless conduct will: it is established that" ' [t] he willfulness require-
ment is .. .met if the responsible officer shows a reckless disregard of a
known or obvious risk that trust funds may not be remitted to the govern-
ment.' 156 Denbo conceded he was aware the trust fund taxes in question
were not being paid, but contended his failure to follow up on his knowl-
edge and investigate the status of the taxes in more detail amounted
merely to negligent conduct insufficient to establish willfulness.1 57 The
court disagreed, noting that "[a] responsible person's failure to investigate
148. Denbo, 988 F.2d at 1032 (citing Hartman v. United States, 538 F.2d 1336, 1340 (8th
Cir. 1976)).
149. Id. (citing Thibodeau v. United States, 828 F.2d 1499, 1503 (11th Cir. 1987) and
Gebhart v. United States, 818 F.2d 469, 472 (6th Cir. 1987)).
150. Id. (quoting Kizzier v. United States, 598 F.2d 1128, 1132 (8th Cir. 1979)).
151. Id. (quoting Kizzier, 598 F.2d at 1132).
152. Id. at 1033 (quoting Howard v. United States, 711 F.2d 729, 734 (5th Cir. 1983)).
153. Denbo, 988 F.2d at 1033.
154. Id.
155. Id. (quoting Burden v. United States, 486 F.2d 302, 304 (10th Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
416 U.S. 904 (1974)).
156. Id. (quoting Smith v. United States, 894 F.2d 1549, 1554 n.5 (11 th Cir. 1990)) (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted).
157. Id.
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or to correct mismanagement after being notified that withholding taxes
have not been paid satisfies the § 6672 willfulness requirement."1 5 8
Although Denbo was aware of the problem by September 1986, and subse-
quently met with the IRS concerning the matter, he continued to rely on
Allred's assurances that the taxes were being taken care of and that the
matter had been "worked out" with the IRS.159 The court concluded that
Denbo "cannot escape lability by claiming that he relied on the assurances
of others."16° Because Denbo "was aware that the corporation had de-
faulted in its payment of employment taxes but nevertheless disregarded a
known risk by relying on the assurances of Allred instead of doing more,"
Denbo was held to have willfully failed to pay over the taxes.16 1
Denbo also argued that the rule laid down in Slodov v. United States1 62
absolved him from liability. 1 63 In Slodov, the Supreme Court held that if
new management assumes control of a corporation when a trust fund de-
linquency already exists but the withheld taxes have already been dissi-
pated by the prior management, the new management's use of after-
acquired funds to pay other creditors in preference to the government
does not make it liable for the 100% penalty. The Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals easily distinguished Slodov from the circumstances in Denbo. In
Slodov, the members of new management were found to be "without per-
sonal fault," and where there was no nexus between the after-acquired
funds and the trust fund delinquency, imposition of the 100% penalty on
the new management was found to be improper. 164 Here, Denbo simply
was not "new management." He "was responsible both at the time taxes
went unpaid and at the time the government sought to collect them under
§ 6672."165 Therefore, the 100% penalty was appropriately imposed.' 66
2. Muck v. United States
167
First addressing the question of whether Muck was a responsible per-
son, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals considered Muck's primary con-
158. Denbo, 988 F.2d at 1033 (citing Mazo v. United States, 591 F.2d 1151, 1154 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 842 (1979)).
159. Id.
160. Id. at 1033-34.
161. Id. at 1034.
162. 436 U.S. 238 (1978).
163. Denbo had sought a broad jury instruction that suggested he could not be liable for
the 100% penalty. The proposed jury instruction stated that the 100% penalty could not be
imposed for a failure to cause funds to be applied against the deficiency when the corpora-
tion obtained such funds after the unpaid taxes arose. See Denbo, 988 F.2d at 1035 n.4.
164. Slodon, 436 U.S. at 254.
165. Denbo, 988 F.2d at 1035.
166. Id. Denbo also argued as error the failure of the trial judge to issue jury instructions
which would have incorporated the Supreme Court's definition of "willfulness" in Cheek v.
United States, 498 U.S. 192, 201 (1991). In Cheek, the Supreme Court held that a good-faith
misunderstanding of the tax laws need not be "objectively reasonable" in order to negate
willfulness in criminal tax prosecutions. Id. at 203. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals
agreed with the trial judge, however, that this standard had no application to a provision of
the Internal Revenue Code imposing civil liability. Denbo, 988 F.2d at 1034.
167. 3 F.3d 1378 (10th Cir. 1993). The three-judge panel consisted of ChiefJudge McKay
and Judges Barrett and Seth. Id. at 1380.
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tention that the day-to-day operations of Graystone Castle were performed
by a business manager who made all decisions concerning the disburse-
ment of funds and the selection of which creditors were to be paid.
168
Noting that a similar argument had been made in the recently-decided
Denbo case, the court reiterated the rule that the existence of" 'significant,
though not necessarily exclusive, authority in the general management
and fiscal decisionmaking of the corporation' "169 is determinative, "irre-
spective of whether that authority is actually exercised." 170 The court
pointed out that Muck was the sole shareholder of the company, had the
authority as president of the corporation to manage the business and af-
fairs of the company, had the power to borrow money on behalf of the
corporation, had check signing authority, and had the power to suspend
the company's business if payroll taxes were not being paid.17 1 "These
indicia of authority are sufficient to establish [Muck's] status as a responsi-
ble party for § 6672 purposes."
172
Muck also argued that, even if he was a responsible person with re-
spect to the unpaid payroll taxes, he nevertheless did not act willfully in
failing to pay them over to the IRS, and therefore, the second element of
liability under I.R.C. § 6672 was not present. 173 In evaluating this ele-
ment, the court noted that "[w]illfulness is present whenever a responsible
person 'acts or fails to act consciously and voluntarily and with knowledge
or intent that as a result of his action or inaction trust funds belonging to
the government will not be paid over but will be used for other pur-
poses.' "174 In making his argument that he did not act willfully, Muck,
like Denbo, invoked Slodov. 175 Muck contended that he did not learn of
the unpaid taxes until the latter part of the second quarter of 1989.
Therefore, as to the deficiencies for the last quarter of 1988 and the first
quarter of 1989, he did not act willfully in failing to pay them over.1 76 Just
as in Denbo, the court had little trouble disposing of this argument.'
77
Muck's "decision here to pay creditors of Graystone after he learned that
withholding taxes were owing to the government was conscious and
intentional."
178
In his final argument, Muck asserted that the corporation had en-
tered into a payment agreement with the IRS to bring the unpaid with-
168. Id. at 1380-81.
169. Id. at 1381 (quoting Denbo, 988 F.2d at 1032 (quoting Kizzier, 598 F.2d at 1132)).
170. Id.
171. Id
172. Muck, 3 F.3d at 1381.
173. Id.
174. Id. (quoting Olsen v. United States, 952 F.2d 236, 240 (8th Cir. 1991)).
175. See id.
176. Id.
177. Muck, 3 F.3d at 1381-82. The court noted that" 'Slodor does not relieve a "responsi-
ble person" of the responsibility to reduce accrued withholding tax liability with funds ac-
quired after the funds actually withheld have been dissipated so long as the person
responsible has been so throughout the period the withholding tax liability accrued and
thereafter.' " Id. at 1381 (quoting Garsky v. United States, 600 F.2d 86, 91 (7th Cir. 1979)
(alteration in original)).
178. id. at 1382.
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holding taxes current. 179 Given the presence of the payment agreement,
Muck argued that his failure to cause the taxes to be paid could not be
willful. 18 0 The court of appeals rejected this argument, pointing out that
"[t]he liability of the corporation is separate and distinct from [Muck's]
liability to collect and pay over withholding taxes.... Only if [Muck] can
establish that the agreement specifically provided that he, individually,
would be held harmless can the presence of the agreement relieve him of
personal liability."1 8'
Muck's liability for the 100% penalty was therefore affirmed.
18 2
D. Summary
As recognized by the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, the operation of
the 100% penalty can be "harsh." 183 The court's recent opinions in Denbo
and Muck illustrate the severe consequences that can befall responsible
persons if trust fund taxes are not paid over to the IRS by the employer to
which the responsible person is linked. The responsible person or per-
sons will be called upon to make good the loss to the government. The
fact that an individual may play a comparatively passive role in the opera-
tions of the employer is not helpful in shielding that individual from liabil-
ity for the 100% penalty, even if others are more active in those operations
and may bear a higher degree of blame for the nonpayment of the taxes.
Personal liability for the 100% penalty is joint and several, and if the indi-
vidual otherwise stands in the position of a responsible person with respect
to the unpaid taxes, he will be liable to the same extent as any other per-
son also determined to be a responsible person as to those taxes.
The Tenth Circuit's opinions in Denbo and Muck also underscore the
limited scope of the Supreme Court's decision in Slodov. Simply because a
responsible person does not learn of unpaid trust fund taxes until after
the taxes were due and payable does not aid the individual in a claim that
he could not have acted willfully in failing to see that they were paid. So
long as corporate funds are still on hand and have not been dissipated,
and so long as the individual in question stood in the position of a respon-
sible person at the time the taxes went unpaid, the individual's failure to
discharge the accrued trust fund liability with corporate funds will be seen
as willful, and not falling under the special rule in Slodov.
179. Id.
180. Id. It is unclear from the reported opinion whether the IRS entered its assessment
against Muck while the corporation was still timely performing the payment agreement or
only after the corporation had defaulted under the agreement.
181. Id. (citing Olsen, 952 F.2d at 241 and Monday v. United States, 421 F.2d 1210, 1218
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 821 (1970)).
182. Id.
183. Denbo v. United States, 988 F.2d 1029, 1035 (1993).
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IV. BAD DEBT DEDUCTION PERMITTED FOR LOANs MADE TO
CORPORATION BY SHAREHOLDER-EMPLOYEE:
L_7wv v UNrro STA Is 
8 4
A. Background
Under I.R.C. § 166(a), a creditor holding a debt that becomes wholly
worthless may claim a bad debt deduction for the full amount of the debt
in the taxable year in which it became worthless. 185 Such a bad debt de-
duction is allowed to the taxpayer as an ordinary loss, which is deductible
in full against the taxpayer's gross income.
1 86
On the other hand, I.R.C. § 166(d) provides an exception to this rule,
stating that so-called "nonbusiness debts" do not give rise to ordinary loss
deductions if they become worthless. 187 Rather, the loss suffered by the
holder of the debt is characterized as a short-term capital loss. 18 8 As such,
it may only be offset and "netted" against other capital gains, 189 and to the
extent a net capital loss results, may only be deducted by an individual
taxpayer to a limit of $3,000,190 subject to certain carry-backs and carry-
forwards.
19 1
I.R.C. § 166 therefore relegates bad debt losses in respect to "nonbusi-
ness" debts to short-term capital loss treatment, while all other types of
debts, known as "business" bad debts, will qualify for deduction as ordinary
losses if they become worthless. For purposes of the bad debt deduction,
therefore, the characterization of the debt as either a nonbusiness debt or
a business debt is of great importance to the taxpayer suffering the loss.
The Internal Revenue Code defines a nonbusiness debt in the nega-
tive, by defining it as any debt other than one created or acquired in con-
nection with a trade or business of the taxpayer, or other than a debt the
loss from the worthlessness of which is incurred in the taxpayer's trade or
business. 192 All debts which cannot be characterized as nonbusiness debts
will be treated as business debts.
Generally, when a debt becomes worthless and the taxpayer claims a
deduction in connection with the loss, the taxpayer will seek to character-
ize the debt as a business debt so as to achieve ordinary loss treatment.
The IRS may challenge the characterization by asserting that the debt was
in fact a nonbusiness debt giving rise only to a short-term capital loss upon
its worthlessness.19 3 Applicable Treasury Regulations provide that in or-
der to meet this challenge and deduct the loss as a business bad debt, the
184. 983 F.2d 997 (10th Cir. 1993).
185. I.R.C. § 166(a)(1) (1988).
186. See I.R.C. § 166(a),(d) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
187. I.R.C. § 166(d) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
188. See id.
189. See I.R.C. § 1222 (1988 & Supp. V 1992) for the rules by which long-term capital
gains and losses and short-term capital gains and losses are netted against one another to
produce a net capital gain or loss.
190. I.R.C. § 1211(b) (1988).
191. See I.R.C. § 1212 (1988).
192. I.R.C. § 166(d)(2) (1988).
193. See Treas. Reg. § 1.166-5(a) (2) (1980).
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taxpayer must show that the bad debt loss was "proximate" to the conduct
of a trade or business by the taxpayer, or that the debt was created in the
course of a trade or business of the taxpayer.
194
In United States v. Generes,19 5 the Supreme Court held that where the
taxpayer is both an employee and a shareholder of a corporation which is
indebted to the taxpayer, the taxpayer's "dominant motivation" underly-
ing the transaction at issue determines whether the transaction is proxi-
mately related to the taxpayer's trade or business.' 9 6 If the dominant
motivation in the transaction that created the debt was business-related,
the debt will be characterized as a business debt.19 7 Such a motivation will
be seen to be present where the debt was created in the context of a trans-
action by which the taxpayer sought to protect his status as an employee of
the corporation.' 98 On the other hand, where the dominant motivation
was investment-related, the debt will be seen to be a nonbusiness debt.
Therefore, where the dominant motivation of the taxpayer was to protect
his investment, rather than his status as an employee, the debt will be char-
acterized as a nonbusiness debt. This determination is necessarily a ques-
tion of fact, generally reserved to the trial court.' 99
In Kelson v. United States,2 00 the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals held
that "objective facts surrounding loans, rather than the [shareholder-em-
ployee's] subjective intent, control"20 1 in determining the shareholder-em-
ployee's dominant motivation in entering into a transaction giving rise to
a loan to his corporation. The Tenth Circuit therefore employs an objec-
tive test, rather than a subjective test, in classifying debts as business or
nonbusiness debts.
Regarding transactions between a corporation and a taxpayer who is
one of the corporation's shareholder-employees, the bad debt deduction
is not limited to circumstances involving direct loans from the taxpayer to
the corporation. The deduction may also arise out of personal guarantees
made by the taxpayer in connection with corporate debts. 20 2 A taxpayer
providing a personal guarantee of corporate debts will have a right of sub-
rogation against or contribution from the corporation in respect to
amounts the guarantor is required to pay if called upon to perform under
the guarantee. If the taxpayer is unable to recover from the corporation
or the right to do so is or becomes worthless, the taxpayer may seek to
194. Treas. Reg. § 1.166-5(b) (1980).
195. 405 U.S. 93 (1972).
196. Id. at 103.
197. IM.
198. That is, the taxpayer will be seen as having entered into the transaction to protect
the trade or business of being an employee.
199. Under the "clearly erroneous" standard of review under the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, the trial court's findings of fact "shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous,
and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of
the witnesses." FED. R. Cirv. P. 52(a). Thus, the trial court's findings of fact will be upheld
unless the appellate court is firmly convinced a mistake has been made. E.g., Las Vegas Ice &
Cold Storage Co. v. Far West Bank, 893 F.2d 1182, 1185 (10th Cir. 1990).
200. 503 F.2d 1291 (10th Cir. 1974).
201. Id. at 1293.
202. See Generes, 405 U.S. at 98.
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claim a bad debt deduction for the amount paid by the taxpayer under the
guarantee. 20 3 The classification of such a deduction as arising from a busi-
ness debt or a nonbusiness debt will depend upon the dominant motiva-
tion of the taxpayer in providing the guarantee. 20 4 If that motivation was
to protect the status of the guarantor as an employee, as opposed to pro-
tecting his investment in the corporation, the bad debt will be character-




Harry Litwin was a petroleum engineer who had started a number of
successful businesses. In 1980, he founded Advanced Fuel Systems
("AFS"), which was engaged in providing and installing alternative fuel
systems, such as compressed gas and propane, for motor vehicles.20 6 Lit-
win initially was the principal shareholder of AFS, and throughout its life
also served as its chief executive officer and chairman of the board.
The company did not prosper, and in 1983 it filed for Chapter 11
reorganization and then later converted to a Chapter 7 liquidation bank-
ruptcy.2 0 7 During AFS's brief life, Litwin had loaned the company various
sums, and had personally guaranteed certain third party loans to the com-
pany. In connection with AFS's demise, Litwin incurred several monetary
losses, including (1) $150,000 he personally loaned to the company, (2)
$350,000 paid to a third party lender to discharge his obligations as a per-
sonal guarantor of a company loan, and (3) $118,674.08 representing cer-
tain other amounts asserted by Litwin to have been advanced by him on
behalf of AFS.20 8 Litwin claimed all of the foregoing losses as bad debt
deductions-that is, as ordinary losses-under I.R.C. § 166(a).209 The
IRS disallowed certain of the deductions in full and recharacterized the
remaining deductions as short term capital losses on the theory that they
were nonbusiness losses, rather than business losses.
2 10
After paying the deficiency and filing a partially successful refund
claim,21 1 Litwin initiated a refund suit in district court. Following a
bench trial, the district court found for Litwin on his entire claim, holding
that the losses were incurred in transactions entered into with a business
203. See id. at 99.
204. Id. at 103.
205. See id. at 104.
206. Litwin v. United States, 983 F.2d 997, 998 (10th Cir. 1993).
207. Id. at 998-99.
208. Id. at 999. The third figure included $75,097 in legal fees incurred in a suit to col-
lect against other guarantors of AFS debts, $33,577.08 in legal fees incurred in defending a
counterclaim asserted by an AFS distributor, and a $10,000 advance made by Litwin to an-
other distributor. Litwin's bad debt deduction in respect to these amounts was based upon
his alleged right to collect these amounts back from AFS. Id.
209. Litwin also asserted that certain of these expenditures were alternatively deductible
under I.R.C. § 162 as ordinary and necessary business expenses. In any event, this issue was
not reached by the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals.
210. Id.
211. Litwin was successful in having a portion of his deduction for legal fees, which had
been disallowed almost in its entirely, reinstated. Litwin, 983 F.2d at 999.
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purpose, and therefore gave rise to ordinary loss deductions as business
bad debts under I.R.C. § 166(a).2 12 The government appealed to the
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals.
C. The Tenth Circuit's Opinion
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals2 13 affirmed the deci-
sion of the district court.2 14 After recognizing that the Tenth Circuit ap-
plies an objective, rather than subjective, test in determining a taxpayer's
dominant motivation in entering into the transaction giving rise to the
bad debt,2 1 5 the court noted that "courts appear to . . . focus[ ] on three
objective factors in determining a [shareholder-employee's] dominant mo-
tivation: (1) the size of taxpayer's investment, (2) the size of taxpayer's
after-tax salary, and (3) other sources of gross income available to the tax-
payer."2 16 Where a taxpayer's investment in the subject corporation is rel-
atively large, his salary is relatively small, and he has other sources of
relatively large income, the courts are more likely to find that the domi-
nant motivation of the taxpayer in extending the debt was nonbusiness,
that is, designed to protect the taxpayer's investment in the corporation
rather than his status as an employee of the corporation.
21 7
Based on these criteria, the Tenth Circuit had no problem in af-
firming the district court's determination that Litwin's dominant motiva-
tion in loaning money to AFS, guaranteeing AFS's debts, and advancing
money on its behalf was to protect his status as an employee, rather than
his investment in the company.2 18 First, the testimony and other evidence
indicated that Litwin started the company and sought to keep it afloat in
order to remain active as a salaried employee and be useful to society,
goals best achieved by someone of Litwin's advanced age by running his
own company.21 9 Second, Litwin was in fact very active in AFS's day-to-day
affairs, and his relationship with the company was not that of a passive
investor. 220 Third, although Litwin had deferred his salary for three years,
the evidence indicated that he intended to begin drawing it once the com-
pany's cash flow problems had eased. Furthermore, his efforts that gave
rise to the losses in question were aimed at resolving those problems.
22 1
In any event, even if Litwin's deferral of his salary could be taken as an
indication that his motives were investment-oriented rather than employ-
ment-oriented, this one fact is not dispositive. Fourth, Litwin's loans, guar-
antees, and advances were three times the value of his investment in the
212. Id.
213. The three judge panel consisted ofJudges Baldock and Seth, andJudge Clarence A.
Brimmer, District Judge, United States District Court for the District of Wyoming, sitting by
designation. Id at 998.
214. I at 1001.
215. IM. at 1000 (citing Kelson v. United States, 503 F.2d 1291, 1293 (10th Cir. 1974)).
216. Litwin, 983 F.2d at 999.
217. See id.






company, indicating his motives to be other that the protection of that
investment.
222
In light of the foregoing evidence, the court of appeals upheld the
trial court's conclusion 22 3 that "Litwin's dominant motivation ... was busi-
ness, not investment, related." 224 Therefore, Litwin's various losses could
be claimed by him as ordinary bad debt deductions under I.R.C. § 166(a).
D. Summary
The opinion of the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals in Litwin did not
attempt a definitive exposition of the law concerning the deductibility of
bad debts by shareholder-employees. The court did make it clear, how-
ever, that it will apply the three-factor objective test recited above in deter-
mining the motivation of such a taxpayer in entering into the transaction
that gave rise to the claimed loss. If the dominant motivation was to pro-
tect the shareholder-employee's trade or business as an employee, the tax-
payer will be allowed to deduct the loss as a bad debt under I.R.C.
§ 166(a). On the other hand, if the dominant motivation of the taxpayer,
as determined in accordance with the objective factors, was to protect his
investment in the corporation, the bad debt loss can be claimed, if at all,
only as a short-term capital loss.
V. SUMMARY OF OTHER CASES DECIDED BY THE TENTH CIRCUIT IN 1993
A. Some Decisions of Note
In Anthony v. United States,225 the taxpayers had been issued a statutory
Notice of Deficiency for the tax years 1978, 1979, and 1980, in which the
IRS asserted a deficiency in the amount of $32,735.64.226 Following the
filing of a Tax Court petition by the taxpayers, the matter was settled for
$15,367.00.227 The "decision document" evidencing the settlement con-
tained a "finality clause," stating that the settlement agreement constituted
"a final civil settlement of taxes due for the years in question."2 28 The
document was signed by the taxpayers and an authorized IRS representa-
tive and entered as a final decision of the Tax Court in early 1987.229 Sub-
sequently, the IRS instituted activities to collect not only the $15,367.00
figure stipulated, but also interest on the deficiency in an additional
amount in excess of $19,000.00.230 The taxpayers paid the total sought by
the IRS, then filed suit for refund in the district court.23 1 The district
court held that the term "taxes" as used in the decision document in-
222. Litwin, 983 F.2d at 1001.
223. In other words, the trial court's finding of fact was not "clearly erroneous." See supra
note 199.
224. Litwin, 983 F.2d at 1001.
225. 987 F.2d 670 (10th Cir. 1993).




230. Anthony, 987 F.2d at 672.
231. Anthony v. United States, 765 F. Supp. 656, 656 (D. Colo. 1991).
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cluded interest, and entered summaryjudgment for the taxpayers. 232 The
court ordered the IRS not only to refund the interest, but also to pay the
taxpayers' reasonable attorney's fees and costs.
2 33
In affirming the district court in Anthony, the Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals noted that the settlement document did not satisfy the statutory
requirements for either a compromise, as asserted by the taxpayers, or a
closing agreement, as contended by the IRS. 2 3 4 The former would have
constituted final payment, including interest, while the latter would not.
The document was therefore seen to be open to interpretation. Finding
the agreement nevertheless to be a valid stipulation by the parties,23 5 the
court proceeded to construe the document in the taxpayers' favor. 23 6 The
court noted that the "finality clause" quoted above was added to the docu-
ment because of the taxpayers' concern that the settlement be final and
that it resolve all civil aspects of the case. 23 7 The evidence reflected that
the IRS attorney handling the matter had so assured the taxpayers.
238
Conversely, despite the IRS's claim that it rarely waives interest and that
the IRS most likely so informed the taxpayers that interest was a separate
element of the settlement, the IRS could produce no specific evidence
that the taxpayers were so informed. The court further noted the rule of
construction that resolves an ambiguity against the draftsman, and applied
it against the IRS. 23 9 In this regard, the court noted that "where the gov-
ernment enters into an agreement with its citizens, it has a duty to act with
at least a 'minimum standard of decency, honor, and reliability.' "240 The
court concluded that this standard was not satisfied in the present case.
Finding no material issue of fact, the court upheld the district court's en-
try of summary judgment.24 1 In addition, the appellate court upheld the
imposition of litigation costs against the IRS, 2 4 2 although it remanded the
question of whether the costs imposed by the district court were in fact
reasonable.
2 43
232. 1& at 657.
233. d.
234. Anthony, 987 F.2d at 673. See I.R.C. §§ 7121, 7122 (1988).
235. Anthony, 987 F.2d at 673. Informal agreements to settle tax disputes are generally
held to be invalid, and it is usually necessary for the agreement to satisfy the formal statutory
guidelines for compromises, closing agreements, and the like. Uinta Livestock Corp. v.
United States, 355 F.2d 761, 765 (10th Cir. 1966).
236. See Anthony, 987 F.2d at 674.
237. Id. at 673.
238. Id.
239. Id. at 674.
240. Id. at 674 (quoting Heckler v. Community Health Serv., 467 U.S. 51, 61 (1984)).
241. Id.
242. Anthony, 987 F2d at 674. Such costs may be recovered by the taxpayer against the
government if the taxpayer is able to prove that (1) all administrative remedies have been
exhausted, (2) the requested award constitutes "reasonable litigation costs," and (3) the tax-
payer is the "prevailing party" in the matter. I.RC. § 7430 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
243. Id. at 675. Attorney's fees awarded under I.RC. § 7430 cannot exceed $75 per hour,
adjusted for cost of living increases and "special factors." I.R.C. § 7430(c) (1) (B) (iii) (1988).
The record before the Court of Appeals was insufficient for it to make a determination on
this question. Anthony, 987 F.2d at 675.
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In Angle v. Commissioner,2 44 the taxpayer timely filed his 1982 federal
income tax return on which he reported a $453,638 tax preference item in
the form of excess intangible drilling costs. 245 In 1984, the taxpayer filed
a timely refund claim in which he reduced the amount of the tax prefer-
ence item.2 46 In 1986, he again filed a refund claim pertaining to his 1982
taxes, this time based on a net operating loss from 1984, and again recal-
culated his excess intangible drilling costs. 247 Finally, in 1989, he filed a
third refund claim, asserting that in fact he had no excess intangible drill-
ing costs at all in 1982 because his excess percentage depletion 248 should
have been added back to his income from oil and gas operations in deter-
mining excess intangible drilling costs. 249 The taxpayer had executed var-
ious consents to extend the statute of limitations applicable to his 1982
return, to December 31, 1987. This extended the period in which he
could claim a refund based on his 1982 return to June 30, 1988.250 The
IRS disallowed the 1989 refund claim on the basis that it was not timely.
25 1
The taxpayer brought suit for refund in the district court. The district
court dismissed the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
25 2
On appeal to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, the district court's
decision was affirmed.2 53 The appellate court noted that a refund suit
may not be brought until a timely refund claim has first been filed with the
IRS.2 5 4 The refund claim must fully set forth the grounds upon which the
refund is said to be owed, and in any subsequent suit for refund, the tax-
payer may not rely upon any grounds not reasonably encompassed by
those set forth in the timely filed refund claim. 2 55 The taxpayer in Angle
argued that his original and 1986 refund claims put the IRS on notice,
generally, that the calculation of the correct amount of excess intangible
drilling costs was at issue. The taxpayer argued that his 1989 refund claim
merely posited a new method for its recalculation and did not advance a
244. 996 F.2d 252 (10th Cir. 1993).
245. Id. at 253; see I.R.C. § 57(a)(2)(11) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
246. Angle, 996 F.2d at 253.
247. Id.
248. See I.R.C. § 57(a)(1),(8) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
249. Angle, 996 F.2d at 253.
250. Id. at 253 n.2; see I.R.C. § 6511(c)(1) (1988).
251. Angle, 996 F.2d at 253.
252. Id.
253. Id. at 256.
254. Id. at 253. I.R.C. § 7422(a) (1988) provides:
No suit or proceeding shall be maintained in any court for the recovery of any
internal revenue tax alleged to have been erroneously or illegally assessed or col-
lected . . . until a claim for refund or credit has been duly filed with the [IRS],
according to ... the regulations of the Secretary [of the Treasury] established in
pursuance thereof.
255. See Herrington v. United States, 416 F.2d 1029, 1032 (10th Cir. 1969). The applica-
ble Treasury Regulation provides:
No refund or credit will be allowed after the expiration of the statutory period of
limitation applicable to the filing of a claim therefor except upon one or more of
the grounds set forth in a claim filed before the expiration of such period. The
claim must set forth in detail each ground upon which a credit or refund is claimed
and facts sufficient to apprise the Commissioner of the exact basis thereof.
Treas. Reg. § 301.6402-2(b)(1) (as amended in 1977).
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new theory of recovery. 256 The Court of Appeals rejected this argument,
noting that the 1989 claim "involve[d] theories different from any that tax-
payer put forward in the timely filed claims."2 57 Thus, the claim was
barred by the applicable statute of limitations.
2 58
The importance of properly formalizing tax arrangements was high-
lighted in White v. Commissioner.2 5 9 The taxpayers in White had caused a
family partnership to be formed in Utah and funded it with personal and
business assets of the family.260 The family also purported to transfer a
tract of undeveloped land to the partnership. Other than the execution of
an unrecorded and undelivered deed which did not contain a description
of the property, however, no action was taken to transfer the tract to the
partnership, and it remained titled in the names of individual family mem-
bers. 26 1 In 1982, construction of a house began on the tract. The partner-
ship's cash flow provided the bulk of the funds needed for construction,
which extended over several years. When financing was necessary from
time to time, the family members-not the partnership-borrowed the
funds individually and executed deeds of trust to the lender in their indi-
vidual capacities, giving the lender a security interest in the tract.2 62 The
IRS issued a Notice of Deficiency, asserting that the moneys applied by the
partnership toward construction of the house constituted deemed cash
distributions from the partnership to the partners; and to the extent the
deemed distributions were in excess of the partners' bases in their respec-
tive partnership interests, were taxable as capital gains.
263
The Tax Court sided with the IRS, 26 4 and the Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals affirmed.265 The taxpayers correctly pointed out that under Utah
law, property acquired with partnership funds is presumed to be partner-
ship property;2 66 and that partnership property can be held in the name
of a general partner.2 67 The Court of Appeals determined, however, that
in fact the partnership simply failed to acquire any property.268 The part-
ners had owned the property in their individual capacities prior to the
formation of the partnership, and therefore could not be viewed as having
held the property on behalf of a yet-unformed partnership. 269 The subse-
quent improvement to the tract, in the form of the house, merely became
part of the realty. As such, the home was simply an enhancement to the
property interest held by the partners, not a separate property interest
256. Angle, 996 F.2d at 254.
257. Id.
258. Id. at 255.
259. 991 F.2d 657 (10th Cir. 1993).
260. Id. at 659.
261. Id.
262. Id.
263. Id. at 660; see I.R.C. § 731 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
264. White v. Commissioner, 62 T.C.M. (CCH) 1181 (1991).
265. White, 991 F.2d at 662.
266. Id. at 660; UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-1-5 (1994).
267. White, 991 F.2d at 660; UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-1-7 (1994).




held by the partnership. 270 The partnership therefore did not acquire any
property interest with partnership funds; it merely improved property held
individually by the partners. Moreover, the evidence-such as the manner
in which financing was obtained and the fact that the deeds of trust were
delivered in the individual names of the partners-reflected that the part-
ners treated the tract as owned by them in their individual capacities and
not by the partnership.2 71 Thus, any amounts expended by the partner-
ship to improve the partners' property constituted deemed cash distribu-
tions to the partners.
272
In Buckmaster v. United States,27 3 the personal representative of the de-
ceased taxpayer's estate had distributed the estate's income in equal
shares to its beneficiaries in each of the two taxable years the estate was
open.2 74 The estate then claimed deductions on the estate's income tax
returns for these distributions under the provision of the Internal Reve-
nue Code that allows a deduction for income either required to be cur-
rently distributed by the estate-such as by the express terms of the will-
or which is otherwise "properly paid" during the tax year to the benefi-
ciaries of the estate. 275 The decedent's will did not require these distribu-
tions to be made. The IRS challenged the deductions on the grounds the
distributions were not "properly paid" by the estate because in neither year
did the personal representative secure an order from the probate court
authorizing the distributions before they were made.2 76 When the estate
was closed in February 1986, however, the state probate court in
Oklahoma had issued an order of final settlement in which it approved all
actions taken by the personal representative. 277 The order was a general
one and did not reference specifically the distributions, though they were
set out in the final accounting filed with the petition for final settle-
ment.2 78 The estate paid the deficiency and filed a refund action in dis-
trict court, which granted the government's motion for summary
judgment.
279
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, siding with
the estate. 280 The court of appeals noted that a post-distribution approval
will render the distribution "properly paid" only if the approval is recog-
nized as valid under the state law governing the estate's administration.
28 1
Finding no reported decision of the Oklahoma courts on point, the court
reviewed decisions emanating from states other than Oklahoma and con-
cluded that "every appellate court that has directly considered the ques-
270. See id.
271. Id.
272. Id. at 661.
273. 984 F.2d 379 (10th Cir. 1993).
274. Id. at 380.
275. Id.; see I.R.C. § 661(a) (2) (1988).




280. Id. at 383.
281. Buckmaster, 984 F.2d at 381.
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tion, including the United States Supreme Court," has treated post-
distribution approvals as valid. 282 The court of appeals concluded that
"the Oklahoma Supreme Court, if presented with the issue, would con-
sider distributions of estate income by an executor or administrator made
without prior probate court approval but subsequently ratified by that
court to be 'properly paid' " within the meaning of the Internal Revenue
Code.
2 83
The taxpayer in Worden v. Commissione28 4 was an insurance agent.
The taxpayer primarily sold casualty and property insurance, but occasion-
ally sold life insurance through Federal Home Life Insurance Com-
pany.2 85 Apparently as a "loss leader" to maintain goodwill with his
clients, and in accordance with written contracts entered into with his cli-
ents, the taxpayer sold the life insurance policies "at cost"; that is, the first
year premium collected from his clients was equal only to the net amount
the taxpayer was obligated to remit to Federal Home Life. 286 Normally,
the taxpayer would have been entitled to collect a larger amount from the
insured: the net premium payable to the insurer and a commission he
would retain for himself.2 87 Instead, the taxpayer collected only the net
first year premium due to Federal Home Life, which was remitted in full to
the insurer. He never collected or paid himself a commission. On the
assumption that the taxpayer was in fact paying himself a commission, Fed-
eral Home Life filed an informational return indicating that the taxpayer
had earned approximately $33,000 in commissions from the sale of its life
insurance. 288 The IRS assessed this amount to the taxpayer on the theory
the taxpayer had "constructively received" the commissions 289 even
though he had never actually received them. 290 The Tax Court upheld the
assessment.
29 1
The taxpayer appealed to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, which
reversed.2 92 The court noted that the taxpayer's contract with Federal
Home Life obligated the taxpayer to remit only the net premium, so there
was no question of the arrangement constituting a deemed payment of the
larger amount to the insurer with a deemed payment back of the commis-
282. Id. at 383.
283. Id.
284. 2 F.3d 359 (10th Cir. 1993).
285. Id. at 360.
286. Id. at 360-61.
287. Id. at 361.
288. See id. at 360-61.
289. Cash basis taxpayers must report items of income in the year they are "actually or
constructively received." Treas. Reg. § 1.451-1 (a) (as amended in 1978). A taxpayer is
deemed to be in constructive receipt of an item of income "in the taxable year during which
it is credited to his account, set apart for him, or otherwise made available so that he may
draw upon it an any time." Treas. Reg. § 1.451-2(a) (as amended in 1979).
290. Worden, 2 F.3d at 361. The IRS also determined the waived commissions could not
be deducted by the taxpayer because the arrangements constituted illegal kickbacks to the
clients, and were therefore nondeductible under I.R.C. § 162(c) (2) (1988). The Tax Court
agreed. Id. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals did not reach this question, having reversed
the Tax Court on the question of constructive receipt. Id.
291. Id.
292. Id. at 362.
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sion. 293 Federal Home Life never paid any commission to the taxpayer,
nor was it obligated to do so.29 4 Likewise, the taxpayer's written contract
with each client specified that the client was only obligated to pay the net
premium, not some higher amount that included a commission. 295 Thus,
the taxpayer was not providing a reduction of premium or a kickback, but
was merely waiving his right to the commission prior to his having earned
it. Under these facts, the court of appeals held that the taxpayer could not
be viewed as having constructively received the commissions and reversed
the determination of the Tax Court.
29 6
B. Enforcement
The taxpayers in Anaya v. Commissioner,2 9 7 a married couple, were
partners in a partnership that kept inadequate financial and tax records
from which it was not possible to determine or verify their taxable in-
comes. The evidence indicated the taxpayers maintained a lavish lifestyle
inconsistent with their claim that their joint income never exceeded
$15,000 in any of the three tax years in question.2 9 8 A criminal investiga-
tion did not yield an indictment, but a civil case against the taxpayers
culminated in the IRS issuing a Notice of Deficiency asserting underre-
ported income in excess of $70,000 and proposing a deficiency plus a civil
fraud penalty equal to fifty percent of the deficiency. 2 99 The taxpayers
filed a petition with the Tax Court, which upheld the IRS's
determination.
3 00
To reconstruct the taxpayers' taxable income and generate the Notice
of Deficiency, the IRS used the "cash expenditure method."30 1 Under this
method, the IRS is entitled to rely on the magnitude of funds expended
from a taxpayers' checking account in determining taxable income, so
long as the IRS can present evidence either that the funds were likely de-
rived from taxable sources, or in fact were derived from taxable sources (in
the latter case, by tracking deposits made to the account). 30 2 On appeal,
the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals found the taxpayers had produced no
credible evidence to overcome the presumption of correctness in the IRS's
293. See id.
294. Id.
295. Worden, 2 F.3d at 362.
296. Id.
297. 983 F.2d 186 (10th Cir. 1993).
298. Id. at 187. Among other indications of unreported income, the taxpayers' mortgage
payments exceeded their claimed monthly income by more than $200. In addition, the tax-
payers took numerous vacations, owned a "Corvette with personalized plates," a satellite dish,
solar energy equipment, and a large swimming pool. Id.
299. Id. at 187-88; see I.R.C. § 6653(b)(1) (Supp. IV 1992). The fifty percent civil fraud
penalty was repealed by the Improved Penalty Administration and Compliance Tax Act, Sub-
title G of Title VII of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 10 1-239,
103 Stat. 388 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.). The current penalty
scheme is set forth in I.R.C. §§ 6662-6664 (Supp. IV 1992). See Dennis R. Schmidt & Thomas
C. Pearson, Civil Penalty Provisions Revampted by IMPACT, 68 TAXEs 187 (1990); Richard C.
Stark, IMPACT Makes Fundamental Changes in Civil Penalties, 72J. TAX'N 132 (1990).
300. Anaya v. Commissioner, 61 T.C.M. (CCH) 2040, 2041 (1991).
301. Anaya, 983 F.2d at 188.
302. Id.
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assessment30 3 and therefore affirmed the determination of the Tax




The issue in In Re Graham30 6 arose when the Bankruptcy Court for the
District of Colorado imposed two awards of attorney's fees against the gov-
ernment in light of the "extraordinarily inept and confusing" manner in
which it had handled various aspects of the proceedings in the Bankruptcy
Court.3 0 7 The taxpayers had filed for bankruptcy under Chapter 7 of the
Bankruptcy Code in 1987. Following a "long history of procedural mis-
steps, neglect, and mismanagement" on the part of the government involv-
ing missed pleading deadlines, motions not properly served or filed,
hearings not attended, withheld documents, and files inadvertently de-
stroyed,3 0 8 the Bankruptcy Court assessed approximately $4,000 in attor-
ney's fees against the government.30 9 The government appealed, arguing
that the doctrine of sovereign immunity prevented the imposition of attor-
ney's fees.
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals noted that absent "some explicit
statutory waiver that will support the bankruptcy court's award," 310 the fee
awards could not stand. The court then examined a series of statutory
provisions explicitly waiving sovereign immunity under various circum-
stances, but found each of them inapplicable.3 1' The court therefore re-
versed the attorney's fee awards.
3 12
The issue in In Re Richards3 13 involved the application of the Bank-
ruptcy Code provision that affords seventh priority status to tax claims as-
sessed within 240 days before the filing of a bankruptcy petition.3 1 4 The
debtor had filed a petition in bankruptcy under Chapter 13 of the Bank-
303. The assessment proposed in the Notice of Deficiency is presumed correct, and the
taxpayer bears the burden of proof in showing the assessment to be incorrect. Jones v. Com-
missioner, 903 F.2d 1301, 1303 (10th Cir. 1990).
304. Anaya, 983 F.2d at 188.
305. Id. at 189
306. 981 F.2d 1135 (10th Cir. 1992).
307. Id. at 1137.
308. Id.
309. In re Graham, 106 B.R. 692, 693 (D. Colo. 1989).
310. In re Graham, 981 F.2d at 1139.
311, Id. The court analyzed I.R.C. § 7430(c) (4) (1988), the general provision of the In-
ternal Revenue Code for the award of litigation costs. Id. The court held that section 7430
did not apply, as sanctions can be imposed against government only if its litigation position
was substantially unjustified, and no "position" of the government was implicated here, only
administrative incompetence. Id. The court also looked at 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (1988) (Bank-
ruptcy Court's power to sanction a party for contempt does not include an express waiver of
sovereign immunity that would authorize a monetary sanction), FED. R. CIv. P. 11 (Bank-
ruptcy Court rules determined to be distinguishable), and 11 U.S.C. § 106 (1988) (provisions
that waive sovereign immunity in three categories of cases found inapplicable). Id. at 1140-
41.
312. Id at 1140.
313. 994 F.2d 763 (10th Cir. 1993).
314. See 11 U.S.C. § 507(a) (7) (A) (1988).
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ruptcy Code ninety-six days after the IRS had entered an assessment
against him for certain long overdue taxes.3 15 The IRS filed a proof of
claim listing the claim as seventh priority. 16 As such, the claim was re-
quired to be paid in full. There was no objection to the IRS's proof of
claim, however, 219 days after filing the petition, the debtor voluntarily
dismissed the petition.3 17 Subsequently, fifty-one days after dismissing his
petition and 365 days after the assessment, the debtor filed a second Chap-
ter 13 petition.3 18 The IRS again filed a proof of claim listing its claim as
seventh priority, to which the debtor objected. The Bankruptcy Court
held that the 240-day period was suspended during the pendency of the
first bankruptcy petition, such that the total time elapsed between the as-
sessment and the filing of the second petition was reduced to 147 days,
well within the 240 days provided in the statute.3 19 The district court
affirmed.
3 20
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals noted that the Bank-
ruptcy Code contains no explicit authority for the tolling the 240-day pe-
riod in the case of successive petitions in bankruptcy.3 21 The court of
appeals nevertheless affirmed the order of the Bankruptcy Court, holding
that the Bankruptcy Court's determination to toll the 240-day period was
within the power granted it under the Bankruptcy Code to " 'issue any
order, process, or judgment that is necessary or appropriate to carry out
the provisions' of the Bankruptcy Code and to take 'any action or mak[e]
any determination necessary or appropriate to enforce or implement
court orders or rules, or to prevent an abuse of process.' ",322 According to
the court of appeals, an order suspending the 240-day period in this fash-
ion "fulfills and preserves Congress's intent to afford the government cer-
tain time periods to pursue collection efforts, and at the same time
prevents the debtor from avoiding priority by prolonging the initial bank-
ruptcy proceeding."
3 23
D. Annual Round-up of Tax Protestors
The annual Tenth Circuit case involving the National Commodity
and Barter Association (NCBA) and its "service wing,"32 4 the National
Commodity Exchange (NCE), is Aspinall v. United States.32 5 The plaintiffs
in Aspinall were account holders of the NCE and members of the NCBA.
The NCBA has been consistently characterized by the courts as a tax pro-




319. See id. at 752.
320. Richards, 141 B.R. at 752.
321. Richards, 994 F.2d at 765.
322. Id. (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (1988)).
323. Id.
324. See National Commodity & Barter Ass'n v. United States, 951 F.2d 1172, 1173 (10th
Cir. 1991).
325. 984 F.2d 355 (10th Cir. 1993).
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testor organization,32 6 and cases involving the NCBA, the NCE, and their
members are a frequent feature of the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals
calendar.3 2 7 In 1985, the United States executed a search warrant at the
NCBA/NCE offices and seized a large quantity of precious metals, coins,
and currency in furtherance of a jeopardy assessment made against the
organization for promoting abusive tax shelters.328 The seized commodi-
ties had been held by the NCE against the account balances of various
NCBA members. The NCE, in turn, paid the household and consumer
bills of the account holders, cashed checks for the account holders, and
otherwise acted to obscure the paper trail normally associated with taxpay-
ers' financial dealings, all in the name of the NCE. Having now seen these
commodities seized and their accounts rendered worthless, the plaintiffs
filed an action in the district court, claiming an interest in the seized prop-
erty and asserting that the seizure was improper.3 29
The plaintiffs' action was dismissed, and on appeal, the Tenth Circuit
Court of Appeals affirmed. 330 After rejecting a series of meritless proce-
dural objections relating to motions and hearings not granted to the plain-
tiffs, the court noted that the assets held by NCBA/NCE on behalf of each
account holder were commingled with those held on behalf of all other
account holders, much as a commercial bank commingles the funds of its
depositors. 33 1 Under Colorado law, when money is deposited in a bank
326. The National Commodity and Barter Association describes itself as an "organization
which espouses dissident views regarding the federal reserve and the IRS and advocates the
return to currency backed by gold and/or silver." United States v. National Commodity &
Barter Ass'n, 951 F.2d 1172, 1173 (10th Cir. 1991). The NCBA has been described as an
organization whose members "advocate dissident political views concerning the tax and mon-
etary policy of the United States Government," Kroll v. United States, 573 F. Supp. 982, 984
(N.D. Ind. 1983), in response to what the organization "perceives to be an unconstitutional
and oppressive monetary and taxation system. The leadership of the NCBA advocates and
promotes opposition to federal income taxation laws." United States v. Stelten, 867 F.2d 446,
448 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 828 (1989). The National Commodity Exchange is "oper-
ated by NCBA members as a private or warehouse bank" the government views as a vehicle
designed, among other things, to obscure the paper trail surrounding the financial affairs of
its members. National Commodity &BarterAss'n, 951 F.2d at 1173. In essence, NCE acts as a
clearing house for a wide variety of financial transactions entered into by NCBA members by
carrying out those transactions on the members' behalf, but in the name of NCE. Each
NCBA member on whose behalf a particular transaction was effected would therefore remain
anonymous, insuring "a high degree of privacy for the member." Id. The only record of
these transactions maintained by NCE consisted of the current balance of each NCBA mem-
ber's account at NCE. Id.
327. See, e.g., Aspinall v. United States, 984 F.2d 355 (10th Cir. 1993); Pleasant v. Lovell,
974 F.2d 1272 (10th Cir. 1992); United States v. Parsons, 976 F.2d 452 (10th Cir. 1992);
National Commodity and Barter Ass'n v. United States, 951 F.2d 1172 (10th Cir. 1991); Na-
tional Commodity and Barter Ass'n v. Gibbs, 886 F.2d 1240 (10th Cir. 1989); Grandbouche v.
Clancy, 825 F.2d 1463 (10th Cir. 1989).
328. Aspinal4 984 F.2d at 356.
329. Id. The Internal Revenue Code provides:
If a levy has been made on property.., any person (other than the person against
whom is assessed the tax out of which such levy arose) who claims an interest in or
lien on such property and that such property was wrongfully levied upon may bring
a civil action against the United States. ...
I.R.C. § 7426(a) (1) (1988).
330. Aspinall 984 F.2d at 355.
331. Id. at 358.
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account, title to the money passes to the bank.33 2 The account holder
then becomes merely a creditor of the bank, and the account represents a
chose in action against the bank in the depositor's favor. 333 Such a credi-
tor relationship represents a " 'mere claim of a contractual right to be
paid, unsecured by a lien or other specifically enforceable property inter-
est' " and is insufficient to confer standing under I.R.C. § 7426.
3 3
4
The taxpayer in United States v. Meek335 was a member of the Freeman
Education Association (FEA), a tax protest organization similar in purpose
and operation to the NCBA.33 6 The taxpayer received substantial income
from a trust that owned a majority interest in a Coca-Cola bottling plant.
Acting on the beliefs that led him to membership in the FEA, the taxpayer
did not file federal income tax returns for any year subsequent to 1976. In
1987, the taxpayer was convicted of willfully failing to file federal income
tax returns for 1981, 1982, and 1983.337 The taxpayer was sentenced to
three years in prison. Tenaciously clinging to his beliefs, the taxpayer
while in prison failed to file tax returns for 1987 and 1988, despite contin-
uing to receive income from the trust.338 As a result, the taxpayer was
again tried and convicted for willfully failing to file tax returns as well as
willfully attempting to evade income taxes33 9 for the tax years 1987 and
1988. On appeal of this conviction, the taxpayer argued that the jury in-
structions were erroneous.
3 40
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals disagreed and affirmed the con-
viction.3 4 1 The court of appeals also affirmed the manner in which the
district court applied federal sentencing guidelines in determining the
length of the taxpayer's new prison term.
34 2
332. Id.
333. Id (citing Jefferson Bank & Trust v. United States, 894 F.2d 1241, 1243-44 (10th Cir.
1990)).
334. Aspinall 984 F.2d at 358 (quoting Valley Fin., Inc., v. United States, 629 F.2d 162,
168 (D.C. Cir. 1980)).
335. 998 F.2d 776 (10th Cir. 1993).
336. The FEA is an organization,
designed to provide its members with an alternative to the Federal Reserve System.
The FEA acts essentially as a warehouse bank, retaining funds deposited by its mem-
bers until directed to disburse these funds. At the time the defendant became a
member of the FEA, all transactions were conducted by means of a numbering sys-
tem to protect the privacy of FEA members. At trial, a former trustee of the FEA
testified that the majority of FEA members were individuals who believed that the
income tax laws were either unconstitutional or voluntary and wanted to avoid leav-
ing a paper trail for the IRS.
Meek, 998 F.2d at 778.
337. Id; see I.R.C. § 7203 (Supp. IV 1992).
338. While in prison, the taxpayer was paid $126,266.00 in 1987 and $92,565.10 in 1988.
Meek, 998 F.2d at 778.
339. Id; see I.R.C. § 7201 (1988).
340. Meek, 998 F.2d at 779.
341. Id The taxpayer argued that the jury instructions did not apprise the jury of the
need to find that the defendant must have committed an affirmative act constituting an eva-
sion of taxes. The court of appeals held that the jury instructions, taken as a whole, did in
fact put the jury on notice of the need to make such a determination. Id
342. In determining the length of the taxpayer's sentence, the district court considered
the taxpayer's unreported income for all the years 1984 through 1991, not just the two years
to which the current conviction related. The court of appeals found this to be proper. Id. at
782.
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